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The Honorable John C. Coughenour

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

WASHINGTON STATE REPUBLICAN
PARTY, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

WASHINGTON STATE REPUBLICAN
CENTRAL COMMITTEE, et al.,

Plaintiff Intervenors,

LIBERTARIAN PARTY OF
WASHINGTON STATE, et al.,

Plaintiff Intervenors.

v.

STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al.,

Defendant Intervenors,

WASHINGTON STATE GRANGE, et al.,

Defendant Intervenors.

NO. CV05-0927-JCC

WASHINGTON STATE REPUBLICAN
PARTY'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION
TO STATE AND GRANGE
INTERVENORS' MOTIONS TO
STRIKE SUPPLEMENTAL AND
AMENDED COMPLAINT

NOTE ON MOTION CALENDAR:
FEBRUARY 26, 2010

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I. RELIEF REQUESTED

Plaintiffs Washington State Republican Party and Luke Esser (collectively, “the Party” or “the Republican Party”) respectfully requests that the Court deny the State and Grange intervenors’ motions to strike plaintiffs’ supplemental and amended complaint. The State’s motion merely repeats its earlier arguments to the Party’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint, which this Court rejected when granting the Party’s motion in part. Much of the relief sought by the State and Grange relates to portions of the complaint that are neither amended nor supplemented. The supplemental and amended complaint adds detailed allegations regarding events that occurred since the original complaint was filed and complies both with this Court’s August 20, 2009 order and the obligation to give notice to the defendants of the claims made.

II. ARGUMENT

A. The Court’s August 20, 2009 order does not require the Republican Party to delete portions of its original complaint; instead, it limits what the Party may add to its amended and supplemental complaint.

The State overstates this Court’s August 20, 2009 order. The order does not require the Party to delete portions of its original complaint, but rather limits what the Party may add to the complaint. *See* Order at 20 (“Although not strictly necessary, the Court . . . approves Plaintiffs’ requests to update their pleadings . . . to add any relevant facts that have occurred since the original filings. However, any new factual allegations should be relevant to the ongoing as-applied First Amendment challenge.”). The Party is not required to abandon its ability to appeal this Court’s earlier rulings by eliminating allegations and claims from the complaint. As a result, the Court should not strike the following paragraphs in the amended

1 and supplemental complaint, which remain unchanged from the original complaint: 1, 2, 4,
 2 6¹, 16², 40 – 43³, 48 – 50⁴, 53⁵, 56 – 57⁶, and paragraphs 1 – 5 of the prayer for relief.
 3 Similarly, the following paragraphs are unchanged in substance from the original complaint
 4 and should not be stricken: 12 – 15⁷, 17⁸, 39⁹, 44¹⁰, 61¹¹, and paragraph 6 of the prayer for
 5 relief. In its motion, the State merely recycles arguments it made in response to the Party’s
 6 motion for leave to file a supplemental and amended complaint. *Compare* State Mot. at 5 –
 7 11 *with* State’s Opp’n to Mot. (Dkt. No. 152) at 3-10. Although this Court denied the Party’s
 8 motion as to the state constitutional claims, it rejected the State’s arguments when it granted
 9 the Party’s motion as to the Party’s as-applied challenge. *See* Order at 28.

11 **B. The State’s challenges to the amended and supplemental complaint are meritless**
 12 **under the notice pleading standard.**

13 This Court’s August 20, 2009 order authorizing the filing of the Amended and
 14 Supplemental Complaint did not alter the standard for pleading, or require that the
 15 Republican Party prove the alleged violations of its First Amendment rights in the complaint
 16 itself. Under FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a), allegations in a complaint are to be “short and plain.”
 17 Under the Supreme Court notice pleading standard, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary” for
 18 pleadings to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007).
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21 ¹ Paragraph 6 is identical to paragraph 5 in the original complaint.

22 ² Paragraph 16 is identical to paragraph 20 in the original complaint.

23 ³ Paragraphs 40 – 43 are identical to paragraphs 23 - 26 in the original complaint.

24 ⁴ Paragraphs 48 – 50 are identical to paragraphs 31 - 33 in the original complaint.

25 ⁵ Paragraph 53 is identical to paragraph 34 in the original complaint.

26 ⁶ Paragraphs 56 – 57 are identical to paragraphs 37 - 38 in the original complaint.

⁷ Paragraphs 12 – 15 are substantially the same as paragraphs 16 - 19 in the original complaint.

⁸ Paragraph 17 is substantially the same as paragraph 21 in the original complaint.

⁹ Paragraph 39 is substantially the same as paragraph 22 in the original complaint.

¹⁰ Paragraph 44 is substantially the same as paragraph 27 in the original complaint.

¹¹ Paragraph 61 is substantially the same as paragraph 40 in the original complaint.

1 Motions to strike are disfavored and “should not be granted unless it is clear that the
2 matter to be stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation.”
3 *Colaprico v. Sun Microsystems, Inc.*, 758 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (N.D. Cal. 1991); *see also In*
4 *re UTStarcom, Inc. Secs. Litig.*, 617 F. Supp. 2d 964, 969 (N.D. Cal. 2009). “[A]llegations
5 supplying background or historical material or other matter of an evidentiary nature will not
6 be stricken unless unduly prejudicial to defendant.” *LeDuc v. Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co.*,
7 814 F. Supp. 820, 830 (N.D. Cal. 1992). Therefore, where a complaint’s allegations, “when
8 read with the complaint as a whole, give a full understanding thereof, they need not be
9 stricken.” *Id.* “Under the liberal federal pleading rules,” furthermore, “notice and clarity of
10 claims is all that is required.” *Id.*

11
12 The State asserts that the Party’s claim that I-872 is not being implemented
13 constitutionally should be stricken because the Party has not, in its supplemental and
14 amended complaint, identified the specific ways the primary might be implemented in
15 accordance with the First Amendment. The paragraphs squarely allege confusion resulting
16 from the misappropriation of the Party’s name, nicknames, and abbreviations, and that the
17 candidates bearing the Party name are associated in the mind of the public with the Party.
18 The State attempts to treat these paragraphs in isolation. The detailed relief sought may be
19 found in the prayer for relief, specifically in paragraph 8. Among the possible remedies
20 identified is a disclaimer in immediate proximity to the “preference” language of
21 unauthorized candidates that would inform voters that those candidates are not actually
22 affiliated with the Republican Party; not republishing unauthorized candidates’ use of the
23 Republican Party name in State publications (thereby giving the State’s imprimatur to the
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1 designation, and reinforcing the appearance of association in the public's mind); or
2 alternatively, limiting participation in the primary for candidates who have designated the
3 Republican Party as their preference to persons authorized by the party to participate. The
4 extent to which other specific steps the State might undertake to alleviate confusion would be
5 developed during discovery, and presented at trial.

6
7 **C. The Amended and Supplemental Complaint adequately alleges that the State's
8 ongoing implementation of I-872 violates the First Amendment.**

9 1. Paragraphs 1 – 6.

10 The State argues that paragraphs 1 – 6 “reiterate legal arguments that have already
11 been rejected, and inaccurately imply that I-872 interferes with the Republicans’ selection of
12 nominees for public office,” and misstates the Supreme Court’s decision in *Grange*, claiming
13 that the Court has “rejected the assertion that I-872 interferes with political party
14 nominations.” State Mot. at 5:14-17 (citing *Grange*, 128 S. Ct. at 1192). The Court rejected
15 the assertion that under I-872, the primary election voters select the Party’s nominees, but did
16 not address the issue of interference on an as-applied basis, as a result of voter confusion
17 from the State’s method of implementing the modified blanket primary.

18 Paragraph 3 states, as it has from the beginning of the case, that I-872 will confuse
19 voters. Plaintiffs added language specifically alleging that voter confusion is the result of the
20 implementation of the Initiative. Paragraph 5 again alleges confusion regarding the
21 Republican message resulting from State’s implementation of I-872. The State objects to the
22 allegation that I-872 is unconstitutional in Paragraph 6 because “it is a flat assertion” that I-
23 872 is unconstitutional. State Mot. at 6:19-20. The State does not allege it is misled or that
24 the allegation is unclear. The State’s objection to the allegation is its substance, which is not
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1 a ground to strike it from the complaint. As noted above, the paragraph remains unchanged
2 from the original complaint.

3 2. Paragraphs 12 – 20.

4 Paragraphs 12 – 17 are either identical or substantially the same as paragraphs 16 –
5 21 of the original complaint. The allegations, as amended, are relevant to the State’s
6 implementation of I-872 and the association in the minds of voters between the Republican
7 Party and candidates claiming a “preference for” the Party and resulting voter confusion.
8 The supplemental paragraphs 18 – 20 are relevant to the issues of voter confusion resulting
9 from the State’s implementation of the Initiative and severability, which requires a
10 determination of the voters’ intent when enacting the Initiative. *See Guard v. Jackson*, 83
11 Wn. App. 325, 333, 921 P.2d 544 (1996).
12

13 3. Paragraphs 23 – 27.

14 Paragraphs 23 – 27 contain detailed allegations regarding the State’s implementation
15 of I-872 since its enactment, providing relevant information regarding the effect of I-872 on
16 the plaintiffs. For example, paragraph 23 makes clear that the State’s implementation
17 mandates the conjoining of the Republican name on the ballot with the name of any
18 candidate who wishes to appropriate the name. The ballot used by the State continues to
19 conjoin the Republican Party name on the ballot and in the mind of voters, the press and
20 public with candidates who are not actually affiliated with the Party, nor carry its message.
21 The State’s authorization of this conjoining is directly related to the question to be presented
22 to the Court whether the State’s administration of the primary system results in confusion. If
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1 the State did not permit the conjunction of the Republican Party with all comers, there would
2 be no risk of confusion among voters.

3 4. Paragraphs 29 and 34.

4 In objecting to paragraphs 29 and 34, the State urges the Court to disregard the
5 overall political and public context of elections in Washington, which is relevant to whether
6 voters, in fact, are confused about the relation between the candidates carrying the Party
7 name on the ballot and the Republican Party.
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9 5. Paragraphs 36 – 38.

10 In objecting to paragraphs 36 – 38, the State misapprehends the nature of the
11 allegations. As part of its implementation of I-872, the State has taken the position that party
12 nominations are ineffective under Washington election law, even though the precinct
13 committee officer (“PCO”) statutes tie the election of PCOs to votes received by party
14 candidates. Whether or not the ballot indicates the party nominee, the State may not deprive
15 the Republican Party of the ability to nominate candidates and vest those candidates with the
16 status of being of the GOP. The paragraphs also allege facts that give rise to confusion
17 among voters.
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19 Paragraph 38 specifically addresses the State’s administration of its election laws and
20 is directly relevant to whether there is an increased risk of confusion among voters, because
21 the Republican Party is subjected to unique restrictions on its ability to convey information
22 about its endorsed candidates to its own members. The ability of the Party to speak to its
23 members and make clear which candidate carrying the Party name on a ballot is actually the
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1 Party's nominee is an essential prerequisite to avoiding ballot confusion among voters most
2 loyal to the Party.

3 6. Paragraphs 39 – 40.

4 Paragraph 39 was amended to describe events in 2006, but is otherwise identical to
5 paragraph 22 of the original complaint. Paragraph 40 is identical to paragraph 23 of the
6 original complaint. These paragraphs are relevant to the Party's as-applied challenge to the
7 State's implementation of the Initiative.
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9 7. Paragraphs 41 – 43.

10 Paragraphs 41 – 43 are identical to paragraphs 24 – 26 of the original complaint.
11 Under this Court's August 20, 2009 order, the WSRP is entitled to introduce evidence that as
12 implemented by the State, the primary election under I-872 is indistinguishable in operation
13 from a primary that formally nominates party candidates. These paragraphs are relevant for
14 that purpose.
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16 8. Paragraphs 44 – 46.

17 Paragraph 44 is substantially the same as paragraph 27 in the original complaint.
18 Paragraphs 45 – 46 are similar to paragraphs 28 – 29 of the original complaint, and have
19 additional allegations regarding the State's implementation of the Initiative. These
20 paragraphs are relevant to the Party's as-applied challenge.
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22 7. Paragraphs 48 – 53.

23 Paragraphs 48 – 50 and 53 are identical to paragraphs 31 – 34 of the original
24 complaint. Paragraphs 51 – 52 supplement the original complaint to address the State's
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1 implementation of the Initiative. In its motion, the State cites to a portion of the Supreme
2 Court's decision, but disregards the following language:

3 Of course, it is possible that voters will misinterpret the candidates' party-
4 preference designations as reflecting endorsement by the parties. But these
5 cases involve a facial challenge, and we cannot strike down I-872 on its face
6 based on the mere possibility of voter confusion.

7 *Grange*, 128 S. Ct. at 1193. To the extent that voters are confused, I-872 is an invalid
8 primary as alleged in paragraphs 48 – 53.

9 No court has ruled on the severability of I-872; no court has determined whether the
10 whole should fall if part of it is unconstitutional as applied and whether voters would have
11 adopted its constituent parts piecemeal. This Court's order authorizing the filing of the
12 Amended and Supplemental Complaint did not alter the standard for pleading, or require that
13 the Party prove the alleged violations of its First Amendment rights in the complaint itself.

14 8. Paragraphs 56 – 59.

15 Paragraphs 56 – 57 are identical to paragraphs 37 – 38 of the original complaint. The
16 Republican Party's second cause of action explicitly alleges that the statutes, as applied,
17 compel the Party to be affiliated with unauthorized candidates. The supplemental paragraphs
18 allege confusion and that candidates carrying the party name are associated in the mind of the
19 public with the Republican Party. In *Grange*, this is exactly the sort of result that could
20 invalidate the primary in an as-applied challenge. *See Grange*, 128 S. Ct. at 1195 ("That
21 factual determination must await an as-applied challenge."). The State seeks to preclude
22 fact-finding by the Court on the question.
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1 9. Paragraphs 61 and 63.

2 Paragraph 61 is substantially the same as paragraph 40 in the original complaint.
3 Paragraph 63 supplements the original complaint to address the State's implementation of the
4 Initiative. The equal protection claim relates to the State's implementation of the primary
5 system, including re-adoption of minor party convention rights. This is in accordance with
6 this Court's direction to supplement with later events after initial filing of complaint. The
7 equal protection claim is still subject to appellate review unless it is abandoned by the
8 Republican Party in its pleadings. The Party has no intention of abandoning the claim.
9

10 10. Paragraphs 65 – 67.

11 The State's request to strike paragraphs 65 – 67 renews its assertion that the Supreme
12 Court's narrow ruling that I-872 was not unconstitutional on its face was actually a
13 ratification of the Initiative as applied. The Supreme Court made no such ruling, and if this
14 Court determines that the Initiative is unconstitutional as applied to the Republican Party, the
15 Party will be entitled to injunctive relief. These paragraphs identify the types of steps the
16 State could take to avoid confusion on the ballot and in other election materials produced and
17 distributed by the State that cause confusion among voters regarding the status of candidates'
18 affiliation with the Party.
19

20 11. Prayer for Relief.

21 Paragraphs 1 – 6 of the prayer for relief in the supplemental and amended complaint
22 are either identical to or substantially the same as paragraphs 1 – 6 of the original complaint.
23 The Republican supplemental and amended complaint is modeled on the Democratic Party's
24 supplemental and amended complaint, because that document had been circulated to
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1 opposing counsel and no objection was received. Through inadvertence, the prayer for relief
2 in paragraph 7 relating to the state constitutional claim was not deleted from the final draft.
3 Based on the Court's order, this relief should be stricken. Paragraph 8 is substantially similar
4 to paragraph 7 of the original complaint. The prayer for relief is fully consistent with an as-
5 applied challenge to the statute.
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7 **D. The Republican Party was not required to file another motion for leave to**
8 **amend when this Court already granted its prior motion, with the exception of**
9 **the state constitutional claim.**

10 The Grange argues that the Republican Party's supplemental and amended complaint
11 should be stricken because the Party "failed to seek leave from this Court to file an amended
12 complaint as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2)." Grange Mot. at 2. The
13 Grange asserts that the Party cannot rely on this Court's August 20, 2009 order because "the
14 amended complaint falls outside its scope." *Id.* at 3. The Grange ignores that when the Party
15 filed its Motion for Leave to File Supplemental and Amended Complaint on December 3,
16 2008, the Party attached a proposed amended complaint, which is substantially the same as
17 the supplemental and amended complaint filed on January 22, 2010, except for allegations
18 related to the Party's proposed state constitutional law claims. This Court granted the
19 Republican Party's motion for leave to amend "as to amendments necessary and related to
20 the ongoing as-applied challenge" and denied the Party's motion "as to [the] proposed state
21 constitutional claims." Order at 28. The Party complied with the Court's order, and the
22 Grange's contention that another motion was required is without merit.
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DATED this 22nd day of February, 2010

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on February 22, 2010, I caused to be electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to all counsel of record.

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