


Joel M. Pritchard



An Oral History

Washington State Oral History Program
Office of the Secretary of State

Joel M. Pritchard

An Oral History

Interviewed by Anne Kilgannon

Washington State Oral History Program
Office of the Secretary of State
Ralph Munro, Secretary of State



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Washington State Oral History Program
Office of Secretary of State
Legislative Building
PO Box 40243
Olympia, WA 98504-0243
Telephone: (360) 902-4157

Foreword by Daniel J. Evans

Foreword by Slade Gorton

Foreword by Jim Ellis

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Introduction by Anne Kilgannon

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FOREWORD

ABOUT JOEL PRITCHARD

I first met Joel Pritchard shortly after returning from naval service in the Korean War. He and his brother Frank were already known as political campaign wizards. They helped elect a little-known Gordon Clinton as mayor of Seattle and were looking for new political challenges.

We all joyously plunged into campaigns, both for candidates and on important issues such as Metro. It was a time when volunteers meant more than money and Joel knew precisely how to engage and enthuse volunteers.

He preferred to stay in the background, but finally in 1958 we prevailed upon him to run for office for himself. He was elected as a state legislator and began a long and illustrious career in public service. He also quickly became not only a trusted friend, but a wise political mentor who gave extraordinarily good counsel during all of my political career.

Joel Pritchard represented all that is good about public service. This remarkable man lived by his often repeated credo, "It's remarkable what you can accomplish if you don't care who gets the credit." His name may not appear as prime sponsor on many bills, but he built coalitions and tore down partisan barriers to achieve some landmark legislation during his terms in Congress.

Joel was a lifelong Republican, but recognized and respected the good ideas of others. He chuckled at the pompous, made allies of rivals, and gained universal respect on both sides of the aisle.

The name Joel Pritchard is synonymous with political integrity, intelligence, and courage. His legacy is a better state and a new generation of political activists charged with his spirit and love of public service.

DANIEL J. EVANS
Former Governor and U.S. Senator

FOREWORD

ABOUT JOEL PRITCHARD

Joel Pritchard's two most remarkable attributes were his unerring good humor and his unerring good judgment.

In every legislative body in which he served, Joel was, or was extremely close to being, the best-liked member by other members, both Democrats and Republicans. His colleagues sought him out for trips to distant places, or in the case of particularly fortunate friends like me, as companions in shared living quarters in Olympia during legislative sessions, when we were unaccompanied by our families.

Perhaps even more significant was Joel's judgment. I've always liked to think of myself as being able to think a problem or a challenge through logically, step by step, to a valid conclusion. Invariably, however, when we served in the Legislature together I found that Joel had already arrived at just such a conclusion intuitively. It was of his very nature to be thoughtful, considerate, and right.

Washington State has rarely had a public servant to match him; I have never had a friend I treasured more.

SLADE GORTON
U.S. Senator

FOREWORD

ABOUT JOEL PRITCHARD

I have known Joel Pritchard since 1947 and found him to be one of the most able and effective public officials and one of the finest human beings I have known. We got acquainted as young men in the early 1950s, representing the Republican Party in political debates. I remember these debates not only because we thought we won, but because we had so much fun doing them.

Joel participated actively in the civic improvement efforts of organizations like the Municipal League, including local Charter reform, and efforts to solve regional problems. I remember Joel debating one of the principal opponents of the “Metro” ballot measure to clean up Lake Washington. His opponent opened a jar of slimy green algae and proceeded to eat it on television in an effort to prove the algae that was fouling up Lake Washington was really good for us. Joel’s response on television was to hold his nose and lift his eyes. That was all it took to convince the audience that his opponent was out of his mind.

Joel was a pragmatic idealist as a legislator and responded to good ideas from every quarter. He quickly became one of the best liked people in each legislative body in which he served, including the state Legislature, official commissions, committees on government reform or the U.S. House of Representatives.

He was willing to undertake tough tasks and to devote long hours to listening. He would go way beyond the call of duty if he thought his effort would be publicly valuable. He was very helpful in the design of the original Metro Water Pollution Abatement Program. He was very active in preparing the Forward Thrust rapid transit plan and the major transit programs that followed. We lost several elections, but in 1972, after most people were discouraged, we came back for a third try. Joel was no longer in the Legislature, but he co-chaired a citizens committee with Dave Sprague, a Democrat. The plan was for Dave to first pass the package in the Democrat-controlled Senate, but this took until the next to last day of the session. The bill seemed certain to die in the House when Joel called late at night to say, “You know, we’d better get down there or this thing will be dead.” We met at an early breakfast in Olympia with key House leaders. By the end of the day, Joel succeeded in getting the bill through the committee, through Rules, and finally passed by the full House and sent to the governor for signature. This was a remarkable achievement. As I followed him around the chambers, I could see that everyone Joel talked to not only remembered him from his legislative days, but trusted him completely. In the election that followed, the voters approved what is today the Metro Transit System in King County. This enormously successful public service exists because Joel Pritchard would not let it die.

FOREWORD

During his twelve years in Congress, Joel was always in the minority party, but was so well liked and trusted by members of both parties that he could play an effective role. He organized social events for House members and games like softball and Pickle-Ball. People got used to each other and the Washington delegation began to work on common interests. Joel was the glue that held the delegation together. When he retired after five re-elections, as he had promised before his first election, he came up to talk with me about possible new avenues. He really did not have much support in his family for running for lieutenant governor, and we had a long talk over lunch. I told him he would be a natural in that role and could turn the job into a very useful public service. He did run, was elected, and became a very popular lieutenant governor by using his unique talent for bringing people together.

Before he left the Legislature, when he was significantly affected by cancer, he nevertheless did things whenever he was asked. Shortly before he died, the Mountains to Sound Greenway wanted him to be master of ceremonies for their annual Christmas celebration, but I didn't feel comfortable asking. He volunteered to do it, performed beautifully, and created an atmosphere that was inspirational for everyone present.

Throughout his life, Joel Pritchard carried his high personal ideals and standards into his public service. He set a goal for winning people over by not plowing them under. He was the kind of role model young people need who aspire to public service. It was not surprising when he died that there was such a huge crowd at his church services. They were there to remember warmly one of the best men they had ever known.

JIM ELLIS

PREFACE

The Washington State Oral History Program was established in 1991 by the Washington State Legislature to document the formation of public policy in Washington state. It is administered by the Office of the Secretary of State and is guided by the Oral History Advisory Committee.

Each oral history is a valuable record of an individual's contributions and convictions, their interpretation of events, and their relationships with other participants in the civic life of the state. By reading these oral histories, the complex interweaving of the personal and political processes that shape public policy is revealed.

The Oral History Advisory Committee chooses candidates for oral histories. Extensive research is then conducted about the life and activities of the prospective interviewee, using legislative journals, newspaper accounts, personal papers, and other sources. Then a series of taped interviews are conducted, focusing on the interviewee's public life and contributions, but also including personal sources of their values and beliefs. Political values, ideas about public service, interpretation of events, and reflections about relationships and the political process are explored. When the interviews have been completed, a verbatim transcript is prepared. These transcripts are edited and reviewed by the interviewer and interviewee to ensure readability and accuracy. Finally, the transcript is published and distributed to libraries, archives, and interested individuals. An electronic version of the text is also available on the Secretary of State web site (www.secstate.wa.gov).

Recollection and interpretation of events vary. It is the hope of the Oral History Program that this work will help citizens of the state of Washington better understand their political legacy.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Washington State Oral History Program wishes to thank all of those who contributed to this project.

Lieutenant Governor Joel Pritchard was a generous and committed participant in this process, devoting time to meet despite keeping a busy schedule and undergoing treatments for cancer. When, due to his illness, it became apparent that he could not complete the interview series, Joel asked his friends and colleagues to fill in the rest of his remarkable story.

The program would like to thank Frank Pritchard, Joel's brother, for his unfailing help and guidance in completing this political memoir. Peggy Pritchard Olson and other family members also lent their support. Maury Hausheer, Joel's longtime administrative assistant, completed the chronological and topical discussion of the congressional years, provided an overview of the lieutenant governor years, and helped edit the manuscript. Dan Evans, Slade Gorton, Lois North, Steve Excell, Kirby Torrance, Liz Stroup, Frank Shrontz, Sid Snyder, Don Brazier, Denny Heck, and Bruce Chapman graciously consented to be interviewed about their work with Joel Pritchard. Jim Ellis, Don Bonker, Suzie Dicks, Joyce and Rod Chandler, Herb Stone, Mike Woodin, Grant Degginger, George Weigel, Bill Bell, the Rural Development Institute, and Beacon Hill Elementary School contributed information and insights on specific topics. Carol Hudson, Clio Davidson, and Betsy Bohannon were invaluable supporters.

We also appreciate the members of our Legislative Advisory Committee for their guidance, support and unfailing interest in this work. The committee includes Senators Sid Snyder, Shirley Winsley, and Al Bauer; Representatives Patricia Lantz, Karen Keiser, Don Carlson, and Kathy Lambert; Secretary of State Ralph Munro, Secretary of the Senate Tony Cook, the Co-Chief Clerks of the House Tim Martin and Cindi Zehnder. Ex Officio members are Warren Bishop, David Nicandri, Dean Foster, and former legislators Robert Bailey, Eugene Prince, Alan Thompson, and Don Brazier.

The State Department of Printing has greatly aided us in the production of this book. We thank them for their professional help.

Secretary of State Ralph Munro and Deputy Secretary of State Tracy Guerin have been a constant source of support. Their encouragement and dedication have sustained the program. Many others in the Office of the Secretary of State have lent their assistance to the program in innumerable ways. We thank them for their generous assistance.

Those named gave more than we asked. It is a privilege to acknowledge them.

THE WASHINGTON STATE ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM

INTRODUCTION

INTERVIEWING JOEL PRITCHARD

The interviews with Lieutenant Governor Joel Pritchard that form the core of this oral history were recorded over the course of about a year, from September 1996 to shortly before his death in October of 1997. Most of the interviews took place in the spacious office of the Lieutenant Governor on the second floor of the Legislative building.

Carol Hudson, Joel's always gracious administrative assistant, would wave me into the faded green and gold splendor of the historic office, with its high windows still draped with the original green velvet, soft light from hanging chandeliers, and walls lined with bookcases brimming with works on history, biography and politics. We sat on roomy brown leather couches separated by a coffee table, where I placed my tape recorder and notes. Joel would sit opposite me, either leaning forward, elbows on knees to explain some point, or waving his arms in exclamation, or rubbing his mobile face, searching his memory for some answer to a question. The interviews sometimes felt like tennis matches: him lobbing ideas, stories, even mini-lectures at me, while I struggled to launch back my own questions and comments. Our conversations were exhilarating, intensely engaging encounters. My carefully prepared, chronologically organized notes would be in tatters, my notions of sequence and coherence lost, but I would emerge from the encounter feeling privileged to have been a witness and participant in such an exchange.

Steve Excell best described Joel Pritchard's speaking style when he said, "He can give a stem-winder of a speech, and there won't be one complete sentence in it, because he was like a machine gun of ideas and enthusiasm... He just keeps going in a stream of consciousness." Then Steve added, "You almost had to be there—reading the text of something that somebody transcribed, versus being present at one of his speeches—you wouldn't get the flavor. You wouldn't get his animation..." Certainly, interviewing Lieutenant Governor Joel Pritchard for this oral history was a bit like paddling pell-mell in his stream of thought, as I raced to keep up with his comments drawn from more than three decades of involvement in Washington State politics.

Even when we were discussing his early days of service in the Legislature, if an example from his work in Congress served better to illustrate whatever point he was making, he would tell that story. He had such a rich fund of lessons learned, observations, experiences and anecdotes about every level of political involvement: from local Seattle city campaigns, to international maneuverings for laws governing the use of ocean resources, to dealing with refugees from various world conflicts. He was as fully engaged talking about running doorbelling campaigns as defeating the pet schemes of powerful congressmen. Clearly, Joel Pritchard loved politics,

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and immersed himself in the challenge of solving problems and helping people.

He reveled in the give and take, the building of relationships, the planting of ideas. Always serving in the minority, Joel perfected the art of crossing the aisle to “get things done” and of sharing the credit where it would do the most good, letting as little of the recognition fall to him as possible. Tracing his “fingerprints” on any given piece of legislation was sometimes a task for a detective; he was more comfortable describing issues and the contributions of others than in revealing his own role of accomplishment. This habit of self-effacement seemed unusual in a life-long politician, but it was genuine. I learned not to ask, “But what did *you* do?” which elicited a slightly impatient expression from him and a change of topic. While Joel enjoyed recounting tales of campaigns won and lost, of efforts to pass Washington’s abortion law, or to save stretches of wilderness for the enjoyment of backpackers, he was not, as he would be quick to say, “a legend in his own mind.”

My task of somehow uncovering the career and contributions of Joel Pritchard became more complicated as his health deteriorated. He dedicated his last months to launching his last project, the history of congressional offices, seeing old friends, and undergoing treatments for cancer. He mourned his lost hair, but did not feel sorry for himself. He stayed interested in current affairs, Pickle-ball, and everyone around him. But we could not finish the story of his work and life. At our last meeting he directed that I contact his friends and family to finish the narrative. He looked relieved to delegate the telling of his story, a project he had never been completely comfortable with, to his longtime assistant and friend Maury Hausheer. His brother, Frank, would represent the family and oversee the publication. That problem solved, Joel relaxed and said a poignant good-bye.

Everyone I contacted was more than glad to help fill in the stories from the years that we had not explored. The portrait of Joel Pritchard grew more complex and nuanced as friends and colleagues shared their insights and memories of his career. All were careful and respectful of his privacy, understanding which stories he would have told of himself and how he would have wanted to be represented. The affection shone through in every conversation. I gained a deeper understanding of the person and his record of service to the state of Washington.

Joel Pritchard lived an active, full life. Many events of his life are only touched on in these pages; others are unexplored. Still, I hope the flavor and the animation are present, between the lines for readers of this oral history. I can see him, eager to explain some point or grinning when he

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reached the punch line of a great story, serious and even sorrowing over the state of the world and politics, yet forward-looking and wise about the possibilities for the future. He cared deeply about the survival of the citizen legislature, about civility in government and the participation of all members of society. A “level playing field” was his ideal for those campaigning for office or buying a home or looking for work. He sought always to open doors and bring people into the political process—the world he knew firsthand and the one to which he dedicated his life and considerable energies. That ball is in our court now; better follow his lead and pick up a racket.

ANNE KILGANNON
Interviewer

BIOGRAPHICAL HIGHLIGHTS

JOEL PRITCHARD

Joel McFee Pritchard was born in Seattle, Washington on May 5, 1925. He was the second son of Frank and Jean Pritchard. He and his brother, Frank, attended Queen Anne-area schools and were avid members of the local YMCA. Joel attended Camp Orkila on Orcas Island for many years as both a camper and a counselor, a significant influence in his life and outlook. Close family relationships and deep roots in the community characterized Joel's upbringing.

Joel served in the Americal Division in the Philippines, at Bougainville, and in the occupation forces in Japan during World War II. He returned home to continue his college education, choosing to attend Marietta College in Ohio. Upon marriage to Joan Sutton, Joel left college and returned to Seattle to begin family life and his career with the North Pacific Bank Note Company as a salesman. He worked with that company and its affiliate company, Griffin Envelope Company, for twenty-five years, retiring as president of Griffin. Joel and Joan had four children.

Upon Joel's return to Seattle in 1948, he became involved in political activities locally and on the national level in his support for President Eisenhower. He was a founding member of the Evergreen Republican Club and the Republican Discussion Club. Along with his father and brother, Joel was an Eisenhower delegate at the state Republican convention of 1952. He later attended the national Republican conference in 1956. He became the Republican district leader for the Forty-fourth District in 1954. He, with his brother, worked on many campaigns, including George Kinnear's bid for U.S. Senate in 1950, Bill Devin's campaign for mayor two years later, the successful attempt to replace State Senator Kimball with Ted Peterson, Congressman Tom Pelly's re-election campaign in 1954, Gordon Clinton's surprising win of the Seattle mayoralty race in 1956, and the statewide campaign of Phil Evans for Congressman-at-large in 1956. The Pritchard brothers were considered to be "organizational marvels" with their energetic and innovative campaign tactics.

After a decade of working on campaigns, Joel ran successfully for state representative for the Thirty-sixth District in 1958. He entered the Legislature during a period of Republican minorities and worked closely with fellow legislators Dan Evans, Slade Gorton, Charles Moriarty and others to build a new team of dynamic and moderate Republicans. Each campaign season saw the success of more of the "new breed" until Dan Evans became Republican leader in 1960 and eventually governor in 1964 after an arduous campaign, ably assisted by Joel and Frank Pritchard. Joel became one of the new governor's most able lieutenants in the House of Representatives and in the Senate after 1967, steering executive legislation and other measures through the process. As a state senator, Joel was the

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chief architect of the liberalization of the state's abortion law. He was a noted supporter of civil rights, environmental legislation, anti-gambling measures, and other reforms.

In 1970, Joel made his first bid for Congress, against longtime incumbent Tom Pelly. Although unsuccessful, the vote count was closer than expected, which made him a front runner in 1972. Narrowly defeating the Democratic candidate, Joel became the representative for the First Congressional District, an office he held until 1984.

He entered Congress at a time when the country was increasingly riven over the Vietnam War and then the effects of Watergate. He weathered the energy crisis and economic problems during the Ford and Carter years, worked for creative solutions to urban problems on the Neighborhood Commission, and battled special interests both inside and outside of Congress. He twice bucked his colleagues when he helped prevent Congress from taking over facilities designed for the Library of Congress and opposed a proposed expansion of the Capitol building for office space. Joel was especially proud of his fight against the Tennessee-Tombigby Canal and against subsidies for tobacco growers.

Joel chaired the Wednesday Group, a Republican discussion group known for their leadership and moderate pragmatism. He worked closely with the Washington State delegation on the conservation of wilderness areas such as Alpine Lakes area and what became the W.O. Douglas Wilderness area. His love of history spurred the creation of the first national park that spanned more than one state, the Klondike Gold Rush Park. Joel worked behind the scenes to keep oil tankers out of Puget Sound and to save the Merchant Marine hospital in Seattle. He served on the international Law of the Sea Conference and as a U.S. delegate to the United Nations in 1983. As a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Joel traveled extensively throughout the world. His concern for the plight of refugees brought him into contact with the victims of the Vietnam War and of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Palestinians in the Middle East. As a board member of the Rural Development Institute, he had a deep appreciation of the needs and tribulations of the landless poor of many nations.

When first elected to Congress, Joel had pledged that he would stay in office no more than twelve years. Despite his own inclination and the support of many friends and colleagues, Joel kept that promise. He worked briefly as a government relations person for the firm of Bogle and Gates in 1985. Joel also served as a U.S. representative to the Panama Canal Consultative Commission. During 1986-87, Joel was a news and affairs commentator for KIRO TV. He soon came permanently home to Washington State to pursue a dream that he had cherished for some time,

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the office of lieutenant governor.

After a successful campaign, Joel assumed his new duties as lieutenant governor in 1989. Besides his duties of presiding over the Senate, chairing the state Senate Rules Committee and being a member of several state boards and commissions, Joel was executive chairman of the Partnership for Learning, a statewide organization that worked for education reform. He also worked closely with Washington Literacy, a group dedicated to the promotion of adult literacy programs. On a more personal level, Joel tutored children at Beacon Hill School in Seattle.

Joel served as lieutenant governor for eight years, retiring in 1997. Despite undergoing treatments for a reoccurrence of cancer, he remained active in many areas. He was an active board member of TVW, Washington's statewide public affairs television channel.

As co-chair of the Washington State Concord Coalition, with former Congressman Don Bonker, he had a ready-made forum for expressing his deep concern about the national budget deficit. Another avenue for expression was his involvement with the Discovery Institute, a Seattle policy group founded by a longtime friend, Bruce Chapman. Returning to his love of history and Congress, Joel instigated an extensive project to research past office locations of former members of Congress, a project still underway.

Right to the end of his life, Joel remained fascinated by public affairs and the issues of the day. He worked tirelessly on initiatives concerning gun control, campaign finance reform and against the spread of gambling. Still, he found time to play and promote Pickle-Ball, the game he invented with friends that has spread around the world. Although his second marriage to Demaris Brightman did not weather the return home, Joel found rich enjoyment in sports, friends and family, and that most human of activities, politics.

Joel Pritchard died October 9, 1997.

CHAPTER 1

FAMILY BACKGROUND

Joel Pritchard: Both of my grandparents came to the state of Washington at statehood time for different reasons. It's McFees on one side and Pritchards on the other side.

The McFees are from Scotland. They came over in 1800, just 1800 on the nose. They came to Canada and settled in Quebec. Part of the family stayed in Canada, and part came down to Wisconsin. My grandparents came out here from Wisconsin to work for James J. Hill, the railroad fellow. My grandfather's brother had worked for Hill back in Maine, where he was building a railroad, and then they both worked for Hill out here doing railroad construction.

I'm not aware that my grandfather had a lot of education, but he was a pretty able person. Later on, when the brothers had a construction firm, my grandfather ran the construction part and his brother ran the business side. They built railroads around the Northwest here. In those days there were a lot of railroads for getting logs out, short little railroads running here and there, because that's the way people moved. Everything was on the railroad.

So, the McFees came here at the time of statehood, and first lived at the bottom of Queen Anne Hill, right near the fairgrounds. My mother was born where the World's Fair was, where the Space Needle is, right in there. Grandfather McFee then went up to Alaska and was superintendent on

building a tramway over the Chilkoot Pass for the line of people going over to the gold fields. He was up there for over a year, a year and a half, and then came back down and moved the family up on top of Queen Anne.

Anne Kilgannon: How big was the family?

JP: He was already married when he came out. He had a family of four,* and my uncles were in the first class at Queen Anne High School. They lived right up top of the hill there. And his brother lived there too, the two McFee brothers. My mother went to Queen Anne, as did I, and as my kids did. The family lived up there and were very involved in the community, all of those things.

On the Pritchard side, my grandparents came out from England. He was a Welshman and she was English. She came from a substantial family, but he was the gardener's son. That's why they got out of England, because there was such a stretch between who she was—

AK: That only works in this country.

JP: And there were two sisters who married two brothers, so it was kind of an unusual thing. But my grandmother was very well educated. She was very well read, and like women in those days—they sent them to France—she was educated in France.

My grandparents were married and were going on the boat to Halifax, to Canada. On the way over they got acquainted with Frank Pixley, who owned the *San Francisco Argonaut*, which was the paper in San Francisco then. He liked them, so they made a deal that they would come around and run his ranch in Corte Madeira. So they got on a boat in Halifax and went down around the Horn and back up to San Francisco. My father was born there in 1888.

But, because my grandfather brought a pal of his over, and Mr. Pixley didn't like his pal, the upshot was that the friend was let go and my grandfather quit out of loyalty. They came up to

*Frank Pritchard noted that there was a fifth child who died in infancy.

Seattle then, just at the time of the Seattle fire—a tense time. He started a little fuel business down in the south end of Seattle, and they bought a little island in Lake Washington, and named it Pritchard Island.

Then, when the gold rush hit, both my grandfather and grandmother went up, went over the Chilkoot Pass, right at the start of it. My grandmother talked to me about going down the river. They had two fellows who went with them from Bennett on, who had gone up to gamble. They made a deal to help row the boat, and they went on to Dawson.

AK: Did they have children at this point? They didn't drag any babies up there, did they?

JP: Yes, they left my father in the Briscoe Boy's School. They were up there for awhile and then came back down. Like most, the great majority of the people who were in the gold rush, they never got any gold. They worked, or they did this or that, and then they came back. Then they went back up in the Nome rush, and came back. But then they went back up again to Kotzebue, which is way up above Nome—that's way up there. And they did hit gold in Kotzebue, but they weren't always smart about how they did things, but it was a real adventure. And they did come back with some money. By then my father was fourteen, and he worked there. I have some wonderful pictures of them up there.

AK: Were your grandparents still in Seattle when you were growing up?

JP: They lived there. My grandfather on the McFee side died when I was quite young, I was four or five. And my grandmother died when I was probably ten or eleven. On the Pritchard side, I was fifteen or sixteen when my grandmother died, and my grandfather died earlier. I was probably nine or ten at the time.

AK: Were you impressed with their Klondike stories? What did you think about their adventures?

JP: Oh yes, but when they were telling me I was pretty young. My father talked about it because

he was up there, too. He'd been up there one or two summers as a college kid. He liked the hunting. You can imagine, all they had to do was go out and hunt all day and they'd get paid for it. He thought that was the neatest thing in the world.

I was pretty young, you see, and I got more into it after we went up and kind of retraced their steps. I read a lot about it and the things they had said kind of stuck, and it kind of tied together.

AK: When did you do this trip? Was this with your brother Frank?

JP: We did it for the Bicentennial, so that would be '76. And we took our twenty-year-old sons with us. I said we ought to do something, you know.

We were going to go this last summer to Kotzebue, but my brother smashed up his hip skiing—he's seventy-five. We're hoping that he'll be in decent shape so next summer we can go up there, because we're going to try and find the mine and find the area. I haven't been there, but I've been up in Alaska—Fairbanks, Prudhoe Bay, and some places like that.

AK: Did the family settle down after all this running up and down the coast?

JP: Yes, they had a lovely home on the end of the island, Pritchard Island. It's very fuzzy—we have a hard time figuring out exactly how the land worked, as far as it being an island, because shortly after that they lowered the lake nine feet and the island became part of the mainland.

They just built the new bathing beach down there. It's the last one on Lake Washington, of all the city bathing beaches. But the house burned down and my grandfather got into a mess, and they ended up being divorced. Very foolish thing and exacerbated by foolish things done—

My father had gone to Broadway and then he went out to the University of Washington. His close friends there were the McFee brothers, my mother's brothers. They were in a fraternity together, and they were great pals and friends. My mother was younger.

Then the family had some problems, like I said, and my dad quit school and started working. He got in the printing business and was a

salesman. Then he and my mother started going together. She had completed school and had started teaching at Richmond Beach.

Now this is interesting. We used to have family picnics with all my mother's cousins and I realized that all of them had completed school. They'd all gone to college.

AK: That's unusual, for that era.

JP: Yes. And they were very strong. They were Presbyterians, and their word was their bond, and all these wonderful old things that you appreciate.

Yes, my mother started teaching, and then she and my father decided to get married. He had been in World War I, but had not gone overseas. He was down in the Vancouver barracks. Because he had worked for the North Pacific Banknote Company, which was a printing company, the Army thought "banknote" must be a banker, and so they put him in the payroll division. You know how those things are.

He was down there and he got the influenza, you remember—

AK: The 1919 epidemic?

JP: Yes, and he was very ill. I remember hearing about how my grandmother went down to help nurse him. People did that in those days. They would go down to where the person was sick. Anyway, he got through that, but ended up with very bad asthma—people always assumed that was the cause.

AK: Did he mind not going overseas, or was he just as happy not to have?

JP: I don't know. I never heard. He didn't get in at the start. That war didn't last that long. But he went and he was about two years down there. But he came back to the printing company and was a salesman. My parents got married in 1919. He worked there, at the North Pacific Banknote Company, for fifty-five years. My brother worked there thirty-five years, and I worked there for twenty-five years. We did not own it, but people thought we did. A Tacoma family owned the company.

My father and mother were very involved in the community, and my dad was always helping with any number of things, and giving free printing to this group or this thing. Everybody always laughed because he was such a soft touch.

AK: Was he a very gregarious sort of person, a people-person?

JP: Yes, very good with people. Not boisterous, but very good with people. Wonderful, wonderful understanding of people. He had lots of friends. He helped Arthur Langlie. He was very supportive of Langlie, and supportive of Bill Devin, who was the mayor of Seattle. They were friends of the Devins.

And he made a real effort to get the YMCA started up on Queen Anne Hill and did a lot of work with them.*

My mother was very involved in the PTA.

***Frank Pritchard:** My first recollection of the YMCA was when I was nine years. My father dropped me off at the downtown Y one Saturday morning, signed me up for gym and swim—that's what they did with little kids then—and for a number of years I went down there three times a week after school. I'd ride the streetcar down and ride the streetcar back.

Then my dad and several others wanted the YMCA to reopen their Queen Anne branch, which had been closed in the Depression. They got some other community leaders to support it, because the Y's pitch was that it has got to be self-sustaining. They got a church that had been abandoned, then they got people to pledge, most of them two dollars a month.

An interesting sidelight: my senior year in high school I was sort of the treasurer and I went around and collected the two bucks a month from these guys, many of whom waited for me to come rather than mailing it in. That sounds like a little, but I remember a streetcar conductor and he was always late because he didn't have much money.

FP: That was kind of our start. Joel was in programs in the Y in grade school, and in high school he was in Hi-Y. We went to Camp Orkila. Joel went five years as a camper, and probably three or four as a counselor, as I did.

AK: Would this be canoeing and crafts and swimming and camping?

FP: Yes, but in those days we didn't have canoes. We didn't have very much. We mostly played baseball, which my brother loved. I've still got a finger that's crooked because he broke it, sliding into me at second base at camp. We both spent a lot of time up there. Our parents were very interested in it.

When my father died, the people at the company wanted to do something in his memory, and so for about seven years they had a work party up at Camp Orkila, on Orcas Island, every May. Thirty or forty would go up and they rebuilt an old structure there and called it Pritchard House. It's used for staff housing now.

My dad was interested, and I was, and Joel. I'm still active. I'm on the committee for Camp Orkila and raise money for it.

JP: She was a big reader. She would go in and read in the hospitals in the war as a Red Cross Grey Lady. She was very involved in a number of things. They were both very involved in the community and had lots of friends.

AK: Would they have known a wide cross-section of people, or just a certain kind of person?

JP: They knew lots of people. They knew everybody.

AK: Was Seattle, in those days, still a small enough kind of place where you really could know everybody of consequence?

JP: Yes. My father was active in the business community, and so he knew a lot of people. Then they lived on Queen Anne, and my mother had gone to Queen Anne and my dad had gone to Broadway, and then they'd gone on to the University of Washington.

AK: Did your parents travel much, away from Seattle?

JP: My dad had asthma and so they would leave for a month every spring, and for five years they took my brother and I with them. They thought it was better for us to do that.

AK: To take you out of school?

JP: Yes, take us out and we would go south in the car. My father loved to drive, and once he got out of Puget Sound his asthma was all right. One year we went to Monterey, Mexico, all through Arizona and California and Texas.

AK: So mostly to dry places?

JP: Yes. He'd get away from here and whatever was coming on—the pollen or whatever. For four years we went, then the fifth time just I went with them. My brother was in high school and he couldn't do it—and then it wasn't any fun, just alone with your parents.

And Sunday would be family day. We were with the family.

AK: Did your family also belong to the Presbyterian church?

JP: We moved out to the Methodist church in 1935 because there was some battle in the Presbyterian church over the minister, and my father said he didn't go to church to get into those kinds of fights. So we went to University Methodist Temple. He liked the minister there—he knew him. The minister was very able, and so we went down to the Methodist church. My parents were very involved there.

AK: And this was okay with your mother?

JP: Oh yes. She said, “As long as your father will go to church, we’re not going to argue about where.” So, that was just it.

My father was an interesting man. He was very careful. He did not want his wife cooking on Sunday. He remembered his mother always spending Sunday in the kitchen, and thought that was bad. He was very thoughtful that way.

AK: So what did your family do instead?

JP: We would go to church and then we would stop at a hamburger place. And then we’d go see our grandmother. And we’d go watch the soccer matches at Woodland. We’d do different things.

AK: So it wouldn’t necessarily be solemn?

JP: Oh no. It was fun. We were up at Mukilteo looking at the fish coming in, and the boats, and going around. Then we’d go home and have some snacks, and my mother would play the piano and we’d sing. Lots of singing in the car.

My father was also a great hunter and fisherman. Like I said, he’d been a professional hunter in college. He went to Alaska and hunted for the mining companies up there, for so much per bird. And, of course, he hunted for years right here in the Nisqually flats. He and a bunch of men had a farm place down there. He took me down there once, but I was terrible at it.

AK: You didn’t pick it up?

JP: No, and I’m one to play sports. And I didn’t want to go fishing. Neither my brother nor myself were big in the hunting and fishing department, but my dad was a big outdoorsman. All I wanted to do was go play games.

My father, both my parents, did a lot to encourage us. But one thing that really helped me was that my mother went to the library every week, every Tuesday, and came home with a book for everybody, every week. And then, if you didn’t like it, she’d grab you and you’d sit on her lap while she read the first chapter and got all the characters set and that. Much of it was historical

stories. So, while I was not a very good student because I goofed off all the time, I was a voracious reader. That came from her being a great reader. She and my father would read books—she would read out loud—and they would read books together by her reading out loud.

AK: And then would they discuss their ideas?

JP: Oh, I guess. I wasn’t there when they were doing it, but I’d hear them. And when I had the flu I remember she read *Gone With the Wind* to me.

AK: You had a long flu!

JP: Yes, it was two weeks. Later on, I realized that she’d skipped a few parts, but I was fourteen at the time, and she read the whole thing to me. She did lots of reading, and encouragement of reading. My brother was a very good student, and of course he was five years, four-and-one-half years, older than I was.

AK: There were just the two of you, you and your brother?

JP: Yes.

AK: What was it like for you to be the younger brother?

JP: My brother went to school—his birthday was in September—he really went with his pals who were a year behind him. But he was very active in things and he was a very good student. And he was very good about letting me go along with him. I could always tag along.

Lots of times we’d be playing in the neighborhood, baseball and touch football and all that stuff, and I was always able to play with them, play with him and his pals. And then over at the beach we were out there in boats and all the stuff that goes on at a beach place. Yes, my brother was very good about letting me come along and we were very close.

He was smaller than I—we were both small—but he turned out for teams. I was a nut on sports, not great, but I had intense interest.

He was not very outgoing. People really respected him and he was good, but I could never get him to run for office.

AK: What kind of sports did you play?

JP: Every kind. I played football, basketball, and I played tennis in high school.

AK: What about baseball?

JP: The only sport I didn't play. Actually, I was going to go and turn out for the team, but it was clear down at the bottom of Queen Anne. The tennis team was right up by the school, and so I said I'd play tennis. It was easier.

AK: Could you describe your home, what it looked like and how it was for you?

JP: First we lived up on 315 Hayes, which was about two blocks from Queen Anne High School. When I was in fourth grade we moved from one grade school to another on Queen Anne. I thought it was terrible. We moved over on the side of Queen Anne where we had a wonderful view, which was something I didn't understand at the time. But they thought it was just wonderful because they'd wanted to get on that western side with the view. They had a nice house. I can remember we had two bathrooms! It was a nice place—it wasn't a big showy place. It's still there, a nice home.

We had lots of friends around there in the neighborhood. Of course, unlike today, my mother knew everybody in the neighborhood. They knew everything about everybody.

AK: Was there a lot of coffeering and going back and forth?

JP: It was just friends. My folks' social friends were their University of Washington friends. They belonged to two card clubs, bridge clubs. It was big in the Depression. That was not an expensive thing to do. You had to have the bridge club to your house once a year and you'd get dinner and play bridge all night, and talk and all that.

They belonged to two of them. One was made

up of a lot of my mother's social friends and the other was high school or college friends. Long-time friends, and some of these people are still around. The other night I was at a dinner and one of the wives there—her father had been in the group. So, I had a lot of stability in my family as I grew up, with all these nice people.

My parents were very strong people—one didn't dominate the other. I can remember in the '40 election I was impressed because one voted for Roosevelt and one voted for Wilkie. I thought that was pretty good, because everyone else I knew, their parents voted the same. My father, of course, had relatives in England and he was very worried about the war and thought that we would get into a war, and therefore Roosevelt ought to be the one. My mother thought Wilkie would be better. But it was no big deal, just the fact that it was unusual at that time to have people voting differently.

All the bridge club was voting for Wilkie except my dad. That was just because of this war thing. I remember my mother saying, "I'll be glad when this election is over so we can stop having these kinds of discussions at the bridge club." But my dad was concerned, and he thought that we were going to get in sooner or later and we might as well get at it. I suppose you can say that he had a little broader view than most people.

AK: Did people dislike Roosevelt?

JP: No, no. It wasn't all this bitter stuff. My grandparents voted for Hoover—I remember them having a little sign or something, but my parents were not those hard party people. My dad helped some people run. He gave some free printing to people. He'd help somebody he really liked. He was quite involved in mayoral races, which were nonpartisan, although Devin was closer to a Republican than a Democrat. Some city council people he'd help, but that was all nonpartisan. But most of those people, they certainly weren't part of the Rosellini, Ed Weston, Teamster bunch.

AK: Did it fall more to individuals, who the people were?

JP: Yes, people. But a big thing was labor's hold

here in this area.

AK: Dave Beck? So they were just looking for some balance?

JP: Yes, they'd gravitate—there were people that they naturally would feel comfortable with. Eisenhower, they felt very comfortable with. That was later. Earlier, there was Langlie. Langlie did not have alcohol in the mansion, and they liked that. There was no alcohol in our house. My mother was pretty hard on drinking. My father said, "Your mother doesn't want alcohol in the house, and that's fine with me. If that's the way she is, that's fine." My uncles, none of the McFees, I never saw any of them ever take a drink. That was just it.

Langlie was governor for three terms, he was out once, so it was a sixteen-year time. They were very supportive of him. And then up on Queen Anne, those were Republicans that won all the time, so it was more a matter of "which one?" Before the war I don't remember much.

AK: Let's back up a bit here. How did the Depression affect your family?

JP: My father had a good job. He was the manager of a printing company. Now, companies didn't make a lot of money in the Depression, but as he used to say, "With the printing company you don't make great big profits, but you keep it going." He had a good job, and so there was never a financial crisis in our family.

My parents believed in living under their means, not over their means. They had a nice summer place. My dad developed this place over on the beach at Bainbridge Island over the years, and so we spent a lot of time over there.

The Depression, for me, was other people, but not our family.

AK: How were you taught to think about those other people?

JP: My parents were very helpful to others. They were very involved in charitable activities, in helping and doing things. And then my father was helping all kinds of people, privately. When he

died, a lot of people wrote and said, "Your dad did this or that."

At the company, he helped a lot of people. Everybody kind of went to him for advice. He took intense personal interest in everybody, and always tried to help.

AK: So your parents were comfortable, but not—

JP: They were not wealthy. My dad had a good job, but we did not own the company. And he had been careful: "If you live under your means, always, you don't feel the pressure." On the other hand, you weren't loose. There was never a discussion of money in our house. In fact, my parents didn't want that sort of talk around there.

AK: How did your parents convey these values?

JP: By example. They didn't always talk, though they were somewhat critical of people who lived over their means, or put on the show.

I was raised in an atmosphere—my folks were very nice to other people, thoughtful of other people, always tried to help people. People liked my parents. They had lots of friends. My mother was probably more outspoken than my father. She was involved in that group for unmarried mothers, the Crittenton Home.

AK: Was she the kind of person who was interested in the downtrodden?

JP: I don't know about the downtrodden. She just wanted to help people. My parents were somewhat critical of people who pontificated a lot about their religion and didn't really do anything. They didn't have a lot of time for people like that. They thought that deeds are what mount up, not statements or positions, and all the rest. They just went out and helped people.

AK: Were there a lot of ways to connect with people in Seattle, who wanted to help?

JP: There was the Community Chest and the different agencies. A lot of these programs came on during the Depression. But people in our neighborhood—there were quite a number of

homes where the grandparents lived in the home. That's the way people were taken care of.

One thing that I did remember about the Depression—my father took me over to see the Hooverville. It was full of all these men. You never saw a woman. When I think about it now, you never saw women who were out on the street. You never saw women who were homeless. The family took them in. You saw men on the street, and you saw men who were out there in these shantytowns, but you never saw women, because women were all taken in by someone. It was different. Families took families in homes. It was a different time. But people felt enormous responsibility for relatives. You did whatever had to be done.

AK: What was your father's purpose in taking you down there? Just to show you?

JP: Maybe he wanted to see it and I was there. I don't know. My folks weren't trying to mold us. They just said, "You ought to see this."

AK: So, when the Depression came, and people wanted to respond by just taking care of their families, what would happen if they couldn't?

JP: I don't know. There were all these things that went on, children were taken to aunts, but the feeling was: we have an obligation and we have to—And women worked. It was not easy.

But the war took us out of the Depression. People all think of '29 and '37 when unemployment was up there around nineteen percent, and all the stimulants hadn't worked, but the war orders were coming in from Europe, and that's what turned the Depression. And the Depression, of course, was in many parts of the world.

AK: Did you listen to the radio? People often remember these defining moments in these different eras partly by radio speeches—Roosevelt's fireside chats, the announcement about Pearl Harbor.

JP: Yes, the war was the big thing. There was great concern once the war got started over the relatives in England. I know that my grandmother and my aunt went back for the coronation after—

what was his name—King Edward and Simpson got bounced. That was about 1938, they went back to England, I think, and so they kept some kind of connection.

AK: Did any of them live in London? I was just thinking about the bombing of London.

JP: I don't know. My brother was in Europe in the war and went over and saw some of them, but I went to the Pacific. Later, I went back there and saw some of them, but by that time they lived in a different place.

AK: Do you remember Pearl Harbor? Was it deeply shocking?

JP: Oh yes. I can remember being there. Oh yes, the radio and all the talk. It was big news. It's like the president's been killed, or something. Wowee! People really didn't know what that meant. They didn't sort it out, "Does that mean we're going to war with Germany? Does that mean we're going to war with Japan? What does this mean, they bombed Pearl Harbor?" It was such a surprise to people.

AK: How old were you when these things were happening?

JP: I was born in '25, so in '35, I'm ten. In '39, when the war hit, I'm fourteen. I can remember my mother saying, "Thank goodness you're too young to go," because everybody was being drafted at twenty-one. That was the idea, you got drafted when you were twenty-one. My mother said, "Oh, I'm so glad you're too young. Your brother will have to go, you know."

AK: Did everyone know it would be a long fight? In World War I there was this "they'll be home by Christmas" syndrome.

JP: There was no way to know, but they didn't think it was going to be over that quick.

AK: Your mother probably never dreamt that you would get old enough to go, too.

Another important event at this time was the

Japanese evacuation—that was a big event in Seattle.

JP: We had Japanese in our home. My mother helped Japanese girls. She—twice then—had me ride home with Kimiko on the bus because she didn't want her hassled on the bus. And my folks took food down to the camps when they were in Puyallup.

AK: Did they disagree with that policy?

JP: My mother worried about them being hassled because people were so foolish. She said, "They've got to be protected." I can remember my folks' attitude. And then, on Bainbridge Island they knew a lot of them. I can remember my mother saying, "They've got to be protected because some people are just awful." It doesn't take very many people to be awful, but that went on.

AK: Did they think it was a necessary thing, then?

JP: My mother thought it was necessary for them to be protected from some of the nuts in our society, in our community. Well, of course, you get into a war, World War I, you know how people acted towards Germans.

The boy across the street, Tak Watanabe, his father was with the Yokohama Bank, and I used to play with him. He was right across the street. They went back to Japan about six months before Pearl Harbor. I often wondered whatever happened to him.

My folks had a lot of friends in the Japanese community.

AK: How did they get involved with them?

JP: Through the Baptist church. I can't remember the minister, but he talked to my mother, and my mother had one of the girls come and live in our house. I'm not sure what that meant.

AK: Did these relationships give you a different perspective on the whole issue? If you really knew Japanese people—

JP: The senior basketball team had a Japanese player, Hiama. He was captain of the basketball team at Queen Anne, and his brother Paul was on our freshman basketball team, and we didn't have all this trouble. Kids don't.

AK: Just the adults.

JP: People just got panicked over the war. Somebody went up in an airplane and showed how the crops and the vegetable farms down there—there was one all worked out like a big arrow pointed right at the Boeing airplane plant. This was a plot, you see. Once you get started in this conspiracy stuff, they were panicked, they were scared. It's very easy to criticize it now, but the pressure was on people to do something.

This is what happens when you get people scared to death, with their relatives being killed overseas. Ships are being sunk, and oh boy! Obviously, you had some people who just thought most of these people were spies.

I remember our friend, Harold Nickerson, the YMCA guy here in Olympia, he had been the YMCA person in Puyallup when the war hit. And he was criticized by a lot of people in Puyallup because he was spending so much time helping the Japanese who were interned. First they went to Puyallup. Nick was down there getting criticized because he was being helpful. Well, you know—

Right at the end of the war we had a fellow from Seattle come in as a combat officer, a Japanese, in our outfit, the Americal Division, overseas. To me, these were all friends, and what have you.

Now, the feeling that we had toward the Japanese-Americans had nothing to do with Japan. In our family, I know, we were very critical of the Japanese government and the way they were operating in China. When Walter Judd came back as a missionary from Japan, just before the war, my father took me out to hear him—I think we went out to hear him at the University Congregational Church. He was warning about sending steel out to Japan and what was going on in China and how bad it was and what they did there. Walter Judd was a terrific guy; he later became a congressman.

I was in Japan for six months after the war. I remember one person said, “Your army was nicer on us than our army was.” They were brutal to their people.

AK: When you were talking about the Japanese in your school and across the street, were there other racial minorities that you were in contact with in quite the same way?

JP: First of all, I didn’t think of them as minorities. They were just kids. There were very few blacks living on Queen Anne, very few. The blacks lived in that central area.

As far as others, my aunt taught down at Cleveland High School. First she taught at Roslyn, and then after four years she came to Cleveland. She taught there for twenty-five years, home economics. She used to talk about how, “I’ve got to teach these girls, because these girls are mainly Slovaks, Italians, mainly Catholics, and they’re going to have big families, and they’re going to have to know how to cook, and really know how to sew. They’re going to really be on the line.” She was a strict teacher, and I had other people tell me, “I appreciate her now. Boy, she was really tough.”

But there was that south end area, an area where you had a lot of lower-income people, and lots of Catholic churches, lots of Catholic families.

AK: Was this the immigrant section, the area for new Americans?

JP: No, you didn’t think of them as particularly new Americans. It was just like in Chicago, you could be a foreman if you were Italian, but you couldn’t be a foreman if you were Slovak. They had these things. I wasn’t so aware of it, I was younger, but it was true down in Interbay, because the railroad roundhouses were there. That’s where Cherberg’s folks were, they lived right down there in Interbay. He was my football coach at Queen Anne.

You had a lot of Italians in Rainier Valley. That was what you thought of—Rainier Valley was full of Italians. There were mixes of people all over. But I wasn’t conscious of this.

AK: I just was wondering how much contact you would have had with people of a different background from yourself.

JP: One of the things was, I went to Y camp, Camp Orkila, and there were kids from all over in Y camp—blacks, everything. My folks really pushed me into the Y; they wanted me to get that experience.

AK: You might not have been aware, but do you think they were looking to broaden your experience?

JP: I’m not certain they had the designs. They wanted me in the Y because they thought it would develop good habits. And my father was very involved in working on Y programs and helping things.

My better involvement was two years in the infantry in World War II. Because I had bad eyes, I couldn’t get in any of the programs that all my pals were in. I really felt like I had been short-changed. Because I had bad eyes, all I could do was crawl around in the infantry, which was fine. But I quickly learned that I could get along and deal. I didn’t have any trouble getting along with everybody. It helped that I could play sports. You play on the company basketball team. It is a help—more so then than now—but it is a help for a kid. You go back to some area, and if you start playing on the teams, you’re no longer this little kid with glasses.

But I got along fine. We were very involved in the YMCA, and we had some wonderful leaders up there.

AK: I’m just picturing you with this, as you say, very stable situation, these long-time friends, your relatives, a fairly large extended family up on Queen Anne. And your close relationship with your brother. How do you think that has shaped your life?

JP: Well, certainly Frank’s interest in politics helped me. He was very interested, as was my father, and I. All three of us were delegates to the state Republican convention from different areas of the state in 1952. I thought that was pretty good,

the three of us all there. My dad was a strong supporter of Eisenhower, as we were, and got very involved in that.

Frank had been campaign manager of three different student body presidents out at the University of Washington when he was going there. Somehow he took on the thing and elected some of these people.*

AK: Was that the role he seemed to enjoy, behind the scenes?

JP: Yes, he was always the manager. You know, we were going to go into business together. During the war, when he was in Europe—he was a captain in Europe in the service—he wrote me and we got onto the idea that we'd like to have a newspaper in a small town. Be crusading newspaper people in a small town. We almost bought the *Okanogan News*, but we didn't.

By that time I was working at the envelope company, and it was going pretty good. And so he went to Yakima and was there three, maybe four, years. He had a printing and mailing business. He was very active in Yakima. He was president of the state Young Republicans, and he was involved in campaigns. That was always his

thing, to help people with campaigns, but never be paid. It was always a volunteer thing.

AK: Is there an important difference?

JP: Oh yes. But in our time, if you ran for office, you had a bunch of your friends and they sat down and did it.

AK: Did many people have paid campaign people then?

JP: As things developed, more and more. That's what we've got into now. Now, you have all these young people that are staff people. Maybe they don't work for campaigns, but they really do. They work for, say, a labor union, or this or that, and their job is really to be over hustling campaigns. No, we weren't into any of that business. We just helped people that we liked.

AK: Just to make sure I understand, you're more independent; you're more free if you're not paid? You can just choose and do what you like?

JP: Of course. We just wanted to help people that we wanted to help. We weren't trying to get

***Frank Pritchard** recalled that, "I got started in politics in grade school—campaigning for friends to run for grade school boys' club and was very successful. And I was very active in politics in high school and very much so in college. I managed Kirby Torrance's campaign at UW and out of that came a life-long friendship. He also became one of Joel's best friends. I guess the significant thing was that I managed the campaign of the first girl to become ASUW president."

Anne Kilgannon: What was it about campaigning that captivated you?

FP: I don't know, but I can remember in grade school being interested in city elections. I can remember very clearly when Arthur Langlie ran for mayor against John Dore, and the issue was to try and do something with the transit system, which at that time was street cars. Langlie got beat, but two years later he came back after they'd run some tests of trackless trolleys out of the Queen Anne Counterbalance, and he won. He was in for about three years and then ran for governor. He was an upset victor. I was very conscious of these things.

AK: Was that because your father was involved with Langlie and civic affairs?

FP: I don't know what, but I got hooked on it. It was something we talked a lot about at home. I wouldn't want to say we knew everything about it, but we weren't completely ignorant of what was going on.

somewhere, politically. We had no idea of running for office. I worked for ten years helping campaigns until they had redistricting, and a fellow died who was a druggist in Magnolia, and all of a sudden there was this opening, and the committee got together and decided I had the best chance, and so I ran in '58.

AK: I know your father was a Republican, but was it just a matter of course that you, also, were

a Republican? Did you really choose it?

JP: My father had been a strong supporter of Langlie and Bill Devin and they would be viewed as moderate Republicans. My father wasn't big on doing a lot of talk. He wanted to get some good people elected and he didn't pontificate a lot on philosophy.*

AK: What would have been the difference

**Frank Pritchard related that their father had been a Republican precinct committeeman, but that "after Roosevelt got elected, our family became very pro-Roosevelt. We talked a lot about it at the dinner table. Our father was quite active in the Queen Anne Community Club, and our mother was highly interested, too."*

When asked why the family remained in the Republican fold despite their support of President Roosevelt, Frank Pritchard replied, "We were Republican on everything except Franklin Roosevelt."

Anne Kilgannon: What would characterize a Republican, then, in the Roosevelt years, especially one who supported Roosevelt?

Frank Pritchard: I guess your heritage. I always had the feeling at that stage in life that the good guys, the honest guys, locally, were Republicans. Arthur Langlie had been a reform mayor, and a good one, and a reform governor. Bill Devin had become mayor of Seattle, and people voted for him because they were against Dave Beck and Dave Beck's influence when Earl Millikin was mayor. It was kind of the good guys against the bad guys.

The reason I and my family were strong for Roosevelt, I guess, is that here was somebody who came in and tried to do something. A lot of the things he did became unconstitutional, got thrown out, didn't work, but, by golly, somebody was trying. I didn't analyze it this way then, but the thing the country needed most then was hope, and he gave it hope. You just had this feeling that somebody was trying to do something, because it was an awful mess. He did a lot of good things.

I can remember in high school, on the debate team, I debated against starting Social Security. One day, I kind of thought back, the arguments I used are pretty much what's happened to it. It will balloon and get out of control. But that actually was a good thing, a great thing that was done. Roosevelt did a whole lot, and I still think very highly of him. He was a great war leader.

AK: So, would you describe yourself more as a pragmatist, then, concerned more with how to solve problems, how to move on issues?

FP: Probably. Joel and I were both pragmatic. I'd have a heck of a time if I were in the Legislature right now [February, 1998]. I feel like the Republican Party, officially, has walked away from us. They espouse so many things that I don't like. Joel and I were very pro-choice, and I can't see any reason to have prayer in school, and so many of these things they're all wound up on.

AK: And this was your party that you have worked so hard for.

FP: We've had our day during the Evans years. Our Republican thinking was the Party's thinking and we were comfortable with it. It was a little more inclined to have compassion for people's

problems. Government can help on some things. Some people would have them do everything. Some of our Republicans would have them do nothing. I think you've got to have zoning. You've got to have growth management laws. I don't mind paying taxes, I just don't want them wasted.

AK: The middle way.

FP: Yes, and the truth is, that's where elections are won, in the middle.

between being a Republican or being a Democrat in those years, say at the state level?

JP: In the state there were two things. One, labor—this is a big labor state. It was a big state. Dave Beck, all the people. And the other would be—but this really wouldn't have affected the folks that much—would have been private and public power. My mother's cousin helped start the PUD movement in the state, and quit as a Republican legislator and switched and became a Democrat. He lived down in Carson, Washington.*

But, my dad just helped people that he thought were good. And, of course, if you lived on Queen Anne, that was one of the few areas that, even in the Depression, stayed Republican. Now, the Republicans don't even run up there.

My brother and I came back from the service and we were part of putting together this Evergreen Club, which was a Young Republican club. That was our vehicle for our activities, and most of the members were similar types. Then the Evergreen Republican Club really got into the leadership of the Eisenhower thing in our state, and one thing led to another.

AK: What was it like to be a Republican during that long Democratic sweep of the Roosevelt years, where you were kind of out in the cold?

JP: You've got to remember that Langlie got elected; there were people being elected. And my dad voted for Roosevelt.

AK: Did everyone in your family pretty much agree with how the world worked?

JP: Yes, it was pretty much unified. It was a very strong group of people—always doing things. I never saw anybody drinking in that bunch, and there wasn't a lot of money, but they were very solid citizens. All college graduates—teachers. My aunt was a teacher, and my mother had been a teacher and then got married, but she taught for a year.

The cousins hung around our house because we were in Seattle and they all went to the UW, and I was sort of the youngest, with my cousins and my brother. A lot of times they'd be over there on Sundays. It was mainly because my mother did a lot of promoting being the center of the clan up there for the kids on weekends. And so, you're younger, and you see that, and that's another group of people that impress you.

AK: You certainly didn't lack for role models—maybe an over abundance.

JP: Maybe.

**Chauncey Price represented the Twenty-second District as a Republican from 1931 until 1933. He later served as a PUD commissioner from Skamania County and worked closely with Ken Billington on public power issues.*

CHAPTER 2

WAR SERVICE AND RETURN TO SEATTLE

Anne Kilgannon: How old were you when you entered the Army?

Joel Pritchard: I was eighteen. I was drafted.

AK: When did they begin drafting kids? I thought the age was twenty-one.

JP: Yes, it was closely after that they dropped it. And it was my mother's perception when Pearl Harbor hit that, "Your brother is going, but you're too young. The war won't last seven years," or six years or something. That was her thought. You see, the Civil War lasted four years. World War I lasted four years, and I think a lot of people felt it would go three, four, five years.

AK: There must have been times when it felt like it would never end. So, you're coming up, you're finishing high school, and you realize you are going to be drafted. How did you feel about that?

JP: Oh, of course, we all wanted to be. We all wanted to go into the service. What worried me was that my eyes would be too bad and I wouldn't get to go. You wanted to go, there wasn't any question about that.

AK: Was your brother still in when you were drafted?

JP: Oh sure. They were just in a longer part. He was at the U, in the OCS program. When they first had officer programs all over, training people,

he was in the program at the UW for a year, nine months or so, and then he went into active duty. Everybody went.

AK: Yes, it was the defining thing for your generation.

JP: Yes, and you wanted to go.

AK: Not that you had a choice, but did you want to go to Europe, too?

JP: It didn't make any difference. I had hoped to get into the Air Force when it first came up, or something like that.

AK: Was that the glamorous one?

JP: It seemed like it, for a kid, and then I realized that I couldn't do that. That took away any great desire to study because you have to study to get into the program—so I didn't have to study after that, anyway. The war took over everything.

AK: There was rationing. And all the war industries—Seattle was transformed.

JP: My father was on the Ration Board, which was not a terribly pleasant chore. For about three years he spent about four hours every afternoon up there at the Ration Board. He spent a lot of time at the Ration Board, and Queen Anne had these different areas all out there. Everyone wanted to do their part.

AK: Did you collect metal and do all those different drives?

JP: Oh yes, in high school we did. We went through neighborhoods with trucks getting metal.

AK: I remember seeing photographs of people with big piles—

JP: Oh yes, pots and pans and all kinds of things. I can remember doing that in high school, and working on a number of projects. It was very important. And that was a big deal because when you're a junior or senior in high school, why

wowee! You'd get to use the car, but everybody was careful with gasoline. You had to cut down, and that was something that everybody talked about.

AK: So you had to do your dating on foot? The war must have impacted every part of life.

JP: You did whatever you had to do. You have to remember that for most people, the war was a very wonderful time. Everybody had a job. Everybody could get all the overtime they wanted. There were lots of things going. When I say it was a great time, in a sense you had a purpose, you're in the thing, and, all of a sudden, everybody could make the money they wanted to make. People could go anywhere and get jobs.

AK: They just couldn't buy much of anything.

JP: Oh well—when we talk about the shortages—you could buy clothes, not everything, but there were lots of clothes. I worked in a men's store, a boy's store, just next to Frederick and Nelson, McCann's Boys Shop. I can remember, they were really tough on the Russians. I remember how bitter they felt toward those Russians. People had a lot of feelings. I just remember the McCanns because a couple of Russian guys came in and they said, "Dirty guys!"

AK: The Russians were supposed to be our allies.

JP: I think they were very involved Catholics. It's funny I should think of that now.

But the war, as I say, was a great time, but it depended on your age, and where you were, and who was worrying about you. So, at a time when it was dangerous and people were getting killed, all kinds of people had never had it so good, never had so much fun. The sports went on still, and the teams, and radio, and then the war was progressing. The first couple of years were kind of slow, but after a year and a half, after you got by Midway, Stalingrad, and El Alamein—they hit almost at the same time, then—

One of the things I did, I went over and worked on a farm in Ellensburg on the theory that it would make us stronger for playing football.

Three of us went over and worked.

AK: Baling hay and that kind of thing?

JP: Yes. They had twenty-nine cows and all that stuff. They were anxious because farms were short of workers. So, the three of us went over. These other two kids had worked there the year before, and so I went with them. Working in Ellensburg on a farm was a real experience for me, as I'd never been on a farm. People did that—people were doing things. There were jobs. They only paid us twenty-five cents an hour, but we got room and board, and I didn't care.

AK: Was it good for you, your development?

JP: There was some development, sure. You get stronger and you work all day, but it was a good thing because I'd never done hard, physical labor all day long, every day. And there's a discipline there of having to go out and work, and I'd never done that. Oh, I'd fussed around, but I'd never really worked.

AK: Well, not like that.

JP: It was a good experience for me, yes. A whole lot of people got opportunities or did things different than they normally do. It was nifty. And, of course, when you're a high school kid and all this is taking place, wow!

AK: You were part of a big thing.

JP: Oh yes, so the idea that we were suffering, that we had shortages, we were oblivious, really. Most kids were. There were certain things curtailed, cut down a little—it wasn't in keeping, okay. We had all the dances and all the rest of the stuff, and we thought it was a nifty time.

AK: Were you worried about your brother?

JP: He didn't get into combat, he was in the engineers. He went overseas about a year before I did. Yes, you're concerned, but you have no way of knowing—you aren't aware of when they might be in danger. It isn't like knowing tomorrow they

are going—I'm sure my parents were concerned.

AK: I don't know what your brother's experience was.

JP: He was in the combat engineers. He just looked so young to be a captain. People would come up to him and say, "Captain, how old are you?" But he was twenty-two and he looked about seventeen. Yes, your parents are concerned and worried about things like that, and I know when I went overseas my parents were very worried. They'd be worried to death all the time because we were where people were getting killed.

But, the service is a big ho-ho time for a lot of people if you got along. You played a lot of sports, you bellyached, and this and that, but for many people it was the happiest time in their lives. One, they had structure; two, most decisions were made for them. All their needs were taken care of, and they belonged. A lot of people have a terrible time belonging, but when they are in the service, they belong. They're part of the submarine outfit, or this outfit or that. They are accepted. And health-wise, physically and all the other things, it was the happiest time. They don't want to say that, to think back and say it was, but for so many people, they never looked so good, they belonged. Because you've really got to be a misfit—in the service they had so many ways of keeping you in line. So, gee whiz, they were doing it and there was no failure there. They weren't taking tests every day. They belonged. They were in the Navy! Yes, and they're being fed, and they're seeing movies and this and that.

AK: I have never heard quite this perspective before.

JP: Well, it was. It's true. They complained a lot, everybody complained. But the truth of it was, it may have been the happiest time in their lives because they belonged.

AK: Where did you go to do your training?

JP: Camp Roberts. That's a place between San Francisco and Los Angeles. It's kind of close to the early Hearst ranch, in that area. No trees.

By that time, the infantry was getting different kinds of people, because when I came along, which was pretty near the end of the war, they just needed one thing. You see, in the early time, twenty percent of the guys were in the infantry—line outfits—and everybody would have sort of liked to be in something else. That's sort of the bottom of the barrel, to be truthful. So let's get into something else. For everybody shooting a gun, you have to have about ten people behind it, so you build all this structure up. But by the time we got there, they needed only one thing, because seventy percent of the casualties fall on twenty percent of the guys. What they needed, then, were replacements for the infantry. It also meant that in our basic training—we had all kinds of guys that were good students and had pretty good IQs and, earlier, would have been picked off for all these other things. But there wasn't any need—

AK: Because they were already filled.

JP: Yes, they were filled. So, what do we need? We need replacements here. So, we had a pretty good bunch. You had a lot of people you could be pals with.

AK: So you learned to shoot a gun, and take orders—

JP: All that sort of business. We were there for how long—basic training is eighteen weeks and we got there two-and-one-half weeks before it started. I don't know. All I knew was that it was very hot, and they ran you around a lot, and it didn't take much brains.

We had a softball team and I started playing on the softball team there, and then about half the weekends I'd go up to San Francisco. I had friends up there. So you'd get the train up to San Francisco and you'd get back.

You just went through the program, and they didn't allow you to flunk it, you couldn't. The only guys that got pulled out were some that couldn't read. They went to some special language class, and I don't know what happened to them. That was mainly Mexican-Americans out of Los Angeles. Some of them couldn't read, and you didn't have to know how to read perfectly, but

you did have to know how to read.

AK: When you entered, what was happening in the war?

JP: The war was pretty well along. Half our gang went to Europe and half went to the Pacific.

AK: Did you know which way you were going to go?

JP: Oh Lord, no. You didn't know anything. In the European war, they did the invasion. They broke through and it looked like that thing was going to be over. Wowie! At the time, we said, "Boy, this war's going to get over, wowee!"

AK: And then there was the Battle of the Bulge—

JP: And then it backed off, and it got stuck. As I said, about half our guys went to Europe and half went to the Pacific. It was late—the middle of '44, and the fellows just got shoved in there at some very tough times. Some of them really got caught in some fighting.

AK: Is that when they were going island by island in the Pacific?

JP: Out in the Pacific the Japanese had been stopped. They were incapable of going out. We were now bringing enormous pressure on them—they sunk our ships, we sunk their ships, but by then we could build our ships faster. We just out-produced them, and were able to do it. We were now moving up. The outfit I joined was in Bougainville, which was the Americal Division, Powell's outfit. We got over there in the middle, no, the latter part of '44. Then we went up to the Philippines and fought there. We were not in the worst part of the war. I think we had twelve guys killed in our company.

AK: I'm afraid I have just a lot of movie images of the war. What was it really like?

JP: It depends on where you were. I was a good soldier—physically, I'd played high school football, and I fit in pretty well. I became a scout. We were there—the campaign lasted eighty-seven days, I think it was. And then I got transferred into a real scouting outfit for advanced scouting for the battalion.

AK: What did that involve?

JP: That means there's twelve key guys that are supposed to be way out in front getting things.

AK: Looking for the enemy troops?

JP: Yes. And we went to some sort of special little school deal. We were waiting to go and hit Japan. We were supposed to be out there. We would have taken a lot of casualties in Japan. We would have taken enormous casualties because, first, it's very rugged terrain, and right up to when they were in the Philippines, where they had no chance, nothing, you still had to dig them out and kill them, because they did not surrender. They were trained not to surrender. So, I tell you, our killing power at that point had gotten so great—the bombs, the Navy, the Air Force, it would have been awful in those islands. I'm one who thinks that dropping the atomic bomb saved a lot of lives.*

AK: Yours, for instance.

JP: Yes. I've read an awful lot about it. We didn't really have this world view of it, you know. We didn't understand the breakdown of communications between the cities that had been bombed, like Tokyo. You could make the case that you could have dropped the second bomb out in a harbor or something, but they only had very few bombs and they didn't know, and I'll tell you, hindsight is a lot easier. So, the war got over.

Then, I went into Japan. We were the first troop ship to land in Japan after the war. It was fascinating.**

***Anne Kilgannon:** I was thinking back on what you were saying, about how, when Joel came back from the war—I don't know if he was more serious—but perhaps he was more focused. Do you

think his war experience changed him?

Frank Pritchard: I think it changes most everyone. His war experience wasn't very long, but it was pretty intense. He was in combat. When you're in a foxhole and a hundred feet away there's somebody in another foxhole that's trying to kill you, you begin to think about things a little more seriously.

He always laughed that they made him a scout in the army. A scout goes on the periphery and is supposed to be able to see everything. Joel's eyesight was lousy!

AK: That's right. That's why he couldn't get into the air force.

FP: We always laughed about his being a scout. He never talked about it very much. He was like a lot of people who don't talk about their war experiences.

It was brief, but fast. He graduated from high school and I remember telling him—because I was already in the service—go to the University and sign up and get registered, because he was just waiting to be called. I said, “Even if you're not going to stay there very long, then you've got that on your record—college.” And so he did, and it turned out.

AK: He went about three weeks, I believe.

FP: He wasn't there very long. Then he went to Camp Roberts, and then he went over to New Caledonia, where he joined the Americal Division. He was in the 132nd Regiment, I Company. From New Caledonia, they went to Bougainville. This was after the Marines had taken Bougainville, so I guess it was just a mopping up operation.

AK: Yes, but I believe that mopping up was pretty fierce, because the Japanese did not surrender.

FP: I don't know if they had much fierce combat there. They did have combat on Cebu in the Phillipines. They went from Bougainville to Leyte and Leyte Gulf, and then to Cebu. I remember he was telling me that they got to the beach in the landing craft, and the gate goes down, they all start into the water, and shells are flying all around, and he turns to the guy next to him and he said, “Boy, that artillery is good.” The guy says, “No, we're in a mine field.” Anyway, they got through it, and he survived.

He told me one day that he was the only one in his company that didn't get really dangerously sick from dysentery. Or wounded. He did get sick, but not dangerously.

****FP:** Our understanding was that his division would be in the forefront. Fortunately, the bomb was dropped. And he was in the occupation there. He kind of enjoyed that. He saw a lot of things and had a pretty good feel for the Japanese people when he came back.

Of course, our family had always been interested in the Japanese because we had a few girls who came from Japan to go to school, who lived with us. They'd do the dishes and clean up the kitchen for that. We got them from the Baptist Church. They were always so good and such nice people. And we had a Japanese neighbor, and I played with him, but Joel more than me, because they were the same age. I remember several older guys down the street who didn't know why we were playing around with “Japs.” This was before the war started.

AK: But there was a lot of prejudice?

FP: Yes. I remember after the war, before I went back to work, my dad hired a Japanese-American girl to work in the office. The other women who had been there a long time came to him and told him they would all leave if he hired this girl. I always admired him for this, he said, “Well, he sure hoped they wouldn’t leave, he wanted them there and thought highly of them, but the war was over and this girl was going to be hired.”

The interesting thing was, a year later, these other three women, they just couldn’t say enough good about this girl, because she was good! If I have a prejudice, it’s that Japanese-Americans work harder than anybody.

AK: Why do you think your family was so free of prejudice? It was so common, so acceptable—just the norm, and yet your family doesn’t seem to exhibit that.

FP: We had the usual prejudices. My mother’s father was Scotch-Canadian who had grown up in Quebec, and he had a very bitter attitude toward the Catholics. And I used to hear negative talk about Jews. Not very much at home, but just in general. In those days they didn’t invite Jews to join this club or that club, all kinds of things. I remember my college fraternity didn’t have any Jews.

AK: At some point, did you just outgrow that, or did it just not take with you?

FP: I guess Camp Orkila had something to do with it. We had Jewish kids there. And Jewish kids weren’t any different than anybody else.

I had a Catholic friend in grade school. His father was a garbage man. We went down to his house and talked to his mother about camp. She reached up into the cupboard to a cookie jar and got out fifteen dollars. In those days it was one dollar a day at camp and two dollars for transportation to Orcas Island and back. That was a lot of money to them. Anyway, he and I went to camp. They always had a camper say grace or invocation at lunch time, and it had been raining for three or four days, so my camper friend gets up and he prays for sunshine. By the time lunch was over—sunshine! So I decided that those Catholics had something going for them.

So, I think our experiences in the YMCA had a lot to do with not being prejudiced, or having less than some others.

AK: It sounds like you had some experiences that could correct some attitudes that otherwise might not have been questioned.

FP: That was one of the things that kind of bothered me at college. You went through high school and you had friends that were Jewish or colored or something. Get to college, I joined a fraternity, and the fraternity system was strictly white and no Jewish. So, you kind of lost those friendships, or didn’t see much of them.

That’s one reason why I’m very big on the YMCA because I go down there in the morning to the locker room and there are just as many black men, just as many Asians. Nobody knows who anybody is and nobody cares what you’ve done, and I think that’s good. I preferred that. As a member of the Rainier Club, I could have worked out there, but then all you do is work out with rich guys.

AK: I imagine it’s pretty exclusive.

FP: Oh yes. And Joel didn’t have any big prejudices.

AK: Was it devastated, from the firebombing of Tokyo?

JP: Boy, oh boy! Because I was in this advanced thing, we had access to a couple of jeeps, and we went into Tokyo the third day and it was incredible. Just block after block of nothing.

AK: Wasn't the damage there almost as great as Hiroshima?

JP: Oh yes. And more casualties were there than at Hiroshima. But it was very interesting—it was all swept up and piled up, and the bricks were stacked. I remember telling the others, “Remember when we left Manila, the mess was still lying there after three months. Here it is all swept up, stacked up. These people are going to make it.”

AK: A different culture.

JP: Yes, highly organized. I particularly enjoyed the first two or three months of the occupation, being there and seeing things.

AK: What role did you play? What did you do?

JP: About half of our division came home, they were bringing troops home, but if you didn't have enough points—you got points for being married, points for being wounded, points for how many months you were overseas—you stayed in Japan as occupation troops. And I didn't have enough points.

So we got switched and became an outfit. We got sent up to an outfit building airfields. It was fascinating how fast—particularly those farm kids—could learn those machines and all. That's one thing Americans are good at. Up at Nagata we built an airfield. I was playing on a basketball team, so I got to travel around quite a bit. We went around a lot, so I enjoyed it. It was interesting.

AK: Did you get to see a lot of the country? What shape was it in?

JP: I saw quite a bit of it, yes. And it was amazing how fast, as soon as the war was over, it turned

around. Two months later—we were in Nagata, it's on the western side of Japan—there wasn't any damage there. Now, going into Tokyo, yes, we saw a lot of damage. But for the great majority, we didn't see any. The farms, the rice fields, things were going.

The American soldiers, for the first week, or the first few days, everybody was uptight. But American soldiers are so good at getting along, and the kids—just like that—bang! We didn't have any trouble.

AK: Did you learn any Japanese?

JP: No, and that was dumb. And I didn't eat the food. We had American food and all that. But we went around and saw things. After about three months I was ready to come home, but I was glad I got there for two or three.

AK: Did you feel you were a part of making history?

JP: I didn't feel that. I was reading a lot of books then. For one thing, the Army has great books. I was reading a lot. But, no, you don't have that grand a feeling when you are a private in the infantry. I became a sergeant, finally. I came home a sergeant. But no, I was ready to get on with my life.

AK: So, for you, was it more of an adventure?

JP: Yes, yes. It was at the end. It was interesting. I found the Japanese people interesting. I think that was because I'd been raised around them. I felt a little more at ease with them. It was fascinating. I thought it was a pretty good experience, but I was ready to move on.

AK: Were you able to learn much about their culture while you were there, or were you just kind of on the outside looking in?

JP: Kind of on the outside. But you go around and you see places and all that. And I've been back many, many times. I've spent a lot of time there.

AK: And then you came back to Seattle. What was it like, to come down the gangplank, and there you are, finally, at home?

JP: It was early '46 and I'd been in Japan with occupation for about five or six months. Our troop ship landed in Seattle, very nice. We got off the ship and then there was my mother and father. My brother wasn't there, I don't think. I don't really remember.

AK: Was your brother back by then, too?

JP: Oh yes. He had been in Europe.

AK: When you came home, did you have something special you really wanted to do?

JP: No. You have to remember, we'd been in the army of occupation, so it wasn't like coming out of the lines or anything. But we were anxious to get home, all of us, because we'd been gone a long time.

AK: How old were you by then?

JP: I was in the service when I was eighteen, and came out when I was twenty. I was in two years. Roughly six months basic training and all of that. A year, and joined the outfit in Bougainville, the troop ship took us to New Caledonia. We went from up to Bougainville and joined the division—the Americal—same one that Powell was in, except different wars. It was kind of unusual, it was a division formed overseas. It was the only division in the Army that didn't have a number, it had a name. Ameri- and Cal- which is for America

and Caledonia.

After we were in Bougainville, the war, everything there was pretty well over. Then we went up on troop ships to the Philippines and we were involved in the war in the Philippines. Then we were getting ready for the invasion of Japan, and then the war was over. Then we came up into Japan as occupation troops. And we happened to be the first troop ship to land in Yokohama, and it was very interesting. After we had been there for awhile, six months later, we came home. That was really the essence.

But it was a very good experience for me, because being a private in the infantry and being in the lines and all, I think I gained a lot of experience in dealing with all kinds of people.

AK: Did your experience change your view of where America belonged in the world, of the role of America?

JP: No, no. I was one that was reading the papers, and the magazines, and the books, and my father used to send me the *Kiplinger News*, and I would relay that to other soldiers. Everybody had ideas, but even then I was very interested in government and history. I read all the time.*

AK: From different things I've read, it seemed like a substantial number of Americans did not believe that America had any role outside its own boundaries.

JP: Oh no. We always believed—maybe it was because we had relatives in England—no, I always had a view that we had to be involved. If you don't get out and help solve the problems,

***Frank Pritchard** related that, "It was about that time that learning kind of caught on with him. Two trips across the Pacific in a troop ship, there's nothing to do except play poker or read. He did a lot of reading. He was a lousy student in high school. I can remember one year he'd gone over to work on a farm in eastern Washington, and I went up to get his grades, and the teacher looked at me and she said, "You know, Frank, if he weren't such a nice boy, I'd have flunked him." He came back from the war and he was kind of curious and wanted to learn things.

Then he went to Marietta College. But he's an example of somebody who didn't get much higher education, but kept on learning. I have friends, and they quit at the schoolhouse door, and even though they went all through college, they never learned another thing. He went right up to the end reading all kinds of things. We had lots of interesting discussions."

why the problems come to you. And sometimes they come when you don't like them, or how you get them. I was always a strong believer in our being part of some kind of an international structure to keep the lid on things.

AK: Do you think your war experience had any influence over your interest in Pacific Rim countries?

JP: Well, when you come from Seattle, why naturally, that's your focus. We look out on the Pacific; we have more identity with the Pacific Rim countries, certainly, than the east coast of our country. Then, going out there in the service, yes. Then, when I was in Congress, I was on the subcommittee of Foreign Relations for the Far East and the Pacific, so one thing kind of built on another. I think it was just a steady growth of interest—after you have an interest, why you read, and as you read, you know more. As you know more, you have more interest, why things stick then. Then when you see something, it sticks, and one thing plays on another.

AK: After you came home, what did you do next? What did you want to do?

JP: I figured I'd go to school. I was going to go to the University of Washington—I had gone there for three weeks before I was drafted. I had intended to go back, and then one day out on the campus another fellow, Chuck Burkland, and I ran into a fellow named Loren Schoel who had been a coach in high school and he had just become athletic director of Marietta College. So he said, "How do you like it, boys?"

And we said, "Gee, there's seventeen thousand students here at the U, and it's just so big."

Then he said, "Well, you've got the GI Bill, you can go anywhere you want, can't you?"

"Sure."

"Well, why don't you come back to our little school? It's a neat place," and this and that. We talked about it, and so three of us went back there.

AK: Just like that! I was wondering how you happened to go there.

JP: Both my parents and Chuck's parents were sort of taken aback by the fact that we'd just come back from the service and now we were going to turn around and go again.

AK: Did you feel restless?

JP: No, we just sort of thought about going to a nice little school, so we did.

AK: Besides a good sports program, what else did Marietta have?

JP: No, it wasn't a big sports program, not at all. That's why people like me could play. No, it was about like Whitman. A very good school, it was the first school west of the Alleghenies, any kind of school, because Marietta was the first town west of the Alleghenies. It started in 1793 or '96, something like that, before 1800. It was a very nice little school. It had about one thousand students, and they thought they had a lot, because a lot of people came back from the service. It was a nice place. We just went up in the town and made some calls around and got somebody to let us stay at a place, and it was very nice.

AK: Do you mean a boarding home?

JP: Yes, it was just a house. I lived at Aunt Minnie's, and next door were the O'Neill's and Chuck lived there. Then a fellow named Bob Clark went with us, and he lived with Aunt Minnie, too—so there were three of us. Then we got to know other people and made lots of friends. And so one thing led to another and after a year and a half, I decided to get married. With that, I thought I'd better go to work. My father said—one of the things he said was, "Are you doing anything besides playing football and having fun?" I intended to be a printing salesman, and I thought that would be fine. That's what my father was and he was the manager, so I came back to Seattle and really ended up working in the envelope company.

AK: So that is what ended your college career. I just want to back up for a second. Presumably, you did do something besides play football. What

kind of courses did you take?

JP: I took all kinds of courses. I took lots of history and literature. I took some religion courses. I had an interest in a lot of things, and I just wanted to advance my interests.

AK: Were you not thinking of getting a degree then? You just wanted to broaden yourself?

JP: No, I figured I'd be in business, and in those days my feeling was that I went to college to enhance my understanding of people.

AK: And did it?

JP: I guess it did. There's a variety of things—what you read, what you do, and how you interact with people.

AK: Do you remember any particular professors who had an influence on you?

JP: None that had a great influence—a couple of good ones, a good history professor, but I can't remember his name. I took a course in music appreciation with Jerry Hamilton.

And a friend of mine and I organized a campaign—so he won the student body presidency. And we were not in fraternities. I had belonged to a fraternity at the University of Washington.

AK: I was going to ask you about student politics. How did you organize this?

JP: I was kind of his campaign manager, and we started building around, and got him elected. That was that. And then we organized another campaign—for our crew. They decided that the college at that time didn't have enough money to send the crew to Boston, where there was going to be a crew race for small colleges. Not the big, big schools like Washington or Wisconsin, but just for the smaller ones. And we thought it was wrong they didn't get to go, so we went out and organized and got the business people and got the money. I remember the president of the college said, "This is really sort of embarrassing having you do this. It really makes things difficult for us." But we

got it done, got the money and shipped them off. And they went to Boston and rowed, and I forget how they turned out. They didn't win, but—

AK: You did it, though.

JP: We loved the idea that we'd sort of gotten in and stirred the pot.

AK: Why was this embarrassing, because the college didn't have enough money?

JP: They didn't have enough money, and they had programs they were trying to run, and we just got there in the community in this little town. I can remember getting up and talking to the student body at the meeting or assembly and making a pitch for it.

AK: Were many of the students returning GIs?

JP: Oh sure. Quite a few.

AK: Your class has always been written up as a very different group of people because they were older and more experienced.

JP: Yes, they were older. You'd have been in the service two, three, four years, and then had come back, so you'd have a real mix. I made some good friends and had some good times. We got along very well. If I had had hindsight, I would have stayed the four years and graduated, but I wasn't one who was highly organized. My father had only gone to school two years in college and he'd been successful in business, and I thought the key was having a keen understanding of people. I still think that's terribly important.

AK: Did your brother finish the four years? At the University of Washington?

JP: Oh yes, at UW. My brother was a very good student, a very good student.

AK: Did he also come back from the war and then finish college?

JP: No, he had graduated, and took a course for

his Master's degree, but the professor said his paper was too much history and not enough economics or something, and he wanted more economics. But he was in a ROTC program or something at that point.

AK: So his life pattern was a little different—

JP: He came back though and went into the printing business, also. We worked together for years and years. I was very active at school and then I came back to Seattle. My brother and I had the idea we would get a newspaper in eastern Washington in a small community, and we'd be a crusading, small-town newspaper. Be involved in everything and all. We came fairly close to buying the Okanogan paper.

AK: I see that your wife was an editor in Marietta. Did she want to be in the business, too? Did she share this dream?

JP: She worked in a newspaper and was editor of the college paper. And she's still writing a column back in Ohio. The thought was, well, she could do the writing, and my brother knew how to do the internal business. His wife could keep the books, and I'd sell the advertising.

But my life was going pretty good in the envelope deal, and then my brother went to Yakima for three or four years. He and his wife, they had a good thing there, and I thought he should stay there, but they wanted to come back to Seattle. He had some good offers, and finally he ended up coming back and working for the same people we all worked for.

AK: Did you know you would have a job waiting when you came back to Seattle?

JP: My father was in the printing business and he said, "Come and try this." So I did. When I came out of the service, I had an offer from Ben Ehrlichman, John Ehrlichman's uncle, to be in the business he was in. He was in investments and financial stuff. He talked to me and said I could work the summers there, and then when I got out of school, I'd join the firm. I looked around the office, and gosh, it looked very staid. Didn't

look like much action. So I decided not to do that.

Ben was a very good guy, and, in fact, asked me to run for Congress back in 1952, which would have been too early. But they were scrounging around, desperate to get a candidate, and they finally called back and said, "Don't bother, somebody just got Tom Pelly and he's willing to do it."

AK: How ironic. But weren't you awfully young to run for Congress? What was it about you that attracted such notice?

JP: I had worked in the Devin mayoral campaign, and Ben knew my parents, and he just took a liking to me for some reason.

AK: When you moved back to Seattle, where did you live?

JP: We lived in an apartment on Queen Anne. But as soon as we started having children, we moved to Magnolia, in an eleven-thousand buck home with the GI Bill—

AK: Was that a nice home in those days?

JP: Oh, it was an older house, one of those smaller and older houses. It was built way back—it's right on the start as you go in Magnolia coming up near Twenty-eighth, there.

AK: A starter house, then?

JP: Yes, but it had two bedrooms up and one bedroom down, and a bathroom and a basement and a nice back yard. It was fine. We moved out of there after about five years and moved to a house that had four bedrooms and two bathrooms.

AK: Did you have all four of your children by that time?

JP: No, because they were every two years. Two years, then three years, then two years separated them. Most of our friends had four—lots of children then.

AK: That's pretty intense, but it seems like that's

what everybody was doing. After the war, a getting back to “normal life.”

JP: Nobody came along and said, “Gee, you’ve got a lot of kids.” No, you’d say, “Oh gosh, there’s a lot of kids.” Most of my parents’ family, they had two or three. Then after the war, people had three, four or five. Then later on, it went back down to two, or what have you.

AK: Can you explain that—just an exuberance for life after the war?

JP: I don’t know what it was. Sociologists and all the rest— But anyway, a lot of our friends, some had two or three, but three and four were just sort of normal.

We lived up on Twenty-ninth, there and that was an average house. We paid, I want to say \$29,000 for it. Of course inflation moved along. We were maybe six or seven years in that first house, and then we were another six or seven in the next house. Then we moved over on Forty-third and paid like forty or forty-five. It was a

nice house, had a swimming pool, which was really neat. The kids just loved the swimming pool.

But I went to Congress right in the middle of the Boeing slump and I had to sell it—forty or forty-five thousand—and a year or two later it went way up. But I’m a person that’s not particularly interested in money. You’ve got to pay your bills, and live under your means.

AK: But you felt comfortable?

JP: Oh sure. I always made a good living when I was selling, and then as a sales manager, but it wasn’t my goal in life to make a lot of money.

AK: What did you do as a sales manager? I’d like to hear now about your work at Griffin.

JP: When you’re a sales manager, I had five sales people. The trick is hiring good people and then managing them well and helping them work. Later, I became the manager of the place.*

**During an interview with Frank Pritchard, he elaborated a bit more on Joel’s work at Griffin.*

Anne Kilgannon: You said that he was the first salesman, that before that the company hadn’t operated that way?

Frank Pritchard: They just operated as a supplier to wholesalers and cheap contracts to cities and counties. My father felt that we ought to be selling direct to customers. When we’d sell blank envelopes to a paper house, they’d sell them to a printer. Then the printer would print on them and sell them to the customer.

AK: So, half your business was going out the door and you wanted to close that loop?

FP: Oh yes, the profitable part. So Joel became the first salesman. The next one was Barney McCallum, and Joel was sales manager, and when he became president, Barney was sales manager for awhile.

Joel transformed this from a wholesale supplier to a competitive company. We had one other company in Seattle, they were big, but we kept growing at their expense. It became a very successful operation. Joel stayed plenty active in it.

AK: What was his modus operandi at work? Just the same as anywhere else?

FP: Yes, basically he always left the details to somebody else. His strong points were personal relationships, all the way down to the factory floor. He knew all the people and they genuinely liked

him. He understood the business and he also represented us very well at the national envelope conventions. He was highly regarded by that group. They elected him to their board.

AK: What sorts of things would this group do? What would be his involvement?

FP: It's like every trade association. You get together and you talk, especially with your non-competitors. You trade ideas and you can do better. You've probably seen this Tyvek they put on the sides of buildings for insulation? We were one of the first to do that with envelopes. They're not paper, you can't tear them. They're just a devil to make, but as a result of knowing other people in the industry, we learned how to do it, and for a couple of years we kind of had a little edge on the market. Those are the kind of things you learn there.

AK: I see. That strikes me as very characteristic of him—meeting people and talking and learning new things from them, and having the kind of mind that picks up on what's going on, and bringing it back. Not worrying too much about himself, but open to learning.

FP: Yes. When he ran for Congress, these people all contributed. Not big, enormous amounts, but it really made him feel good that they would. When he got back there, he picked up Herb Stone, who had been on their staff, and brought him on to his congressional staff, which turned out to be a great move.

Joel had good relationships around town. Back, way back in the fifties, Richfield Oil, which was an oil company, had a program about local growing or successful businesses. The program was called "Success Story."

AK: A television program?

FP: Yes, an hour on TV, prime time. Each week they'd come along and do a company. They were doing this through the Chamber of Commerce. Joel was on the board at the Chamber, and he got us selected. It was a big coup. This was our printing operation, not the envelope operation. As a result of his friendships and his efforts, old North Pacific Banknote Company had an hour of free prime time. Greatest advertising you could get. These were the kind of things he really did well.

He liked to leave the details of things to somebody else. This worked well for him and me because I like to do the detail.

AK: No wonder you're considered such partners.

FP: It kind of fit. We never had any difficulty in that he was working for me, because I was in charge of all three of these companies we had, and he was running one of them. That was no problem.

My dad was there all the time, and by that time I had become general manager. My dad had an office and he would go after people who owed us money, that didn't pay their bills on time. I never understood why he kind of liked to do that. But he did that until he was well up into his eighties.

AK: I think you have such an extraordinary family.

FP: We were fortunate, very fortunate. I look at other people who have gone through this where their father just couldn't let go of the reins of authority. My dad was just great at it, and Joel and I were big benefactors, I'll tell you.

Joel really ran the envelope company, and we had our offices right next to each other so that we were talking and checking all the time. It was a good deal.

AK: So, would you go around and talk to your major customers?

JP: You had some major customers that you took care of, you called on, you know. Drive through Tacoma, come down Highway 99, come down to Olympia, look at the bids at the state printing office, or Sunset Life, or different people who use envelopes. The banks, and all the different ones. We built a pretty good little business there.

It didn't have any retail sales when I was there. It was mainly wholesale and working through printers. I went up there and started as a salesman, and then we got another, and we built up to about six salesmen, and the plant. I was there twenty-five years.

I had some wonderful friendships out of those people that worked there. One of them was a mountain climber and he got everybody climbing. We turned into a group, and things like that.

AK: Was it a union shop?

JP: Oh yes. In fact, I negotiated the union contract. It was the envelope union, and the contract would be up every two or three years, and then we'd work it out.

AK: Were labor relations pretty stable at the company? These are the Dave Beck years. I was wondering if that had any impact.

JP: No, I thought our relations with the employees were good, and I had a lot of friends there. The printing union is a much more aggressive union and more difficult. The envelope people were not as highly organized. You had the contract and rules and regulations and all.

AK: Did you ever have a strike?

JP: No, not while I was there. You'd have, you know, contention over this and that, and work it out. I've always been a believer that you can work things out if you want to. Now, some things you can't, but I'm basically someone who believes you can work things out if you're approaching it with the right attitude. If people want to work things out, why, generally, you can.

AK: You were still pretty young, still in your twenties, when you began at the company. Did you work directly with your father?

JP: I started working when I was twenty-two. The company was owned by the family that owned the printing company where my dad and brother worked. It was the North Pacific Banknote Company, Griffin Envelope, and then later on Bank Check Supply. My father was the general manager, and so we were responsible for the day-to-day operations. My father was the overall manager, but we were under his guidance and we had to report to the owners. And then my brother, when he came back from Yakima, became general manager.

So, we ran our own deal, but we'd talk things over with my dad. And it was a great joy that I could—lots of times—we went to lunch many, many times. Then we moved the companies all back in together, put them all together up on Broadway. I had the office right next to my brother and we shared a secretary, and we talked over all these things.

My father would go to lunch with a salesman, and when he was out, my brother was the one. My dad stayed there until he was eighty-two and worked around, and took on chores that nobody wanted. We had what I think was a very healthy and very good association.

AK: I think that's remarkable—such a close relationship.

JP: Yes. My brother and I have worked together on lots of campaigns, and for the company, and all, and we almost always see eye to eye. It just works that way. I was greatly influenced by both my father and my brother. My father was as good as anybody I ever saw in dealing with people. He really liked people, and people liked him. He never tried to get the best of people. He was always trying to be helpful, and he believed everybody had to win something.

AK: It must have given you a tremendous boost to have these models in front of you.

JP: Oh, it did. And to grow up in that atmosphere,

and they'd talk about things—all kinds of things we would talk over and talk over. It was nice. But my responsibility was the envelope situation. I enjoyed the company and enjoyed the people. We had—it wasn't a big company—but we had a good, little company going.

AK: How many people were involved?

JP: There were probably fifty or sixty people.

AK: And you would know all these people?

JP: Oh, you had to know everybody, because you were involved in hiring them, and working with them. If they had problems, you tried to help them.

AK: Did you have company picnics and parties and that sort of thing?

JP: The envelope people did a lot of things—we had a baseball team, and we'd play sports together. We'd climb mountains together and things like

that. That was a great thing. We played a lot of sports and it bonds you. You become great friends with the people.

But the key there is being very careful and hiring the right people. I had my own ideas about that. I would look for certain attributes in people.*

AK: Could you say what they were?

JP: You'd look for where they showed some interest in something besides themselves. We were impressed if somebody came along and was helping somebody else, or was involved in something. You look for character and you look for stability. We weren't interested in fast talking salesmen.

You only are successful in that type of business if you have customers that continue, and you continue with them over a long period of time. It isn't like selling cars where you make one sale and then you go on. You've got to have somebody to take care of their problems in printing, or in envelopes. Something comes up, they pick up the

***Frank Pritchard:** He always had top-flight people working for him. Of course that's the way to be successful in this world. He had good people in Congress, and he had good people here. He didn't need many here [in the lieutenant governor's office] but many people get in trouble because they don't hire good people.

That was another thing he was great at in the envelope business. He and I both used to brag about it, but I think he was better at it. We thought we had an innate sense of looking at somebody and talking to them, and being able to judge whether they would be good as an envelope salesman or a superintendent or whatever. And he was usually right. And so we had a company of really good people. All of them knew more about the printing business than I did.

Joel went through life getting people to do things, and they'd do it because they liked him and he'd let them have the credit. That's important.

Anne Kilgannon: That was probably his most important maxim.

FP: Yes, it works, believe me.

AK: He didn't seem to have his ego first. That was, I think, an unusual combination, being a very strong person without having to acknowledge it or have other people always taking note of it.

FP: To me that shows great confidence, if you can hire other people that are smarter than you are about certain things, and not be fearful that they're going to take over your job or what you're doing. No, he had lots of self-confidence, and he always hired and attracted good people.

AK: He had that sunny personality.

phone and call you, they have confidence you'll take care of it. You've got it, okay. Don't have to worry about it any more. And you get repeat orders, things are all worked out, another ten thousand of this, okay, and da da da. That becomes profitable because it isn't just one-shot deals.

AK: I can see how that works.

JP: Over a period of time. The printing and envelope business, they're not big money makers, but, on the other hand, they're in business, always. They don't go out of business. So there's a sense of security, and you do it. That's why you have to be careful who you hire.

AK: I'm really struck by how secure your whole life was.

JP: Mine was very secure, very solid family. Aunts, uncles, people all over—lots of family support.

AK: You were just grounded with all these things.

JP: Yes, surrounded by people with great character.

AK: You could hardly but turn out well. Everybody knows you.

JP: Sometimes you'd run into somebody and they'd say, "Oh, I know your uncle. What a wonderful man. His word is his bond. What a wonderful man." Sure, those are examples. You try to live up to those things. And everybody's helping and everything, and so as a child growing up, you're surrounded by very solid people.

But lots of fun—lots of games—card playing, games, all kinds of games. And I was in some plays. My folks tried to encourage me to be in lots of things. They gave me lots of support, you know. The family enjoyed one another and were very close, very close. My brother and I, today, live only five blocks apart. I can't remember

having an argument with my brother.*

Not that we always agree on everything, but so often we do. One time a fellow came to see me about some issue, and he said, "What do you think?"

And I told him. He said, "Oh, you've been talking to your brother."

And I said, "No, I haven't talked to my brother. What did he say?"

He said, "I was in Yakima and I asked him, and he said the same thing you just said."

And I said, "Well, I haven't talked to him about it."

We just instinctively came at things pretty much the same way.

AK: I'm sure that makes a tremendous difference.

JP: It's a great help. Particularly when you get thrown into new situations, or things where you're kind of bouncing around trying to look for proper answers. It's a great help to have some basic guideposts that you work from. I always looked for people that I could have confidence in and tried to use their brains, also. And I try to stay away from people who maybe were quite smart, but of questionable character.

AK: I suppose you can find both kinds thick in politics.

JP: There's lots of wonderful people in the political world and in government. There's all kinds—really good ones, some of the best people I've ever known. But there's all kinds. You get to a place like the Legislature and it's very easy for a person to do dumb things, and let their ambition drive them into some places which are foolish, or take some positions that really don't make sense. But they are trying to please this group or that group.

I never felt beholden to any group. I appreciated anybody that supported me, but I never felt beholden. I can remember a lobbyist who came up who was a very big customer of ours at the

***Frank Pritchard** echoed his brother's words: "We were very close. We enjoyed each other and kind of enjoyed each other's successes. We worked together on a lot of things."

company and said, “You’ve got to vote with us.” And I said, “Watch me.” I walked out on the floor and voted against him. We weren’t about to—

Years ago, when I first ran for Congress, I was running against the incumbent, a Republican. Not attacking him, but running against him, and several people from Boeing Company urged my brother to encourage me not to run. They were very large—and that settled it with my brother. He said, “You better run.” We didn’t take lightly to people telling us what to do, and always felt that we were free to do what we wanted to do. And in that same election, Dean Thorton helped me and he was treasurer of the Boeing Company, even though other people out there thought that, no, they shouldn’t. It all dealt with the SST and all that business.

I think if you have solid reasons for why you are doing something, people may not like it, but they will understand it. The key is, it isn’t that you have to be liked, but you’ve got to be respected. If you have good reasons for why you do something and you can explain it, even if people don’t agree, that’s one thing. But if they think you are voting for something because that group is pushing you, or because you want this or that, or traded this vote for that vote—I tried never to get into this trading votes. It’s very important to build up that respect so that when you deal with outside groups, you deal with them on the right basis.

AK: Yes, it’s straight then.

JP: Sure. Slade Gorton was reminding me of something I said when we were first down in Olympia. We used to sit out on the floor. Our office was on the floor then. One night we watched a couple of lobbyists over there working on a legislator, and I said at the time, “Those who can be pushed, will be pushed.” This guy was being pushed because he had a reputation that he could kind of be rolled over. That’s the way it works.

If you have that kind of reputation, people get to know, then everybody leans on you. If people know that you can’t be pushed, but you’ll listen—not that you’re inflexible, but you’re not going to be shoved around—why then, they don’t shove you. It changes how people approach you. That’s true of all people in life. And it’s just exacerbated in the political process because you’re so exposed. You’re out there.

And people feel very, very strong, like yesterday, with the veterans, with the war memorial.* It’s my responsibility to do what I think is best. I have a serious question about where they wanted to do it. I didn’t think it was right. And that’s that.

AK: That’s what you’re here for—to make decisions. Make the judgment calls.

JP: We’re supposed to be on the job and make that decision. And, of course, when you don’t do it the way they want, why then, they are very, very unhappy.

**Lieutenant Governor Joel Pritchard, as a member of the State Capitol Committee with Governor Mike Lowry and Lands Commissioner Jennifer Belcher, disagreed with the site chosen for the new World War II memorial by the Capitol Campus Design Advisory Committee and veterans group in October, 1996. This disagreement and resulting controversy occupied Joel Pritchard during the period these interviews were conducted. He alluded to the issue on several occasions during the interviews.*

CHAPTER 3

GETTING INVOLVED: CIVIC GROUPS AND EARLY CAMPAIGNS

Anne Kilgannon: Your early campaign literature includes a long list of community groups you were involved with. I'd like to talk now about that part of your life. I was wondering how you managed to do all these things. Did your business allow you a lot of flexible time?

Joel Pritchard: Oh sure. Some of those things, if you were on something one year it gets on your political folder—

AK: Let's start with the YMCA. What kinds of things did you do for them?

JP: I was very involved with the YMCA from the time I was a little kid. I went to camp. Mr. Rennie, who was head of the YMCA, was in the bridge club with my folks. And then, my dad and mother liked the YMCA. They liked the people in there and they liked the atmosphere, and so they were happy to have both my brother and me spend a lot of time at the Y. We always went to Camp Orkila, and we'd go to sessions, and were very involved. I had, before the war, sort of thought I might like to go into YMCA work.

AK: You were a counselor?

JP: Yes, I went to camp all the way up, and then I was a counselor. Yes, I had thought about going into Y work, but then when I came back from the service, I kind of decided, no, I didn't want to do that. I probably wasn't that socially committed. I wanted to do a little better financially than the Y. I wanted to be in business, and then be involved. I was an advisor to the High Y Club and things like that.*

AK: Are you still involved with the Y?

JP: I just turned them down from going on the board, until after awhile—I'm going through this

***Anne Kilgannon:** Joel said at one time he thought of going into Y work as a profession, but then he thought that maybe that wasn't really what he should do.

Frank Pritchard: He was a Hi Y leader. He was the staff person who took care of the Hi Y group.

AK: Is this where his qualities of leadership become apparent? Was it in Y work that he learned to be a leader?

FP: I suppose. It started when he was in high school. That's when that kind of develops. He would coach younger kids in basketball and YMCA activities. Every once in a while, I'll run into some civic leader and he'll say, "You know, when I was in Hi Y, your brother was the leader of it." He made a lot of friends that way.

AK: I was thinking of his development, and of how being a leader with boys shows his people skills were present at an early age. But financially, it would have been tough. Those kinds of groups can't pay very much.

FP: No, as frugal as he was, he didn't think that would quite work out. But we had—and still have—a strong feeling for that camp and for the Y.

chemo [chemotherapy] right now, so—

AK: At least intermittently then, you've been involved with the YMCA your whole life?

JP: Yes, I'm still very involved in the Y. My brother and I just went up to Camp Orkila and looked at things. There's one of the buildings up there named after my dad. The employees of our printing company went up just on their own when he died, went up as a tribute to him and spent weekends up there fixing this place.

AK: Did your own kids belong to the Y?

JP: Not as much, because I had three girls and they weren't into it like I was. My son was in Cub Scouts. Part of it there was a lot of sports at the Y, and I was a nut on sports. I was not balanced; I'd play on any team, and all that sort of business.

But the YMCA was very big, a big influence in my life, yes. And my brother was president of the Y for three years in King County.

AK: So, that's a very legitimate listing for your literature. The Toastmasters are also on your list. Did you join them to learn public speaking, as well?

JP: Yes, a big thing. Right after I came back to start selling, a fellow came up there and said, "Joel, you ought to get into Toastmasters. It would be good for you. It helps you in your presentations and your sales, and all of that. It would be very good."

I said, "Well gee, when does your club meet?"

He said, "Our club isn't the right one."

Later on I found out it was an Alcoholics Anonymous club.

AK: Slightly different.

JP: "But," he said, "I've got another one." George Carlson called me—he was working for United Airlines then—and asked me to go up. It was terrific. Every Monday night I would go to Toastmasters and a lot of my friends were in there. We brought a lot of friends in—my brother, and a lot of people. I was in that about ten years, and I

learned speaking, and I had some naturalness toward it.

AK: How does it work? You give a speech and then people critique it?

JP: You had two things in those days. You had the one-minute speech, and that went all around the group. Somebody would get up and say, "Okay, the three topics are da da da, da da da." Then you speak for one minute. You have to have an opening, a body and a close. Generally, if you can't do it in one minute, you can't do it.

Then the other way was, you had four people that were assigned five-minute speeches. They could speak on anything they wanted, but they came in and had a five-minute talk.

So you went all around the room and did the one-minute talks, and they had a light that went on, and you got a sense of seeing what you were saying—"da da da and that's why I believe." And that was very good.

AK: Good practice doing it, and of hearing other people do theirs—

JP: Yes, and watching. And then, at the end of the evening, the critics—generally there was one or two—they'd comment on all the one-minute talks, quickly run through them, saying, "Look, you shouldn't do this and you shouldn't do that."

AK: Did you take turns being critics?

JP: Yes, but they were the senior, the better ones, as I remember. The four fellows—in those days you did the five-minutes and those four would really get clear. We had some very skillful, good teachers. It was very good training for me—to have that intense scrutiny in a positive, helpful way. I was in some speech contests representing the club.

It was all men at that time. But I went to the club, to one of the reunions four or five months ago, and it's now half women and half men.

AK: Do any of your own speeches stand out in your mind?

JP: No, I can't think of any at this time.

I can remember my brother giving a talk on why Harry Truman would go down in the records as a great president—because he did the four great things: he fired MacArthur, he dropped the atom bomb, he went into Korea, and he did the Marshall Plan. So, here's my brother who had been the state president of the Young Republicans, and he laid out why Truman will be well remembered. But he's a history guy, too, and these were crucial things. Funny, I can't remember any of my talks.

But, anyway, it was a very constructive thing. The program really went along. You were out of there, bang, bang, bang. It was six-thirty—the program started at seven, and you were done, and it wasn't any late thing. You were out of there at eight-thirty, quarter of nine.

AK: And you met all those people who had similar interests?

JP: Yes, and there were a lot of very good people in that, very able. That's another way of networking and making friends. You get to know them and work with them. That was a very active thing. I put some real time in on that.

AK: You are also listed as belonging to the Chamber of Commerce, as holding the vice chair for the Member's Council.

JP: This was not a big activity. I was on some Chamber things, but that wasn't really anything.

AK: All right. How about the Queen Anne-Magnolia Kiwanis?

JP: Yes, it was a group of Magnolians mainly, a few Queen Anne, but mainly Magnolia. A lot of my friends were in it, social friends of ours, and we had a lot of activities. Dick Brown, I think, was the one who got me in there. He was a great friend.

AK: Did you do social-service-type projects?

JP: We mainly did the coaching for the Little League teams. We did it properly. It was balanced and well run, what I thought was a very good way.

I coached a basketball team and I coached a football team, with two or three others. My son played on the football team and we didn't over-emphasize winning. Yes, a lot of good friends and involvement in the community.

AK: Was there a relationship—your family, your friends, your social life, your business—all kind of knit together?

JP: Sure. You'd do things together.

AK: You are also listed as a board member for the Methodist Church.

JP: Well, I taught Sunday school at the Methodist Church. I wasn't a board member. After we moved to Magnolia, we lived half a block from the Presbyterian Church, and the Methodist Church was clear downtown. So, after about ten years, we switched over. It was easier for the kids to go to Sunday school right there. My wife had been a Presbyterian, and there isn't that much difference between Methodists and Presbyterians, even though they think there is. There really isn't, unless you want to get into the fine points of predestination and all these other things.

AK: Did you teach Sunday school when your own kids were little?

JP: Yes. I taught Sunday school at the Magnolia church. Then, when I went to the Legislature, I couldn't. I did cut back on a lot of things like that because you have other things you're doing. We had a lot of good friends at the Presbyterian Church there on Magnolia. You know how that works—you have friends and you do things and it's all interrelated. It was a very nice community.

AK: I'm not quite sure how to phrase this, but in light of certain public figures these days who play heavily on their Christian roots, how was it in those days? Is this a new phenomenon?

JP: Yes. You've got to remember, these were mainline churches, not evangelical churches. I don't believe in using your religion for political advantage. I gave a talk to a group in Washington,

D.C. and we had great comments over it. The Southerners—generally Democrat Southerners—always played heavily, always played their religion big. I took a dim view of that and said so. I have some theories about that as demeaning your relationship with God. My theory is that you're living in your community and people can judge you as you are, and you don't have to advertise things like that.

But it's a different world now. The evangelical churches were not involved at all in any political activity. They did get started in about 1970 or '72. It was a major factor in Don Bonker winning a congressional primary against Bob Bailey, because he had some really good connections—his wife did—in those evangelical churches.

AK: I didn't know that.

JP: Oh my, that made a real difference in his beating Bailey, who everybody thought would be the next congressman from that area. I didn't have any involvement with the evangelical churches. My involvement was with I guess you call the mainline churches.

What else was on that list?

AK: I'm not sure of this one—the Town Criers—is this a committee of the Municipal League? And the Municipal League, itself? Was the League a Seattle group, or King County?

JP: The Municipal League was kind of a good government group. It was King County, well, Seattle really, but the King County area. I was on some committees for the Municipal League when I first came into town, that was something I got involved in. The Town Criers was the speaking element. I would give talks for things they promoted.

AK: A kind of Speaker's Bureau?

JP: Yes.

AK: At this point, isn't the governance of King County somewhat in disarray, with just dozens of different bodies, and no coordination?

JP: You had a lot more small towns. Yes, in fact, that effort was the first thing Jim Ellis tried to do. The League tried to come in and make the county government much stronger. They came in and tried to make the county government nonpartisan. That got into a big foo-fraw, and it did not pass. That was the first thing Jim Ellis worked on.

AK: Was it premature?

JP: Our city was nonpartisan, and so it was tried. But the Town Criers just took on certain things—government things, where they would take a position and we would talk to Kiwanis groups and different groups around. I was on the Speaker's Bureau for the World's Fair, a number of things.

AK: Did you have a specialty? Did you give talks about anything in particular, or were you good for any topic?

JP: Whatever. When Metro came along, I gave talks for Metro. Some of those were things I did when I was in the Legislature. I would often give talks, and I can't even remember now, I guess it was the Metro campaign on buses. I remember that's when I first ran into Slade Gorton. He was a brand new guy in our town, and he was doing talks and he was so good at it. That's where I first heard him. They said, "Gee, we've got a good guy in here. Really willing to do it." But, you know, he was single and a new guy in town.

AK: Do you remember what positions you took on these different issues, what the thrust of the campaigns were?

JP: Generally, they were issues that the Municipal League had taken. They were for the World's Fair, for trying to get the transit system—upgrade the transit system. Things like that.

AK: Was there an organized opposition?

JP: There is always an opposition for whatever it is. Maybe it costs some money or something, you know what I mean. Or, many times, there isn't, and it will pass. But you have to have people to go out and explain it and answer questions. That

was all part of my education, all these different things. You get educated in a variety of ways, and this is one of the things that helped educate me, was getting involved in all these issues.

AK: Would there be a real cross section of people in the Municipal League? As you said, it was a nonpartisan group.

JP: Yes, it was nonpartisan. Some were lawyers, some were people active in government.

AK: What did you think the role of government should be, especially with these issues?

JP: Of course I believe in more decisions at a local level. I think they are more effective. I think it's very hard to be effective when you try to implement things from a national level. For it to work, you've got to have the community plugged into the effort, and it's got to be a combination of local government and local people working on something together. That means that the people have got to be informed, people have got to be involved, and it's our community. No sitting there and blaming somebody and not getting involved.

In Seattle, the Municipal League and organizations like that have really done very well.

AK: Can you tell something about the state of politics in Seattle during this period, when you are just getting involved in civic affairs?

JP: I was very involved in the mayor's election of 1956, for Mayor Clinton. Gordon Clinton was a friend of ours, and we—a lot of us—formed this “one hundred young men for Clinton.” We had a very active campaign and we beat the old guard. Well—Allan Pomeroy wasn't so old, but he had hopes of going on to being governor. He was a lawyer and Gordon was a lawyer. And Allan was a Democrat, but the thing didn't break down along hard party lines. And Goodloe, who was a Republican state senator, was also involved in the race, but we beat him in the primary, and then we beat Pomeroy in the final. We had a wonderful team—we just had a reunion the other day—we had a whole lot of young people who were willing to work. We had a whole network around the city. And we surprised people by winning this election. Gordon was an excellent mayor, just a grand person.*

***Anne Kilgannon:** Were you involved with the Gordon Clinton for mayor campaign, one of the one hundred young men?

Frank Pritchard: That was a great campaign. The background on it was that Bill Devin and four or five movers and shakers in Seattle were looking for a candidate. Joel and I got invited—we were seen as guys that ran campaigns—and we would meet for breakfast down at the YMCA, a very Spartan meal. I remember we were having trouble finding somebody to run against this Allan Pomeroy who had beaten Devin four years previously.

I knew they were trying to get Gordie Clinton to run. I didn't know him very well then, although he and I had been to college at the same time. I remember before this meeting, I said, “Gordie, don't let them talk you into it. This would be a disaster. You're not well known, and etcetera, etcetera.” So, we sat down, and Bill Devin stands up and he says, “I think here is our candidate.” He puts his hand on Gordie, and Gordie says, “Okay.”

So we went to work. They said that they'd raise the money, “and you guys run the campaign.” The first glitch that came up was that Gordie went before the Municipal League and didn't get prepared. He did a lousy job and got a terrible report.

AK: That's rather critical, isn't it?

FP: Yes, and worse than that, the guys putting up the money were the founders of the Municipal League. So then, we had Gordie go and take on the Municipal League rating committee, and that

just made our backers furious.

AK: You were really making yourselves popular, weren't you!

FP: Yes, but we went on.

AK: Did you do that so the low rating would look less important?

FP: Sure. So, anyway, we got the campaign going. Bob and Bill Dunn took Gordie around to most of the things. The amazing thing was that Clinton had all kinds of people coming out of the woodwork that wanted to help him. Wherever he'd been in life, people had liked him—college, in church—big in church. We'd never seen anything like this in politics before. All these people wanted to help who were not political types.

AK: That was his strength—that's what he had going for him?

FP: Yes. We built just a great campaign. Probably the greatest thing we did is that we had a TV telethon the night before the primary. This was before these things were ever done, and TV wasn't that big then. We had to have it on Channel 13, which wasn't the greatest at that time, but they had let somebody in Pomeroy's campaign have some air time free, and so our ad man, Don Kraft, got tough with them and threatened to go to the FCC. So, they gave us two hours air time, the night before the election, prime time.

AK: Two hours! People would die for that now.

FP: Yes, we had this, and we put on all kinds of our people giving testimonials. We had Gordie on there. We had "Women for Clinton" on there.

AK: And was he a good speaker? Was he better prepared this time?

FP: Yes. He became one, not great, but good enough. TV probably didn't have much to do with winning, but it was such a novel thing that it really caught a lot of people's attention. We won the primary and beat Bill Goodloe who was running, and we were ahead of Pomeroy. And then, we beat him in the final, and oh, we were happy, I'll tell you. A bunch of young kids, and we'd done it!

AK: You certainly came from behind.

FP: It was a great feeling. During that campaign we met every noon up at my office. We had hamburgers from Dick's, and of course, Joel got indigestion. We met every noon and we ran the campaign.

AK: That was intense. For how many weeks did you do this?

FP: About ten weeks.

AK: Was this unusual, different from how other campaigns were run?

FP: At that time, yes. We did it more intensely. That's the way you win. That's the way I won

elections in college—doing more. I remember in college I started a whole new thing. We printed up tags that just said so-and-so for president and got people to wear them. We'd pass them out on the campus the day of the election, and that was so new and different. And from that we kind of got into doorbelling. We were very big on doorbelling.

AK: Was that an innovation, too?

FP: The intensity of it was.

AK: Do you remember what the big issues were for that campaign? What was it that got you all so involved?

JP: One, we didn't like the way Pomeroy was approaching and doing things. We thought there was some bad stuff going on.

AK: Could you give me an example of what you mean?

JP: Well, I can't remember right off, but we felt that Pomeroy was using the police department and we didn't think it was being run right. But Gordon went in and he cleaned up the police department and really straightened it out. Did a fine job.

He was from the First Methodist Church and also taught Sunday school there at First Methodist where I did. And he'd gone to Roosevelt and people remembered him. His mother raised his family—his father died, and she had to raise them. Gordon was in the FBI during the war and then he came back and was a young attorney. And we got behind Gordon and urged him to run, and got him going and he won.

That was part of a resurgence—we were kind of a fresh, new group, and we were taking on some of the old guard in the Republican Party. A lot of us were running for the Legislature, and then running Dan Evans for governor, another bunch of young people, a lot of it. We organized all over the state and that was a big effort. Oh, Dick Christensen was the clear favorite for governor, and Goodloe was in the mayor's race—a state senator people assumed would be the front runner. But we dispelled that.

AK: You're the next generation, the coming group. How would you have characterized

yourself, compared to what you call the old guard?

JP: It wasn't really age, because we had lots of people that were on our side. We were, I guess, part of the Eisenhower attitude. Progressive, you could say moderate, we looked at it that way. The Eisenhower deal was between Eisenhower and Taft, and that kind of carried along.

AK: Could you characterize Taft people versus Eisenhower people for me?

JP: I think they were more traditional and maybe older, maybe a little more conservative. When you have somebody new like Eisenhower who comes along, why the tendency is for them to bring new people in, and then the people who have always been there say, "Oh, well, here they all come. We've been doing all the work now, and now look here, how it's working." But that's not unusual, and that goes on all the time. Taft was representative of people who had been active in the party over a long period of time. We had some of those, but we also had a lot of new people. By and large, our group was a little younger than the Taft people.

AK: But Taft and Eisenhower seemed to have very different world views—

JP: Yes, in foreign policy. The Taft people tended more to isolation, staying out of a lot of international affairs. They were much more critical of the Marshall Plan, although by that time a lot of these programs were pretty well in place. But still, Taft took a very tough line on Taiwan. They were then fighting over these two tiny islands right off China, Quemoy and Matsu. I've been in China and you can see them from the mainland with the naked eye. But they had

become sort of symbols—of where to draw the line, and how tough are we going to be. Actually the Chinese had very little ability to cross the water straits, and we did have the fleet ready.

The Taft people were more critical of foreign entanglements, and this was not unusual. It had been carried back to Chicago in the *Chicago Tribune* and various isolationist views, the McCormick paper. There was a thread running through it.

But people had a lot of faith in Eisenhower. He had been head of NATO and had a reputation and a standing, and so I think people felt he could handle it if we got into something, and we weren't going to do something foolish.

AK: The Korean War was an issue at that time.

JP: Yes, the Korean War was in kind of a stalemate at that point. That wasn't such a big issue between the Republicans. We couldn't seem to get the thing settled, and later on that became a big issue between Republicans and Democrats. Eisenhower came in and said, one of the things in his campaign, he said, "I'll go to Korea." Actually, he settled on about the same terms that Truman would have. That's often the case—a new man comes in and they settle, and get out. So the line was established and is maintained to this day. I don't remember harsh or strong differences.

One difference I was critical of was the Taft people were willing to use McCarthy. The Eisenhower people didn't have much use for McCarthy, and by '52 he was pretty discredited, but there was contention. But a guy like Taft was smart enough to know that the guy was a sick-o, but he was perfectly willing to use him and let him run his course. That was the difference. The senators who supported Eisenhower, Hugh Scott and those, had very little use for McCarthy.

AK: How did you view all this?

JP: I was very anti-McCarthy. I thought it was very, very wrong. I was especially offended when he went after Marshall, who was one of my great heroes. I'd already kind of exercised my thing by helping to get rid of this guy Kimball. But still, they were saying that somehow they had "lost

China." It was so lacking in factual material, but these are the kind of things that are easy to toss around when you want to blame people and make charges. It's tailor made—oh, I'd hate to think about now—with TV, how they'd run these issues.

AK: And we had our own state version of the McCarthy hearings. Could you comment on those? Did people stand up to them?

JP: Yes, but the trouble with that sort of stuff is that it's hard to erase. It's like a microphone yelling out, and here in this state the Senate and the Legislature got out there and held hearings. That's when Ed Guthman won his Pulitzer award, because he was able to prove that this professor wasn't even there—he found the evidence that he was in another part of the state when Canwell and these guys claimed he was in this meeting. And I thought it was wrong.

And I thought Truman was right in firing MacArthur. Most of the troops out in the Pacific didn't care much for MacArthur, you know.

AK: The ones he actually served with?

JP: And that's an overstatement. MacArthur wasn't a bad general—he was brilliant in his restoration of Japan. He really did a marvelous job in doing that. All kinds of able and thoughtful things went into that. That was the high point of his career—I had a friend who talked to his wife, and that's what she said when he died. She said, "The best thing my husband ever did was the work in Japan." He was unusual, I'll put it that way. I have a book on him right here, *American Caesar*, Manchester's book. I've got a lot of stuff on him.

AK: In the descriptions of him I've read, he was very colorful, theatrical even. But he seems to have overstepped his bounds—

JP: Oh yes. Of course he should have come home. For a person never to come home—he went out to the Philippines in the thirties, and didn't come back to the United States until '52—planes aren't that hard to get.

AK: Twenty years—that's a long time.

JP: And it was a haywire deal—having his wife and children right there. Nobody else had a wife out there, and he had. And then he was very skillful—you can't find a general in the Pacific area—all you can think of is McArthur. In Europe there were all these generals. Not McArthur. The news never came out about any other general. His attitude was, "Well, we shouldn't play up the personalities." The end result was there was only one personality in the Pacific. One of the people who worked for our printing company had worked in the news—they handled all the news, sent it out—and they always erased all the names of the other officers—

AK: So no one else got any credit?

JP: Yes, his argument was that you were better off if you don't build up these people so that they get personalities, but his critics—like I—said, "Well, he didn't want anybody to be known except him." Who knows?

AK: Well, he had a tremendous ego.

JP: Yes, so we weren't keen on him.

But we've digressed. Now Eisenhower—my father, he hadn't really been involved in party politics but he really liked Eisenhower, and we did, too. A lot of us had been in the service. We thought the Republicans really needed a winner. We wanted to win, and it had been Democrats since 1932, and now it was 1952, and so we felt it was time.*

AK: The Republicans had been out in the cold for a while.

JP: For a long time, and it's not healthy in my opinion. But we thought Taft was not as appealing a candidate. He'd been a Senate leader, which is a much more difficult place to run from than from the outside. It's easier to be a governor and run for president, than it is to be a senator and run. As a senator, you've been in every battle, you've had to vote on everything—

AK: You have a record—

JP: Yes, it's much more difficult. And governors

**Frank Pritchard was the president of the Young Republicans in Washington in 1952. "I moved to Yakima and got active in the Young Republicans there, and was active in the Young Republican Federation, which was a statewide umbrella for all of them. The guy we had elected president moved away and nobody else wanted to step up, so I became president for a year." He recalled that he "spent a lot of time traveling around the state encouraging and trying to build up Young Republican clubs. That activity got me a place to the national convention. It was a great thrill, wow!"*

Anne Kilgannon: That would be the convention that nominated Eisenhower in 1952, finally with a chance to actually win?

Frank Pritchard: Yes, and it was a big landslide nationwide.

AK: Did you ever meet General Eisenhower?

FP: Yes. Because he was overseas, head of NATO when this thing started, there wasn't time for him to visit all the parts of the country, so they would have state delegations come to Denver to meet him. Our delegation flew down to Denver to spend a day with him. It was great. I was just a young kid. I got a picture shaking hands with him and I put it on our Christmas card for that year.

During the campaign—they campaigned by train in those days—when his train came into Washington, I was over there and got on it and rode it all the way to Seattle. That was very exciting. I met him again, but I'm sure he didn't remember me. Those were exciting days.

are administrators. And you have voted on all these issues—sometimes four or five times. They can always go through your record—it's impossible.

AK: But Eisenhower was not a politician with a record—a dream candidate, in a sense.

JP: We were in the Evergreen Club, which was a young Republican group, and we really got in the forefront and were very involved in the Ike campaign in King County. It was very spirited because the Taft people had lots of support, and the precinct caucuses were going, with lots of people at every precinct caucus.

AK: I got the impression that the machinery was for Taft, but the people coming up in the party were for Eisenhower.

JP: Mort Frayn was state chairman and he played it very fair. In many areas the traditional Republican organization leaned toward Taft, but a lot of new people coming in were for Eisenhower. And, of course, they came into the caucuses and carried it. Ray Moore had been a reform candidate for county chairman in King County, and he was for Eisenhower—most of the district leaders were for Eisenhower.

So that thing built, and there was lots of bickering and battling the forces, particularly the Spokane people. The county convention was very acrimonious, and the district conventions. At each one we had battles as to who were going to be the delegates.

AK: The newspapers called it very bitter.

JP: Particularly between the Spokane people and Seattle—very bitter. And then you'd have a battle and one group that would lose and walk out. Then it would go to the state convention. And then, of course, who had the most votes brought in the

delegation from whatever it was. Inter-party fights are always sort of like family feuds. They're the worst.

I can remember, we had a district meeting, the Forty-fourth, and what we did, we had a pre-meeting. We got all our people together—we had everybody organized—and then marched them one block over to the meeting. We had a majority of votes, the Eisenhower group, and so we sent our people to the state convention, and I was one of the delegates.

My father came from the Thirty-sixth district and he was a delegate to the state convention in Spokane, and I came from the Forty-fourth, and my brother came from Yakima. And my brother was an alternate to the national convention in Chicago. That was a really big deal for him. That was a pretty exciting time. And maybe in trying to keep up, why, I became an alternate to the 1956 national convention.

AK: Was there an unusual amount of ferment in the Republican Party at this time?

JP: There always is—in both parties. You have only two parties, not like all these other countries where they'll have seven or eight parties. If you have two parties, why you're going to have—at times—sometimes very bitter splits.

AK: And was this one of those times?

JP: Well, this was a major split. The sides were fairly close. Taft carried a lot of states. Then you had the South, which was solid Democrat then, but always produced a lot of votes at the convention. Most of the organizations in the South were solid for Taft, and he probably had Indiana and Ohio. He had a lot of states. And Earl Warren was also running, and he was carrying California.

AK: What about Harold Stassen?*

***Frank Pritchard:** Harold Stassen had been a county prosecutor in Minnesota and then became their boy governor. I got interested in him because Si Olson, who had been his law partner, moved to Washington and became a close friend. In fact, in 1952, I was still supporting Stassen, personally. But, of course, after the state convention when I got elected to the convention, I had to be for

FP: Eisenhower.

I can remember in Chicago at the convention on the final day, when the final votes were taken, I and another delegate, Bob Yeomans, that morning went over to see Harold Stassen and urged him right quick to throw his votes to Eisenhower because it was hopeless for Stassen. “Oh, no,” he said, “Taft and Eisenhower are just going to have a clash and not get enough votes, and then they’re going to come to me.” We looked at him, and up until that time I thought he could say no wrong.

We went back shaking our heads, and then on the convention floor Earl Warren, who later became chief justice, threw his California delegation votes over to Eisenhower and that put things over the top. It’s probably a good thing, but Stassen was a very exciting person.

Through my friend, Si Olson, I got Stassen to come and speak at the Yakima Rotary Club that year. And then when we had our Young Republican convention in Spokane, we had Stassen come as the featured speaker. And, of course, he being a presidential candidate, we had a big convention.

Anne Kilgannon: What was he saying that was so exciting? What was the new Republican thought coming up then? They’d been out of office for so long.

FP: At that time people looked at Truman as a bungler, a local county politician who only put his cronies in office, and they weren’t much good. We were going to clean up government and get away from cronyism. That was really about it.

It wasn’t until much later that we all realized—and I think all of us do now—that Truman was a great president. He made the big decisions right.

At any rate, at that time the perception was that we’re going to clean up this government. Adlai Stevenson was the opposing candidate, but the campaign was really run against Truman and the fact that the Democrats had been in since 1932. That’s twenty years. Stevenson was a marvelous speaker and wordsmith, but other than with very liberal Democrats, he really didn’t light any fires.

JP: Harold Stassen was running, but he had run strong in ’48, and Dewey had beat him—he had failed. And Dewey had beat Taft. There were three in that time. This time—’52—Dewey was not in the race, but was supporting Eisenhower.

Everybody watched it keenly. My brother was state president of the Young Republicans, and he was elected as an alternate, from Yakima. It was a very big deal. Particularly when you’re young, it seemed like, golly sakes! I forget how many delegates we had, twenty-one or twenty-two, something like that.

AK: While we are on the subject of conventions, you mentioned that you also were a delegate to the national convention in 1956. That was San Francisco, right?

JP: I was always trying to catch up to my brother.

AK: What was that experience like?

JP: It was all settled. But the movement was to elect Christian Herter to be vice president. I was the only one of the forty-eight delegates and alternates that supported Christian Herter. We had a little vote just to see—it was forty-seven to one in our delegation.

AK: This is the move to dump Nixon, I recall. So, you were just not a fan of Richard Nixon?

JP: I had gone to a conference—a campaign school—in Idaho in 1954, I guess. I’d gone over there and I was telling people how to do doorbelling, or at bus stops, or something like what I had done. And they had Nixon’s guru, I can’t think of his name [*Murray Chotiner*], but I didn’t like him and the things he talked about. This guy was kind of sleazy, but he was a clever campaigner. But I said, “Boy, I’m a great believer that you judge people by who they have around them.” I think you have to be responsible and not surround yourself with people like that. They have

a tendency to get in and use their connection, or—

AK: It just opens the door.

JP: I don't believe in that stuff. So I decided not to support Nixon. I thought it would be better to make a change. The movement to dump him was short-lived and didn't amount to much—it didn't go anywhere. But it's just interesting to note that I was the only one of forty-eight people that thought we ought to put a new vice president up.

But the vice presidency is always something that's sort of bargained around. We've had two hundred years of funny vice presidents—who's the one that shot Hamilton—Aaron Burr? He was vice president. But, we've had lots of vice presidents who have gotten there in strange ways. They get on the ticket in funny ways. Agnew—ye gods!

AK: So you took it philosophically?

JP: They are usually trying to patch up some group, or this and that.

AK: What did you think of the "Checkers" speech?

JP: I wasn't very impressed with it, but most people thought it was wonderful. I didn't care for it. I don't like that kind of maudlin talk. I remember I had to go out to a meeting on Mercer Island and talk for some candidate, and my father and I happened to watch it together because he was going to drive out with me to this meeting. We both said that we didn't care for it very much, but then we got to the meeting and everybody was praising it, so we laughed and said, "I guess we see things differently."

AK: That's interesting, to hear what someone at that time felt about it. Now, we can't help but view Nixon in light of later events.

JP: It was very popular with run-of-the-mill voters. But I thought it was sort of maudlin. But Nixon had been a vehicle to get California, and so that's what happens in these elections. They're always kind of a stretch, but that's the way it is.

AK: It kind of makes you wonder how history would have turned out if they had chosen Earl Warren to be that vehicle.

JP: Well, Nixon was the vehicle. They wanted to get California away from Earl Warren, and to do it they decided they would get Nixon. They were scared. They knew Warren wasn't making it, so where do his votes go? If they go to Taft and it's close, the best thing to do is to take this senator who had just won a senate race and put him on the ticket. No one ever pays attention to the vice presidential ticket except how does it help the election. Lord, the Kennedy people would have died if they had thought Lyndon Johnson was going to follow Kennedy.

AK: Was it exciting to go to the convention? What did it mean for you in 1956?

JP: I was fairly young. It's kind of a big deal. At that age, the first time you've gone to something like that—

AK: Did your wife go with you?

JP: No, it was fairly expensive to go down, and then you go right to the convention. And you go with a bunch of the delegates.

AK: Was it like a big party, or more serious?

JP: That one was sort of like a big party because there was no contest. You were just reaffirming that Eisenhower was the candidate.

AK: Was there no business? What about the platform?

JP: Oh, the platform—the only people who pay attention to the platform are the opponents. Nobody ever sees it. It's what you use to get on the train to go to Washington, D.C. and you leave it at home.

AK: Occasionally it rears its head.

JP: It rears its head only through the press. I never heard the platform discussed once in the twelve

years I was in Republican caucuses in Washington, D.C. Never once did I remember a person standing up and saying, “This is in the platform.” It’s a big thing to some groups and they make it a big deal and they push for it, whether it’s free silver or high tariffs—

AK: Yet there are such fierce fights about it.

JP: Oh yes. Battles over how high the tariff should be on products coming in, and you get things like abortion, or you get some other issue, and usually the party can buy the group off by putting it in the platform. But it doesn’t mean anything, because the only thing that counts is where do the elected officials vote?

AK: I understand that, but then why does it take on such a high profile?

JP: Because to those people, they come and they come for that one issue.

AK: Not realizing that it’s just not going to go anywhere?

JP: I know. But they don’t think so—

AK: Do they try to bind you to the platform?

JP: No, they can’t bind you. Well, they want it to be in the platform, and then, of course, the top candidates run, and they stand up and ask, “Do

you agree?” And you say, “Well, I agree with most of the platform.” I thought the best statement on the platform issue was a fellow who said, “I can’t change every two years, and when I came in, in 1972, there was a platform and I bought it. That’s the one I still hold up. That’s where I stand, and I’m not going to change my views every four years because some delegates gather. Now if you want to ask me some questions, fine.” I don’t know anybody that agrees with everything in the platform.

AK: Yet some of them are very long and detailed.

JP: Oh, they go on, and on, and on. Every little, tiny group—the Cubans in Florida—what you do is you write it for that group, and then they take it home and say, “See.” Both parties do it. If you ever start getting through it all, you say, “Holy smokes, what is this?”

AK: It’s what they call a Christmas tree. So you went down there, and you were a part of things, and then you came back. Did it give you kind of a boost?

JP: It wasn’t a big deal. It really wasn’t.

AK: To return now to the first Eisenhower campaign, you mentioned the Evergreen Republican Club* as the place where you first became involved. Can you tell me something about that group—who was in it and what you did there?

**Frank and Joel Pritchard also belonged to another political group called the Republican Discussion Group, which began about 1959. This group met for lunch, without spouses, and was less social in focus. About twenty-five progressive Republicans belonged to this group, many of whom became the nucleus of the “Dan Evans Republicans” within a few years.*

Frank Pritchard: I can tell you how it started. I’ll give you a little background first. Walter Williams Sr. from Seattle was one of the national chairmen for Citizens for Eisenhower. Walter gave us help when I was state chairman of the Young Republicans in 1952. I had tried to get financial help from the Yakima County Republicans. No way. They were so much more conservative. They were all Taft Republicans, and we Young Republicans were looked on as pretty liberal.

Anne Kilgannon: Are they your parent group? Are you the junior group, under them in some way? I’ve always been a little confused about the connection between the two organizations.

FP: The official party welcomed the Young Republicans when there was work to be done. They'd just as soon they stayed behind when there were decisions to be made. Generally speaking, Young Republicans were a little more liberal. In 1948, the county chairman sent a telegram to all his precinct committeemen, warning them against us Stassen people because we were "communists."

AK: Incredible!

FP: Yes. I think he really believed it. Of course, in those days, those were bad words.

AK: Dangerous words, even. People's careers, their whole lives were ruined by being so labeled.

FP: There wasn't any real connection between the Young Republicans and the party then, any more than there is between the Junior Chamber of Commerce and the Chamber of Commerce.

But Walter helped us. I remember he talked to me and Joel and said, "I'll pay for a luncheon if you'll get a group together and we'll have a little discussion group." So, that was the genesis of the Republican Club. He footed the bill at the Rainier Club for, I think, about ten or twelve of us. Then the thing grew in membership to about twenty-five or thirty.

AK: So these were just your friends, people you knew?

FP: Yes, political friends. Guys who were interested and who were, I guess you'd say, moderate or more liberal Republicans. We got people like Slade Gorton, Dan Evans, Dick Marquardt, Lud Kramer, Bob Leonard, Wally McGovern, Kirby Torrance, and George Kinnear—he was very active in it.

AK: What were the activities of this group?

FP: We'd meet and talk, a lot of talk.

AK: Were things very fluid then—it's just the end of the war, a new era beginning?

FP: There was lots to talk about. We would have people come and talk to our meetings that were interesting. We had Joe Davis, the head of the state labor movement come talk to us. I remember—and this just appalled some of the senior Republicans—that we had the head of the ACLU come and talk to us.

AK: I suppose they were considered pretty controversial.

FP: We were all very impressed. We had no idea what they had been doing. The guy really impressed us, and we came away from the meeting with the same attitude Eisenhower had, that if we didn't have the ACLU, we'd be trying to invent them, because the country needed something like that.

We had Dick Christensen come to one of our meetings. This was when he was first running against Magnuson for the Senate. He was a very persuasive, handsome, young guy that had been very successful in the Lutheran ministry, and probably realized that it was a good time to move on. He ran a remarkably close race against Magnuson in 1962.

That was the kind of thing that we would do. We would have speakers come in and talk, and then ask them questions, and argue.

AK: Did this club, then, work as a kind of clearing house, a forum or seminar to help form your

views and check people out?

FP: We considered it a discussion club. We agreed early on that we were not going to turn it into an activist organization that was going to go in and run campaigns, or have to do this or do that. It would be a discussion situation. I think that's why we enjoyed it so much.

AK: How long did this club last?

FP: My recollection is that it kind of unraveled, unofficially, about the time Evans became governor, because so many of our people got so involved in government. George Kinnear and Dan Evans moved to Olympia. By that time Walt Williams Jr. and Joel and Slade had become not only active in the Legislature, but with responsibility. By 1964 it had just run its course.

JP: It was right after the war. I think it started in '48. Yes, about then I came back from Ohio and started working in January of '48, and joined the club. They were just forming it. I was there when they were making the by-laws. My brother Frank, George Garber, Jay Adams—

AK: Where did you meet?

JP: We met mostly in the upstairs of Rosellini's 610—it's a restaurant. We generally met once a month.

AK: Was it just men in the group?

JP: No, no—husbands and wives. It was social. We'd have speakers, and then we'd take positions and we'd help candidates. I think it really took off in the fifties—it was really active. The members didn't all support the same candidates. They'd be split among different Republicans.

AK: Were you a statewide organization? Is that why you called yourselves Evergreen?

JP: No, it was just a name somebody started. We were basically Seattle people.

AK: Do you remember some of the speakers or topics? Would candidates come and make their pitch to you?

JP: Oh yes. We'd discuss state politics, and who was running for various offices. We'd have programs. It wasn't a real big club, maybe thirty

members. If wives came, and most of the wives came, we'd have forty people at the meetings. It was a real core group for the Eisenhower campaign, which started in '51.

AK: Was your group for Eisenhower before Eisenhower had even made up his mind to run? One of those early groups?

JP: Well, I tell you, we were encouraged. Two people, a senator from Pennsylvania, Hugh Scott, and another senator decided to test the Eisenhower idea—how much support he had out there—and they decided to get as far away from Washington, D.C. as they could. So they came to Seattle and stayed at the Olympic Hotel. They put an ad in the paper—they wanted to talk to anybody that was interested in helping Eisenhower.

AK: And there you were—

JP: They talked to our club, and they went back with the feeling that there was real support for Eisenhower. They felt they got a great reaction.

AK: Do you think you were a representative group? I mean, were there other groups like yours all over the country, or were you something special?

JP: No, we were one of many young Republican groups around the state—but it was not a highly organized bunch.

AK: I just wondered if you considered yourselves

sort of the cutting edge of the time.

JP: Well, we had some bright, able people in there, and we were willing to work. We had Henry and Isla Morris, Paul Gibbs, Paul Cressman, Jay Adams, and people like that. Kirby Torrance was president. We were very active.

AK: Was Dan Evans a member of your group?

JP: No, he was more active in the Young Republicans of King County, another group.

AK: Was it similar in purpose?

JP: Somewhat, but anyway, when the Eisenhower effort came on, we were very active in organizing. We had a big campaign.

And I had worked in the Devin campaign, Bill Devin, the mayor of Seattle. This was right after I came back to Seattle. They sprung me from work and let me go up there and work the last month of the campaign.*

I kept a letter from old Bill—I have it here—because I thought so much of Bill Devin. The mayor’s election in those days was in the spring, so it was in the spring of ’52. The letter is from March 18, 1952. “Although everyone in our campaign is greatly disappointed now, time will diminish the outcome of the election and there will always remain the satisfaction that we’ve done everything possible for a great cause. The part you played in the campaign was vitally important in the district organization”—and da, da, da.

AK: So your candidate didn’t win that time?

JP: Bill got beat, yes. He’d been the mayor for twelve years. Grand person.

AK: What role did you play in this campaign? What was it you did for which he’s thanking you so warmly?

JP: I was in charge of the district organizations around the city.

AK: Are those the people who go out and doorbell?

JP: We didn’t have doorbelling, but we had distribution of literature, things like that. But this was typical of what people would say: “I truly appreciate what you did in the campaign, and the spirit in which you did it. Knowing your father and mother as I do, the best compliment I can give you is to say you are a true Pritchard,” because the Devins were friends of my parents.

AK: Still, it’s nice to hear you are evidently living up to the standard set by your dad.

JP: Yes, and my mother. At that point, organized doorbelling wasn’t as big as doing bus stops, where you’d have people downtown handing out things to people getting on the buses.

AK: So—anywhere there was a crowd?

JP: You worked wherever the crowds were. In those days, why, if you were running a city race, most of the people getting on the buses still lived in the city. It was before Metro, so you could work all the city buses.

***Frank Pritchard:** I think Joel was involved in Devin’s loss to Pomeroy in 1952, because he got quite friendly with Devin. I had known Devin. I was active in his earlier campaigns. After he lost his first race for mayor, I was asked to study why he lost. I was just in college, then. I remember that I finally came up with a chart that showed that in all the areas and precincts where the average rent was above a certain figure, he won. All the precincts that were below that in average rent, he lost. I had this in color, plotted on a map.

Anne Kilgannon: And you figured this out by hand, before computers? What a lot of work.

FP: Oh yes. But this was strictly an economic thing. Then two years later, in 1943, he ran and won.

But my brother was very successful in organizing a mammoth doorbell for Tom Pelly in '54. He was first elected in '52, and then in '54 he was behind at the end of the primary, and my brother—who was just back from Yakima—headed up that effort. He turned that around and was very successful. They had big doorbell operations all over the city for Pelly.

AK: Did you also use radio ads?

JP: No, we never got into radio. The committee would have people to do the radio and do ads.

AK: What about television? Had that started yet?

JP: Yes, but the work we did was all organization of people: door-to-door, stuff that you could do for free, and endorsement cards. Getting people to send endorsement cards to their Christmas card list. And then endorsement ads in the paper, where you list a bunch of people.

AK: Seattle was still a town where people knew each other?

JP: Right—a community where people knew people, and they'd look to see who is supporting who. It's much more difficult now in Seattle. Those districts are big and people don't know their neighbors.

AK: According to various newspaper stories about these campaigns, what you and your brother were doing was somehow new and noteworthy. I believe it was Ross Cunningham who said, "The Pritchard boys were Republican organizational marvels."

JP: We had worked in the Peterson campaign, and we were in the Gordon Clinton thing, and we had helped some other people in legislative races. So, yes, my brother and I had a reputation for helping candidates.* But we never wanted to be paid.

***Frank Pritchard:** In 1954, Pelly talked my dad into releasing me to work for him full time. I ran a doorbell campaign for him in which we averaged fifty-five people a night for three weeks. This was really unheard of at the time. We passed out pot holders, forty thousand pot holders. We would only give out a pot holder if somebody came to the door. If nobody was there, we left literature. That really took a lot of effort and organization to get enough people every night, because it isn't fun doorbell in the rain in Seattle. But we did it, and he won.

The pot holder thing we got from Joel. He had started it when he did the Ted Peterson campaign that same year and beat Harold Kimball in the primary in Ballard. They had passed out five thousand pot holders, but we just took hold of that idea and went with it.

So, when Clinton's campaign came along, we really pushed on the doorbell and on postcards. We were big on postcards, personal endorsement postcards. We got people to send them to their Christmas card lists, to send them to their barber. Just a card with Gordie's picture, and "I'm voting for this guy and I hope you will, too." Nothing much more.

Anne Kilgannon: So using the personal touch, making connections?

FP: That and the doorbell and lots of bumper stickers. And endorsements—yard signs that were an endorsement. Not trying to put them on telephone poles or blank lots, but in people's yards. That was pretty much our campaign. TV advertising wasn't known at the time.

And the thing was then, you could get lots of volunteers, and truthfully, most of the volunteers were women. I don't mean for the doorbell, but for mailing the postcards. We would say to somebody, "Give us your Christmas list, and we'll address them all, then we'll take them to you and you sign them, and then we'll dump them in the mail." We tried to get them to put up the postage, but if they wouldn't, we would. Lots of women to help.

In those days, women didn't work as much, and they would work for free. Talk about exploitation!

FP: All of our campaigns were based on wonderful women just coming down day after day to the headquarters and working like the devil. On every campaign I can think of there were two or three women who just made the difference.

Now, they go and hire everybody and spend half their money on some hot shot from the East who doesn't care about the local thing, just wants to win the election and teach them to throw mud. Things are different now. But that's kind of the way we did it—with terrific intensity.

JP: Actually my first state campaign was running a Republican state senator out of office—Harold Kimball—who, almost everybody agreed, was kind of a bad guy. But they all said, “You can't beat him, and he owns the Ballard paper, and we can't do anything about him.” But we did run him out—

Yes, we unloaded him. I always believed that parties have to—if they get people that aren't any good in there, instead of supporting him and saying, “He's not much good, but he's ours” attitude, which I got from the business leaders in Ballard when I first went out there— Now, if the person just disagrees on some issues, why, that's fine. But if I don't think the person is a good person, then I think you should not keep them in office.

AK: For you, character matters even more than particular policies?

JP: Yes, and the way they operate and act.

AK: Was this your campaign with Ted Peterson?

JP: Yes, this was Ted Peterson. I was the Republican leader of the Forty-fourth District then, and we got Ted to run against Kimball, and we beat him! It was high, high! We really thought we were doing things.

AK: Wasn't Ted Peterson basically an unknown at that time, and you jumped him up into the state Senate from out of nowhere?

JP: Unknown—didn't know anything. We just got him to run—no one wanted to run against Kimball. So we got him, took him to lunch, asked him to run and organized the people and won it!

I'll tell you, we did have an organization, boy, I must say. There was a chairman for everything.

Coffee hours—see: I still have a coffee cup from that deal. Anyway, that gives you an idea of how we did things.

One thing we did—we distributed pot holders door to door. It was the first time we used pot holders, and I'll tell you, it doesn't matter what you have on a pot holder, people do not throw them away. And then Frank used pot holders again for Tom Pelly.

AK: That's a good tactic. What made you think of pot holders, out of the blue, or you just happened to have a lot around?

JP: People hang on to them. They only cost us a nickel a-piece, but they do not throw them away. Bruce Baker—he was in the advertising business—said, “Hey, a guy was trying to sell us some pot holders.”

We said, “Pot holders?”

“Yeah.”

“Maybe we could do those door to door.”

“Yeah, that's not a bad idea.”

And so we found that people kept them. And then we just had one slogan: “You can trust Ted Peterson.” Because you couldn't trust the other guy.

AK: Did this have a particular resonance? Was it pretty widely known that you couldn't trust Kimball?

JP: A lot of people knew it. We built on it. The senator had been very involved in the Canwell hearings and all this business, and he sort of thought of himself as the Joe McCarthy of Puget Sound. We didn't take to that very kindly, so we booted him out.

AK: Was he involved with the UW hearings, out there accusing people of all kinds of things?

JP: Yes. When the Senate went after that, he was part of that Senate gang. And then, of course, when they redistricted Magnolia away from the Forty-fourth District four years later, and he turned around and ran as a Democrat and got elected back into the state Senate, because without Magnolia, the district went Demo, and he went and ran.

He had also been a key person for Pomeroy, the mayor's operation—and had been the staff director for Pomeroy—and had done some, what we thought, weren't very good things when he was there. He was just an enormous pain in the neck to Governor Langlie, and we were strong supporters of Governor Langlie, so we felt we had plenty of good grounds. But those were very exciting times.

AK: Just to be clear, this campaign was in 1954, and when did you become the Republican district leader?

JP: I came right after Eisenhower took over. Ray Moore called me—he later became a Democratic senator, but he was King County chair of the Republicans then—and asked me to do it. So I had a lot of good, young people and we organized and had a lot of activity.

AK: You are about twenty-eight, twenty-nine years old then, and you had already made a name for yourself?

JP: Well, I don't know about name, but I had no intention of running for office, no, no.

AK: But you liked the campaigning—

JP: We were helping other people run. Some people play golf, some people—

My brother helped people run for office, too, but he was in Yakima during this campaign for Peterson.

AK: About this time your brother was elected or appointed assistant chief clerk of the House of Representatives. How did that come about?

JP: That was in '53. I was at a Toastmasters meeting and George Carlson came in and said,

“Too bad your brother didn't take that job.”

And I said, “What job?”

And he said, “Mort [*Frayn*] thought he ought to be assistant chief clerk of the House.” Mort was going to be Speaker. He said, “Frank ought to come down and be assistant chief clerk because we need somebody to do the nuts and bolts. We've got a guy who's going to be doing other stuff. We need somebody that we can really trust, you know.”

And I said, “Well, he's pretty busy over there. What was the pay?”

They said, “It pays forty dollars per day.”

And I said, “You're kidding! Forty dollars a day! Wow!”

AK: Was that a good amount for that time?

JP: Oh boy! And seven days a week. Oh, my gosh! I said, “Why did he turn it down? Did he know it paid that much?”

“No, but he just said he couldn't get away.”

I said, “Well, just a minute.” I got up right out of the Toastmasters meeting, went out and got on the phone and called him. I said, “Frank did you know—?”

There was sort of a silence. “Oh, my gosh, no.”

I said, “Well, let me see if I can hold it for a day, or see if they've already done it.”

Frank said, “I'll really think about it.”

So, I came back and talked to George and George said, “Oh no, we can hold it a day, because Mort really would like to have Frank.”

Then Frank worked it out so he could do it, and from that, he came back to the west side. So he was over here.

AK: Did he move back then, or was this just during session?

JP: Just for three months—after that this place closed down. There wasn't anybody here. They just closed the whole place down. But he was there for three months and it was an interesting experience for him.

AK: Frank was elected to this position unanimously. Both Democrats and Republicans sup-

ported his appointment, and the press wrote that up as if that was unusual.

JP: I don't know. I know Sid Snyder worked here at the time and thought very highly of him. Another campaign I remember was for Congressman-at-large in '56. This was for Phil Evans, because he was a friend of mine. He was the head of the World Affairs Council.

AK: I see that you were also a member of that group. Were you very involved with that organization?

JP: No, I just helped Phil. I did work hard in that election, but we couldn't beat the Magnuson name—even though this guy Don Magnuson wasn't a relation of Maggie's. And he had a lot of personal problems—Don did—he drank too much, and he played poker, and he thought he was the greatest poker player, and he had debts all over Washington, D.C., betting debts and gambling debts. It was kind of sad.

AK: Not very sustainable.

JP: No, but he was in a Democratic district and it was quite awhile before they dumped him.

AK: So your friend Phil was not successful?

JP: He didn't win, no, but I did work hard in that election.

AK: What were the important issues in these campaigns, all through these years in the early and mid-fifties? What positions were the parties taking?

JP: This was the time of Dave Beck—all of that time. I wasn't very keen on the Teamsters. I felt that in this area they were very powerful and I thought they had too large an influence in the Democratic Party in our state.

And there was a big push also on public and private power. There was a big push to take what the TVA did and replicate it here with the CVA, Columbia Valley Authority, and take over almost all the power arrangements. I thought Bonneville

was enough, and I wasn't very keen on it.

I was a very strong proponent of NATO and world cooperation. I supported the Korean War, going into Korea. I thought it was the right decision. It was a different situation from Vietnam. It was a total thing—it was a U.N. situation. We went in with British troops, Australian troops, Turkish troops. There was a general policy. When we went into Vietnam, we went in all on our own, a much different thing.

But in the Republican Party, like we said, there was a split between the isolationists and the world view people.

AK: Well, you are more definitely in the second camp.

JP: That's right. I thought the isolationists were short-sighted. I thought in the long run that problems come home to haunt you and you'd better be out there helping to solve them because we were getting into the spot where we were having to pick up the pieces when these things went haywire.

AK: The United States was the world power then. It comes with a certain amount of responsibility.

JP: That's right, and you play your part. And we still have this—vestiges of isolationism. People like Perot, who I have very little regard for. I'm not a Perot fan. I thought if they had run Dick Lamb, he'd have brought up some very legitimate issues. Too bad Perot wasn't about three inches taller—he'd have gotten over that Napoleonic complex he's got. He talked right out here on the Capitol steps. I listened to him through the windows. I thought he said nothing.

If Perot hadn't been in the race, Clinton wouldn't have won. That's right. Bush would have won. But Perot had a personal thing against the Bushes. Remember, he came out with that charge about how they'd done things that upset his daughter's wedding?

AK: Yes, I remember thinking that was rather strange.

JP: This guy took this all out on George Bush,

who is one of the nicest men I've ever known. He and his wife, they don't even think in terms of being nasty and difficult, and all that. Later on, history will treat them much better.

AK: Every era reworks these issues. I've been reading the Stephen Ambrose book on Eisenhower and one of the most complex issues of this period that he dealt with was the rise of the civil rights movement. I think many people think the movement began in the sixties, but it was really the fifties that saw this rise, with *Brown versus the Topeka Board of Education* and other events.

JP: The fifties, you bet. Eisenhower was the one who really stood up on those civil rights things in Little Rock, wasn't it, against Governor Faubus? And down in Louisiana. Eisenhower was, I thought, very sound on civil rights. You can get into this whole business of how fast do you move? Then you get into arguments—it's endless.

AK: While I was reading, I was reflecting on the paper you gave me on Republican principles, about the one saying, "The government closest to the people is the best government."

JP: The most effective government, yes.

AK: For these civil rights issues, what would have been the best level of government? Eisenhower maintained the stance of, "Let the states handle it," but how would that work in the South where it was those very governors who were the problem? I was wondering how you reconciled these issues?

JP: That's the argument that was always made against doing anything from the state level. "Oh well, you can't trust Louisiana, therefore we'll have to do it." Yes, you set the law and the policy, but the bureau, the employees, the whole mechanism and the money coming in, it was all done at the national level. And so often it wasn't done very well. If you take the Great Society programs, they were setting policy. Lyndon Johnson came in with a whole lot of programs, and if you go back and look at them, most of them land somewhere in between disappointment and

utter failure.

But that came about because there was growth—after Eisenhower got out, he was the last president to have a balanced budget—because we had bracket creep in the income tax. If every year you have inflation, more and more people move into higher brackets, so the government takes more money without the senators having to vote on it. Maggie, Jackson, myself, anybody who was back there all that time never voted for an increase in the income tax. And yet you had about a ten percent growth of government every year. That gave the federal government a money stream—and so what do you do with it? That's where the Great Society programs came on.

Then congressmen found out that as long as you didn't have to vote for a tax, then you got judged on how much you brought home to the district. So, it was a game of how much pork you could bring home, and if you could, you got re-elected. People would talk about the deficit or back door spending, but nobody paid any attention to it.

Now, Eisenhower had some programs he spent money on like the interstate highway. It was a great program. They put it right on the gas tax, which is a very appropriate place. It makes a lot sense.

AK: It would pay for itself?

JP: Sure. People are going to drive their cars and they want to get there. Just like New Zealand where no-fault insurance is covered right at the gas pump. The more gas you use, it just covers your no-fault insurance. Everybody has it—it's paid right out of the gas.

And Eisenhower—he didn't muck around with a lot of little things. Oh, and he had a great technique for fooling the press. He acted like he didn't understand things very well. But then later on, when they got reading his own notes and things he'd kept track of, they found he understood them perfectly. But he didn't like to talk to the press very much, but he didn't try to magoozle them. He just fluffed it.

But on the important things, like security issues and things like that, he was extremely strong and very good. He went into Lebanon with

16,000 troops. They had a fluff-up there and he went in, put 16,000 troops in there, stabilized it, and then took them all home. He got them all out of there.

And when the Suez thing came up, he told the British and he told France to get out, and they had to get out. And they were bitter about that.

AK: That was a big rift among the former allies.

JP: Eisenhower wanted to get those colonies back to self-government, back to the people of those countries. He believed in that policy, as did

Roosevelt. That was a policy of Roosevelt, but Eisenhower carried that along, and at times it was a little tough for some of our allies to understand. And when the French wanted us to go into Dien Bien Phu, and back them up in Vietnam, Eisenhower wouldn't do it. He wouldn't get in there. He didn't want to muck around on the mainland of China, Southeast Asia.

Sorry, I got sidetracked.

AK: Getting this national picture really helps. These are the things that people were very concerned with in those days.

FURTHER THOUGHTS

KIRBY TORRANCE

EVERGREEN REPUBLICAN CLUB

Kirby Torrance, a longtime friend of Joel Pritchard, was interviewed August 24, 1999. Mr. Torrance became acquainted with Joel Pritchard through his brother Frank. He recalled that, "My fraternity, SAE, wanted me to run for president of the student body at the University of Washington in 1942, and we decided that I would do that. I had heard of Frank Pritchard as a guy who was a political organizer and he had been the campaign manager for a previous student body president and that fellow had been elected. I didn't know Frank, but his fraternity was just across the street from mine. I walked across the street and introduced myself and said, "This is what I want to do, and would you be my campaign manager?" It wasn't too long after that he agreed to do that. That was a successful campaign, and it was very exciting for me. It turned out to be an exciting time to be president of the student body. I was grateful to everybody who helped me to get elected, and Frank, of course, was the manager. And then some years went by, and Frank went into the service and I went in the service, and then we came back after World War II. I don't think that I met Joel until then, but it was through Frank."

Kirby Torrance: I might have met him about the time that the Evergreen Republican Club was formed. A number of people of our era were

interested in political matters in the city or state level, even the national level. We formed an organization to see what we could do to help in political matters and we met monthly for dinner for I don't know for how many years. The club started out with just a few members and then some other people joined up over time.

Anne Kilgannon: Were you the first president?

KT: No, I was president another year. Evergreen went on for several years, and then it gradually ceased to exist, but I don't remember who the first president was. It was somewhere in those early stages that I met Joel. We discussed issues; it reminds me of the modern day Allied Arts, where they have things come up, and they discuss the issues, whether they are good or bad and do we have something to add to it or subtract from it, or whatever.

AK: Did you make statements to the press, or would you go outside your own circle in any sense?

KT: Not particularly. It was sort of an idealistic thing for quite a while. We didn't involve the press. I guess we didn't exclude the press, but in the beginning we were not influential enough to be considered by the press.

We were motivated mainly by sort of an idealistic attitude toward trying to improve the way we do things in government. One of the first issues that came up was the presidency. I think that we all thought that Harold Stassen was a nice guy—honorable, and he had already been an unsuccessful candidate for president of the United States. We were interested in Stassen, but he wasn't going to be a successful candidate. I think that was what we kind of agreed on, that although he was a good man, we didn't think he was electable. But it came up then who the Republican nominee would be. It was between Taft and Eisenhower, and the hard-core Republican people were all in favor of Taft, and our group was in favor of Eisenhower.

AK: What was it about Eisenhower that appealed to you especially? Or you just didn't like Robert Taft?

KT: I think we felt that Taft was too conservative. General Eisenhower was highly electable. I think, from an idealistic standpoint, we thought that Eisenhower would lend stability to our government, and that Eisenhower would have a fresh look at things.

This was right after the war, and Eisenhower was not a politician and in a sense that was an advantage, because we thought he would be open-minded about modern-day issues. And there was no question that he was a hero for those of us that were in the service. You know what I mean—Eisenhower was our guy.

As I remember, it had to go to the state convention. We had to have a consensus of opinion from our state as to who we were backing. We were for Eisenhower—it was somewhat nonconformist to do so. By this time we were beginning to get recognized as a group that knew

something about what we were doing. So we voted in our club and officially endorsed Eisenhower, and we were the first ones in the state of Washington to do so, and it caused quite a little stir among people who were interested in political affairs.

Over time, a lot of Evergreen Republican people got into politics directly one way or another. We were all active in political campaigns. Doorbelling became a fine occupation! Joel was in the Legislature, Eugene Wright was a judge, Frank James eventually became a judge with the endorsement of Evergreen, and George Kinnear was elected to a state office. Jim Andersen went into the Legislature and later became a Washington State Supreme Court judge. George Morry became Seattle Postmaster, appointed by President Eisenhower. There were quite a few. I followed that with interest.

CHAPTER 4

REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE THIRTY-SIXTH DISTRICT

Anne Kilgannon: I'd like to begin this discussion with your decision to run for the Legislature. Earlier you had said that although you were very involved with Republican campaigns and organizational matters, that you had no thought of office for yourself. What prompted you to change your mind?

Joel Pritchard: I had no intention of running, but what brought it about was they had redistricting and they cut Magnolia out of the Forty-fourth and attached it to the Thirty-sixth District. The Thirty-sixth District was a solid Republican district, which had sent Republicans to Olympia even in the Depression.

AK: Yes, it had been solidly Republican for years—it went briefly Democrat in '35 and '37, and then switched back to Republicans, and was all Republican until 1973 when it began to transition. By 1983 it was a Democratic area, but certainly during your time it was a Republican seat. So that was pretty safe.

JP: Oh yes. I didn't do any campaigning, except the first time. The first time was a big campaign because I ran against an incumbent.

AK: For the primary?

JP: For the primary—that's what it was—a battle in the primary. Like I said, I had no intention of running, but when they made this switch, I was the Republican leader of the Forty-fourth and I

was from Magnolia. Also, we had a Republican representative by the name of John Strom who was a druggist—he had a drug store at Interbay, at the bottom of Magnolia—who died at the same time that the redistricting hit. Our district had been switched into Queen Anne, so, of course, we met with the Queen Anne people, and they said, "Well, we've got our incumbents."

And we said, "No, you don't understand, we have almost forty percent of the vote, so we get one of the three seats."

And they said, "No, because we have the three incumbents."

Well, several senators—I won't say who—called me and said, "Would I run against Vic Zednick?" who was the old senator there.

And I said, "No, I wouldn't do that, I wouldn't want to run against Vic. I wouldn't want to get personal."

Then our group met and we appointed a committee to find out who would be candidates, who we could get, what would work. And they came back and said that I had the best chance. I remember putting it off for a week and saying, "No, I'd have to think about it."

AK: Were you intrigued, though? Was it tempting?

JP: Well, you're interested, but you know, you're kind of wondering. How will it be with your job? In those days, it was sixty days every other year, which wasn't too bad. It's the way it was supposed to be.

AK: Did you talk with your brother and your dad? What did they think you should do?

JP: Sure, I talked to my brother, and I talked to my dad a little, and they said, "If you want to do it."

AK: You were really crossing some kind of line, from working on campaigns to being the candidate.

JP: Yes. A fellow named Jay Adams was active in the district, and because of the organization we had built getting rid of Kimball and getting

Ted Peterson in there, we had a good organization. And we had a lot of friends. I'd gone to Queen Anne, and the Magnolia kids all went to Queen Anne, and then you knew families. And my uncle lived on Magnolia, and my mother was born on Queen Anne, and I was born on Queen Anne. We just had lots of friends.

AK: You were just a natural.

JP: And I'd been active in the Magnolia Kiwanis Club. I coached the Little League football, and I taught Sunday school up at the Presbyterian Church. You're involved in the community.

AK: You sound like a dream candidate.

JP: Well, you're very involved with the community, and then I was active in these campaigns.

So, I said, "Well, okay, we'll do it."*

AK: What did your wife think about this?

JP: Well, if I was going to do it, okay. She was not as enthused about politics as I was, but it was all right.

So, we got started and I know we raised either \$1,200 or \$1,400 for that whole campaign. That's what it cost us.

AK: Was that a lot of money at that time for a campaign?

JP: Well, we didn't have billboards. We put one ad in the Magnolia paper, and one in the Queen Anne paper with a big list of people who were supporting me. We had endorsement cards, which we really worked hard. We would ask people how

***Frank Pritchard:** That's the way we did it, with terrific intensity. Same thing when Joel ran for the Legislature the first time, and the first time he ran for Congress. We had a breakfast meeting every day, and the little committee would be there. That's the way to keep things going.

AK: Were you his campaign manager?

FP: Not officially. I looked upon myself more as a catalyst. Just about everybody that we would have known what they were doing, or had a talent way above mine. You get all these people and you get all this talent—

AK: And your talent is to connect all the dots? Make it all happen?

FP: Yes, call the meetings, be there.

AK: Who worked on Joel's campaigns? Who would be in this breakfast group?

FP: His friends—he's got a list a mile long. Don Kraft was there, because he was always our advertising agency, but he was more than that—a lot of brains. And Barney McCallum, who is a very close, personal friend. He worked for us for a while before he started his own business. He always did a lot. And Kirby Torrance.

There are so many. Over the years it changed, because some people got older or moved away or something. Wally McGovern, who's now a retired federal judge, was involved. And we were involved in his campaigns. These things work both ways.

When Joel ran for the Legislature, the people that really worked were the people from the company, the other salesmen. And the guys he went to high school with. When he ran for Congress, the same people would come and help, but then there were lots more.

AK: That was a much bigger scale.

many endorsement cards they could send out. They always said, “Who should I send them to?”

“Send them to anybody that’s on your Christmas card list that lives in the Magnolia-Queen Anne area.” We figured if people they send Christmas cards to don’t like them, who will?

I had a wonderful uncle, my Uncle Donald, who had some health problems and was older, but would drive his car around, and he would pick them up. Well, that was such a big thing. He’d go to pick them up and they’d say, “I haven’t got them quite ready.” Then they’d do them.

My uncle was very nice, he’d go back and he’d say, “We’re picking them up.”

They’d say, “No, we’ll mail them.”

“No, we’re picking them up so that we can mail them all at one time and make an impact.”

That was our excuse, but what we wanted to do was get them all. And we got 7,200 endorsement cards signed in the Queen Anne-Magnolia area.

AK: What was the size of population you were dealing with?

JP: Fifty thousand people, but the actual voters weren’t that many. So, I don’t know. And you’d get overlap. People would say, “I’ve gotten three cards.” That was fine with us.

The Municipal League was very important then, and I got the highest rating. That was the first time I’d really had a serious talk with Dan Evans. He had talked to me about getting on the Highway Committee, and in those days it was hard to get anybody in King County to be on the Highway Committee. It was all these rural people that were getting the money and that. So he laid out all these figures, and a day or two later I went before the Municipal League, and I had my whole pitch about how we ought to get our share of the money. Well, anyway, I got a good rating from them.

Then we had a bunch of people that doorbelled. We had about thirty-five, forty people, and we had four nights. They went out, and I went, all these friends of mine, and you do four nights of forty people going out, you cover a big chunk of the district.

AK: Did people do analyses of the district, then, to figure out a strategy?

JP: Oh sure, which precincts were the best ones. Of course, we were going after the Republican precincts.

AK: Because your race was really the primary?

JP: Yes, that was the big effort. Election night we went to dinner, some of the key helpers, and then they all went to different precincts to pick the results up.

AK: Who were some of these key people who helped you?

JP: Oh gosh, the bad thing is you forget some people. There was Jay Adams and Barney McCallum, Phil Luther, John McCallune, Jerry Bach—there’s a whole lot of people who really helped me. All my friends just really rallied around me and it was very satisfying.

AK: Did you have a manager?

JP: No, we were on our own. We had a little office there in Magnolia, and we did hire a college girl for some part-time to run the office for about three, maybe two months—just for the primary. She’d phone people for cards, doorbelling, telling them when. We did our thing.

AK: The press called you “a real sparkplug.”

JP: Yes, it was active. We had no idea how we were doing. But if you have good friends, and they are real friends, then they help. Obviously, your friends that you make in church and whatnot, they get to know you, and if they like you, and you run for office, why they help you. Or, if they’re going to do something, you help them. That’s natural.

We’d meet every Monday at the Ship’s Café for breakfast, right at the foot of the Magnolia Bridge, there. We’d gather and kind of go over where we were and how we were doing.

AK: How many weeks did you have to do all this?

JP: My feeling is that we were really campaigning June, July, and August.

AK: Pretty intense. Did you give speeches, attend all kinds of community events?

JP: You didn't have that many. They'd have a community club meeting, but I only remember about two club meetings. We went out where people were, not waiting for people to come to us. But most people who come to a meeting, they've already decided who they're for.

AK: I wondered if you went to neighborhood picnics and that sort of thing. I know my neighborhood association sponsors a candidate picnic.

JP: No, not that. Just my friends helping me. But the night of the primary, we had dinner, maybe eight or ten couples, and then we all went out to collect the results. I remember our wives went to Phil Luther's house—he had the party—and I went to the John Hay school where there were four precincts voting. When I walked in I said, "How's the election?"

It was just over and a lady said, "It didn't go well at all."

And I thought: That settles me for politics, I won't be a candidate any more.

She said, "If you want to look around the back of the machines, you can." She said, "I just can't understand it how that Joel Pritchard won this election."

And I went, "Who-oo-oo," and I didn't say anything.

AK: I guess it just depends on who she was for.

JP: Yes, she was a friend of the lady who came in third. So, I looked at the machines, and yes, I was running first and Moriarty was running second. I ran, really, about even-up. Just barely ahead there, but then when I got to Magnolia, I ran substantially ahead.

AK: But you didn't run against these people—you ran for yourself?

JP: No, I didn't. I never said anything negative about either candidate, never ran against them, just ran for things. What happened though, was that the Kirk forces and the Moriarty forces were sort of at odds—Chuck was Catholic and Mrs. Kirk's husband was an active Shriner or something. So, people vote for two—you didn't have position 1 and position 2—the two top people won. There were quite a few people who voted for Chuck and myself, and then there were people who voted for Mrs. Kirk and myself. So I had an advantage there.

AK: Did you run because you thought Magnolia should have more representation, or because you thought one of these candidates would not be the best representative?

JP: No, they were pretty decent, and I helped get Mrs. Kirk back in.

AK: She reappears in the records almost immediately.

JP: Because the old senator, Vic Zednick, died at the end. He keeled over in the middle of his speech at the community club meeting at the end of that session. So, we had an opening, and I urged Chuck to go into the Senate as he was there ahead of me. And then I urged him and the party to have Mrs. Kirk come back.

AK: Her husband had the seat for three sessions, and then she took it. I wondered if he had died, like sometimes happens and then the wife takes over.

JP: No, no, he went into county government. He was involved with the county. I thought that she was a better legislator than he was.

AK: Then Charles Moriarty went to the Senate, and Mrs. Kirk comes back and fills out his term. Did you three work well together?

JP: Yes, we got along—you had to. Chuck had gone to the Senate, so he didn't have to work as much with Gladys, and I was with Gladys.

AK: I couldn't find any photos of her, just of you and Senator Moriarty, which led me to wonder if she was as much a part of the team.

JP: I have a photo of her and me and John Murray. John Murray owned the Queen Anne paper. He became a friend of mine and he was helpful to me. But both papers, they didn't come out with any big endorsements one way or another, but I got a pretty good treatment by both papers. Especially later on, after I was an incumbent, John was very helpful to me through the years. And he became a legislator.

AK: So, you found out you were winning. Did you go back to your friend's party?

JP: Oh yes. I came in and most of the others had similar results except for the precincts where we had not doorbelled. They were Democratic precincts, and we didn't have endorsement cards going in there. We didn't have much connection with them. That's where Barney went and he came back discouraged. He said, "Gee, we're losing." He called and said, "We're losing." And we said, "No, no, we're winning!"

AK: It must have felt great. How did it hit you, that you had won?

JP: Oh yes, well, wowee, and you know.

AK: It sounds like you were ready to let it go, and then it turned out to be a big victory.

JP: It was a lot of work and a lot of effort, and everybody was pleased. And so we got ready to go to Olympia. The election was in November, and you go down in January.

But first we went over to meet with the leadership in Spokane. They always had the meeting at the same time as the Washington-Washington State football game, this time in Spokane, not down in Pullman. Two things I remember about that: Elmer Johnson took Slade Gorton and me down into the basement of this big, old Spokane house to talk to us.

AK: Was Slade Gorton new that session, too?

JP: Slade was brand-new, too. We were all together. We were all new. I remember Elmer talking to us. He said, "Now boys, if you've got to have something for your district, I can work with John O'Brien and we get along, and we can work things out."

And I remember saying to Elmer, "Elmer, Slade and I didn't come down here to work things out and to get along with John O'Brien. We came down to make some changes." Sounded like these guys going to Congress: We came down to make changes, and we didn't come here to get along, or to get anything special. "There isn't anything in our district that we think we need—we'll work it—that's the way we're going to play the game."

He said, "Well, okay boys, you young guys, I know—"

And, two years later we changed the leadership, put Evans in and changed the whole deal. We went out and got a lot of new people to run for the Legislature, and helped them.

The other thing that happened was Moriarty had a house in Olympia, from a friend. The husband and wife moved out to their summer place and we rented their house—it's right up the street from the Capitol. Chuck said, "Do you want to do it?" I said yes, and he said, "Well, let me see if we can get Evans. But we can really put four in it. Who else can we get? How about that new guy, Gorton?" And they said they'd do it, and out of living together, we became great friends. And two years later Jimmy Andersen was there, so we had a pretty good group.

AK: You became quite a power block, the new force in Republican circles.

JP: Not at that point. We were just freshmen in the back, learning the ropes. But they were very bright—both of them, Slade and Dan—were exceedingly bright, and I liked them because there was never any question about their honesty, or drinking, or anything at all. They worked, and they were well-read, thoughtful people. And no lobbyist had an arm on them. They'd tell any of them to go to hell.

AK: You've said what a boon it was to fall in with these really top-notch people—

JP: Just lucky, it was just lucky.

AK: But they've also intimated that they thought pretty highly of you.

JP: Well, it was great for me because Dan was an engineer and had a very good reputation. Chuck and Slade were very fine lawyers, and for me, I kind of got to where I could think like these other guys can. Sometimes I was a little better on relations with some of the others. I worked on that.

Don Moos, from over near Spokane, and Jack Hood, there were seven of us in that freshman class.

AK: Did you freshmen tend to gravitate together because you were all new, or because you thought alike?

JP: We just happened to live there. I liked Chuck, and Chuck knew Dan. It was kind of natural. And we did a lot of things—we'd go down and play basketball at the YMCA late in the afternoon, go down and work out. It was very stimulating.

AK: Did you have gatherings at this house you all shared? Did it become a central place?

JP: We had lots of talk. It was a very invigorating time. And, of course, when you're young, you have enormous energy. But it was catch-as-catch can. We were in different places and all, but there was quite a bit of sociability to it. There were many others: Tom Copeland and Jim Andersen, who later became the chief justice of the Supreme Court—a number of them. We ran together. The Olympia Elks Club was where all the so-called action was.

Maybe it was easy in that we got that first session out of our way and learned the ropes. It was a good session for learning. Rosellini was in full command, and of course we were very opposed to Governor Rosellini.

It was a dull session. Don Brazier, who's writing a history of the Legislature, said, "It's the least reportable session of any. Gee, you just didn't get anything done that session."

AK: So, was it kind of a soft landing for you, to learn the ropes, as you say? How did you go about learning the intricacies of being a legislator?

JP: It's just like a school. You're sitting all the time. You're in the middle of it. Most of it was a learning process, that first session.

AK: Did you come in already somewhat familiar with the processes?

JP: Well, you'd know some of it. First, you know something about politics, and second, you know something about history. You learn the rest of it pretty darn fast.

AK: The procedures—how to pass a bill, committees, the details?

JP: Sure. Don Moos and I sat together that first session, or was it Jimmy Andersen? Then I was with Slade and Jimmy.

AK: Did you get to choose your seatmate?

JP: You kind of chose. We were in the back end, the freshmen in back.

AK: So the senior people sat at the front?

JP: Oh yes, that's the way it worked then. But Greive changed all that. When he was in the Senate, he moved back into the middle. But in those days, in the House, they were down front, and you came back up.

But we observed, and Don Eldridge was a great help. He was very close to us, so that two years later when we made our move for bringing in new leadership, we made Dan the leader and Eldridge was the caucus chairman. He was a bright guy. He was from Mount Vernon and he'd been in three terms, and he was good. We just had some very good people.

AK: Who were the Republican leaders at that time?

JP: At that time it was Newman Clark and Elmer Johnson. Clark was really from the old school.

He had been at the University of Washington, and I think he was some kind of athlete out there. And then, I think he was an attorney.

He and Elmer had been there a long time, particularly Elmer. Elmer was from Spokane, and they kind of made their deals with John O'Brien, the Speaker. For a lot of us who were young, we sort of chafed under what we thought was a lack of aggressiveness and new ideas. We thought we needed stronger leadership.

AK: Were they too consensual and just not very dynamic?

JP: They didn't have much zip. We didn't feel they were the new look. We were young and aggressive, you know, and all that. They were all right for their time, but it seemed like their time was over. Although we didn't cause them trouble particularly, by the end of that session we got together, some of us, and said, "If we're going to stay down here, we're going to change the leadership and we're going to go out and get some new members. We're going to do more than just do a lot of talking."

And Zeke [Newman Clark] ran for governor in 1960. He looked like central casting for a governor—beautiful white hair, and tall. Whatever ambition he lacked, his wife had. But he got beat in the primary, Zeke Clark. So when he wasn't there, there was going to be a change, and so we changed it.

AK: A little vacuum at the top, and you jumped in. Had the Republicans, being in the minority for awhile, lost momentum—lost their creativity dealing with issues?

JP: By and large, the Republicans had been in the minority since the thirties. Langlie had won as governor, but most of the Legislature had been Democratic for years. That's hard on any group. So that's where we were.

But Don Eldridge was the caucus chairman and we started doing things. But it wasn't split all older and younger. Damon Canfield ran for the leadership against Evans. But we were great friends with Damon and Cecil Clark and some of the others that we had great respect for.

We made a lot of friends, and Evans was a natural. Chuck Moriarty and Dan Evans were in the '57 class. I think Tommy Copeland was in that, too. And Don Eldridge was already in, so that when we came in we had a big fight in our state over the "right to work." The Republicans just got cleaned. It was a case that you didn't have to belong to a union, you had to pay your dues, but you didn't have to belong to a union. Well, the unions just went crazy on it and just murdered the Republicans. I wasn't that keen on the "right to work" and I didn't think it was too smart. This was in '56, and I thought that the Republicans were foolish to make it a cornerstone, because it just did us in.

AK: In 1959, when you came into the House, there were sixty-six Democrats to only thirty-three Republicans, and in the Senate the numbers are just as bad: thirty-five Democrats and just fourteen Republicans. In 1953, the Republicans had had majorities in both Houses, but after that there is a shift to the Democrats. By your time they had piled up big majorities.

JP: Yes, in both Houses, it was really one-sided. And Rosellini was a full-fledged Democratic governor. In the Senate they were fighting with Al Rosellini—there was a lot of battling, and of course, we went after Al with gusto. We ran all our campaigns against him. Everybody who ran for the Legislature against us, we ran them as Al Rosellini legislators. "Do you want another Al Rosellini?"

AK: Just tarring everybody?

JP: That's right. "Do you want someone who is with Al Rosellini?" Well. He won the next election, but he was our best target.

But it was interesting, fascinating. You're learning, and you're on committees. As I said, it was a very stimulating atmosphere.

AK: Let's go back to the mechanics for a moment. You once mentioned to me that you didn't have an office in the early years, that you operated from your desk on the floor. Can you tell more about how that worked?

JP: That's right. You had your desk and they had a pool of stenographers. You'd get a stenographer and you'd dictate your letters—that was at nighttime. You'd come back at night, and if we weren't having night sessions, you'd work on the floor. You'd be there and answer your mail. It wasn't until the last two weeks of session that you got into a lot of night sessions.

AK: This would be mail from your constituents?

JP: Yes, they'd write to you. Then, on the next night they'd bring the letters to you. You'd sign those and if there was something wrong, you'd have them done over. And you wrote letters back. It was very good—it made everybody be on the floor. It was kind of nice.

AK: You said you thought the members talked to each other more because you were all there, not tucked away in separate offices like now.

JP: You had lots of togetherness, I guess that's what you'd say.

AK: Did it also have a fishbowl effect? Everybody could see who you were talking to?

JP: Yes, you could see that. The lobbyists would be walking around on the floor talking to people. But we didn't even have a third of the members—we couldn't stop anything if they really got their act together. That was a major factor. We had so little influence.

Speeches are made, but I made a point of being the last person of the freshmen to speak. I can remember I just tried to tone myself down a little. For me, it was a great learning process. These were very smart people that I was around. I'd done a lot of reading, but I'd only gone to college a year and a half. And when I was in high school, I was not the greatest student in the world—I spent all my time fussing around with sports. So, it was something to find I could hold my own.

AK: Well, you had good people skills.

JP: Oh yes, but I could also hold my own in the

thought processes, in the debates and all that. Yes, I could deal with the others.

AK: Were you somewhat relieved and gratified to find that out?

JP: It was kind of reassuring. I'd been involved in a lot of things and didn't lack for confidence, but it was sort of nice to know, because Slade and Dan and Moriarty were just really, really bright. It reassured me that I could sort of play in that ball game.

AK: Did you come into the Legislature with some of your interests already set? I was wondering how you chose your committee assignments, what areas you wanted to work in? Could you choose?

JP: You can ask for committees. But, first of all, when you're a freshman, you get put on committees—they've got to fill out committees. Sometimes you get your choice.

But there was talk, even then, though nothing was done, to cut down on the number of committees. You had a big number of committees because that was the way the majority could take care of their pals, or reward people, or give them some position. And if they could be a chairman of a committee, why it might sound good in a press release back home. It might not mean a darn thing. So you had far too many committees overlapping. Too many times you'd have three committees meeting at the same time.

AK: How would you choose, then, which to attend?

JP: That's the point. And then, of course, in many the chairman has the majority sway, and the Democrats were two to one—

That's why in that first session, actually I can't think of much that we did. Oh, there were things that happened in the session that were important, but as far as our effect on it, we were in the back of the chamber.

AK: Rather marginal, then?

JP: Sure, but that's not a bad way to come into

an operation, to be able to come in and sort of learn it. To have a chance to learn it before you get into something terribly critical.

AK: How, then, did you keep track of what was going on, if you are on all these different committees?

JP: We didn't have secretaries in those days, but you had your schedule and you could see the committees and the critical things. You'd know if there was a vote up for this or that. But it was a poor operation as far as too many committees, too many things going on. But, if you're in the majority leadership, you'd just as soon have things fouled up a little because then you can just sort of push what you want, and not push and let things die that this group wants—it's helpful.

AK: I see. With having to cover so many different issues, I was wondering where you got your information, to know what you wanted to support?

JP: First of all, you read up. And what I would try to do, I would try to find a person on each committee who I had some respect for, who was knowledgeable, and I would work off of their knowledge. I'd ask them, what about this? They were in the hearings, they attended the hearings. I never tried to be the expert on everything. And I followed that system all the way through Congress.

Now, that doesn't mean that you don't read up, that you don't know. And we are all products of our experience, so we all have ideas about these things, but I'm always suspect of people who have a thin knowledge of something but have strong views. Many times their experience is one experience, when what you have to do is look at the whole picture. And also people pushing from your district, wanting you to vote for this and wanting to vote for that. Mailings, all the letters you get.

AK: So did letters from constituents have an impact on you?

JP: No. Obviously, you don't try to make enemies with it. But I never believed that you should weigh

the mail. I think it's absolutely backward from what our founding fathers wanted. The legislator should go there, he should listen to everybody in his district, get all the information, and then he ought to vote what he thinks is best. And then at the next election, if they don't like him, they throw him out and put a new person in. But I do not believe in doing a poll to find out how you should vote. I've tried to follow that, always.

AK: Yes, all that sticking your toe in and taking the temperature every time you need to do something.

JP: Yes, and the amazing thing is, lots of people like their representative. "He votes the way we want him to." Well, many times the "we want" is a fairly small number of people in a district who are interested in an issue. You please that group, and it's like feeding the robins in a nest, you just go along and give each little group a few worms, and they all say "what a great guy." I thought that was terrible.

AK: To keep up, then, you read a lot of things and you talked to a lot of people. What role would lobbyists or special interest groups play in your process?

JP: Everybody has a lobbyist—the churches. When you talk about special interests, everything is a special interest. Everything is: "I'm not a special interest person, it's just that I have a special interest" perspective.

AK: It must be those other guys—

JP: Yes, they're a special interest, and we speak for the public. Yes, well, you listen to everybody.

AK: But how do you sort them out?

JP: That's a matter of experience and judgment. And you have to be careful because sometimes people that you don't like particularly are pushing something that's a very good cause. And you have to be careful you don't do it on "I like this guy, I don't like that guy" type of attitude. You get to know pretty soon, who's pushing things that make

sense and who tells a straight story. And who you can trust. All of that is a mix that goes on in everybody's life. It's just to a higher degree when you're in the legislative process.

AK: It probably has a wider impact. I was reading about a certain bank lobbyist down here who was considered very reliable and people could go to him about banking issues. Were there people like that who you just knew would tell it to you straight?

JP: If somebody represents a group and over the years he or she has always been honest, and people like them and say they are really good in what they do, then they have a greater influence. But there again, I think you have to be careful about becoming a vote for a lobbyist. I've had times when I've had to say to good friends, "No, no, no." Even though you like them and you like their group, you just didn't think it made sense, or it wasn't in the best interest.

AK: Was there a lot of wining and dining in your day?

JP: I don't know about wining and dining. There were people wanting you to go to dinner at some joint. And then you'd have to run back—lots of evening hearings, or late committee meetings. Early going in the session, you had a lot of committee meetings and not much floor action, and committee meetings would break up at, say, four-thirty or five, and people would go on down. We spent a lot of time at the Y, but yes, you'd get together. A lot of times you'd get together with other members. The problem with having lobbyists take you is, you'd have to hear the commercial. And then you have some people who like to go to dinner before the evening session and have a few drinks. That isn't very wise because you've got to go to work after.

There was lots of alcohol in the first few sessions. In both caucus rooms they had a bar right on the end of the wall, and you'd get into those late sessions, and in the lounge there was always a bar set up. Certain members, you'd know it. You'd also hear the volume of noise on the floor going up as people consumed more alcohol.

AK: I believe that part has changed over the years—it's not that way anymore, is it?

JP: There is much less drinking now than there was in those days. I'm not saying that I never took a drink, but I had been raised that alcohol was not in my home, and I had been taught by my father that that was something you did after the day's work was done, not during the work. That was an attitude. Like in any group, you have some people who drink and some who don't, and then you have some that drink too much, and of course, it handicaps them. And people know it.

It's true, some people are very funny, and all of this. It's such a mixture. The Legislature is such a cross-section and a mixture that it's got all the goods and the bads.

AK: Maybe that's what makes it so representative.

JP: It is. And the people that come down—everybody sees things from their standpoint, their viewpoint. It's a very interesting process. I thoroughly enjoyed the legislative process with all its faults and problems.

AK: The quirkiness of it?

JP: Just the humanness of it. Of course, lots of battles were not partisan battles, they were East side, West side.

AK: The urban, rural split?

JP: Yes. The farmers, when I came down there, they had a real lock on things because the farm block could always produce a lot of votes. And now, we've gotten to where we have practically no farmers in there. And we've done away with all the lawyers in the Legislature, practically. In our day there were lots of lawyers that were in the Legislature, but none of the people that I talk about could be in the Legislature today. None of us could.

AK: You couldn't afford to do it, or give that kind of time?

JP: You couldn't get away. In those days your

prime job was whatever—Evans was an engineer, Slade was a lawyer, I was a printer. We had somebody who was in the insurance business; it was just part of our life. When the Legislature first started, it was supposed to be sixty days every two years. Now, they run four months one time, three months another, and there's no way that you can have a meaningful career. It just wouldn't work, so what you have are people whose number one thing is their political career—that's their scorecard in life. That's why the strong feeling to hang on, because that's it for them.

AK: Do you think the quality of what happens is different? Do you think that has an impact on legislation?

JP: I think in some ways the quality is down.

AK: Even though they take it that much more seriously?

JP: That doesn't mean you get more talent, more judgment. What you look for in people is experience and judgment. And they have to start with good character.

AK: So, do you think the experience of many is too narrow now?

JP: It's wrong to say "they" because there are some very good ones now, and there are some others. But, I thought at that particular time, we had some very able people on both sides of the aisle.

And we have made it very difficult for lawyers—the reporting. Lawyers have always been a major part of legislative bodies all over our country. They are the ones who read a lot of history. There is a naturalness for them to be in it. And no one is tougher on the lawyers than I am. No one is more disdainful of the trial lawyers than I am. I think they are an abomination in our state and our country, and I think the system that they have helped create and certainly maintained is an enormous burden for our country. All this liability—

AK: All the litigation?

JP: The litigation—every time something's wrong, we've got to sue somebody. And it isn't just those suits that cost money, everything that companies do, the liability and all of that, goes on the cost of products. It makes us less competitive in the world market. Through very, very shrewd political manipulation, you have ten percent of the lawyers being one of the biggest political factors in this state. And they do it with campaign funds. They are an enormous power in Olympia. I have very hard feelings about that.

Now, all groups try to get advantages, whether it's the farmers or whatever, or they rationalize why their group is terribly important. The beekeepers, or everybody, if they get an advantage they'll figure out some way why it's in the best interest of the country. But, hopefully, as long as they don't have too much power, they can't subvert it.

AK: I think you're right, there have been some pretty strange cases lately in the news.

JP: Yes, what it should be is, "how do you solve the problem," not "how do you stay out of being liable." We've got it turned around, and I know, I've sat in on meetings where silly things were done, but we sat there and said, "We have to because of the liability."

AK: How do we, as a society, turn this around, dismantle some of this?

JP: The Congress put through a bill, but that's just a first step.

AK: Do you think there's going to be a reaction, that people will reach a limit?

JP: It's pretty hard because it is very tough in today's world, because of the political process. It can be so responsive to a group if they are really well organized and know how to do things.

I think there are some serious questions about our whole justice system. People no longer feel that the good-old jury of twelve is going to end up with the right decision. They feel that the lawyers manipulate things, and as a result, there's a feeling that things aren't fair. I don't know all

the answers, but I do think that we're going to have to make some changes. It shouldn't be like a lottery. But, of course, I don't believe in using money as a way to solve all problems. This idea that something goes wrong, so we give somebody \$500,000 or \$3,000,000 and that's it—it's wrong, bad.

AK: It certainly leads to bad public policy.

JP: Turning it around is difficult. Changing anything is very difficult.

AK: Let's get back to the Legislature of your time. I would like to talk now about your committee assignments when you first came down to Olympia. That first session you were on several committees: Banks and Financial Institutions; the Constitution, Elections and Appointments; Labor; and Legislative Processes. And Highways.

JP: You know, it's terrible, but I can't remember anything about those committees. As I said, as a freshman you just get put on committees. But Highways—Dan Evans had taken me to lunch when I was first running, and urged me to get on the Highways Committee. At that time, I didn't know why that should be of such interest, but he soon convinced me that King County was not getting our share. Almost all of the highway money was going outside of King County, and we should get on the Highway Committee.

So I got on it after all my talk, and immediately we got into the cross-Sound bridge. And Julia Butler was the chairman—a very strong woman—and she was a big supporter of the cross-Sound bridge. I opposed it. It was going to go across to Vashon Island and then go across to Port Orchard and then go up. It would have been awful for the Port of Tacoma. It would have been bad for Bainbridge Island, because you'd have had to take your car all the way through the bridge into Fauntleroy, and then drive into Seattle. It would have brought more cars in. My folks lived on Bainbridge Island and they were very upset about it. And I didn't think it was a good idea. But, well, they were pushing it.

AK: Who was supporting this project, then?

JP: Julia and the Highways people—they'd gotten it started. And the people in Bremerton kind of liked it because they could just drive into Seattle. Well, it was a big battle, and it lost. I can remember being on the committee and not supporting the chairman's bridge. It was highly emotional and all.

AK: Julia Butler Hanson, the chairperson, was a Democrat, so would it not be very surprising that you did not support her bill?

JP: Oh no. Things like that in Highways, it didn't break Democrat, Republican. Sometimes it broke urban-rural or East-West—all kinds of combinations. And the majority of bills have both Democrat and Republican sponsors.

AK: Was it normal practice, then, to get somebody from the other side to cosponsor?

JP: Of course, if you're smart. I never sponsored a bill in the twenty-four years that I was in the House, the Senate, or the Congress, where I didn't have a Democrat on the bill with me. Because I was in the minority for twenty-four years, if I wanted to get something to pass, I worked, always, with the Democrats. In those days, more bills went through with bipartisan support, as far as going through. Some of the major ones, of course, would be just one party.

AK: How many members would be on a committee, say, ten?

JP: Yes, or might be fifteen. And of course they'd be two to one, majority, so that if you were going to have any effect in anything, the bills would be cosponsored Democrat, Republican.

AK: When I was reading about the cross-Sound bridge, the issues surrounding it were very complicated. It seemed like it was defeated not just because of where it was to be located, but because of the structure they were proposing for paying for it, with the toll authority.

JP: That's right, and there were all kinds of feelings. And I thought it would be very

detrimental to Tacoma.

AK: Would it have funneled people away from that area?

JP: Well, it blocked it off. You would have had to pull the bridge apart for ships to go through, and, my, oh my, that's not an easy thing, delaying shipping, or all the rest of it. But the other thing was, instead of having people ride ferries into Seattle and walk into their businesses and then walk back to Bremerton or Bainbridge Island, why, they'd all be driving their cars in, coming in down at Alki and then driving into Seattle with their cars.

AK: And we think it's congested now—

JP: At that point I thought it was bad. Now, my parents lived on Bainbridge, full-time residents, and the Bainbridge Island people were just adamant against it. And I didn't like the cross-Sound bridge, but it was not stopped in the House. It wasn't stopped in committee. The committee voted it out. It was Julia Butler's big thing, and then it was Al Rosellini's big deal. But it finally got into a tie vote and Cherberg sent it back to committee—it was his vote.

AK: Did it just die there?

JP: They couldn't get it out. It died, but it was that close.

AK: The things that might have happened, but didn't, are so interesting—makes you wonder. Another issue for Highways in these early sessions of your career was the regulation of billboards.

JP: Yes, we got into a battle on billboards. We put some limits on billboards. It was before Mrs. Johnson came in with her pitch. I was very involved in that. Evans and I, we all fought the billboards. I was on the committee, and we prevailed, as I remember.

The thing that really got us was the AAA was fighting us—figure that one out.

AK: The AAA was for billboards?

JP: Well, the billboard lobby was very involved, they were part of the highway lobby and all the rest. And we wanted to cut back. We got a bill through that substantially cut back. And then Lyndon Johnson's wife's thing went through on the federal level, and it backed it up a little bit. We just didn't want these billboards all over the highways. Yes, I was very involved in that. And Evans was very involved—he was on the Highways Committee, as I was, and we had some good battles over that. We were successful.

AK: Was your position considered to be anti-business by some of these groups?

JP: When you say business, you got into arguments. Well, here's a restaurant that's on the highway going into Humpty-Dumpty little town, and they want to be able to advertise, you know. We just thought it was wrong. And we won, and then we won probably seventy-five percent of what we were trying to do, after Lady Bird's bill became federal law.

AK: Who was your support at that time?

JP: In those days it wasn't the environmentalists, but there were the garden clubs. And we had quite a number of friends who were in these garden clubs.

AK: Did you have hearings? How would you organize a campaign for this kind of issue?

JP: Yes, there were hearings, and the sort of inside highways lobbyists were opposed to it, but the good government people were for it. But it wasn't a big issue in the Legislature. But, when you're in the minority—we had some Democrats with us, I'm sure. I never had a bill in that I was on, that there weren't Democrats on. Anyway, it was good stuff.

AK: It made a big splash in the newspapers, even so.

Another thing that hit the papers was your support for creating LIDs for neighborhood bomb shelters.

JP: I was not on that. Let me tell you how it happened. Ross Cunningham wanted to write a story, and at that time everybody was really uptight. Everybody was concerned about the Russians blasting us, or we're blasting the Russians, and so this whole idea of getting bomb shelters came about. Ross Cunningham came up with that idea and then sort of said this and that, and then wrote the story as if it was my idea. See, he never wanted to put his name on it, he'd always do it to somebody else.

I went up to him and said, "I don't want you to do that ever again," because I said I was really taken aback when my mother said, "You know, that's pretty good."

And I said, "I didn't really have anything to do with it."

And she said, "Joel, you wouldn't have put your name on something if you weren't a part of it." And I got to thinking about that, and that's right.

And he said, "Well, you're being kind of fussy, aren't you?"

And I said, "Well, that's the way I feel. Don't ever do that again."

AK: Well, I was taken in by it. It was in your scrapbook, and it seemed reasonable, something you would support.

JP: Of course. But you see, you get somebody like Ross—and he was a wonderful person—he'd want to give good ideas to good people, and write them up. He liked my brother and me, and all this stuff.

AK: So, if you hadn't thought about saying it, he'd "help" you along with a manufactured quote?

JP: Yes, and I got to thinking, that's not right. I always hold that as an example—but, of course, nowadays, all these guys have all these people writing stuff for them, and figuring up stuff, and getting credit for stuff, and getting blamed for things they shouldn't be. Yuck.

AK: This was a year before the Cuban missile crisis—

JP: Oh yes, but there was great concern. The Russians had all this power, and we had it, and were we going to hunker down? Of course, the ability to survive bombings, if you have people in shelters, is ten-to-one over just normal. So it made lots of sense if you're going to be bombed.

AK: It certainly made sense to have community ones rather than individual ones, but here it wasn't even your idea.

JP: So be it.

AK: To return, then, to something you really were involved in during this session, the Legislature was also engaged in examining some of its own practices. A new code of ethics for state officials and employees was pushed through in this session, and state purchasing procedures were reformed, and a whole new budget and accounting process was created. The press commented extensively on these moves to modernize state procedures, to regularize how the state did its business.

JP: Yes, trying to bring them up to standard. This is where you can get caught—you let something happen, then you say, "Ah, ah, they're playing games there." Of course, this was one of our considerations where we thought the Rosellini administration—too many people—were cutting corners. So we set up some rules. The problem you always have is, as you set up more rules, it's hard to solve problems with rules. It's a little like with children, you know. They have to change the way they act, and you can go crazy with another rule and another rule.

AK: Another move, perhaps part of this modernization trend, was to introduce a state income tax, but that failed completely.

JP: Yes, and that, of course, is standard in our state. Everybody has said to the public, "Wouldn't you like a three-legged stool? We'll cut the property tax down, we'll cut the sales tax down, we'll come in with an income tax, and it would be more predictable." The trouble with that line is, the public looks up and says, "I don't trust the Legislature, and two or three years from now my

sales tax will go right back up, and so we're not going to do it." It takes a sixty percent vote, and therefore we're a state that doesn't have an income tax. And Oregon, they always didn't have a sales tax, and there was always this border problem. But, I found that people just didn't trust government, and so this state doesn't have an income tax. It's been proposed, or at times it's been put out there and said, "Well, let's let the people vote. Let them decide." They always decide no. You can make theoretical arguments on all sides of the issue, but this is just one where they just say "no."

AK: In a big way.

JP: Yes, and you have to get sixty percent, so it's done.

AK: Taxes and highways were some of the bigger issues, but other things were the subject of a lot of attention. There was a move this year to consider having annual sessions.

JP: Yes, we were starting to have annual sessions, but they weren't called for—I mean the governor had to call them special. And the question was whether we shouldn't have them—the idea was to have a thirty day session—or whether we didn't need it.

AK: Were things piling up that couldn't be accomplished in the old allotted period?

JP: I can't remember—I can't remember things piling up. I think the feeling was that we would come back in and have a crack at the governor and be checking up on him, some of that. We had got into annual sessions—it was just a question: are they to be regularized, or are they always to be called by the governor?

AK: In that case, if they were called by the governor, would that give him more power than if sessions were just a matter of course?

JP: Once he called them, sessions could be open for any subject, but he could do some negotiating—whether he would or wouldn't, and when

did he call it, and all the rest of it. I think one of the issues was that it wasn't fair to the Legislature, to have it hanging out there, maybe yes and maybe no, and when are they going to call it, and when are they going to have to be there? It would be much easier if you knew that there would be a thirty-day session in the off-year.

AK: So you could arrange your life, your business?

JP: Yes, you could do some arranging.

AK: I was wondering about the concern that you voiced that ordinary business people couldn't be in the Legislature if it took up too much time. Was that part of the discussion?

JP: Of course, that's where we got into this. As I told you, the people we had then couldn't be in the Legislature today—I couldn't. And it did fundamentally change in many ways the people that can serve there.

Then they paid us \$100 a month for being in the Legislature. And Walter Williams said, "The more they pay us, the more time they'll take, and it will never work out right." So, when we moved from \$100 to \$300 a month, he voted no. He was right. And I was going to vote no, too, but then Stu Bledsoe came in and he had made a promise, and because he had only won by 170 votes, I went over and had him vote no, and I voted yes. I had a solid district. But Walter's premise was right. Now they pay us \$25 a day.

AK: What if you were not very well off? Would the low pay make it so that people without good businesses behind them could not be in the Legislature?

JP: If you're talking about getting a job somewhere, if you go from \$100 a month to \$300 a month, it isn't going to work out.

AK: You're still not going to make it?

JP: No. People that other people are willing to send to the Legislature—they generally have a job, they're solid, they're in the community,

they're involved. It isn't like someone coming off the welfare rolls.

AK: Yes, I've heard that kind of thing.

JP: And the people say, "Well, gee, the poor people can't be legislators. But the poor people don't—but you've got to have been involved, or you were on the school board, or that kind of thing.

AK: Yes, though we might not like to acknowledge it, that kind of service presupposes a certain stability and level of income.

To return to the issues of the session, the question of implementing daylight savings time was a subject you addressed in your constituent newsletter several times, and which was closely followed in the press.

JP: I always thought daylight saving was pretty good for a lot of reasons. But it wasn't a sharp, political battle, it was a fight between rural and urban groups—farmers didn't like it. They said it was difficult for their cows. I forget what it was. It had been stopped by the farmers, and there was always sort of a battle in our state over daylight saving.

So, yes, I mentioned it, but well, you're down here as a freshman, and here you've got to write a little column in the local paper, and ye gods, what do you write about?

AK: Well, you took a stand on trading stamps, too, this time opposed. Could you clarify what trading stamps were, and why they were such an issue? Were they like coupons?

JP: Yes, they're a little like coupons. Green stamps used to be a big thing, and used to put a lot of pressure on the merchants. They were kind of a 'something-for-nothing' deal—a promotional thing. Some people got them and some people didn't. I opposed them, I remember. I didn't think they were good, on balance, for all businesses.

Isn't that funny, I haven't thought about green stamps for all this time, but I believe I was opposed to them.

AK: Some burning issues fade away, but others

keep reappearing. Dog racing was controversial at that time, and I believe gambling issues—your opposition to gambling—were a continuous thread throughout your legislative career.

JP: Oh yes. We had horse racing, and that's part of it. But dog racing, they were going to do it in Sick's Stadium, right in the baseball field, down in Rainier Valley, right in the city. The history of dog racing is pretty bad in this country. They've always been mixed up with bad elements. Then, whenever you have it in a city, you find that a lot of people have social problems because dog racing is too easy to manipulate—just in every way, like the experience in California.

And the other thing is, that people mixed up in dog racing always get involved in local politics. They become big contributors to city races and all kinds of things.

AK: To protect themselves?

JP: Sure. I used to say that I didn't mind the state getting into dog racing, but I didn't like dog racing getting into the local governments.

AK: There were other gambling issues just then, too.

JP: We had the lottery, which I always opposed.

AK: And slot machines—

JP: The slots, yes. But, of course, I'm back at that today, fighting them. I'm the guy against it. But you can't regulate people, how they operate their lives. You can't do that. On the other hand, I think that we should not have it so available—I guess my feeling on gambling is that I don't like it to be so pervasive that you get it with a fellow on his way home from work.

AK: Was it a huge industry then, like it is now?

JP: No, it wasn't. When I was a kid, I used to work around the printing company, and I remember you could look through a window in the alley and see the green tables—they had Chinese gamblers in the Skid Row area of Seattle.

I can remember my father being concerned about employees stopping over there and starting to gamble. He was hoping they wouldn't.

And, of course, the other thing you get is, five people gambling among themselves—somebody wins, somebody loses, but it's another thing when you have professional gambling where some people are taking the money out. Pretty soon, they want to start rigging the rules, and then they want to start doing things with the government. The record around the country is not very good—in Atlantic City and these other areas.

In almost all ways, I was an opponent of liberalizing gambling. I did not think the lottery was a good thing. I fought the lottery.

AK: The state lottery?

JP: Yes, I think anytime you promote something for nothing—when we just shamefully promote it on TV, why, ye gods. Because the people in the top half of the economic structure are not the people who buy lottery tickets. And they are the ones who can afford it. So, there you are.

AK: Another issue debated at this time that's still with us was capital punishment. You wrote about it in your constituent letters, but just as an issue—I mean, I was unable to make out your own stand from your remarks. Do you remember how you felt about that?

JP: Maybe I was agonizing. A lot of times on issues, you agonize and you see both sides, and this and that. At this point today, I think you have the right to take a life if the person's conduct is so reprehensible that it threatens all kinds of people.

AK: Who was supporting the ban, then?

JP: Now, first of all, in those days, there were very few people that were actually put to death. So, you were talking about a small number of people. Then you get into this business of, how long do they stay on death row? Cases can be made that, no matter what, you should never take a life.

And I'm not sure that capital punishment

deters crime. The thing I've always believed, which goes back to the time of the pickpockets in England, was that it's only the certainty of being caught that slows down crime. Not how bad the punishment, because they'd cut off the arm of a person if they were pick-pocketing then, which today we would think was just awful. But it didn't slow down anything, because most pickpockets were not caught. So it's the certainty of being caught rather than how strong the sentence is, because people think, oh well, I've got only a five percent chance of being caught. And so, they'll keep doing it. I'm appalled today at some of the things that go on.

And then we get into this whole business of the person's insanity. In some cases, you can make a case. Anybody that goes out and murders somebody, they're a little insane. They've got a serious problem. But where do you draw the line on insanity, and where do you hold people responsible for their actions?

AK: I was wondering why the issue came up at that time, if there was some particularly egregious murder, or something?

JP: I'd have to think back. But Rosellini had a fellow by the name of Garrett Heyns as head of Institutions. Garrett did a lot of good things. Al should be credited for improvement in the institutions.

AK: That would be prisons, and—

JP: Prisons and mental health institutions. I liked Dr. Heyns. I thought that this is the one area where Rosellini should be credited, I believe. And I think he had real feelings about trying to do a better job in that area.

AK: Had that area been very mismanaged in the past?

JP: No, but over the years, it had gotten to where it hadn't been run very well. I supported Heyns in some of his things, but I can't remember now where all these things fit in.

AK: It was a difficult session to get a clear view.

It seemed a big muddle, with the Democrats fighting amongst themselves. The wrap-ups of this session suggest that the governor hardly got anything he had wanted—certainly not the big things, but with such a big Democratic majority, you would think a Democratic governor’s agenda would have met with a more favorable response.

JP: They had their problems, because whenever you get a big majority, why, it’s hard.

AK: Do the parties start to break down within themselves, into factions? Senator Greive stands out as having his own agenda at that time.

JP: Yes, there were factions, and in the Senate there were some coalitions, and Al didn’t get all he wanted. He tried to pack the Liquor Board, which is a deal for friends, and we had a big fight over that and stopped it.

AK: Whenever Governor Rosellini is discussed, it is said that he had ‘a very political administration,’ but were there any administrations that were otherwise? What is meant by that—wheeling and dealing?

JP: Al was a more skillful politician, and he was deep in politics. He’d been a state senator. He came right out of all the wheeling and dealing. Langlie, who preceded him, was thought of as socially conservative—did not serve alcohol in the mansion. And he was quite a forceful speaker, but not all this clever wheeling and dealing. Al was a real product of the wheeling and dealing, and it never stopped in his administration. Al had quite a bit of charm, and he was extremely clever, and he had some people around him who were very clever. It was a different atmosphere.

AK: Some people charged that at least some of these people surrounding Rosellini were even unsavory—charges, a few rather reckless, about Mafia connections and whatnot, a kind of lumping together of persons of Italian descent.

JP: No, I don’t think that. But he, at times, got too close to some of the less than most noble citizens, in his law practice, in who he represented. But you get into this business. Al was a wheeler-dealer.

AK: But did people respect him?

JP: I don’t know if he ever sat at that kind of level. People thought he was pretty smart. He had solid labor backing. He was a shrewd campaigner. The attitude toward Rosellini spanned the whole gamut. It was a whole range, but certainly, among our group, we were determined to get rid of Al. It became the focus. We ran legislative candidates against Al Rosellini no matter who they were running in what district. Everything was against Rosellini puppets, and all of this business.

AK: Another long-time political personality who came in at the almost same time as yourself, was Lieutenant Governor John Cherberg. What was your sense of him, then?

JP: Well, he was my high school football coach. I was a great friend of John Cherberg, and when I ran for his job in 1988 he was one who suggested that I run for it. He’d been in thirty-two years and he did a good job as the lieutenant governor.

AK: Speaker John O’Brien assumed that position in 1955, two sessions before you came to Olympia. What was your impression of him?

JP: When I came in, he was the oldest legislator in the country—he’d started in 1930. He was fifty years in the Legislature, that’s why they named the building after him, which I didn’t think was right. John was a Rainier Valley Democrat, and he was the Speaker for a long time. He ran things—he put Democratic policies through, labor policies and things Al Rosellini wanted. They worked together. And when we bounced him out, why, he felt pretty bitter. That was the coalition of 1963.

CHAPTER 5

CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES IN THE LEGISLATURE

Anne Kilgannon: You came to the Legislature just as the civil rights era was beginning to receive national attention, though it was not very visible here in Washington State. In your first session, one of the first things you did was work with Representatives Sam Smith and Daniel Brink to introduce two bills, 70 and 71. Bill 70 dealt with “Enlarging the scope of civil rights definitions and of unfair practices,” and the other bill was concerned with “Prohibiting designation of race, creed, color or national origin in traffic citations.” Could you tell me now about your involvement in this area?

Joel Pritchard: The one that really got all the attention was House Bill 50, the open housing bill. Sam and I were on that one together. That’s the one that they came down from Seattle for in bus loads, the churches—loads of people and ministers. I can remember going out and addressing them.

AK: On the steps of the Capitol Building?

JP: No, inside the rotunda. It was evening, and I remember Sam’s senator, Senator Dore, had given me the devil that afternoon for sponsoring the bill. And that evening he got up and talked to the people about how wonderful that this bill was being sponsored, and he thought it was good to get new blood in, and these freshmen to sponsor it and all. And I was so ticked! I went in and everybody said, “Freddy? Of course, that’s Freddy. That’s the way he operates.”

That was typical Fred Dore. And who do I get as the guy who swears me in as lieutenant governor, but Fred Dore. My pals really laughed over it. That was one of the deals Rosellini got when he helped Dixy—she appointed Fred to the Supreme Court.

AK: It sounds like you did not think highly of that appointment, but then he was out of the Legislature.

JP: No, I didn’t. A lot of us didn’t. And he had run for attorney general. He was the one Slade beat, I think it was in the absentees. Fred ran for Congress, he ran for things all the time.

But he was in the Senate then. We passed the bill in the House, but Fred did everything to kill the bill when it got over to the Senate. He and some others killed it. And he had a black district—he came from that district.

AK: Why would he vote against the interests of his own district like that?

JP: It caused him troubles. So he killed it.

AK: Could you describe the content of this bill for me?

JP: Sure, it just said that you couldn’t discriminate in housing. If a person had the money and could afford it, anybody could get a house. But the real estate industry was against it. And then, you had areas which had covenants, where you couldn’t have this and that—no Jews, no Chinese, no this or that. In ’58, there were still areas that had these things. Another thing was getting loans from banks, for mortgages.

AK: The practice of redlining, of drawing a circle around certain neighborhoods and then denying loans—primarily black neighborhoods?

JP: Yes, anyway, the bill didn’t get through. It was killed in the Senate. But then the federal government passed their bill and that knocked it all out.

AK: I know Sam Smith worked on this issue for

several sessions, failed and failed, and kept trying. Can you remember how you became involved in this issue? Did you know Sam Smith previous to this effort?

JP: We came in as freshmen together. I didn't know him. But George Kinnear called me up. He was in a group called Civic Unity or something—I can't remember the group—but he said he hoped I'd look at this and see about it. So then, Sam and I looked at it, and I said, "Sure, I'd do it."

AK: Was there something about you that led them to ask you to help with this? Had you spoken out on this issue before?

JP: No, it wasn't an issue in my district. In my district of Magnolia and Queen Anne, there wasn't any black community there. So there wasn't any drive or push. But I think that George Kinnear, who was a friend of mine, had been a leading Republican and was very active, so when he called me, I gave it serious consideration. He called probably because I was a friend of his and had helped him when he ran unsuccessfully for the United States Senate.

AK: I meant was there something about your philosophical point of view that identified you as a civil rights supporter?

JP: They may have thought I would be more receptive.

I belonged to the Urban League because I thought it was the thing to do, but I had very little activity in it. I knew some of the members, but I didn't have a close association. Like a lot of things, I'd say, "That's a good thing, we ought to contribute and we ought to support it," but I can't say I was deeply involved.

The Urban League strongly supported open housing, and I worked very hard and wanted people like Charlie Stokes to get elected. We worked and elected a Republican, a black Republican, in the Central Area—Charlie was terrific. But the Democrats beat him. Blacks voted for a Democrat rather than for a black. And I would like to have seen the black community have strong representation in both parties.

AK: That would have been more balanced.

JP: If you get all in one party, then that one starts taking you for granted because you're a cinch vote. You're not someone they have to stretch for, but if you are in both parties—

If you look in '46, the state Senate passed some civil rights legislation—there was a good state senator, a white senator, who really led the fight for civil rights, and he got beat in that district because he was white.

But I didn't fit anybody's mold. I came down here and Sam Smith and I sponsored this open housing bill and got a little heat on it. But it was not something that gave an advantage to anybody. It just said everybody is the same. It reflected just the way I feel about these things. To have an even playing field—everybody gets it, and you don't keep people out of Magnolia because they are black. The original covenants in there were that you couldn't be Jewish, you couldn't be black, you couldn't be Chinese, or this and that. You know, somebody put a real estate thing out, and then they'd have these underlying covenants and things. They'd gotten to where most of these things had been long forgotten. There certainly were plenty of Jewish people in Magnolia, but still, it was under there.

And, of course, the other thing was the interest of the real estate people, because so often they owned property. In those days, they really discouraged anybody who was black from going into the neighborhoods. That's why you had so many Asians in Beacon Hill and the south end. You had the central core area for the blacks. My feeling was that everybody should be able to buy a house in whatever area they can afford. If somebody was black and could buy a house in Magnolia, however they got there, they'd showed some discipline.

Those that wanted to somehow force people out, and those that didn't want blacks—well, I thought that we were far better off if we did a better job of dispersing people, I mean getting them out of the Central Area. Then we would not have had the very damaging busing situation, which was so harmful to the education the children got.

I did not oppose busing. It was the law of the

land and I thought the choice was, either we devise our own or the courts would mandate it, and I thought it was better for us to do it out ahead. However, it was a disaster. It was a great mistake, and I wasn't smart enough to see it. It just tore up communities, and so many families moved out. Even at Beacon Hill where I was tutoring, kids were being bused from the north end all the way down here. It just didn't make sense. But, to put that load on kids, and then what they did was, somebody would say, "I know all this, but I don't want my eight-year-old daughter going on a bus from here to clear over there every day." I don't blame them. So they moved to Kirkland—very destructive. Gee, it was tough.

And you'd get black parents who said, "I want my kid to get a good education. Don't talk to me about busing them." The Zion private school—it's all black. What you need is to give a first-rate education to people, and then I think you allow for people—give some flexibility, extra flexibility for people to move around.

But when they finally stopped the busing, why, the old, old people of the civil rights movement, they still wanted to go to court. They had such an investment in this thing. It's just been a tragedy.

AK: When you say you "took a little heat on it," what was the response, in your district and generally, to your stand on these issues? Are you way out in front with this one?

JP: After that, the next election, a fellow ran against me and put up billboards and said, "Elect a real Republican." He had this thing: "Pritchard sponsored House Bill 50." It was such a busy billboard, you'd have to stop and read it. It was kind of silly. But, anyway, he ran against me on that issue, and he didn't get many votes.

AK: I know you won that election, but how did that play in your area? Was it a topic of much discussion?

JP: Not an awful lot. I think I won four-to-one in the primary. His name was Loerch, George Loerch. I didn't get into any controversy with him. I don't remember even seeing him in the

campaign. It wasn't one of these where we had debates or anything. If people asked me about my position, I explained it, and most of my friends said, "Yes, that makes sense."

AK: Were people ready for this, even if they had not yet articulated it for themselves?

JP: I think the majority of people, at least my friends, thought it made sense and was fair. If somebody could afford a house in Magnolia, that meant they had a pretty good job, that meant they were pretty responsible. Or on Queen Anne, you know. It was what I called leveling the playing field.

And we got it out of the House, but it died in the Senate. The fact that it was the first bill I put in, it stuck in my mind. But the real estate industry wasn't very thrilled about it, because they felt it added to their problems.

AK: One of the provisions of the bill said that if a Realtor was caught twice practicing discrimination within a six month period, they would lose their license. Was that the part that concerned them?

JP: I'm sure that bothered them, but I'd have to look at the bill again to remember all the points. But I do remember Slade and Dan and Chuck, they all supported me on it. And it wasn't a partisan issue. And that's what we were trying to do, is keep it from being a partisan issue. But, as I say, it got to the Senate and didn't go anywhere.

AK: Were you very disappointed?

JP: You know, you have a lot of bills, and when you're a freshman you can't do anything in the Senate. But it was not a partisan thing—we followed the old rule—we had three sponsors, two in the majority, one in the minority.

AK: Did you meet with black leaders and discuss this with them, or just do it as a matter of course, as 'the right thing to do,' without a lot of discussion?

JP: I just did it. I went to a breakfast of black

businessmen at Mount Zion, stopped in there for breakfast, I remember, but whether it was that year, I get a little confused. And I'd been very active in the YMCA, and they had all kinds of kids at Camp Orkila—there were some black kids there—so, I guess I was kind of liberal in my social approach. But I wasn't crusading, this wasn't a big crusade of mine.

AK: Although you didn't know him previously, you worked closely on the open housing issue with Representative Sam Smith. What were your impressions of him?

JP: I loved Sam very much—out of that we became very good friends. We were good friends. I liked him and he was very good, and a really good representative for that area.

It's one of the things that distresses me when I'm around black politicians who don't act right—not like Sam—and cut all the corners, and I think, how sad, because they're representatives of their people. Besides being politicians, they're role models. And when they cut corners and do all kinds of things—and I won't name who, but there are several in this state—I think it's a shame.

AK: Do you think, then, that they have a larger role than white politicians because of their prominence?

JP: Sure, I think that they are a bigger factor in their community and so, in some ways, they carry a heavier responsibility whether they like it or not. I think they have a greater responsibility for how they act, how they do things.

AK: More people are watching with a critical eye, that's for sure.

JP: Sure, because they have a higher profile in their community than, say, the state legislator has in Queen Anne.

AK: At this time, the national civil rights movement was still led by ministers and people of that type. Was that also true for Seattle?

JP: Yes, in the black community. And then, in

the general community, there were lots of people—the Council of Churches, which I was close to, was very active. But shortly after that, we had the outbreak in Seattle—in all the cities.

AK: Yes, when I was reading up on these issues I made an outline of events: In 1963, there was the big march in Washington, D.C., and Martin Luther King gave his “I Have a Dream” speech. And in '63, open housing is a big issue in Seattle—Mayor Clinton is put in a rather awkward position negotiating between the people pushing for open housing and those opposed, made more complicated by a fear that a referendum campaign would polarize the city—

JP: Gordon Clinton was a very thoughtful mayor. I was one of his managers when he ran for mayor, and I was very involved.

AK: Did you talk with him about these issues?

JP: He and I were in the same church, the First Methodist Church, and Gordon was very thoughtful and really good on things of this nature. One, they were trying to channel these energies into constructive things, and what got so difficult was that when they started tearing things up and had the real riots, it turned off a lot of people from trying to do something. They found this destructive. And when they came down here, to Olympia, I can remember they marched down here and there was a real question about keeping them out of the Capitol—

AK: Are you speaking now of the Black Panthers, when they came down to demonstrate?

JP: Yes, the Black Panthers—Hewey Newton and all that, and were they armed? I was still in the House then, but I know it was a very difficult time. I know that Lieutenant Governor Cherberg was very unhappy about the pressure that was being put on. They had some meetings between the Black Panthers and some political groups because people were saying, “Let's let the air out of this thing. Let's let some steam out of it. Let's have some meetings.” But there was lots of controversy.

The state didn't really have much of a role, it

was more federal and in the courts—but it was a place, because the Legislature was here, TV was here, and so, of course, they had the marches here. But I don't remember anything constructive coming out of all of that. Maybe there was.

AK: I know they wanted to be heard. Listening seemed to be a good thing.

JP: They wanted to be heard, yes. But then, when they got into the riots and raising Cain, it just turned people off. Their attitude was civil disobedience is not the way. It may get people's attention, but it doesn't win friends.

AK: What were people saying at the time? You, your friends—how did they think this movement should go? What would have worked?

JP: We had a great interest in civil rights. People wanted to level out the playing field, but then, when the riots started, that sort of turned off a lot of people. But it was a big thing in Seattle, more than in the state. It wasn't a major issue in state politics.

AK: But was there anything the state could have done differently, or should have done, that would have helped the situation?

JP: I'm not sure because the feds came in on top of it. It was a major problem in Seattle and probably Tacoma—the cities had to deal with it. And in truth, you can't really solve these things by law. You can make some changes, but the major legislation had been passed.

AK: Do you mean the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

JP: Yes, the big civil rights act, and that really was where it all went. But, I have to tell you, except for that one battle I was really in—a battle I was very involved in—I wasn't closely associated with it. We were moderate Republicans, and under a general rule we supported equal treatment for everyone, and were opposed to all these sort of special laws.

AK: What do you mean by “special laws?”

JP: I mean about riding on the bus, or couldn't do this or couldn't do that, as in other states. Most of us thought of it as a problem back East, or particularly down South. We didn't see it as much in our state because we thought that in our state we were pretty progressive—the state of Washington. Now, if you got into the black community, they still felt that there were things like red-lining and that opportunities were pretty tough.

AK: I know employment was a big issue—the first marches downtown were about not being hired in the big stores.

JP: A lot of labor unions didn't have blacks in them. You didn't see blacks building houses, or in the construction industry. This was the entry, where they had to get in. But the red-neck labor attitude was—

AK: Was there anything state legislation could do about that, or was that somebody else's area?

JP: That's pretty tough—that's a national thing on labor unions. And you had to change the attitudes.

AK: Seattle was, in 1963, the first major U.S. city to initiate district-wide desegregation in its schools. So there was some movement there—they acted as a leader there. But then, the city open housing ordinance failed in 1964, and that was a real blow. However, the federal Civil Rights Act passed in that year—

JP: Came in and overturned it. But, yes, when they had open housing on the ballot in '63 it lost—the city thing. I imagine that I supported it, and Clinton did, and a lot of people, but, when you got right down to it, the people in the voting booth didn't.

AK: The general mass of people just weren't ready for such a measure?

JP: Well, there were lots of people who didn't like it.

AK: Evidently. But in 1967 there was a Sam

Smith amendment of a real estate bill, the one that would revoke the license of a Realtor caught discriminating, that actually went through. That got a lot of press and was considered a breakthrough.

JP: I'd gone to the Senate by then, but Sam was still in the House.

AK: There was an organized opposition, a movement by a group called the Seattle Advisory Homeowners Committee, to stop Sam. It was led by a former state senator, Jack England. Were you familiar with him? He represented the Thirty-second District in 1961 for one term and then moved to the Senate in 1963, again for just one term.

JP: He was not one of our friends. I didn't think much of him. Jack England was kind of on the other side of the Republican Party. I'm sure that would fit for him, because on issues like this, yes, there was a split in the Republican Party. He represented Wallingford, the University District, and then he got beat.

I had friends who were running in the House races at that time, I remember, this would have been '63 or somewhere along in there. But England had been in the House and he was going to run for the Senate, and I remember saying, "The Senate is taken, no use fighting that one. Let's go for the House." We were going to have Ken McCaffree's wife, Mary Ellen, run for that Senate seat, but England got in the thing. She had been the president of the League of Women Voters and was fairly close to Slade and Dan and all of us. I remember because it was part of the discussion of getting her into the race. She was a key part of our campaign team, and her basement was campaign headquarters for lots of races.

AK: It wasn't until 1968 that Congress enacted a federal housing law. That was the same year that Seattle did finally pass an anti-discrimination ordinance, which was used both as a spur to other cities and as a model. I know Olympia, Lacey, and many other cities around here then began looking at setting up similar ordinances. There were hearings where people could come forward

and describe the discrimination they had experienced. And there were teams of students sent out to conduct sociological studies about instances of discrimination in the rental market—black couples, white couples, mixed race couples sent out to test the market. There was a lot of work done along those lines.

JP: Yes, that was a very big time. People were very fearful. It got a lot of attention in Seattle when those riots came out, the disturbances. That was very critical.

But this wasn't an overriding issue—it wasn't an issue in the majority of the state. Not in the Legislature—so these weren't issues that held up the Legislature. There was a lot of lip service given by Rosellini in some of these groups, but Labor really wasn't very keen. But it got a lot of attention in Seattle.

AK: Earlier, in 1961, you cosponsored a bill with Representatives Perry and Holmes, to create a state Civil Rights Commission. Did that reflect your idea that if people are listened to and have avenues for constructive engagement, that you can help before some of these problems get too big?

JP: Sure. I can't remember, but probably the idea was to set up a group to try and look down the road, or to set up policies, or be a clearinghouse.

AK: Nineteen sixty-one seems quite early for that out here. You seem a little ahead in your thinking.

JP: Yes, but I have to tell you, these commissions and that weren't terribly important, and we set them up in a lot of areas. I sponsored the Women's Rights Commission, and was the only male member, I think, of it out of twelve members in the first group. It was to be a hearing, a clearing board, a sounding board. It was thought this is the way to maybe get out some of the problems, or at least get ahead of them. I think that was probably it.

AK: These were years of political upheaval and great social change—the civil rights movement, the beginnings of the women's movement, a time of cultural shifts. Even if you were not deeply

involved, you were a part of these changes, you were active through these years. Could you take a moment and reflect for me on that era, the so-called sixties?

JP: It wasn't that traumatic. People look back and say, "Wow! Those days." But in many ways, it was a thing up there in your brain, because you didn't live in those districts. You weren't on the front line in those things. You tried to be supportive, and you believed in the approach and in trying to work on it.

For some people it was a big, hot button, but it was a fairly small number in my district where I lived. I was involved with the churches—the Council of Churches—in my community, and these are things that made general sense, that you supported, which was attempting to move people to where all people were treated the same, and everybody had the same opportunity. And you didn't judge people by their color, you judged them on their actions. Of course, we had a substantial number of Japanese-Americans and Chinese-Americans in Seattle, and I'd been close to the Japanese-Americans growing up, and so it just seemed the right thing to do.

I supported the efforts on the civil rights bills and that, and thought they were right—voting rights and all those things. But we all thought of it more as stuff that dealt with the deep South and what went on in the South. We thought the state of Washington was pretty progressive and we were out ahead, we were better than other places. And yes, we had problems but we handled them better than other areas. We were ahead of them. And I think that is true—we were ahead of most.

AK: How did you feel about the federal programs? Did you think they were taking the right approach?

JP: The Great Society programs? We had some questions about some of these federal programs and how they were being used, and who was promoting them, and for what reason. But most of that was city government—I know Gordon Clinton was very good on these problems, and worked at it.

AK: These federal programs, the anti-poverty programs, urban renewal, didn't they have a lot of strings attached to them that the state and cities would have to comply with in order to get the funds? Didn't that shift the balance between states and the federal government?

JP: Yes, but it wasn't that difficult for us to comply. Those things were not looked at as problems for our state. Those things were all in there for the South, and areas of the East.

AK: Seattle did experience some violence and tension, though. And Ed Pratt, head of the Urban League, was murdered in Seattle.

JP: Yes, that was a mystery. No one knows why or who or what. There was a lot of speculation: was this really because of this, or other reasons, or was this an internal thing in the black community, or who?

AK: You were a cosponsor of the bill that memorialized the death of Edwin Pratt, to express condolences to his family and to the League. You did the right thing.

JP: At the time, sure. If we were in session, I would have. When did it happen? Sixty-nine—I would have been in the Senate then.

AK: Yes, it's a Senate bill. And you cosponsored it with Senator Dore, which surprised me, given your feeling for him.

JP: He had the district, see, and he would have come over and asked me, because I wouldn't have gone with Fred. But I'm on the record quite a bit because I was thought of as a Republican from Seattle who was very moderate, and had been up on some of these issues. So, therefore, the group, whoever was doing it, they'd call up my office and say, "Will you help?"

But things like that, resolutions, if your name is one of the top three, then they're the sponsors of it. And then they open it up for everybody, and everybody is the sponsor.

AK: Nevertheless, all these small, and not so

small, efforts do add up to quite a respectable record of support for civil rights. You do emerge as a leader of sorts in this area.

JP: Well, the open housing bill, House Bill 50, the fact that it was my first bill and we had real debate on it, it was the first one that I really worked on and I was involved in. And this fellow ran against me because of it in the '60 election, but that was fine with me. But most people—their attitude was that, “If you were on it Joel, it must have been a good thing.”

AK: When you say you really worked on the bill, could you describe what it was that you would do—go around and talk to people?

JP: You talk to others, and explain it, and say, “How about helping?” I’m pretty sure I got a majority of Republicans in the House to be for it. A lot of that was just personal work.

AK: As a freshman, for your first bill, was that hard to do?

JP: Not hard to do. No, it wasn’t hard, but it’s what you come down for. It was memorable to me. I remember it because I was out there—which is what you want to do—it’s what you come down for. There were a lot of things, but that happened to be the first. And we got it through. We made it. And there were Republicans who voted for it just because I was pushing it. They came from areas where it wasn’t anything in their district, but, “Hey Joel, if you want it, well okay.”

AK: Was it because you were already pretty well known?

JP: Well, because I hustled around. We worked at trying to be persuasive.

AK: Did you mainly work the Republican end and Sam Smith talk to the Democrats?

JP: Yes, that’s what you do. And Brink—Brink was a freshman, too—he was a Democrat, and so they worked the Democratic side and I worked the Republican side. It wasn’t a big deal in the session, but just the fact that the three of us had that, and we felt good about getting it through the House. That was it.

AK: Were there hearings? Did people come down to testify?

JP: Yes, there was some lobbying. There was some talking.

AK: Did anyone organize against it?

JP: Yes, they were organized. You can imagine some lobbyists wouldn’t be keen on it. And the Realtors just saw it as one more impediment, one more thing they had to deal with, “Ye gods, we’ve got enough.”

AK: Another government regulation. Would there be any other identifiable group that would have been hesitant about this legislation? I was wondering if the John Birch Society spoke out about this.

JP: They were never anything. They were tiny, just tiny. Their big things were national things. They were squirrely.

But my thought was to try for a level playing field. I was less enthused about, well, special quotas, and all that.

AK: Do you mean affirmative action programs?

JP: Yes—affirmative action. I was more doubtful of it as a sort of general rule. That came in, in the early seventies. But, I’m just saying, as a general rule, I had more feelings about people being treated equal. Then, when we got into special treatment for groups, I got less enthused. That’s just sort of the general rule, the level playing field idea.

CHAPTER 6

BUILDING THE NEW TEAM

Joel Pritchard: I was never big on trying to have a lot of bills, it didn't bother me not getting a lot of bills through. When you're in the minority or a freshman, why, you don't, and when people asked me how many bills I got through, I'd always say, "Probably more than I should have. We pass too many bills." I'd say, "Look, I could be a good legislator and not pass any bills, because we pass just hundreds and hundreds of bills, and the problem is not bills not passing, it's that too many pass. We aren't careful enough about what goes through." That was sort of my feeling.

Now, a lot of legislators just feel they've got to have some bills go through that have their name on them. I never had that feeling.

Anne Kilgannon: Well, that's refreshing—different.

JP: I've just never had that feeling. That also came from being very secure in my district. I didn't feel the pressure to do something just for political reasons.

AK: That's a wonderful kind of freedom, I imagine, because then you can be more careful, as you say.

JP: Yes. My theory always was, if people acted that way, they'd do better in their district. You have to stand up on some issues.

AK: You mean be a leader, and not rely on polling to determine your positions?

JP: Yes. You have to use some judgment, you can't go crazy on this business of polling. You should find out where you are, figure out what you think is right, and then go do it. In a general way you have to fit your district, and if you don't, why they'd better put somebody else in.

AK: Did you feel it was part of your job to kind of bring people along and help them see a little ahead of where they might have been otherwise?

JP: I think that public officials have a role in educating people. That's why it's very important to have people respect you. They don't have to like you, but if you're going to be effective, you've got to be respected. If you're respected, then people will say, "Tell me about it. I don't understand it." Instead of saying, "That was awful," they'd say, "Why did you do it? Well, if you did that, you must have had some good reasons." And if you've got good reasons for doing things, you can survive times when you and someone don't agree. What they don't like is to find that you didn't do your homework, that you didn't have good reasons. Then they don't respect you, and when they don't respect you, it weakens your ability to work with others.

AK: It would seem very important to have that inner compass, to not get bowled over with all the different issues. In your first session, there seemed to be a lack of direction, a lack of agreement among the majority party, the Democrats—so much so that a special session was called, just a day after the regular session ended, to deal with the budget.

JP: It just went on and on. The Democrats had a two-thirds majority, but they had a lot of troubles, a lot of battling—not so much in the House as in the Senate. They had some real splits—Greive, Mardesich, Rosellini. There was all this battling going on. But we were not really much of a factor, our thirty-three Republicans in the House. And O'Brien could pretty well put a majority together there and get what they wanted out of there.

AK: Did you feel you should just sit back and watch the Democrats mess up?

JP: Well, we watched the different people battling. We were learning—for me it was learning. You watched the different fights and the battling that goes on. I can't remember what all it was, but it seems to me it was a budget fight. They were having trouble, and I can't remember whether they needed a tax increase to balance the budget or they had to trim something, or whatever it was.

AK: A bit of both, yes. I was wondering, it's your first session, and then there's a special session called. Had you been looking forward to going home? Were you tired of it?

JP: No, it's not hard. When you're in the minority, and you're a freshman in the back row of the minority of one-third, why, it was very stimulating. If you're a person that is interested in history and government, it's a nifty thing. It kind of dragged on and on, yes, and enough was enough, and I was ready to get back to work.

You go home on weekends, and sometimes if there was something up in the district, you'd go up in the middle of the week. I don't remember—I just knew this sort of thing went on and on. That's a long time ago.

AK: Yes. I was just wondering how special sessions, or the threat of special sessions, would hang over people's family and business life—especially people who did not live within easy driving distance.

JP: Yes, it was much more difficult for those people and for the farmers. And in those days we had a lot of farmers and they had to get back and start getting crops in, and get serious about their farming. And for a lot of people, they had times to do things, and, "Hey, we've got to get going. Yes, let's get this out of here and let's go home."

AK: The news stories seemed to be somewhat complacent about the idea of a special session. Was this acceptance part of the push toward annual sessions, this idea that there wasn't enough time?

JP: We were right on the edge of having annual

sessions. The idea was to have a thirty-day session in between, but the budget was a two-year budget, so annual sessions weren't going to do anything about the budget. Still today, it's a two-year budget, so it would depend for what reason things got held up or done. And often, it was the governor, the administration, fighting with the legislative branch over the process.

AK: Beyond annual sessions, government seems to be going through a transformation at this time, becoming more professional—the handling of the budget—

JP: It was growing. Warren Bishop was the budget director, as I remember, for Rosellini and the departments. There were some very able people in that process. But when you get all done modernizing you look back and say, "Did they really do it better than the ones before?" Well, it sounds better, but when you get all done, did they really do better? I'm not at all certain. It's generally the quality of the people that are making the decisions, the decision-makers in there.

AK: I know with computers the process has become more elaborate, with more and more information and charts and graphs, but do you think that legislators now have it easier making decisions, or is it harder? Does more information really change the quality of the decisions made?

JP: I'm not certain it does. My rule is that as legislators, the less ability, the more they get down to mucking around in the details of trying to micro-manage. The Legislature does not improve as it gets more information and gets down into all these things. They should act more like a board of directors, not as day-to-day operators.

AK: Just stick with general principles?

JP: But there's a great tendency, particularly with those of limited ability, to get down and want to buy the pencils and the erasers when they ought to be worrying about broad policy, and then hold a department or whatever it is, hold the administration responsible and then see how it works. But not get into the details. As you get legislators who

do nothing but legislate and spend all their time—get their ticket from politics—well, this is what you get.

AK: You were not one of those people whose only area of achievement was in politics, and yet, you've basically given much of your life to public service. Back in 1959, when you started, did you have any sense then how many years you would spend in politics, that this would be such a big part of your life?

JP: I had no idea it would be full-time. I didn't look ahead. I didn't have a plan. We were interested in the political process and helping people run for office. We didn't want it to be our life's work, and we certainly didn't want to get our money from politics. But, you know, friendships—

But through the twelve years of the Legislature, at no time did I think of going on. It was just sort of way out there at the last minute, I just said, "I think I'll run for Congress."

But I worked at it. After my first session we went back to our community and did a report—our senator was Senator Zednick, and the two House members were Moriarty and myself. But while Zednick was giving his talk he keeled over—right face forward, bang, and died, right there at the meeting. They finally got the police and firemen and all, but he died. He was gone.

So, the next day I got hold of Moriarty and said, "You've been in one more session than I have, you ought to go to the Senate."

He said, "Fine."

And I said, "And we ought to bring Mrs. Kirk back, after this rather tough election." He wasn't overjoyed with that, because she wasn't his favorite. But I said, "Let's do it that way. You go back and then let's bring Mrs. Kirk back into the delegation."

AK: Was she from a different camp within the party?

JP: No, it was mainly religious—Moriarty was a Catholic and Mrs. Kirk's husband was active in the Shriners or something—

AK: Did you want to bring her in because she was a known entity?

JP: We'd fought and defeated her. And I'm always a believer in "now let's bring them back in, keep them all together, keep them happy." Try to calm the waters. And so we did that. We had the county organization send the names over, and Chuck was sent to the Senate and Mrs. Kirk was appointed.

AK: These were appointments, then, not elections?

JP: Yes, these were appointments. That was rather a dramatic thing. In the next election, Hugh McGough, an attorney on Magnolia, ran against Mrs. Kirk. He thought because I'd done it, he'd do it. But he was not successful, and Mrs. Kirk stayed on as the legislator. We had very good relations. And Chuck was an excellent senator and became the majority leader. Moriarty was in our group. He was one of us.

AK: Did you stay rooming with him down here in Olympia? Did you get the house again?

JP: We got the house the second time. We had Slade, and Moriarty, and myself, and, I believe, Jimmy Andersen—it's awful to say I can't remember, but I think that was the foursome, then. Evans had gotten married, so he and his wife had another place.

AK: Nancy Evans came down with him?

JP: Yes, I think she did. We were now where we'd elected Dan to be the leader in the House, which was the big push and effort to get more aggressive and start organizing people around the state to run for the Legislature. We were out doing that.

AK: Did you travel around the state meeting with people?

JP: Sure. We went to other cities and met people, and urged them to run. We had a team, different ones, but we were encouraging people to run and finding some good people, and putting our efforts there.

AK: Was your brother doing this with you?

JP: No, my brother, at that point, was involved in politics very much, but not so much this. But he was helpful in Seattle, because people would come to him for advice, so he helped in Seattle, but not so much out around the state.

AK: What kinds of people were you able to recruit?

JP: I'd have to look down the list and see, I get a little mixed up. There was Pat Comfort, but his mother had been in before, and Bob McDougall in Wenatchee. He was very good and fit our sort of new, fresh, young group. He came in '61. Tom Copeland came in '57, and he was very aggressive and young and part of the team. And Goldsworthy and Huntley.

AK: Was Elmer Huntley part of your group?

JP: No, but he supported Evans. He was a key vote in Spokane when he switched to Evans.

And Stu Bledsoe in '65—he was the first Republican to be elected from this area in a long time. He represented the Coulee Dam area, so it was Democrat.

AK: The town that Roosevelt created—

JP: And Mary Ellen McCaffree, and Lois North, who was also a state president of the League of Women Voters. We had lots of support in those areas. Mary Ellen—she came in '63—and she was really, really important. We had sort of a command center in her basement, and she was helpful.

These were city people. It's hard to believe we were in Seattle—we had lots of legislators elected in Seattle. It's not true today. There's not a Republican elected in Seattle in the House or the Senate.

AK: To what do you attribute such a change?

JP: People have moved out. Busing didn't help, everybody moved out of Seattle, out to the suburbs, so that in the rim of the county, there's quite a few Republicans. And then everything in

the city is Democratic, very strong.

But, then, we were looking for people who were good people. And when someone good was running, we went over and got them help and got them some material. We had a tabloid that we supplied people. We had somebody print it all, and then the first page was a picture, and then inside there was stuff on state government and they could fit stuff in. And then we got them a very good discount rate. And generally we tried to help them raise some money. We'd say, "Here's ten thousand folders, get out and do these door-to-door and get them distributed through your district." Things like that. And encourage them—all things that were encouraging—socialize with them, you know.

AK: Earlier you mentioned that the Republican Party has some splits in it. Did you, behind the scenes, try to do anything to mend these rifts, as well as bringing in these new people?

JP: We had to elect our people, and most of the time we won. But the Republican King County operation was controlled by those people, and we lost there.

AK: But did you get into big discussions with them about their positions?

JP: Oh God, endless. They were more conservative Republicans and they didn't like Evans. They were part of the Christensen gang, and when we beat them for governor they hung onto enough precinct committeemen to control the county. It was a very close vote. And ever after that they controlled the King County party mechanism. In many ways that doesn't mean a lot, but in some battles, in some issues—

AK: They were a real check on your activities. Yet, in 1960, you were awarded the GOP Man of the Year by the Young Men's Republican Club. What did that mean for you?

JP: It was not a big deal. The Young Men's Republican Club was a very conservative group.

AK: I see it was a very close vote.

JP: There was an old county official that was supposed to get it, and then they screwed up in their membership, and somehow I got it. I just took it as sort of representing all of the new, young people who were going to Olympia. It wasn't a big deal. It was an old, old Republican club—it's still going.

AK: All your activities must have had some impact, because in the 1960 election, although the Democrats gained one seat in the Senate at the expense of your party, in the House you brought your numbers up to forty from thirty-three. I was wondering if these numbers reflect the work of your group?

JP: We were involved in that. We went out and urged people to run, and we started to build. First, we put a different team of leadership in. We elected Dan Evans leader by one vote over in Spokane at our organization meeting.

AK: Was that a big struggle? He won by only one vote—that's very close.

JP: We made a big effort to bring new leadership in. And Don Eldridge became caucus chairman, and Slade played a bigger role in it.

AK: How about yourself?

JP: I was helpful. I was helping other people get their spots. We brought on some new people and we worked the campaigns very hard. We did a good job of recruiting, and of course, we were so far down that you can come back—which we did. But in the Senate, it was still a disaster, wasn't it?

AK: Yes, you lost one seat.

JP: Yes. We only had thirteen out of forty-nine, so it was very one-sided. But our target was still changing the party—we wanted to build our group in the Legislature. And we wanted to remove the Rosellini administration. If this is '61, this follows the Andrews-Rosellini election, and Lloyd was in the ball game, it was very close. They had a TV debate and Rosellini was pretty clever at it, and won the debate, and he was able to stay in the

governorship for another four years.

AK: Were the state contests at all influenced by the national ones? This is the year Kennedy comes in.

JP: Not much. First of all, that was such a close election, nationally, nineteen thousand votes in Ohio, I think it was, would have turned the whole thing around. So, it was very close. Our Legislature was affected somewhat by Rosellini, but, where we had good candidates and where we did our thing, we started to win. The trick of course, was to get good candidates.

AK: Where did you find these new people?

JP: Well, you go into a community and look for somebody about thirty-five years old who was a community leader. We sort of had a target—but it didn't always work out this way—somebody who had been the head of the Community Chest, somebody active in the community. We didn't just go to the local Republican organization. We were looking for community leaders.

AK: Were you trying to break away from the established Republican structure?

JP: Yes. We were trying to get community leaders because, generally, among community leaders, there wasn't much support for Rosellini.

AK: Through these years in the early sixties, the Republicans were making gains in the House, but the Senate remained a Democratic stronghold, though they seem unable to take much advantage of their numbers.

JP: Yes—Greive, Mardesich, Gissberg, all this battling, they did a lot of it. They had such a big majority that many times that happened. But we had nothing to do with the Senate at that point. We were trying to get our act together in the House.

AK: Did it help you that they were splintering?

JP: Not particularly. From the public standpoint,

most of them didn't even know the state senators. The big thing was Rosellini. We ran every legislator against Rosellini, no matter what he thought about Rosellini or what. In the legislative races, if they were Rosellini candidates we were running against them.

AK: So just tar the whole group?

JP: You bet. That's their problem. You get a governor and this was his second term. He'd won the '60, so it's the '61 session, when Evans took over and Eldridge was the caucus chairman. And Copeland was very involved in the '61 session. These were the key people.

AK: Let's turn now to that '61 session.

JP: Wasn't that the power fight? The right to vote? Didn't we get everything locked up for a number of days? All right, I remember, it was a bill we had that was going out, which said that before a public utility could take over, the people in the community had a right to vote. It was called 'the right to vote election.' It dominated that session, I don't know how many weeks—

AK: Yes, a large portion of that session was taken up with it. But everything started to break down. A lot of things were bottled up, because they couldn't decide on the budget.

JP: We were attacking certain pieces. That's what you do when you're in the minority. The majority has the responsibility of putting things together. As I remember, we came in with more money for education. And we offered amendments.

But it's very hard for me to remember these times. I know Gorton and I were seat mates for the '61 session. And I sat with Don Moos—now, Moos was another key one on the new team. He's still over there in Wenatchee. He was very good. Later he was director of Agriculture, and director of Natural Resources for Evans. He had all kinds of responsibilities.

But it seems to me that this '61 session, at the start of it, was this whole business of the power issue. We had just enough votes to get it out—one guy was sick, but my wife and another lady

went out and got him, got him in the car, and they hauled him in here. I can't remember whether he came in a wheelchair, but anyway, we got him to vote. It was that sort of all-out battling.

AK: What position did you take on this issue?

JP: On the power issue, we all supported the fact that the people in the area should have a chance to vote. See, if you had PUD commissioners that had been elected in a district, then they could just automatically switch. This had happened.

This was a big issue with the Democrats, just a big issue. The power issue was one of the biggest issues that ever came along. This public/private power was really religion with the Democrats, most of them, except the ones from Spokane. It wasn't an overriding issue with me, it wasn't one of the things, but I supported what they called "the right to vote." But it did tie up the Legislature.

AK: Wasn't this the issue that became a power struggle with Speaker John O'Brien and some of the Eastern Washington Democrats, the supporters of private power?

JP: O'Brien, of course, was a big public power person. There he had a big majority, and we were trying to force a bill through and it was very close. He kept maneuvering, and, it seemed to me, we went a number of days stuck over that legislation.

AK: Some of the legislators, particularly the ones who ended up in the coalition later, thought that O'Brien handled that bill extra-legally, you might say, when he gavelled them down and left the room, refusing to recognize them.

JP: Of course, he used all the gimmicks. He was very arbitrary in how he ran things. He used the power of the Speaker—

AK: It created a lot of bitterness, by some accounts.

JP: Oh, and all that was just leading up to the coalition. They'd been running things for so long that, in their view, "We've got the votes, and we're going to do it one way or another." It was fine

with us. We were trying to slow this train down.

AK: What was the outcome? Did your measure pass, “the right to vote?”

JP: I can’t remember now, but it seems to me, no. Rosellini would have vetoed it. But no more PUDs were established in our state, as I remember. And, of course, the privates really had to get on the ball and perform well. It was good in that it forced the privates to perform well—the PUDs and privates, both of them have to perform well.

AK: Don’t these issues have long roots in Washington State politics?

JP: First of all, we had Coulee Dam, we had the whole Bonneville power structure, and then, of course, there was a big fight in the early fifties over having a TVA—the Democrats wanted to put a CVA together. The Columbia Valley Authority would have managed all the electricity like TVA does down in Tennessee. The Republicans fought that. Governor Langlie fought it.

AK: What was the issue, some kind of boon-doggle?

JP: The TVA has an enormous amount of power—political power—and we didn’t want this agency to come in and have that kind of power. They were going to build a Hell’s Canyon dam up on the Snake. There was just all kinds of fighting and battling over it. They never did establish the CVA, but it was a political issue, mainly between Democrats and Republicans. Though in Spokane, the Democrats there didn’t go along with it because that’s a private power area.

AK: The other simmering issue that colors this session of 1961 and then spills over into the year of the coalition was redistricting. Nineteen-sixty had been a census year and the Legislature was supposed to redistrict. But you didn’t.

JP: Yes, and then we got into the ’63 session and that was really the underlying reason for the coalition. What with a Democratic governor and

a Democratic House and Senate, we’d be redistricted right out into the street. We were already way short of our percentage of votes; in other words, we’d get fifty percent of the votes but only forty percent of the legislators.

This was Greive’s great thing—he was Machiavelli on redistricting. He was too smart for everybody in that respect, until he ran into Gorton. Gorton ran our redistricting and he knew every jot, diddle, corner, whatever it was. He could tell you how everything worked, and went at it in a very sophisticated way as far as getting past voting records, where it was, and all that. We won some of those battles in redistricting.

AK: Is this when the move towards representing the suburbs was starting to be corrected, because they were so underrepresented?

JP: Yes, underrepresented. That was because they grew rapidly, and the redistricting lagged behind. And we felt that hurt us and we were not happy about it.

AK: Would these be the same years when Republican-leaning people were leaving the city, as we discussed?

JP: No, that was later. Our crew didn’t come out of the suburbs, it came out of Seattle. It came out of Queen Anne, out of Laurelhurst, the University area. Slade lived further north, out past the University, out there.

AK: But it did help your party when these areas were redistricted?

JP: It helped in that we got a better split, yes. And it helped in that the incumbents got turned around, and you got a shot. That’s how I went to the Legislature, was redistricting, when Magnolia got put in with Queen Anne. And there’s a tendency also, when you have redistricting, sometimes you have people say, “Oh, I was going to quit, but now with this new district, forty percent is new, so I’m going to have to campaign. No, I think I’ll get out.” So, it was helpful, no question about it.

Hadley came in ’63, and he was a dandy, and

part of our team. And then going into the governor's race in '64, these people were helpful—

AK: You were well positioned.

JP: Yes. And almost all the legislators supported Evans, despite the fact that Christensen had all the votes, and was the odds-on favorite. They liked Evans, they respected him, and so we built teams of support in every legislative district where we had a Republican. Almost every one of them supported Evans.

AK: Was Evans already thinking of the governorship, then, in '61?

JP: No, not in '61. He was a leader, but I wouldn't say he was plotting and looking forward. He was looked at as a leader and coming up. But '63, yes.

AK: I'm still not sure what characterizes your group, what positions you took, what issues defined you, beyond stylistic differences—your position on taxes?

JP: Well, we weren't for raising taxes. But this was not a group that wanted to turn the clock back. I suppose we would be labeled as moderates, now. There were some differences which started early, back with the Eisenhower and Taft people.

Zeke Clark, our leader, ran for governor in '60, and lost in the primary. That took him out, so it opened the door for us to make some changes, and we were delighted to do it. Our feeling was that Rosellini had a lot of funny stuff going on. And we were squeaky-clean, straight-arrow people whose job didn't depend on being hooked up with an administration. We weren't in the government; we all had our own businesses and jobs.

It wasn't that the old ones were this way or that way, but they'd gotten down to thirty-three, so it was just bringing in new people. And as you bring in new people, you start building. And among the thirty-three, there were probably fifteen who were a part of this. And they weren't all young, certainly—Damon Canfield, a wonderful guy from the Yakima valley, a wonderful person,

he was older, but he was certainly part of our gang.

And Harry Lewis was another one of our young guys. He was from Olympia—it had been quite awhile since we'd had a Republican elected in Olympia. He came in '61, and he was another one of the young hard-chargers. He fit in perfectly.

Moos, Lewis, Walter Williams, Dan, Slade, Pat Comfort—he came in '61, one of the Tacoma people. He was a young attorney, the son of A.B. Comfort, who had been in the Legislature. So he sort of took his dad's place. He was young and aggressive, and a neat guy, and fit right in with the rest of us. And Mrs. Swayze, from Tacoma—she had been in before. She'd been there a long time.

And in '61, we had Helmut Jueling and Charlie Newschwander—both part of our team. Jueling was pretty good. Charlie was a dentist from Tacoma, and he was right in with the rest of us. Norwood Cunningham didn't get in until 1965. And Bobby O'Dell. But Perry Woodall was not one of ours—

These were people that were pretty well respected in their community. They would get high ratings from the Municipal League. So we were able to build a team. We went out and got new people in, encouraged them to run. We got them support. It wasn't a big money deal, but we'd get them tabloids printed real cheap. John Murray would print them for a penny apiece. We'd work out a deal where we gave them a whole lot of tabloids, showed them how to do it, where to put their family picture. We gave them a lot of technical help—how to run campaigns. We had gotten pretty good at it ourselves and were helping others.

AK: It adds up to a big change, almost a watershed. This seems remarkable to me. Was this level of change unprecedented?

JP: No, but it is a thing that goes on.

AK: Was this recognized as a period of renewal in the Republican Party?

JP: Yes. Most of us had been in the war, and then we came back, and by '58 or so we were able to attract a lot of good people. We went out and helped people, and you can make a difference

going out. We'd get out and encourage them to run, or help them if they were running. But we tried to stay away from guys that weren't good. There were some bad apples—I won't go and name them, but we knew who they were.

AK: What would have distinguished someone in that way for you?

JP: Well, their word wasn't any good, or they were trying to get a job out of it. You get to know those who were straight and will stand up and be counted.

AK: I notice that in this period—I was a little surprised at the lateness of the date—that there was still a considerable amount of anti-communist fervor in some circles. There was a bill that session to create something called the American Heritage and Citizen Council to combat communism. I would have thought that had pretty much run its course by then.

JP: All that stuff is nonsense. Like the Goldmark deal?

AK: Yes, that case happened in 1962.

JP: Slade and Copeland testified for Goldmark. We didn't have time for that old business. In fact, I found it very objectionable.

AK: I was wondering if that was one of the things that distinguished the new people coming up, was that for them all this anti-communism was finished, not an issue?

JP: Turn the page, that old stuff. It was the old way, the old people would run on that, or used it, Woodall and some of those guys.

But Sid Morrison came along, but not until '67, and Newhouse got there in '65, and it was Canfield and Clarke in that area. As I say, these people were well read, they were well educated. I'm sure I was the only one that wasn't a college graduate of all of them. They'd been through law school, or they had done this or that—

AK: All these college graduates, was this possibly

the fruit of the GI Bill?

JP: I think they'd have been going no matter what. They were bright, able people, though the GI Bill helped some. I know it helped Jimmy Andersen.

Well, anyway, that's what you're talking about. Now, not all of them had successful political careers, but most of them—some went into the Senate, some ran for other offices, some got out and went back to their businesses.

But we were not able to win the Republican Party, however, in King County. King County was controlled by the other group.

That was what we did—we went out and built a team of people. If you get a good person, they have a lot of friends, they're known in their community through the years, and that all kind of tied together. And it culminated in the governor's race, Evans and then there was the Christensen bunch. It was an enormous amount of work, but eventually we won. We had very little money—we didn't have TV ads or any of that stuff. We doorbelled the state.

AK: That's what I understood, that it was very person-to-person.

JP: Oh yes—it was really remarkable. But these new legislators—they wanted to be in the battle—and they were a key part in each one of these communities. You'd have a legislator who was respected, and not thought of as just another old political hack. And that was a big help.

AK: So this made a difference in Evan's race?

JP: Over a period of time, well, that's an overstatement. We did better in the state, but King County was always something else. But the state chairman of the Republican Party, Billy Walters, was on our side.

And, we had Rosellini. We were fighting Rosellini.

AK: He must have made a handy foil for you.

JP: Yes, it was a great help because, in the battle, some of those Republicans weren't too keen on some of us, but compared to whoever was mixed

up with Rosellini, why we were just wonderful.

AK: Nothing like a having a contrast.

JP: Yes, and there were others. The mayor's race with Gordon Clinton, winning the mayor's election in Seattle, was also part of this fresh new bunch. That was about two or three years before this legislative change took place, but it was some of the same people. But, in many ways, like I say, if you have a party that is down to thirty-three, then you've got a lot of room to come back up.

Duane Berentsen came in '63, and Jack Hood in '59, Metcalf in '61—all part of the young team. Walter Williams came in '61.

AK: By the mid-sixties, what proportion of the Republican Party was made up with this new team?

JP: Once Evans got in, there wasn't any question. Almost everybody was happy with his leadership. And Eldridge was very good.

AK: Can you describe their style of leadership? How was Evans different?

JP: We were much more confrontational with John O'Brien. We were trying to build a majority. We didn't want to wait around for what we said were crumbs that he tossed out—tossed to Elmer Johnson particularly. We were full of ideas. We thought there needed to be new blood. We built on it with these people, and we had Jim Dolliver come down and be attorney for the Republicans. And Jim was a remarkable person, a wonderful person, very able and smart, very well read. Most all of these guys were well read. It was a great help to have that kind of talent. We had a lot of respect for each other. It's the old story, you get good people and they attract good people—

AK: Do you feel you were able to lift the whole level of the Legislature, the level of debate, bringing in all these people?

JP: The Democrats wouldn't have thought that. They had some able ones come into the House about our time, too. There was Dan Brink, Ackley,

Goldmark, those people. But John O'Brien didn't feel comfortable with some of them, so, on some things, we'd work together, which was a help.

AK: I understand from Senator Bob Bailey that about this time legislators of both parties started to eat in the cafeteria with each other, whereas before they had not.

JP: Yes, we ate with everybody. But it's back to that again—Democrats only eating with Democrats, and Republicans— When I came back here as lieutenant governor, it was back to that, not all, but most just ate with Democrats, or whatever. And I think that is foolish. A lot of the times, you want to talk over something with somebody.

But, for us, there was no line between who you socialized with. Oh, sure, we kind of socialized with our young gang, but also we socialized with the others and felt very comfortable. I think it built up respect, so that it's much easier to work on things.

AK: To return to that session of 1961, one of the other struggles of that time that the Republicans weighed in on was the fight over the Liquor Board and proposed changes in liquor laws. And the churches were definitely against any liberalization of liquor laws—they were very active on this issue. But many of the press pieces I read also suggested that this was an area that was a measure of people's feeling about Rosellini, whether his administration could be trusted or not.

JP: Yes. The Rosellini Liquor Board, you see, each brand had a person that represented it—Jim Beam, or these different ones. So, Al's friends had all these different brands that they then sold to the state liquor stores. I remember we used to kid about that—the Jim Beam account—so that if some liquor company that had a brand wanted to get along, the feeling was that you'd better appoint somebody that had good connections with Al Rosellini. People were a little suspicious.

AK: Governor Rosellini was trying to change the length of the terms board members served, from nine years down to six, I guess so that he could appoint new members, get his own people

on the board.

JP: It was like Roosevelt packing the Supreme Court. First of all, they attempted to take politics out of the Liquor Board by having long terms. But well, here's Al Rosellini, he's in there, but he can't get the Liquor Board changed because they've got these long terms. Here he's governor, but he can't switch enough of the board to get control of it. So, he came in with this proposal that they should change the number. I think he was going to increase the numbers, that way he would get control. And then he was going to change some other things.

We fought that very hard. Then the word came down to us that the Senate wasn't going to pass out the education budget until we passed the Liquor Board.

AK: I have a nice quote from Dan Evans about that: "Dan Evans charged that Rosellini was using education bills as trading stock in trying to get the Liquor Board bill passed. Evans said that some Democratic members of the House admitted this to be the case. Evans also charged the administration with unjustifiably using the needs of education as a scapegoat for new taxes." This was from the *Seattle Times*, a Ross Cunningham piece.

JP: Yes, and I got a quote on the front page of the *Times*, saying, "The problem is the governor is more interested in booze than children." I was going out of the door of a press conference and I said I've got to get out of here, and they said, "Have you got any last words?" And I said, "Ye gods, the governor is more interested in booze than children." And it went p-f-f-t, right on the front page.

But there we were, on the side of the angels. It was just our kind of fight—corruption, liquor and education—how terrible. And we defeated him on it, and he had to back off. We loved it.

AK: You couldn't go wrong. And you had all the church groups lining up on your side. Now, this part I wasn't sure of, they were concerned that if the Liquor Board was changed, it would re-open the issue of Sunday closing—

JP: Yes, it would re-open it, and it was a great fight, and we were on the side of the angels. And obviously, we had some people on our side, some Democrats on our side, who didn't like what Al was doing. So, it was tailor-made for a fighting minority to highlight the governor's shortcomings, we felt.

AK: It was hard to judge from reading the papers how important an issue this was—it fills the papers, but perhaps it was just a colorful issue. But it seemed very important to some people, some groups.

JP: It seemed very important to the governor, and so, if it was very important to the governor, we felt, "Oh ho, why is it so important to the governor?"

AK: Was it because it involved political patronage?

JP: Political, yes. And it wasn't Democratic—it was Al's friends.

AK: Was this something where people could be awarded jobs with good salaries, good government jobs?

JP: You'd make if you had an account, oh yes. Say you represented Humpty-Dumpty brand, and they sold a lot in the state—

AK: It sounds like a ready-made area for corruption.

JP: Yes, that's right. We didn't have to say too much. Everybody would say, "Yes, this is sleazy," so we had a field day with it. It worked out well. And, of course, Ross Cunningham was a good friend of ours—he liked our gang of guys—and he was the political reporter for the *Seattle Times*, which in those days was the most important paper in the state. He was very supportive.

AK: And this issue was in conflict with funding for education—right when the state schools were bulging at the seams in the midst of the infamous baby boom.

JP: Yes, but the governor was Catholic—the first Catholic governor in our state, and he didn't send his kids to state schools. A lot of teachers felt that he wasn't very sympathetic to education. Al's big interest, as far as state government, was in the institutions—prisons, all the different institutions. And he had a very good person, Garrett Heyns, come in as head of Institutions, and he did some good work there. I do give Al credit there.

But he didn't have much interest in education, and we—because we were close to a lot of people in education, that was an area where we were pretty strong. And I don't know if it was fair or not, but the fact that Al didn't have his kids in public school— And he didn't have as much interest, he didn't feel as comfortable.

AK: Did the WEA play a role in this issue? They are so strongly associated with the Democrats now.

JP: They were not as strong then as they are now, but they had an organization. We did pretty well in the education areas.

AK: This was the year you worked to amend the constitution to authorize biennial school levies. Was that to help address the funding issue?

JP: Yes, and help them with their ability to get funding. People would have to vote them. We were sensitive to those issues.

AK: The junior college system was really expanding at this time.

JP: Oh yes, that was big. I think most everybody was for this. We had such growth and we had such a high percentage of students going on. We don't have a lot of private colleges, some, but not like back East, where there are so many. Our people had to go to Western, Central, Eastern, UW and Washington State. And there was this feeling that we had to get something in between, and so we developed the community colleges.

AK: Were community colleges a new concept then?

JP: I can't remember, I'm trying to think when they came on. I know we were supportive, we were at it, it was a thing we were pushing—a lot of people were pushing for it. My guess would be that it was a bipartisan effort, and that we were very involved in that effort.

AK: Another educational issue that stood out was that people were pushing for funding of kindergartens then, but they don't seem to have been successful. Did that reflect a reluctance to have the government involved with children of such a young age?

JP: It seems to me that some people didn't think kindergartens were necessary. They weren't as big then. As well as I can remember, they were a local option type of thing. But, as it grew, more and more schools had kindergartens, and the question was: how much and who had it, and what? But kindergartens were a factor.

And we'd had a terrific fight over Catholics and public schools. Pearl Wanamaker was a big school person, and had been in the Legislature, and was Superintendent of Public Schools. She was the spokesman, and she had said, "No kids going to Catholic schools can get on the school bus, even though they are going in the same direction." Those kinds of things were just "Ugh." And that led up to some of Al's problems with the school people. They questioned whether he had much commitment there at all. So, yes, school funding was an important thing.

But I can't tell you today the ins and outs of it. I was not on the Ways and Means Committee, and I was not a key budget person. And that's a long time ago.

AK: It would be impossible to remember everything, but do you recall your activities on the Elections Committee? That sounds more like your own area of interest.

JP: Yes, I was on that committee and was very involved. I remember we made a change so that no longer just the two top people got elected for the Legislature. When I came, it was the two top members. We changed it to position 1 and position 2. Made it a little tougher on incumbents, because

incumbents could get the other vote, and it was easy for an incumbent, even a weak one, to kind of get carried along. We tried to cut down on incumbents' power.

AK: To make sure I understand what you are saying: originally, there might be three people running, and the top two vote getters for the district would be elected, eliminating the third person, but, under the new system, each would have to run for a designated position, not in a general field. So this will tighten things up?

JP: Yes, and also, we felt we had a better shot at electing new, good people if we put it out there. So I worked on that.

AK: Did you choose to be on this committee with that kind of involvement in mind?

JP: I think it was just an interest. I don't remember now.

AK: Well, it seems very appropriate for you. I was wondering if it was part of your plan, your team-building efforts.

JP: No, no. I didn't come into the Legislature with a series of bills that I wanted to pass. I had no plan for what I was going to do, politically, if I was going to stay. I was in the envelope and printing business. I enjoyed the Legislature, but I had no personal goals or hoping to get here or there. It was always sort of a surprise to me as we went along.

AK: And, yet, here you are today.

You did, also, tighten up city council positions in much the same way, where they had to be numbered, too. Again, incumbents would be much more on-point?

JP: That's right. I was a firm believer in accountability. My theory was the good ones would be rewarded by that type of action, and the weak ones would be hurt. I was never keen on adding to the ease of an incumbent being re-elected in anything.

AK: Doesn't it also make a city council person much more representative if they are covering one area, rather than how many votes they could get from a whole city?

JP: It depends. But these positions were not tied to area. I'm not keen on ward districts, because then people just vote for their little area. I think you have to have people that are responsible, saying, "Now, how does this fit for the whole town?" And that's always a big battle.

I think it's just awful that we changed it to where we're going to elect sheriffs again. Ugh—politicians as sheriffs? Just bad, bad government. Everybody who ever looked at that said, "Bad. Look at how it used to be, the corruption, and the stuff that went on." And people sit there and say, "Oh, they'll be more responsive." No, they won't. You should hold the county executive and county council responsible for who they appoint. But that's another matter.

AK: I wanted to ask you about one curious bill that came out of that committee, about requiring symbols of party affiliation on election materials.

JP: There were people who ran that never, ever said what party they were from. You couldn't tell from their signs, or anything. I went along with that one.

AK: That session, there was also a whole spate of what you might call family or welfare-related legislation that you worked on. Was there a new approach to these issues being formulated then? Most of these bills are a tightening up of requirements—residency issues, changes in aid to dependent children, programs to help people get back in the workforce.

JP: I can't remember, but it seems natural. There was always a feeling that welfare didn't work very well, and that it was abused by a number of people. It would also get people in a cycle where they'd just stay on and on. All of these things, everybody knows the problems. Very few people know what to do, because so many things are tried and they don't work very well. But I can't tell you my thinking then, I can't recall. But, undoubtedly, I

was involved.

AK: Yes, your name is listed as cosponsor for some of these bills. And you were also involved in a bill to make more stringent regulations for sixteen-year-old drivers.

JP: I do know that I fought the driver training, not to have it be part of the school curriculum. We just keep adding to the school curriculum things that sound good, but that's not what the schools are there for. I got crossways, and I held it up in Rules two or three days, but finally there were too many people who wanted it. It sounded so good—we've got to teach these kids to drive, because it's so bad. Well, they'd learn to drive no matter what. I objected to the fact that we kept putting things in the curriculum that were not education. If they want to have it after school, if they want to have it at a special time, fine. But to have it right in the middle of school, I just thought it was nuts. But I was overrun on that.

AK: There was also a bill placing limited liability on parents for destruction caused by their children—\$300. I wonder what prompted that bill.

JP: I think parents do have a responsibility for their children's actions. The children have to be held responsible, and the parents have to be held responsible.

AK: We still seem to be struggling with that concept. This partial list of legislation demonstrates the breadth of some of the issues you were involved in. You were also prominent in the creation of an Arts Commission.

JP: I also sponsored the Women's Rights Commission, and a whole host of these things, although I was really unhappy about some of the arts things. Like the art that went into the House Chamber.

AK: Was this when the "Labors of Hercules" was installed?

JP: No, but it all got back to the fact that you should have an arts commission; you should have

them involved in the process. They should bring suggestions, they should lay things out, but they shouldn't be the final say. Then some other people make the final say. If you don't do that, sometimes you get some funny stuff.

The "Hercules" was inappropriate. The color was wrong. Those panels were made for historical murals, that's what the people who designed this, Wilder and White, intended. If you go to other capitols, you'll see these wonderful murals of what went on. In Pennsylvania, they've got Gettysburg, they've got Franklin with the electricity—flying the kite. They've got Washington crossing the Delaware. They've got these wonderful scenes. And what do we have? This nonsense. Well, that just shows I'm very traditional in things like that. Because, I think, for a state capitol, you're not on the cutting edge of art. No, these are traditional things and you don't get way out there.

AK: When you first came down here, how did you feel about coming down here to this building?

JP: When I first came, I was an advisor to the YMCA group, Youth in Government, that came from Queen Anne High School, and I came down with the kids for two or three days. That was really the first time I'd been in the Capitol. But the first time I really sat there in the committee room, and in the other rooms, I can remember, I thought, "Boy, this is really something."

AK: Yes, it really is impressive.

JP: It's a magnificent building. It has been maintained, and it should be maintained. I am an all-out fan of the Capitol building. And I'm just delighted in the fact that this is the only remaining office left of the original—the lieutenant governor's office. This is the last, with everything in here. This is the original wallpaper. Everything else has been updated, it's all different, but this is wonderful. The people who did the lamps and all, Tiffany, it was just really well done. I have great respect for it. I tried to make changes, like putting in the bookcases, that would be appropriate, and fit in. I think the Capitol is terrific.

AK: It's an honor to be here. Before we move on to the events of the coalition session and the gubernatorial campaign of Dan Evans, I wanted to discuss the Seattle World's Fair, Century Twenty-one, which opened in April of 1962. Were you involved in the planning or other work behind the scenes to bring the fair to Seattle?

JP: I was very supportive of the fair. It was a terrific thing for the state, and for the city. It made money for everybody. All kinds of cities had world's fairs after we did because we made money.

AK: That was unusual, wasn't it? Wasn't there a lot of concern that it would be a losing proposition?

JP: Oh yes. You did it, but we paid off everybody that put the money up. It was like war bonds, everybody got behind it. I didn't go to a lot of meetings but I made speeches for the world's fair to groups.

Then, in our own little company way—we manufactured envelopes—we came up with this idea of putting a big picture of the world's fair on the back of the envelopes that people would send all over. We charged pretty much cost for people doing it. Had a little wrestle with the fair people because they thought we ought to pay them every time we did this, and here we were doing something to advertise the fair. But we got it straightened around. Also, you had to generate a lot of interest in the fair just around the state—people coming from Yakima.

It was a wonderful fair. It was small—you could easily get around. It was interesting, and it just took Seattle up, really moved it up, as far as what kind of city it was.

AK: One thing that seemed different, the way Seattle did it, was they made permanent buildings, not temporary ones like many other places did. They actually had a legacy at the end of the fair.

JP: Yes, the buildings were maintained. And, of course, you go out to the University and there're some buildings that are there from the A-Y-P fair. That fair was in 1905 or something. My uncles,

they had a car, and they would drive it out there and haul people into town from the University and make some money. My parents all talked about the A-Y-P fair. So, that was the start of kind of putting Seattle on the map. It really worked.

AK: And then for the 1962 fair, Seattle followed the same pattern.

JP: Yes. The National Guard building, which is the Food Fair, was folded in. And they had passed a measure to build an opera house just before the world's fair. We had to run a special election to make that change, because a vote had been taken to make it an opera house. It was just a Seattle vote. One of the lawyers said that they couldn't fold it into the thing, so they had a special election. Gordon Clinton was the mayor—our friend whose campaign we had all worked on—and he said, "Fine. Instead of spending our time in the campaign for mayor, we'll spend a lot of time making sure that this proposition passes." Which was so like Gordon—he was a wonderful person, still is a great guy. He got that, and we got it into law.

AK: Did the Legislature have to pass it, or was it just a city matter?

JP: It was a city thing. We didn't have much to do. We did some part.

AK: Were you in the Legislature when they asked for the appropriation?

JP: I was for it. But I was a freshman in '59, you see, and we were thirty-three, but Al was for it—Rosellini—and O'Brien, so it was pretty much a done deal. And Rosellini served on the World's Fair Commission. So, they had some help in there as they went along.

But it was a tremendous effort by a lot of people. The people who really made it happen, the board of directors, these are the real leaders: Ewen Dingwall—he headed it up. He died two weeks ago, and I couldn't be at his funeral. I was sorry, but my brother was up at it. And Joe Gandy and Eddie Carlson, Willis Camp, Ned Skinner, Elroy McCaw, E.P. Tremper, Harry Carr was from

labor. See, they had labor right in with it. And Al Rochester—Rochester had been pitching this over and over and over. My mother went to school with him and he was a city councilman. He was always talking about it, pushing it. So he gets some credit for it.

There was a big argument as to who was the first person to say we ought to have a world's fair. Ross Cunningham, the papers, were supportive. The Legislature signed a bill for a feasibility study on a fair, and Lieutenant Governor Emmett Anderson named Goodloe along with Senator Andrew Winberg as representatives.

And Langlie designated Eddie Carlson as chairman, and that was the big thing. He was wonderful. Eddie Carlson was—gosh, he was a good man. He worked as a bellhop in the hotel. And later became the head of all the hotels, and then was head of United Airlines. They bought Westin Hotels so they could have Eddie Carlson as head of United Airlines. And he started by parking cars at night in the hotel garage.

The leaders in the community really stood up, stepped up and put themselves on the line. Lots of businesses put up some money. I remember our company put up some money, because we thought that was what we should do. Everybody did. It was great. Some of the other leaders in the community really went all out. Four families built the Space Needle.

AK: I had no idea it was a private venture.

JP: Yes, they've owned it ever since, and they've had a full house of people going up there and buying their lunch. And it was all dubbed out on a napkin.

A lot of things just came together. One was the transportation thing—the monorail. And that became a symbol. And then the Space Needle became a symbol.

AK: And the fountains—

JP: And the Science Center. Magnuson got the Science Center. The federal government put up

the dough.

AK: He was good at that kind of thing. Murray Morgan, in his book all about the fair, *Century 21*, said that what was surprising was that people really went for the educational exhibits, and not for the flashy entertainment, that had been thought to be so essential. That people came for the Science Center.

JP: Oh yes. It just worked. How they did it and what they did, how it all worked was just wonderful. People just walked from their houses, down. They had lots of entertainment. I thought it was a great success in every way.

And it was in my district. It was in my state legislative district.

AK: Were you part of the opening ceremonies, one of the dignitaries, it being part of your district?

JP: Oh yes—all the Legislature. They had the banquet at, I believe it was the Olympic Hotel, and the kickoff. Then they had golf carts, and we rode in golf carts out to the fairgrounds where they had the opening.

AK: Did it happen to be a nice day, or was it rainy?

JP: It was in the summer, and it was a nice day. All I can remember is we rode out in golf carts in this parade through downtown Seattle and out to the fairgrounds. It was a neat thing. Everything worked.

My God! Sort of brings back all those memories. I worked on a speaker's bureau before I came to the Legislature. Anyway, I gave some talks, was supportive, and thought it was a good idea. But in no way was I a part of making it happen. We were just in the support thing. But it was nifty to have it.

AK: Yes, and right in your own backyard.

JP: Yes.

CHAPTER 7

DAN EVANS AND THE COALITION SESSION

Anne Kilgannon: I want to turn now to the events leading up to the coalition of 1963. Earlier, we touched on the private-public power fight that angered some of the Democrats, primarily ones from Eastern Washington who felt slighted by Speaker O'Brien in that struggle. But another piece of this puzzle, and one with a longer-term impact, was the election of Dan Evans as minority leader in 1960. I'd like to discuss how that came about.

Joel Pritchard: That was one of the most important elections of all in the long run, the big scheme of things.

AK: It was a contested election, though, and a very close one.

JP: Yes, Damon Canfield wanted it, and the three Spokane members held off on which way they were voting, and then they decided to go with Evans and that made the difference. It was Ed Harris and Elmer Johnson, as a matter of fact. But anyway, Dan barely won, but whatever, he won. Eldridge became caucus chair, and it set the tone.

AK: Did Dan Evans have a strategy for this election?

JP: Well, we were going to be more aggressive, and we were going to try to go out and build a team of people.

AK: How did this Spokane meeting go? Did he give a big speech to win people over?

JP: No, no, we didn't have a big speech, no. It wasn't contentious, and there weren't hard feelings—and any of that. I nominated Evans.

AK: So it was just a shift in style?

JP: It was really a switch of the younger ones taking over. Dan was very good at working with those. He was well respected, and the only thing was, this was his third term and there were others who were much more senior.

But, if we hadn't had that leadership election before the '61 session, I don't think we would have been able to put the coalition together. And if we hadn't had the coalition together, we certainly wouldn't have won the governorship. So, this was the first brick.

AK: And, of course, it was holding that position that gave him a statewide platform. His name is always brought forward, he's got things to say on every issue.

JP: That's true. That's right.

AK: And the Democrats are splintering badly, with struggles over the leadership of the Speaker, public power issues, and then, they disagreed over the party platform that year. And the Republicans were able to use these splits and highlight them during the election.

JP: Certainly public/private power was a big issue, but I can't remember what the other issues were, but I'm sure we used them.

AK: Something worked for you, because in the '61 session, the House had fifty-nine Democrats and forty Republicans, but in '63 you had a gain of eight. And in the Senate, you gained four in '63, up from thirteen.

JP: We were so far down in '58, but that was part of the "right to work" legislation, which was perceived as anti-union. It drove us down to thirty-three, and thirteen in the Senate. So we

started to come back.

AK: Yes, you picked up fifteen representatives in two elections; that's quite a turnaround.

JP: And the thing to remember is, back in '56 what did we have? I can't remember.

AK: The Democrats had fifty and you had forty-nine, so you were very close at that point.

JP: In '52 we had the majority, for the '53 session. Mort Frayn was the Speaker, and my brother worked here.

AK: Yes, you had been dominant, and then the Democrats came in with a surge and you were down, but then you started to come back up. And by 1967, you're in the majority again, at least in the House.

JP: We made two good gains, so that by '63 we had a pretty good group. And the nice thing was, we had gotten some good ones. We had gone out and encouraged some good ones to run, and we had a lot of really dandy, energetic, new ones that all became a part of our team.

AK: That's the background, the groundwork, for Dan Evans' rise to leadership. And then in '63, there was the forming of what is called the coalition government that saw the overturning of John O'Brien as Speaker, and the joining of the more conservative Democrats with the minority Republicans.

Dan Evans wrote a piece that discussed the formation of the coalition, and he talks about meeting with the dissident Democrats, going out to some dark, secluded cabin somewhere and planning it all out. Were you a part of these negotiations down in this cabin?

JP: I was not. I did not go out, but, oh yes, I knew that they had gone out the night before. I think Slade knew Perry, and Perry was a key. He was sort of the strategist for those six or seven Democrats. I would imagine it was Evans, Eldridge, Gorton, and maybe Copeland. I don't remember.

AK: There were said to have been four, the top four Republicans. It's quite a story—going down this dark road, out in the country.

JP: Oh, it is. And we had one other advantage. The chief clerk of the House was part of the cabal. Si Holcomb, he didn't like John O'Brien. They were not close. And Sid Snyder was a staff member then, and he heard all about it and knew all about it.

AK: But still, you managed to keep this deal completely to yourselves. You kept it away from the press. That seems incredible.

JP: Well, there were little rumors, but by that morning, when we came in, we knew—some of us that were close. Then we went to caucus, and didn't let anybody out of caucus. And we stayed in the caucus until we walked out on the floor and voted. We were very fearful that a couple of our members—we didn't want them to slide away, and we didn't want them to talk and tip our hand. We kind of knew who might do that, so we just kept everybody in until noon, I think that's what it was. And then we walked out on the floor, and Si Holcomb called the roll. The chief clerk calls the roll, so he controls the vote as far as keeping it going.

Here, I've got the *Argus* [*The photographs mentioned can be found in the January 18, 1963, edition of the Argus on pages 8-10.*] that shows what was happening. Here it is. There's Big Daddy Day. And here we are in caucus—I'm talking.

AK: I thought there was no press in on this deal. How did this picture get taken, then?

JP: We let someone in that was a friend, I guess. And here's Evans, there's Eldridge, and Damon Canfield. And then you go all the way around here—Don Moos—

AK: Can you recall what you were saying when this photo was taken?

JP: Actually, I was not talking about the coalition at that point. We kept everybody in, and I put

together a sort of campaign team to see if we couldn't help some of these new ones, and I was explaining that to them. But, when the picture was taken, it looked like—but I would have to be more honest.

And these photos—there are the three votes. First vote, he was sure, he just didn't believe that these Democrats would leave. And now they are out there voting—here's the second ballot.

AK: It's looking a little tense.

JP: And here's the third ballot.

AK: O'Brien looks really mad.

JP: Then he got up and walked over and said to Evans, "Okay, we'll sit down and we'll make a deal. We can work something out."

AK: It looks like Evans is saying no.

JP: They said, "Too late."

AK: It's gone, yes. It says, "O'Brien stares stonily at the seated Evans." That must have been a dramatic moment.

JP: Oh yes. It was great stuff.

AK: In this photo, what are they doing? It says, "O'Brien and Mark Litchfield huddle with Day and Evans and Canfield." Is he still trying to strike a deal?

JP: Yes.

AK: But it's not going anywhere. And then, "O'Brien bitterly asserts 'a price was paid, we will suffer.'" The Democrats, I imagine, he's talking about.

JP: I guess.

AK: These are great photographs.

JP: Yes, that kind of tells the story. There's Big Daddy. He was a chiropractor. And Margaret Hurley was part of the delegation, not an easy

woman. And so, that was it; that's the whole story.

AK: That's a great document—those expressions say volumes. The coalition upset a lot of plans, what people thought they were going to do, who was in charge, all kinds of things.

There were several things said about this session of 1963. It was called the most trying session, terrible, terrific pressures, tumultuous—that's what Evans called it. And Rosellini, of course, weighed in and called it, "the session that accomplished less than any legislative session I've been in, in twenty-five years. They've devoted more time to bickering than they have to constructive legislation. This session has been full of controversy, rancor, and bitterness right from the start." He just goes on like that.

JP: Of course. Al has decided he's going to run against this. He's going to label all this bad stuff. But it was tough going, because to have a coalition—the bitterness of the Democrats wasn't toward us, it was to the seven guys who had bailed out. That was the bitterness. We were just playing the game.

But we would never have done this coalition if it hadn't been for redistricting. That was the underlying thing. We got forty seats in the '62 election and we had more than fifty percent of the votes.

AK: Yes, Evans says you got fifty-three percent.

JP: And we got only forty-eight in '63 because of Greive's redistricting. Greive was the master at redistricting.

AK: And you were afraid he would do it again?

JP: Of course, because if they had O'Brien as Speaker, and they had the governorship, there was no way to stop it. We would not have gone to such—whether you want to call it extremes, or what have you—we would not have gone down that road, but we had to get some protection. So, we were prepared. We put Gorton in to write the redistricting bill against Greive, and Gorton was just as smart, and just as tough. I don't think we got any redistricting through that time, because

anything we wanted, they didn't want, and back and forth. Oh, it was contentious, yes, you bet.

AK: Well, it's everybody's home base.

JP: Yes, and our pitch was that we wanted it to reflect the vote. We weren't trying to turn it around to where it was to our advantage, we were just trying to reflect the vote. Well, we couldn't sell that to Greive, and so that was the deal.

AK: Various news articles talked about the risks involved for the Republicans attempting this, saying that Rosellini could use this as a platform for his next campaign.

JP: He could use it as an excuse for everything that didn't work right, or whatever it was—"why, it's this coalition government."

AK: But Evans countered that. The Republicans would, he said, "continue to lose elections if they don't," what he called, "carry the ball, if they don't take some action and get in there." So, that sounded more like your new, aggressive style—where you're not going to sit back and take it.

JP: Yes.

AK: You were on the Appropriations Committee that session. Is that where things were happening?

JP: No, nothing came out of this session. Nothing got sent to committee to start with.

AK: So, you didn't get a chance to initiate any measures?

JP: I think Gorton did put in something. Our deal with the seven Democrats was that they could have their district pretty much the way they wanted it. Then we would go ahead and do the rest of the state, and we'd make sure they had a good district.

AK: Were the coalition Democrats from all over the state?

JP: Mainly from Spokane. Perry was from the

Forty-fifth or out of Greenwood, central, north King County, and Arnie Bergh was from Ballard. So there were two from King, and the others were Earle, Day, and Bill McCormick was one, I think. I can't reel them off.

But we blocked the Democrats' efforts to change, and do this. Then, the Supreme Court ruled that we couldn't do any business until we did our redistricting. Then Gorton and Greive had to fight it out. We felt pretty good about how things came out.

AK: Did you manage to get better representation for the suburban areas in King County?

JP: Yes. That had always lagged behind. The growth in the suburban areas was reflected, but they delayed it quite a bit.

AK: Would that be where the new areas were carved out?

JP: Quite a bit, but it was all over the state that you had changes.

AK: When the coalition came in and the new speaker was elected, committee assignments were also reworked, I understand. Didn't the Republicans then get some chairmanships and a share in the leadership, even though you were, technically speaking, still a minority?

JP: Yes. I went on the Rules committee. In those days, the Rules committee was run by the leadership, yes, particularly that session because of the coalition.

AK: It was equal representation, wasn't it, on the committees?

JP: Equal Democrat and Republican, yes. But, of course, the Democrats were on the other side, and so the coalition could pretty well hold.

The coalition didn't agree on everything, and lots of things were debated. It wasn't a coalition that held on all the votes and everything. Lots of things were out there. They split all over, but they didn't on redistricting, and I don't remember any big power issues in '63.

AK: But there's always taxes. Speaker Day made a pronouncement that there would be no new taxes. That was one of the first things he said.

JP: Yes, I think that was. We kept trying to push Rosellini into a position—Al wanted some new taxes, and we wouldn't give it to him, it seems to me. That was really the crux of it.

AK: You reworked the budget, rearranged it. You gave more to education but you took from other things. Same numbers, just a different emphasis?

JP: Yes, that's right. We moved some things into education. That was a time when the Republicans were pretty close to the education people.

AK: Dan Evans seems to promote education very strongly, and saw it as the primary responsibility of the state, to take care of it.

JP: That's correct.

AK: While we are still discussing the coalition session, I wanted you to briefly comment, if you would, on Speaker Day's style as compared with John O'Brien's. How did things go that session?

JP: It's, of course, not really fair to judge one to the other because it was such a contentious time, coming out of that kind of coalition. Day was a pretty good presider, and whenever John O'Brien got too upset about things, why—

AK: So, John O'Brien had to go back to being just another representative, of course.

JP: Yes, he was the minority leader. And the seven coalition Democrats sat in the middle.

AK: Not everyone liked Speaker Day, evidently. He was called a dictator by some, and a news story said, "The quick gavel of Speaker Day threw the House into a furious uproar—the worst turmoil witnessed in the lower chamber in many years. Ignoring scores of loud, angry cries for point of order as he rammed down his gavel in machine gun fashion. House members swarmed angrily in the huge, hall-like chamber, frustration and anger

written on their faces."

It all seems very bitter, and not conducive to good legislation.

JP: You've got to remember, it's very hard for a group that has been in control for years and years and years, and John O'Brien had been Speaker every year, and you take it away—

AK: They just didn't get over it?

JP: That's right. And they would resort to stalling tactics and using a lot of parliamentary dodging and ducking. Once in a while there'd be a vote and we'd just put it through. People had to vote. But then they would try to delay things and Day would cut them off, which is not unusual in that kind of situation.

AK: The rules are very complicated, I know. Was he a master of procedure?

JP: Well, we had Si Holcomb, who was, of course, chief clerk of the House. And they resented that bitterly, because now we were being advised and could lean on his years of experience.

On the other hand, Evans, Gorton, Perry, Copeland, they knew the rules backward and forwards, and were very skilled. People were dueling with great skill.

AK: What was it like, to sit there and watch all this drama going on? Did you just kind of watch the show as the Democrats attacked each other?

JP: We sort of enjoyed seeing the other side, because we'd been the other way. I think the press dramatized it a little more than it was. But yes, there were moments of high drama. I think it was frustration—people are losing, who for years have always won in those situations, and my oh my, did they get upset.

AK: Well, they believed in what they were doing, too.

JP: Sure, but then the other thing you get to, nothing was going to go through the House. The Senate had an overwhelming majority of Democrats,

and the governor was a Democrat. So, it isn't a matter of we were going to write all new rules for the state, but there were some checks on Al, and in the Senate on Greive and these people.

AK: I want to come back to Senator Greive in a minute. But the budget seems like just a battlefield, a real struggle to put it together. One article of the time said that there were two things that made it more complicated than usual: the perceived shift to the Republican, more conservative, no-new-taxes stand. And then a recent court ruling on bonding procedures for school construction and other capital projects that—I didn't quite understand it—but I think it was suggesting that what had been done in the past might not be all right to continue. And so people weren't too sure how to fund schooling. And there was a lot of wrangling and rethinking.

JP: This was about how to bond. I'd have to go back and look it over and see. But we were close to education.

AK: With all the talk of redistricting and budget woes, this session seemed mired and then further complicated by the issue of Greive's campaign fund, which came to light then. There were charges that certain senators were beholden to Greive for campaign money, and that had an unseemly impact on their voting patterns.

JP: I'll say they were. That was in the Senate, and that was an internal Democratic battle between Greive and Mardesich. We didn't have anything to do with that.

AK: There was a clamor to come up with campaign reforms.

JP: I know, but who was going to do this in the Senate? And who was going to do this, and how is the governor going to get it through? I think this was sort of press talk.

AK: There were two points of view in the press. One was that you were avoiding your responsibility and trying to shove it under the rug. The other was that, how could you reform yourselves,

that really, there should be a citizen panel, or the court should do it. There was a sense of "we can't trust these guys to do it themselves, to reform themselves." Yet, if they didn't do anything, they were just shirking their duties. This was the tone of the discussion.

JP: Generally, we were at the forefront of all these reform things. But Greive ran the Senate, and he had troubles over there. He ran a Greive fund, and lobbyists gave him the money, and then he gave the money to legislators. He forced the lobbyists to do that so that he had control over the legislators. Then he drew their district lines so that they were beholden to him, and all the rest of it.

See, we were in the House, so it wasn't head-on, except in the redistricting itself. That Greive battle really was one between him and Mardesich. It was a fight within the Democratic Senate.

AK: Some people seem to be suggesting that, of course, there are these funds—that this is normal political practice. But did the Republicans do anything like that?

JP: We didn't have anybody. We didn't have anything like a Greive fund in the House.

AK: Did people give to the Republican Party, and then it was divvied up?

JP: We'd encourage people to give to these candidates that we were helping, and say, "Hey, help this guy. Give some money to him." We didn't have to go through a person. Greive did it because he wanted to maintain that personal control. He wanted to run the Senate, and he did it for quite a number of years. One of his techniques was to have money come to him, and then hand it out. Now, we all thought that was wrong, but that really was a battle in the Senate between themselves, among the Democrats who were fighting over leadership. The poor Republicans didn't have anything in the Senate. They talked a lot, but—

AK: Was this one of the first battles for campaign reform?

JP: Campaign reform has been going on for one hundred years. It depends on this issue, that issue, this time, that time.

AK: Well, this time there was talk that candidates should say where they got their money.

JP: That's right, disclosure.

AK: Was this the genesis of the Public Disclosure Commission, the idea that there ought to be a body tracking this?

JP: I don't know. The public ought to know where your money comes from. What'd I spend in my first campaign? Twelve hundred dollars.

AK: I wonder if this becomes more critical when campaigns involved a whole lot more money. But this discussion, at that time, came up in connection with an optometry bill. Senator Rasmussen was upset, and he accused Senator Greive of basically selling votes. Apparently the optometrists had given Greive a lot of money—

JP: I always thought it was somewhat critical, disclosure. You get these different groups that want something to go through, and to get it through the Senate, they had to deal with Greive. And Rasmussen was one who was really fighting with Greive.

AK: It was fairly naked looking, the way he put it.

JP: Yes, but we'd just sort of hear it, except that we all thought that Greive's operation was a sleazy deal. He maintained his control through redistricting, and then later on, he would get interim committees for some of his guys.

AK: Were those paid positions?

JP: They'd have a per diem. Later, I was very involved, but that's another story we can come back to.

AK: Did Senator Greive have a position, a political philosophy that he was pushing? Was

there a point to all this?

JP: Greive had some Democratic senators he wouldn't do anything for, like Nat Washington. But Greive had his people. You supported Greive; it was just personal. And Mardesich and Gissberg opposed him, and Nat Washington. But Greive had enough to win.

AK: Besides redistricting, of course, there were many other issues that you dealt with during this session. Let's return to some of them now. You sat on the Water Resources and Pollution Control Committee, and there was a proposal floated at that time for the establishment of a water resources agency. I was wondering if this was a forerunner of the Department of Ecology?

JP: I don't remember, but I was very involved with Metro, which was cleaning up Lake Washington. But it was not a state thing, it was local: Jim Ellis, King County.

AK: Are people beginning to look at their lakes, to raise their awareness?

JP: Politicians were worried about Metro being a government entity. Then you had the far right who thought Metro was some kind of Communist scheme or something. But we were on the side of trying to help the environment. But it wasn't a big issue yet. The big session for that was, I believe, in '69.

We went up to Crystal Mountain then, and had a two-day meeting up there. We put together some environmental rules, new ones, then came back and put it through the session. Evans led that and got some legislators together to do it, and we were successful in doing that.

AK: Yes, the founding of the Department of Ecology was in 1970. Another issue of the '63 session was workmen's compensation and changes in unemployment benefits. But labor seems to be in a weak position with this one, even though it was their major bill that session.

JP: Yes, that was always a big deal. Labor always won that battle.

AK: They didn't this time, which surprised me, with a Democratic Senate and governor.

JP: Oh, well, they had damn near everything they could want already, compared to other states. Unemployment comp, that's a battle that goes on, and on, and on. But labor always controlled that; they had great strength in the Legislature. But the coalition would stand pretty firm on that. Their bill was probably thought of as pretty extreme. There were some major battles there.

AK: Another battle was over gambling issues—slot machines, pull tabs, card rooms, all those things.

JP: I fought it all.

AK: That time, you and Harry Lewis, the member from Thurston County, planned a test case in the courts for the constitutionality of the gambling law as it stood. Do you remember what happened with this case?

JP: No, I can't remember, but I just know we were against all this. And the Teamsters were mixed up in it. Bill Howard was the lobbyist that was trying to work it. He had been a Republican, and he was the chief clerk of the House in '53, when the Republicans controlled the House. He was mixed up in all that business. I don't remember, but I fought the idea of a lottery and the efforts to bring dog racing in. They always wanted to bring dog racing in and I was always opposed.

AK: Were these nonpartisan issues, where people voted their own conscience?

JP: Oh sure, things like gambling. Yes, that wasn't a partisan issue. We tried to hold down the increase of gambling in our state. It wasn't just a problem of gambling, it was the problem of gamblers getting in and mucking around in the political process. That was something that had shown clearly with the dog racing in California and Oregon. The people that were running the dogs there started messing around with city council races.

AK: Were these organized crime types?

JP: I don't know, but I thought a lot of them were pretty sleazy.

AK: There is something unsavory about it all. Another morals-type issue, at least that was how it was packaged, was the "Save Sunday for the Family" bill.

JP: "Save Sunday for the Family," as I remember it, had to do with mandatory closings. It was mainly drug stores and groceries. I didn't support that effort. I thought it was a matter of the marketplace. What they did was, it was a union issue. What was happening was that new stores were coming out in the malls, and they were open on Sundays. The downtown merchants got working with labor, and in between the two of them they came up with this idea of "Save Sunday" so stores couldn't be open on Sundays.

AK: Any stores?

JP: Yes. As I say, it was the ownership of the old stores, the traditional stores, and their unions working together to try to stop new stores that were open on Sundays. So they came up with this slogan.

AK: Trying to take the high road—

JP: Yes. We had some great hearings. At one hearing, a minister got up and pleaded for saving Sunday for the families, and the druggist said, "Well, I don't really want to be open, but about twenty minutes after your church closes, all those people come into my store in their suits and dresses. So, if you'd just get your members to stop coming into the stores, why we could save Sunday for the family."

AK: That's good. And now shopping is a kind of family religious activity—that's what families do together.

JP: It has had something to do with the marketplace, it had something to do with downtown Seattle. Well, it came apart, and as I remember, we

defeated it, or we didn't let it through. In the long run, I guess, you'd have had this, because these stores out there in the malls, Sunday was always a big day for shopping. But it was public relations—the slogan “Save Sunday for the Family.” But as I remember, it did not pass.

AK: It would have been like turning the clock back, on something that had already happened, a cultural change—

JP: It was a combination of owners of stores and unions, trying to do it.

AK: That session also dealt with several driving measures—one, a crackdown on drunken drivers.

JP: We made it more severe.

AK: In the debates, that issue was connected with teen driving, and driving classes at schools.

JP: As I said, I opposed the driving during school hours, and mandatory driving in the schools, but I was unsuccessful to stop it. I held it up in Rules, I know, one round and then the next time it came out. It was, in my opinion, a clear example of one more activity that we loaded on the schools because it sounded so good. We were going to save lives by teaching driving. We'd just give everything to the schools. I was unsuccessful there.

AK: You did help sponsor a bill, House Bill 432, that said minors would need written permission—parental consent—to buy a car. Was that part of this attempt to clean up driving practices?

JP: That's called parental notification, isn't it? Yes, car ownership can be very destructive. The kid gets a car, then to pay for the car he starts working in the afternoon. He's got to have a job to pay for the car, and he doesn't turn out for sports, he's not on the debate team, he's not in class plays.

AK: And he's not doing his homework.

JP: He's got to be working that afternoon job to

pay for that car, and all of a sudden, car ownership becomes a big deal. Now, having a car is a big deal in high school, but I didn't like it. I was not keen on kids spending their time in cars, which have such an attraction to them.

AK: One more high school issue from this time: you wanted PE to be mandatory.

JP: Rosellini vetoed it. I thought, from a matter of health, every child should do some exercise. But the mother would write that, oh, the girl doesn't like to get her hair wet, and this and that. But from a health standpoint, everybody should do some exercise. We didn't have crops, and kids don't work at home. But Rosellini vetoed it.

I don't know now whether, as I look at it, the state should make it mandatory.

AK: Well, you are alluding to a question that arose for me when I looked at these bills. I was reflecting that Republicans these days talk about keeping government out of people's private lives. How did you feel about that line of thinking?

JP: You've got to remember, this was a long time ago. And I was kind of a nut on exercise and that. The kids who didn't turn out for sports, in my day, had to go to gym, but the girls always complained because they'd get their hair wet. But, it seemed to me, it isn't that you need the exercise for the kids who are interested in sports, you need it for the average kid that doesn't want to do anything. A lot of them aren't even walking to school anymore.

AK: They're driving those cars.

JP: Driving cars, riding buses, and you get kids that are starting to become overweight and all the other things.

AK: I remember President Kennedy had a program about then, fitness programs for youth. Was your thinking part of this heightened awareness?

JP: Yes. I can't really remember, but it shows that I was just like everybody else, I had my own pet

things. I thought that kids, somebody in the fourth or fifth grade, there ought to be simple games that they play. I thought everybody ought to sweat a little every day, as a matter of their own health.

AK: In another area, there was talk of raising wages for public employees, and also for legislators. Wasn't the cost of living going up in these years?

JP: Well, it didn't make any difference. The start of the '63 session, there was a push to raise the salary. We were getting \$100 a month. That was the pay for legislators. But everybody was scared to raise it. The Legislative Council had done work between Democrats and Republicans to attempt to get the raise, and the amount of time they were taking and all, and \$100 a month just didn't make particularly good sense.

AK: Was the issue that it was preventing good people from being in the Legislature?

JP: It was a matter of fairness. It had been \$100 a month for years and years and years, and this wasn't realistic. When I got into caucus I agreed with Walt Williams, like I said, that we didn't want to raise our pay because then they'd take more of our time. The great problem for legislators was the amount of time it took, not the money.

So, I came in to vote on it, and saw that Stu Bledsoe, a freshman, who had won by 150 votes, was voting for it. I went over and talked to Stu, and he said he'd promised the people that he'd vote for it—not the people in his district, but some of the legislators, because they had helped him in his race. He kind of got entrapped, and so I walked over to the leadership and said, "I'm going to vote for this."

"Oh great."

"And then I said, "And Bledsoe's voting no."

They said, "Now, wait a minute. He already promised."

And I said, "Well, you get it, you get to switch." Then I went back to Stu and said, "You're not voting for this thing."

AK: Would it have played badly in his district?

JP: It never was a big issue, but everybody thought it would be a bad one. But that started a great friendship between Stu and me.

But, for heaven's sake, nobody ran against me some of those times—I had a Republican district. It didn't make any difference. But I just didn't want Stu, who'd just barely won, to get beat. Over the years, we became very close friends. That was sort of the first thing.

But in truth, the thing that makes it difficult to get legislators is the time. It isn't the money, it's the time. Now we have the worst of all. They get about half pay, and then they've got to get a job, and so they have real jobs, but you can't have a real job if you're going to be gone for four months. Like I said, none of us, Slade, Dan, Moriarty, myself, Jimmy Andersen, all that gang, none of us could be in the Legislature today. Because you just couldn't go four months one year, and three months the next year, and have a meaningful job.

AK: No, not unless you owned something that could take care of itself.

JP: So, what you have is people working for utilities, they work for a labor union, or they work for some government entity, or some community college, or they're in community relations, and they do some things and they get paid some money, which they need. So, that's where we are. We don't have full-time legislators.

AK: Would that be better, rather than this mixture?

JP: You'd have to get the pay way up there. So, that's how it kind of works. It's just a different world today.

But it was even a problem, then. It really got us out of here. Boy, the pressure to get out and get back to your job was intense. So, generally, we were there sixty days and then went home. Then, if you had an off session, it was thirty days.

AK: This year, again, you had a special session.

JP: That really isn't a special session, that just means it went days later. No, the special session

is one that's in the odd year. Sometimes we had them and sometimes we didn't.

AK: Another area of much heated discussion that session was transportation—ferries, paying for them, where to put them.

JP: Oh yes. The first decision was, are ferries an extension of highways? If they are, how do you do it? The highways have been a major issue since this state started—highways and transportation. Then, as you got more and more into automobiles, the ferries fit right in because they are a part of the network.

AK: Part of getting around this side of the state, anyway. Did East side legislators tend not to vote for ferries?

JP: They didn't want to spend much money on them. There wasn't an easy answer. You'd have the ferries like the Bainbridge Island line that always paid, and overpaid more than the cost. But then, you get up into the San Juan Islands and year-round, there's no way for that ferry to pay for its cost.

AK: But you can't just cut those people off and leave them out there—

JP: That's right. See, how it works is, if you're going to have ferries to places, and some ferries have high rates, well, those were all the battles.

AK: And toll bridges, whether tolls should come off or stay on, even after the project has been paid for—

JP: Oh my. Tolls are off, they're on, and they always became political issues. Many people think that the thing to do is keep the toll at a fairly low level, but to keep it on so you can continue to fund other bridges and other things.

AK: But other people thought that was unfair, once their bridge was paid for, to keep collecting money indefinitely.

JP: Of course. "Our bridge is paid for; we don't

have to pay for another."

AK: Were you still involved with these sorts of issues?

JP: No, I was not on the highway committee that session, just maybe the first two years, when I first went into the House. I did fight the cross-Sound bridge.

AK: This year you're on Banking and Insurance, Constitution and Elections, Apportionment, Rules, and Water Resources and Pollution Control. Rules seems like your most important committee. Can you explain its function for me? I know it is a central clearinghouse for bills—what's going to happen and what isn't.

JP: Rules was fairly busy all the time. In those days, there was a secret vote.

AK: The press wags its finger about that every once in a while—secret government, killing bills—

JP: Oh yes—secret government and all that. And eventually they got it to where Rules doesn't mean anything anymore—nothing is held up.

AK: What does it mean, then?

JP: The committee decided which bills should go to the floor, and in what order. If the bill had enough push, generally the Rules group reflected the membership. Then you'd know which bills everybody wanted and which they didn't, and how they came out of the committee. You'd look at the vote on the committee. But then, somebody had to pull it.

AK: What does it mean, to pull it?

JP: You had a pull. It is still there. You'd get to pull a bill up and get it to be voted on.

AK: What would be the procedure for that?

JP: You go around the room. Each person has one pull, and sometimes you have two. You go

around twice. You say, “Okay, I want Bill 69 up.” All right, Bill 69 is up and sometimes there would be a little discussion. You’d say, “This is a bill for such-and-such, and I think it’s good.” Or maybe, somebody would say, “I don’t like it. Let me give you the arguments on the other side.” But a lot of bills just sailed through and went right along.

AK: Do you remember bills that did not sail—why some were marooned?

JP: Oh sure—there are bills that are left in Rules. You had some people who’d vote for a bill and didn’t really like it, and say, “I hope it never comes out. We were getting all this heat from the Humpty-Dumpty group or that bunch, or this and that and got them off our backs. Finally we passed it on into Rules. Nine out of ten bills that come out of committee don’t come out of Rules.

AK: There was some mention that there were something like six hundred to one thousand bills offered that session—a very large number in the hopper. How would you deal with that kind of volume—how would you begin to understand what these bills were about?

JP: You get all kinds of bills that are put in. But, first of all, an awful lot of bills go in that never come out. They go to committee, and maybe there are six bills on the same subject.

AK: So, does the committee work to reconcile the language of the different bills, then?

JP: Yes, or maybe they put some together, or they thrash around and hold hearings.

AK: Then the number dwindles down?

JP: It comes down. There’s a hundred bills sent to a committee, or seventy-five, and maybe the committee comes out with fifteen. Some are new and it’s going to take more time to get it through. The committee has so much time for hearings. So, the bills come out, and I don’t know, you could find the percentage. A lot of times, somebody puts a bill in and then after they have the hearing they

go, “Oh yes, that thing. We’ve got to make some changes. I don’t know what we’re going to do, but yes, that thing...” It’s sort of an agreement, no, it isn’t ready to go yet.

AK: Are most bills fine tuning things that already exist?

JP: Oh sure. The great majority. And most bills, in my day, almost all bills were bipartisan. I never put a bill in the session if I didn’t find a Democrat, and we’d do it together.

AK: Let’s look at some of those bills now from the 1963 session. You cosponsored House Bill 4, with Representatives Perry and Gorton, that removed requirements for holding primaries for the election of school directors for cities of over 100,000 population. Would that be one of these fine-tuning bills or something new?

JP: That’s the kind of a bill where the school directors would come and they’d say, “This is a problem we have,” and if it made sense, okay. And that would be in that committee. A lot of bills are just cleaning up, technical. Something that doesn’t work very well, they come back and say, “This is what screws this up. Can you do something?”

“Oh sure, yes, we can do it.”

AK: So just closing loopholes. We talked already about Bill 80, making high school physical education courses mandatory. And there was Bill 71, changing port district elections, more technical, and then Bill 62, which permits examination of suspect shoplifters, with Gleason and Hurley. Would that be strip-searching suspects?

JP: I wouldn’t be a bit surprised. Stores were just plagued with these darn shoplifters. On things like that I feel pretty tough, you know. The stores would say, “Hey, we have these people in here and we can hardly get close to them, because they holler.” So, we were toughening up the shoplifting law.

AK: Bill 372 involved deleting residency

requirements for city firemen. I gather that means they can work one place and live somewhere else.

JP: Yes. It just seemed to me that if you were in the town of Yakima, say, you can't live on the outskirts and be a fireman?

AK: Bill 373 provided an automatic vote count in certain cases, authorizing applications for recount by either political party.

JP: It would mean that if it got that close in an election, you had a recount.

AK: Bill 396 had to do with changing the name of the Board of Discrimination.

JP: Well, I was close to the people that were dealing with civil rights and discrimination and all that. They were making some adjustment in the board that dealt with discrimination, and I would have been a logical sponsor. Who else was on that bill?

AK: Representatives Grant and McCormick.

JP: Let's see, this is in '63, so I'm still in the House. It might be Bill McCormick, and it might be the other McCormack—Mike. It sounds more like Mike.

AK: Here's one that seems an odd one for you to be involved with, Bill 410, restricting the sale of petroleum products by agricultural cooperatives. You're with Uhlman and Clark on that one.

JP: It may have been a tax dodge for these cooperatives to buy and then sell the gas without charging the highway tax. That's Wes Uhlman who became mayor of Seattle and Clark would be Cecil Clark, who was from Yakima. Cecil Clark certainly represented a rural area, and Wes was from the city. It could have been that somebody was using it to get around the highway tax. But I don't know, I'd have to look at it.

AK: This one sounds more familiar, Bill 432, prohibiting minors from purchasing automobiles without written consent.

JP: Yes. The parents ought to agree that the kid ought to buy a car.

AK: More technical sounding bills, Bill 446, increasing per diem allowance for state officials and employees. And Bill 540, concerning certain industrial insurance practices.

JP: Who was on that?

AK: Representatives Morrissey and Hurley and yourself.

JP: He was a good friend of mine.

AK: So, possibly, he would come to you and ask for help?

JP: Oh yes. He would come over and say, "How about going on this bill?" I wasn't big on putting bills in. My usual answer to people was, "There's plenty of bills that were being put in. What we need is better scrutiny on the bills." I didn't sponsor a lot of bills. If I wanted to make some changes, I'd wait for a bill to go through where I could put an amendment on, what we wanted to accomplish.

AK: There was a move that session to abolish state parks as a separate commission and to put in under the jurisdiction of Bert Cole, the land commissioner. It never came to pass, but Rosellini was pushing, at least in the newspapers, for more recreation areas. He listed that as one of his disappointments of that session, that more didn't happen in that area. Do you remember this issue?

JP: I don't remember that one, but that discussion goes on all the time. I wasn't very keen on Bert Cole. But Rosellini would pull these things out and they were always good government things. "I'm so disappointed we didn't get this."

And you'd say, "Where in the hell was he? Did he do anything?" No. He was very Machiavellian.

AK: Another thing that did not happen, but which was closer to you, was another defeat of open housing that session. That discussion sounded

very bitter. Sam Smith charged the Republicans with “the greatest double cross since Judas.” There was a twenty-four hour sit-down demonstration at the Capitol, with people coming from Seattle. The claim was that the Rules Committee was killing this bill in secret, behind closed doors, and was not allowing open debate.

JP: I was a sponsor of open housing. I think I was probably on that bill with Sam. Sam, when he was interviewed, was asked, “Who in the Legislature or in city council, who was the best person to work with in government in your forty years?” And he said, “Joel Pritchard.”

AK: That’s quite an honor. But Sam seems very bitter. He’s not even getting much debate on it; it’s going nowhere. All his bills just died.

JP: We were never, ever able to get open housing through, because you couldn’t get it out of the Senate. His senator always talked for it and then killed it. They were all Democrats that did it.

AK: Then why is he making these charges about the Republicans?

JP: It could have been that they just weren’t going to move it out. It’s the kind of thing that had gone into the Rules Committee and Day and some of them just said, “We’re not taking it out on the floor. We’re not going to get into that fight.”

AK: And so that was that?

JP: That was that, yes. The real estate industry always opposed it. All kinds of neighborhoods all talked about it until they talked about getting into their neighborhood, and there wasn’t any great desire for it. Very few legislators, when you got right down to it, wanted it. So, I found that the first time we came down as freshmen and got it through, why it went over to the Senate and didn’t go anywhere.

Some felt it was going to be taken care of in the federal government. And it did.

AK: I don’t quite understand. When the federal government passes something, do the states also

need to pass something to match, or come into compliance?

JP: No, they don’t. This was an issue that was decided by the federal government and federal and state supreme courts.

AK: Why did various cities, then, also pass measures banning discrimination? Was it a goodwill gesture on their part?

JP: No, they didn’t. A lot of them said, “We’re going to get into this big fight when Congress is doing this, and the courts are doing this, and that’s where it’s going to be decided.” And there were some who just said, “Hey, it’s being battled at the federal level, and it’s going to come on us some way, and why do we want to get into this fight?”

AK: I see. But Sam thought it was important, worthwhile battling for.

JP: You’ve got to remember that he represented a district that was for it, eighty percent or so. Yes, it was a big issue for Sam. And Sam and I were on it the first two years, got it through the House and got it over to the Senate. But, of course, the Senate always killed it. I’m sure I supported it.

But, looking and thinking, that was the kind of bill that people would say, “Oh yes, I’m all for it.” But they wouldn’t do much pushing on it because people in their district didn’t want it. I thought it was a dumb thing—not passing open housing—because if we got people spread out more, then we’d have less pressure on the schools. And we wouldn’t have gone through that disaster—it got down to busing, which was so destructive to Seattle. So many people moved out of Seattle, and it was just a disaster.

AK: It was a tragedy, the proportions of which we’ll never fully know.

If nothing progressive was happening on that front, legislators were making changes in other areas. That session a plan surfaced to take over the House and Senate buildings.

JP: They were buildings and we took them over as offices. That was the start. When I first came

down, we had our offices on the floor. The senators had desks in the hearing rooms around the Senate, but over in the House, you just had your desk on the floor. You didn't even have a secretary. Well, members pushed, and I wasn't keen on it, but we did get to where we had an office across the street. About the time we did that, I moved into the Senate. But the House people all got secretaries. My Lord, now they have some kind of office in their home district. They have a secretary at home. We didn't have any of those Senate things.

AK: Is this a sign that the process was becoming more complicated?

JP: That's what happens in the growth of any organization. There are lots of reasons why you need more help, more stenographers, more secretaries. Then you start operating, the secretaries start operating as a political tool—I mean sending letters to the right people, doing this, doing that. The districts, you've got more people, more people writing letters.

AK: And if some people are doing it, you've got to do it, too.

JP: And you push the thing to get more involvement. The more you have, the more you need. And you get all this. I was not keen on the sort of growth of all these things.

We didn't have interim committees, except just two. Most people weren't on an interim committee when I came to the Legislature. Now everybody's on an interim committee.

AK: So, it is just more and more elaborate. Do you think all the staff and meetings improve legislation, or does it make no real difference?

JP: I don't think it improves, no. When I was a freshman, there was no staff. As soon as the session was over the Legislature closed down. There was nobody down here. Now there's people

all over the place.

I finally did go along with this idea that we would come down here one day a month. It was a weekend—it was called committee weekend, so these committees could meet during that time. You'd have the Legislature here, and if the governor needed something, you didn't have to call a special. They were all there, they could do it.

Well, the committee weekend started Saturday and Sunday. Then, after a year or so, it became Friday and Saturday. Then, after a while, it became Thursday and Friday. Now, it's Wednesday and Thursday, and they all drive home on Friday.

AK: What happened to all the staff people who were just let go, as before?

JP: That was it. You worked in the session, different people worked in the session, then it was over. But then they became permanent.

AK: So, that represented a professionalization of the staff—

JP: Well, that's one way to put it. Professionalization, that's a very good term. That'd sell very well.

The Legislature became a much bigger animal, and a lot of it is campaigning for the next election. And the promotion. You know, so-and-so is now in the state Senate, he wants to run for this, run for that. And this is a career. This is their scorecard in life.

And what you get, you get people of less ability, and the less ability, the more a person tries to micro-manage. They get down to the pencils and erasers, when they should be thinking of broad policy, and act as a board of directors, hold whoever it is responsible, but don't try micro-managing. Our Legislature continues to get more and more into micro-managing, because people, I think, have less judgment—that's the way they go. I think some of them miss the overall policy.

get it started.

AK: Would you, say, give a little workshop on how to do it?

JP: You get them in there. You didn't have a workshop; you'd line them all up and take them out. Have them go. It isn't real complicated. It's just difficult to get people to do it. But once they do it, oh, that's fun. Then you're really motivated, really enthused about something, why, yes.

AK: I understand that it was a long campaign. When did you begin?

JP: It started a year and a half before the election. It started in about June of '63.

AK: How did Evans decide he was the one to do it? I recall a story about a reporter phoning him up and saying he had been drafted to do this. And there are other stories—

JP: Oh yes, he had people calling and talking, but no. That was down in Cowlitz County, and they sort of got credit for being the first people to

CHAPTER 8

CAMPAIGN FOR GOVERNOR: “FULL TILT”

Joel Pritchard: The election wasn't until November, and we were working full-tilt, all out, for the governor's election. We all worked on that. That's all we did.*

Anne Kilgannon: Did that involve traveling all over the state for you?

JP: I did it quite a bit. I headed up the doorbelling efforts for the campaign. That doesn't mean I went everywhere, but I would go once to a place and

***Frank Pritchard:** In the Evans campaign, Gummy Johnson and I lived at the Olympic Hotel. In those days, there was no campaign reporting and the ownership of the hotel gave us the room. We had it for the whole campaign, for the whole general campaign. It was okay with the company that I left from September to November, and Gummy and I were down there every day. It was kind of a secret headquarters. It's very hard to run a campaign out of a working headquarters. This way people could call in and check. And we could check with Jim Dolliver and Dan, because Dolliver was traveling every place with him. We had an organization doing daily polling to check on how we were doing.

Anne Kilgannon: I understand that Dan Evans started from practically nowhere.

FP: Yes. Al Rosellini was running for his third term and we had uncovered all kinds of monkey business, corruption, and gotten it out there. I do remember that about three weeks before the final, our pollsters began to see a trend that people were tired of negative campaigning, because we were pretty negative on Al. So, I remember that we got our steering committee down to the hotel—we called them all about ten o'clock at night—they all came in, and we met there from about eleven at night until two or three in the morning, and changed the thrust of the campaign. That wasn't easy. I remember the ad agency we had, it was just like telling an architect to start over, but we did. We just turned around and we came up with a whole bunch of newspaper ads that were all positive.

AK: Was this the “Blueprint for Progress” part of the campaign?

FP: It was based on that, yes. We did it at the right time and it worked. We were in there every day and it was intense.

AK: Did you feel more comfortable running a positive campaign, then?

FP: Oh yes. It's easier to run the other sort, or at least you think it is. It's very tempting.

AK: It seemed out of character.

FP: That's the problem. That's the problem a candidate gets into now when some hot shot from Chicago or New York comes in and tells him how to win, and gets him way out of character. Win or lose, he's still got to live here. On the other hand, if you're running against an incumbent, like Rosellini, you have got to do something to tell the people that the incumbent isn't doing a good enough job. Otherwise, he'll get re-elected.

publicly do something. Herb Hadley, who was one of our legislators, he was from down there, and they passed a resolution urging him to run.

AK: But he must have been thinking about it, on some level?

JP: There had been some thoughts, yes.

AK: First, he had to win the primary. Let's see, there was Christensen and—

JP: There were other people in the early going, but Gandy was in the race, who had headed up the world's fair, and had a lot of businessmen. Those were the main three in the primary.

AK: Was Gandy considered the chief competitor for Evans, or was it Christensen?

JP: No. Christensen had run for the Senate two years before. He did better than people thought, and when the first election results were being announced, they came from some eastern Washington areas, and the big news was that Christensen was ahead of Magnuson. Then it came out, and actually, he ran almost the same percentage as Walter Williams did six years earlier. But there was this perception of, gee, nobody had ever heard of him, and he came so close. So, it fit. A group of business leaders decided that he was so far ahead in the polls that they'd better work with him and get him

some knowledge.

AK: Wasn't he a minister? Did he have any experience in government?

JP: No, he didn't have anything. He was a good talker. And so, they got busy, sort of ran a school for him with different people. Dick—I can't think of his name, who had been at the University of Washington—headed up this effort to kind of get him educated on a lot of the things.

We had a meeting, and they did a poll. Christensen had fifty-six percent. I'm not sure Gandy was in the poll. Clinton was in the poll, who was the mayor of Seattle, and Evans. The polling was like fifty-six percent for Christensen, fourteen percent for Clinton, and a little over four percent for Evans. That's where we started.

We had a meeting with the people who did the poll, and some were sort of encouraging us to get out and run for lieutenant governor and then step up later. We talked about how we weren't going to get out. We didn't have to, early.

AK: Was this a small group around Evans doing this?

JP: Yes, six or seven people. Clinton took himself out of the governor's race early, and then Gandy got in. We started in and we started organizing. We had a lot of legislators who were very fond of Dan, and they went in particular districts and really went to work for him. It was a great help.

So, we started organizing and it was a long race. Jim Dolliver was the only one on the payroll, and he drove Dan. We started working from there. That was in June and we were organizing. We ran a big effort.

One year before the election we had papers printed with these fronts on them—they looked like newspapers—which said, “Evans beats Rosellini, Wins Governor’s Race,” or something. We handed those out at bus stops all over downtown Seattle and Tacoma.

AK: Just helping people envision this coming to pass—

JP: Yes, and then inside there was a pitch on Evans.

AK: I’ve seen copies of his “Blueprint for Progress.”

JP: He was an engineer, he was involved in building buildings, so this idea of the blueprint fit right in with this. And Dan was getting better in his speaking, and he had all the right makings, so it was just a matter of getting out there and doing it. He got to where he was so much more—well, he was less wooden. He got more style in his speaking. Of course, he did have a wonderful voice, but he got to where his speaking was much better.

So we started working, and we just traveled, traveled, traveled, and it was just a long battle. Very slowly we went up in the polls, and I think we went a whole year campaigning and maybe got to ten percent.

AK: Did you ever have days when you thought, why are we doing this?

JP: Wait a minute, that’s not right. From the time we took the poll, oh yes, eight months or so of campaigning, and we were ten or twelve percent. But Christensen had come down a little.

And then we had pretty good help from parts of the media. We got our message out, which was that it’s the first one hundred and five days of the session that count. That this was not on-the-job training; you’ve got to know what you’re doing

right away. We had some very good articles written in a few papers, which laid out the difference between the two.

So we just went at it, and at it, and at it. We didn’t have any money, but, as I say, we had people doorbelling all over the state. We covered all kinds of activities.

AK: Did the businessmen start to come over to your side after awhile?

JP: All of them agreed that if they could appoint somebody, they’d appoint Evans.

AK: It was who could be elected, not who would be good—that was the issue?

JP: The attitude was, gee, Christensen has all the votes. And Gandy got out of the race, and didn’t say he was throwing his support to Evans, but in the thing that we worked out, he said he was going to vote for Evans. And that became the story—Gandy’s out of the race and going to vote for Evans. Again, we got a nice jump.

So now, it’s just a matter of staying with it. We pushed for lots of issue talk and that. Slowly, we kept climbing.

AK: In looking over his campaign material—the blueprint—I would call them promises, but Dan Evans had a huge list of things he wanted to change and work on. Was this a little unusual to have such a specific list of things you were going to try and do?

JP: Of course, he was the floor leader—he was the minority leader—he wanted to get rid of Rosellini. We had an advantage in that we had the right kind of an opponent to run against in the final, because Al had been in two terms and he wasn’t in very good shape. A lot of people were looking for an alternative. Politically, he wasn’t in very good shape. So we had the right opponent.

It was a long struggle, but once we got past Christensen and did that, their votes, by and large, came to us. Christensen got up and pledged immediately that night to Evans.

AK: What were the results of the primary—was

it close?

JP: We didn't pass Christensen until about thirty days before the primary election, and then we beat him by one hundred thousand votes.

AK: That's great. Did you have a party after all that?

JP: Well yes, the election night thing. But once you get that thing really going, the momentum started building.

Then we were in the final against Rosellini. And the thing was, with Lyndon Johnson, it was a big election for Democrats. And Al came back; at one point it looked like he might come back and pull it out. But he didn't and we beat him. I don't know, I'd have to look, but we beat him, my guess would be by sixty, seventy thousand.

We had debates. Evans debated anybody and everybody, and he was very knowledgeable.

AK: Was this campaign one of the highlights of your political life?

JP: Oh sure. Oh yes, this was a big deal. And we were pretty young, and we were taking on giants.

AK: Evans was, what, thirty-seven or so—not very old?

JP: Yes. We had a lot of pretty young people involved. We had lots of people involved. All over the state we had groups working.

The Christensen people came—they weren't happy about Evans—but they disliked Al Rosellini so much that we could hold their votes. So everything worked right.

AK: Many people say that Evans transformed state government, that his governorship was a turning point in Washington state political history. Could you comment on that?

JP: It had a major impact. I don't know whether I'd say it turned the state. Of course, he was in for three terms, so that's twelve years. We had some very bad economic times, and it was really

tough. He had to cut back, cut back. And he had to raise some taxes. But anyway, Evans was very good and a very strong governor. A lot of good things went on. He had a lot of good people he appointed. By and large, it was a very strong tenure of office that he had.

AK: Was there any temptation for you to get an appointed office at this time, or did you want to stay in the Legislature?

JP: Well, I never wanted to work for anybody, and never did, no.

AK: 1964 was an election year for you, too. How did your own campaign go?

JP: Once I got elected to the office, I never campaigned. I don't remember ever having an opponent. Somebody ran, but I don't know. They were not strong candidates, and they weren't supported. It's that old business—if people think that you are very strong and the district is very one-sided, whether it is or isn't, perception is reality in political life. So, I had the freedom to work on other campaigns and not have to worry about myself.

AK: And that's where you wanted to be. You were lucky.

JP: Oh, absolutely.

AK: Before we delve into the work of the new administration, can you tell me about Governor Evans' inauguration, surely a moment of great satisfaction to you all after your tremendous effort?

JP: Oh yes. That was a big deal. I think the thing was at the Armory, they used to have the ball at the Armory.

AK: And is it the chief justice who swears him in? Did they do that part at the Armory, too?

JP: They do that here, in the Capitol. Yes, it was a very exciting time, you bet. We had won the governorship, but we were way down in the House

and the Senate.

AK: Did that make it a bittersweet victory, then?

JP: The Senate didn't change any in the election, it was the same, but the House went down some. But, of course, having had Rosellini in there eight years, why yes, it was a pretty exciting time.

AK: Governor Evans was one of only a very few Republicans to oust a Democrat that election. That election—elections all over the country—were something of a debacle for Republicans, because of the heat generated by the presidential campaign between Johnson and Barry Goldwater. Could you comment on that race and your feelings about Goldwater?

JP: We had five out of six congressmen, and after that election we had one out of six, or one out of seven, something like that.

AK: Would you have preferred a different candidate?

JP: I'm trying to think who else was in. I guess Rockefeller was in the race then, and some of us were favoring Rockefeller. It's terrible, but I can't remember whether that was then, or whether it was two or four years later. Evans was the keynoter, at I guess it would be the '68 convention, and he did come out for Rockefeller.

AK: The thing that is probably most remembered from that campaign is that ad with the little girl, plucking the daisy petals.

JP: Oh, the one that was so criticized—Johnson inferring that if you elect Goldwater, he's going to have a nuclear war. It was pretty shabby.

AK: You have often talked about rebuilding the party. When you get a candidate like Goldwater representing your party, does it present a problem for you, your image?

JP: You have to remember that Goldwater was probably more conservative than the public wanted at that point. But as a person, he was very

well liked. Highly respected. No fun and games, but really liked by other senators. He was an outspoken person, but people really had a high regard for him.

But, in that election, which was a tough election, with Johnson having this big landslide, Evans was one of the very few, if not the only, new Republican governors to be elected. At least the only one who knocked out a Democratic governor.

AK: After the election, Evans is quoted as saying that the party needs to be rebuilt, that the party organization had to be revamped, it was so badly shaken by the election results. The Republicans had had forty-eight members in the House and then dropped down to thirty-nine.

JP: Yes, it was a very tough election. He did, and so he worked to get people to run.

AK: Would that be a continuation of what you had already been doing, but just stepped up?

JP: Yes, more. And now he's in a position where he can encourage people to do that.

AK: After Dan Evans became governor, Thomas Copeland became the new floor leader. Could you explain that role for me?

JP: He's the spokesman for the minority.

AK: So, when something is happening, he's the one to jump up and say something?

JP: You look to the floor leader. It gets a little fuzzy because the Speaker is the majority leader, and he has a floor leader, or majority leader there. And then you have a caucus chairman.

AK: Robert Goldsworthy was caucus chair then. And James Andersen was assistant floor leader. And Robert Brachtenbach was the whip. Can you describe that role for me?

JP: The whip is the guy that's supposed to count votes and encourage people. They're just part of the campaign team.

AK: Would these people get together and make sure everything is lined up, is consistent?

JP: They're tight. They're part of the group. There's usually two or three or four that are the leadership.

AK: Is this a way to accommodate several leaders, give them all a role?

JP: It's a way. It's a title. But the caucus chair, he presides over the caucus—he runs the caucus. He may call on the leader to explain what we are doing, or how we're going.

AK: Would he tell you how he wants you to vote?

JP: You can't tell anybody how to vote. But you try to hold all your troops together, and sometimes you do, and sometimes you don't.

AK: I noticed that Gladys Kirk was now the caucus secretary.

JP: Yes, and some of it is window dressing. It sort of depends on the personalities and who are strong people in the caucus, and who does the leader surround himself with, who are the two, three, or four people that give leadership. And sometimes it isn't one of those, it's the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee.

Now, when you get into a specific bill, in theory, the chairman, or if you're in the minority, the ranking member, would say, "Okay, here's the story. I'll explain the bill, and here's what I'm going to do, and we're going to try to get this amendment on or that one."

It changes according to the personalities and how the leaders structure it. I mean how they want to do it, and how it works. Different people play it differently.

AK: How do these leaders emerge? I mean, are they self-identified or does the party determine who are the leaders?

JP: The elected Republicans get together and they pick their leaders. Sometimes there are big battles over it, and sometimes there isn't.

AK: To have one of these positions, is this a way to gain prominence? Is this a ladder up for people?

JP: You have the top three or four who are very good. Then it gets to be, what does a person want? Being chairman of Ways and Means Committee is better than anything other than the top two. But maybe there's a very senior member, and you'd want to, well, not pass them up. Maybe you're saying we'll give them a title, they'll have this. And this person over here will be the chairman of the Humpty-Dumpty committee. Or, maybe you say, no, no, we don't want that person, we'd rather have the person not in leadership—we want him to be chairman of welfare, education, or what have you. That varies a lot.

AK: Did you yourself want any of these positions?

JP: No, nobody ever thought of me as being in that kind of spot, no.

AK: How did you characterize yourself, your role?

JP: I was just a supporter. First of all, I was twelve years in the Legislature, always in the minority. So, I was never a committee chairman or any of this stuff. No, I just worked on legislation. Always had a Democrat on a bill that I would be on. If you're in the minority you've got to get something through.

AK: This not going after positions, was this part of you wanting your independence?

JP: No. I was very much in the group when Eldridge was caucus chairman, and that was very important in '61 and '63. And Moriarty went to the Senate and became the floor leader.

AK: What happened to the coalitionists of the last session, when you came back?

JP: It was all through. They didn't need it, they had such a big majority. And, of course, we had spent so much of our efforts on Evans, we didn't spend much effort on the other stuff.

AK: One item I found very interesting was the story that the Democrats might try to push through the redistricting bill and get it signed by Governor Rosellini in the two days they were in session before Dan Evans was officially sworn in. Do you recall that?

JP: It's tradition. The governor is sworn in on Wednesday, and so for two days you have the new Legislature and the old governor.

Yes, there was concern that Greive and Rosellini would put through a plan for redistricting, and they had a deal for Evans to be sworn in at, let's see, midnight on Tuesday. That would not allow them clear to Wednesday noon to fuss around. Then, they didn't do it, or weren't going to do it. No one knows whether they were or weren't. But Dan had already organized it to have Judge Ott of the Supreme Court over to swear him in at midnight.

AK: To forestall this possibility—

JP: To cut down the chance of redistricting.

AK: Wouldn't that have just been a firestorm?

JP: Well, yes, but that's the way things are.

AK: Could they have done that, could they have pulled that off?

JP: They could have, if they'd have had everything organized, and put it through on the Monday. There'd been a lot of maneuvering, and maybe they could, and maybe they couldn't. But, they didn't.

AK: In the end, they didn't. It just seemed so incredible. Still, redistricting was the big issue for this session. This was when the court ordered that no other business be conducted until a plan was in place—and it took forty-seven days before a deal was struck.

JP: But, of course, when they said nothing could happen, all the committees could work and hold hearings, you just couldn't pass anything.

AK: You just had to sit on everything?

JP: In most cases, the big work in the Legislature for the first month or so is all hearings and working in committees. So, it wasn't as bad as it was made out to be. All the committees were working. A lot of things were run through second reading and just put on hold.

AK: I see. I wondered how that all worked because you had a long session—the usual from January 11 to March 11, but then you had an extraordinary session from March 15 to May 7, fifty-four days.

JP: The redistricting was part of it, and the fact that Evans was there. The Democrats controlled the House and the Senate, and a new governor controlled the administration—but they worked it out.

AK: The next several years—in '67 there was an extraordinary session that lasted fifty-two days and another in '69 which lasted sixty days and the same again in '71. This looks like a pattern, a trend—

JP: Now we don't say it's an extraordinary session. We have these long ones and we go for three months, and then we come back and go for another month, well, that's four months. They've had special sessions before. Having the so-called split government worked—that's what really sort of kicked it off.

They'd had special sessions before, earlier times. But, you see, we had more farmers, and they had to get home and start getting their crops in. And you had a lot of people who just had to get back to their business. There was a lot more pressure then than there is now.

AK: To me, this looks like you should be having sessions every year when you start having these really long sessions.

JP: If you have a two-year budget, it's every two years. But, we were getting to where we were having short sessions in between a lot of them—thirty days. But redistricting and the new

governor—it all tied together.

AK: Could we talk about the redistricting, and all that was involved? It seemed very complicated.

JP: It's not too complicated. People want to have the best district they can.

AK: Of course, but I mean actually drawing the lines.

JP: Greive had made a science out of maintaining his position in the Senate by getting—not all Democrats got a good district—but the Democrats that supported him got their districts. Carving new districts, that was his big forte.

Once we got Gorton into the act—he was just as smart as Greive, smarter—and he could figure these things out just as well as Greive could. So, we stopped having them have that big advantage. We wanted to have more competitive districts, not one-sided districts.

AK: To create more swing districts?

JP: Sure, because we thought we could get good people to run that could win those.

But, redistricting has been going on for two hundred years in the country. It's like winning a championship in some sport, and then having somebody come and say, "We're going to change the rules. We're going to change the way it works." Well, people don't really like change, and then, who's going to be helped? Any time you move a line, somebody is helped and somebody is hurt.

AK: I understand that, but this process seemed to be particularly bogged down, though. What was happening that the courts had to step in?

JP: Because they couldn't get it through. The thing we really objected to was we got fifty-three percent of the vote in '62, and we ended up with forty-six percent of the House. We wanted it to reflect the vote. And Greive didn't care about that, he wanted it to reflect his friends, or to have it where his supporters got re-elected.

What we said was, we wanted an election in

which if they have the majority of votes cast for the Democrats, they'll win the House. And if they have a majority of votes cast for the Republicans, the Republicans will win the House. That had not been true. Greive wasn't interested in those kinds of things.

AK: A different agenda, to be sure. But what was happening with the farm communities, weren't they losing representation?

JP: And you were getting people who weren't farmers. There are a lot of people that live in those areas who are not farmers, and so their percentage of the vote, and their position was going down. It had been overstated in many areas, and outfits like the Grange and that had an awful lot of power. With new people moving in, changes in the economy and all, why—

AK: All these changes—the suburbanization of rural areas, redistricting—did they add up to significant shifts?

JP: It was step, step, step. The other day I looked, and we don't have a farmer in the Legislature today. We used to have quite a few farmers in the Legislature. That's just the way it is.

AK: How is redistricting handled now? Does the Legislature still do it?

JP: It's done the same way. They draw the lines and fight over it. Oh, wait a moment, no, no, they don't. We put a commission through and they battle over it and get it put together. I'm sorry.

This was the way all over the country, redistricting. In Congress, when the rules said each state gets so many votes, they had congressmen-at-large. So, they represented a state, but they didn't change the lines. Everybody voted for a congressman-at-large. We had one in this state.

AK: Thank you for clearing that up for me. I wondered what that floater position was.

JP: That's because they couldn't agree on the lines.

AK: But then you would be beholden to everybody and nobody, wouldn't you?

JP: It's a wonderful job. I always thought that would be the best thing in the world. Somebody would come up and all you'd have to say is, "Where do you live?"

"Yakima."

"Oh, you've got to talk to so-and-so, he's the Yakima guy." You could worry about the big picture things.

AK: That sounds good.

Besides the redistricting issue, Dan Evans, as the new governor, was attempting to implement his Blueprint for Progress. Education was the main thrust in the program, and these are the years when enrollment is just skyrocketing. He also wanted more community colleges and a new four-year college. He was successful there, with the opening of Evergreen.

Another area of development that Governor Evans promoted was nuclear energy, at Hanford. Had Hanford been exclusively a weapons-producing facility up to that point, and now Evans wanted to develop this other potential?

JP: They wanted to use that for power development. Weapons are out. You had that facility there, and they wanted to use it to produce power, and it was cleaner than coal, and you didn't have to disrupt salmon and there were a lot of things. And in many parts of the world, nuclear power is the way they produce power. He wanted to make positive use out of the facility.

AK: Was he the first governor to focus on that possibility?

JP: I think that was the first time when things got changed over there. I think it was reacting to the needs and concerns of an area.

AK: Was there a shortage of energy at this point? Were you looking at, maybe, more dams otherwise?

JP: We did. We had to produce more energy, but I don't remember it being an issue during

the campaign.

AK: He has ideas in a lot of areas. Evans talked about doing more for labor, making improvements in unemployment compensation. And for business, he wanted to do more to promote foreign trade, a comprehensive approach.

JP: Every governor has to be for increased foreign trade. We're on the coast, we're a port area.

AK: One thing Evans pushed was a reorganization of various state agencies. He wanted a new umbrella department of transportation, to combine the administration of highways and the toll bridge authority. He wasn't successful in that his first session.

JP: No, that was a battle. And also to get the ferries and all of that in the same agency. I think, eventually, he got all that done, but it wasn't in the first session.

AK: Just too many turf battles, I suppose. He wanted to speed up highway construction, construct a third Lake Washington bridge, and—with great foresight—Evans wanted to provide funds for rapid transit. He also wanted to change the department of motor vehicles and car licensing. And later to create a department of water resources, the forerunner, I believe, to the Department of Ecology, the creation of which was a milestone in his administration.

JP: Rapid transit, highways—a lot of that we fought for years and years. A lot of this was better management, housekeeping. You come in with new people and you can do it.

AK: Another area to clean up was Evans' support for the disclosure of campaign contributions and the beefing up of the code of ethics for legislators. Was this in relation to issues arising from Greive's campaign money practices, and all the things that had happened in the previous session?

JP: Yes, the previous, and Al Rosellini's way of running things and doing things. Evans' nickname was "straight arrow." Dan was super clean,

straight. This was not a phony deal when he talked about these things.

AK: That session you sat on five committees: Licenses, Local Government, Parks, Capitol Buildings and Grounds, and Rules. Rules was probably your most important assignment. What do you recall of that session?

JP: I do know that we put the voter's pamphlet bill through, McCormick and I. Vic Meyers was still the secretary of state. We put that through because Kenny Gilbert did the work on it.

And Rules was sort of fun—the battling about which bills could come out and which couldn't. I liked the battling. Some of those issues were important and you'd battle around. Also, you got into all the issues that way.

AK: Did any particular issues stand out for you?

JP: The trouble is, I have trouble remembering now which bills came out then, or when I was in the Senate—I don't know.

AK: One issue of this period that I found fascinating was a bill to require cigarettes to carry warning labels for the first time. The newspapers were full of stories linking smoking with cancer rates, a new discovery then. In light of issues today, it was interesting to trace back this movement.

JP: I didn't smoke, so I don't remember the labels. But I put the first amendment up in Congress to do away with the tobacco subsidy. It got within ten votes of doing that. Al Gore voted against me. All kinds of people—everybody in the South voted against me. So, anyway, we lost—but that was in Congress.

AK: The cigarette issue is still very much with us, but how many people are aware these days of the controversy surrounding what was called oleomargarine? Whether or not it could be used in state institutions?

JP: Oh yes. In the early going, it was having margarine with color.

AK: I remember you'd get margarine with a little dot of coloring and you'd have to mix it in yourself.

JP: The farm block did that. They couldn't sell it colored. It was a big deal for the dairy industry, that fight. I think that was finally done by initiative.

AK: There was also a bill authorizing collective bargaining for state employees, a development in that area.

JP: They were a pretty potent force then, but not like they are now. They're the strongest union in the country today, state employees.

AK: I know that during the Evans years the number of state employees grew substantially. It had a big impact on Olympia as a town. People—older residents—will tell you that state employees were not liked here because they came and went and never really settled in Olympia, but during Evans' time, that changed. They bought homes, furniture, sent their kids to local schools—

JP: Evans, all of his key people, everybody—they were here. They were involved in the community. They were encouraged to belong—they were a part of the community.

AK: I know Dan Evans' children went to Lincoln School and that his wife, Nancy, volunteered there.

JP: Yes, all of that. They were just involved. It was so different. And their people, like my friend Bill Jacobs, they were all involved in the activities here in Olympia.

AK: During this session Senator Magnuson attended a joint session of the House and Senate, which received a certain amount of attention in the press. Was this a special or unusual occurrence?

JP: That's just window dressing. Maggie was good at that.

AK: Was there much relationship between state-level politics and the state congressional representatives? Did you work together or have much traffic back and forth?

JP: It just depends. Evans was close to Maggie. He was always helpful to the governor. The governor always felt closer to Magnuson. Evans got along with both of them, with Jackson, but Maggie was the one that he dealt with a lot.

AK: This was a time when the federal government seemed to be deeply involved in state affairs, so I imagine that would be an important relationship.

JP: Yes, and Evans was close to Maggie. But it wasn't unusual—we've had Slade come and talk to us, and Patty Murray, they all come. Particularly if it's getting close to election time.

AK: I see. This was a long session, one in which there seemed to be a lot of interest in reforming the Legislature and its operations. Several people came up with different proposals of how to make it all work better. I thought we could take a look at some of those.

Lieutenant Governor Cherberg had a plan that he called "Operation Legislative Head Start." He wanted the leaders to caucus at the UW-WSU football game, as you told me was traditional, but he wanted the leaders to set up the committee assignments then and not wait until the session. To have everything in place. And he wanted the Ways and Means committee to hold budget hearings before January—to come in ready to go. Did these ideas have much merit?

JP: I have to tell you, I don't remember this, so it wasn't much of a blip. And the rub you have is, it's pretty hard to hold hearings until the governor puts out—two things—he's got to put out his proposals, but more important, you've got to get the budget numbers so you know where you are. Because it doesn't do any good to have a meeting unless you've got the numbers.

AK: Yes. He wants to move that whole calendar up, and to hire a bunch of people early and get bills drafted early, so that you could begin the

session with everything laid out, which seemed pretty fast.

Another area of potential reform was the interim committees. There were nineteen different committees with overlapping jurisdictions and all kinds of staff. Robert Schaeffer, the Speaker of the time, was one who wanted to change that system to one where everyone was involved, but were in subcommittees—fewer of them, but having a more continuous operation, not so ad-hoc.

JP: The underlying problem was that Greive had expanded the committees so that everybody got to be a chairman. The majority party—by the time you take your leadership spots and all, if you've got nineteen chairmanships to pass out, why, yes, you could do business that way. Not so much in the Senate, though.

AK: That's a lot of committees. It couldn't have worked very well.

JP: They had more committees than they needed. And then you get major committees and they split into subcommittees.

AK: Sounds like mushrooms—just popping up everywhere.

JP: If you have big committees with a lot of subcommittees, or if you have a whole number of major committees, it really gets down to if you have a good committee chairman. Some people want to stop bills, some people want to push bills. And you had people who would just as soon have the Legislature go a longer time.

AK: Yes, that idea was floating around, too.

JP: You had a real split between those who had a real job on the outside—that's where you were paid, that was your scorecard in life, it's not your political but your profession or whatever it was. Then you had other people who were pretty much this, and they got a job at the utility or something, or the unions gave them a job, or a community college. They'd like to meet every day, every year, and meet for four years, and then have lots of

interim meetings so that they got per diem. I was on the side of trying to keep the Legislature down to where the average citizen could serve.

The reason the session went so long was that so many people put in so many bills. And, in most cases, an awful lot of them were—you got into this awful business of getting into the details. Instead of operating like a board of directors, like I said, they got way down into the details of the administration.

And my rule in life is that as you go down in the level of ability, the more they want to get into the details. They want to become full-time legislators and be very close.

AK: Is this partly a response to the increase in our litigious society, the need to close every loophole, nail everything down?

JP: Well, it's an attempt to have the Legislature write the rules for everything that goes along. I prefer to have the administration be held accountable, and for whoever administers that division of government, or whatever it is, they can set out rules and policies. But not to get the Legislature to pass laws on all kinds of details.

The Legislature was controlled by the Democrats, and Evans was governor. And so, those that weren't happy with one thing, they could come to the Legislature and try to roll things through to force the agencies to do things in certain ways.

AK: Were you more willing, then, to let agencies regulate than to oversee them as a legislator?

JP: Well, you oversee it, and you check up, and you hold people responsible. But you don't try and run it in the Legislature. That's where we get into differences.

AK: Don't you, in effect, run it by allocating dollars or not allocating them?

JP: Well, of course, a big part of it is the budget. But also, you can write all kinds of rules. And in the process, be here a long time, and have a lot more facilities.

AK: There was a big push in these years to expand.

JP: Oh my, big time for pushing. I wasn't that enthused about pushing. We used to be on the floor with our desks. And the Senators had a desk. There were four to each hearing room upstairs. Each one had a desk.

You didn't have a full-time staff, like now they have a full-time thing. They're playing like congressmen. And then sending out newsletters. An awful lot of it is getting re-elected, and building their political base, and hoping to move on to higher things. So I wasn't keen on it.

There's no end to what you can do if you get into being active, holding hearings, and more hearings, and coming up with more changes. I think some people want extremely active government getting into everything. I would like to have a little less activity. But anyway, that was the way the tide was going.

AK: Did you feel this change as inevitable—was this a turning point?

JP: Other states, like California, they always talked about how they had full-time legislators. And of course, they got paid, and all of this. But for most of us, the gang that came in—and it was all sorts of the Evans people—we couldn't be in the Legislature if that was the way it was going to be, because we had real jobs, real professions.

As state government got into more and more activities after the war, the tendency was the Legislature always went sixty days every other year. Then it got pushed into having special sessions, thirty days in the off-year when I came. Now, we've got four months one year, and three months the other year. In some ways it's just a different attitude to what role the Legislature should play.

And when we came there were two interim committees—Highways and the Legislative Council. But most people weren't on an interim committee, and the Legislature didn't get together. It was rare.

AK: Is life actually more complicated now? Why has government expanded its role?

JP: Some of the basic issues, if you're worrying about basic issues. And the feeling, politically, that you should put bills in and you've got to get back to people and say, "Look what I did."

We did start a program when I was in the Legislature, and I can't remember exactly when, but we started having what we called committee weekend. That idea was that we would come down here for a Saturday and Sunday, and we'd be available if the governor had to have something passed—one weekend a month. Well, like I said, it shifted and now it's Wednesday afternoon, Thursday, and half a day on Friday. Most of them are out of here on Friday noon, going home, so they don't have to touch their weekend.

If you had a job, that would have been an infringement on your job. It's a different animal today. Now committees meet all through the year, and they still call it committee weekend, but it doesn't run on the weekend.

AK: So, it's a euphemism. Looking back, does this time seem like a turning point to you? It seems like there was a quantum leap in discussions about reform and restructuring, a desire to change and grow.

JP: Reform to one person is a higher salary, and another person—more time. Yes. Everything is reform, but I can't say the Legislature in 1970 worked any better than the Legislature in 1950. Real basic issues, but I don't equate the number of bills passed as being whether it was a success or not.

AK: Yes. I was just struck by how many people seemed dissatisfied and feeling that the system had become very cumbersome, as you talked about—the slow accumulation of duties, and that they wanted to rethink how it was all put together.

JP: Yes. And better structuring of the time of the Legislature. Obviously, at times, people did talk about that, and there were ways to get it so the committees didn't overlap so much. People would be on a lot of committees so they could prove they were on the committee, but a lot of times they met at the same time so they couldn't be there.

AK: While I was reading all these different pieces, I was thinking of the Legislature as a person going through some kind of developmental stage just about here. They'd been going along a certain way and then the clothes don't fit any more. It just didn't seem quite right.

JP: I think it was a slow process. It was also very good politics, since people were generally mad at the Legislature, for you to stand up and make a lot of comments about restructuring and improving the Legislature. That way you made a lot of brownie points without getting into any tough issues. Everybody disliked the Legislature, and could get up and say, "Yes, it's clumsy, it isn't doing right, we've got to reform it." It was a safe thing to pontificate about.

AK: I see. One thing that seemed sensible, that Governor Evans pushed, was to include fiscal notes with bills. I hadn't realized that they didn't do that before.

JP: They didn't have to. So they'd roll a bill out and pass it, and somebody would say, "Well, this is going to cost seventeen million," and somebody else would say, "No, it's only twelve million." Well, you've got to have the budget office say, "This is what it is," and have agreement. Yes, that sort of stuff, fiscal shaping up, that kind of business was important.

But people did ask. You'd have the people testify, but so often, it wasn't really firm. Because, who's to say it? The department says one thing, the Legislature says—Now, you have the budget office.

And the same thing happens in Congress. They don't like what they get from the budget office.

AK: Another issue that was receiving a lot of attention—another perennial issue—was campaign reform. At this time several citizen groups were weighing in on this—it seemed to be coming to a head. The focus this time was registering lobbyists, and listing what interests legislators had outside the House, and who they got their money from, and all that kind of thing.

JP: That's one of the reasons why we don't have lawyers in our Legislature. Because we made the reporting restrictions so strict that we chased them out. It's very difficult, and also, when you have four months sessions, it's very hard. I think that's too bad.

Full reporting made a lot of sense. But as far as election reform, that's been going on for two hundred years. It's been talked about and we're still at it. I've been involved in a lot of it. As soon as you make three steps this way, then you find, oh-oh, now people are doing this, and, oh, the creativity of people. The election process has been going on for years. It's more so now that we have the TV.

AK: That takes really big money.

JP: Yes, it's so expensive to campaign that it makes it very difficult.

AK: Also at this time, there was another discussion about holding annual sessions. There's the idea of having seventy-five day sessions, then thirty-day restricted sessions in the off-years—

restricted, that is, to fiscal matters, taxes, things of that sort.

People like Slade Gorton and Walter Williams opposed putting a limit on what could be discussed in the off-years. They wanted wide-open sessions. I wasn't sure what position Governor Evans took on this issue.

JP: If Williams and Gorton were talking about it—so often it's very hard to say what is a major issue.

AK: Doesn't almost everything have some fiscal impact, in the end?

JP: Everything is a part of it. I think it's very hard to restrict it, because there are so many things that can affect legislation.

AK: This was a long session, and as it turned out, this was your last session as a House member. Did you realize you were about to make a change, a move?

JP: No.

FURTHER THOUGHTS

DAN EVANS

Former Governor Dan Evans was interviewed May 10, 1999. Mr. Evans served as a member of the State House of Representatives, 1956 to 1965, until his election as governor. He served three terms, leaving office in 1976. The following year Evans became president of the Evergreen State College, and later was appointed and then won election to the U.S. Senate upon the death of Henry Jackson. He is currently a consultant and political commentator in Seattle.

Anne Kilgannon: I would like to begin with the question of how you first met Joel Pritchard.

Dan Evans: Well, I was called back into the Navy for the second time during the Korean War, and when I came back out in late 1953, I first got back into the engineering business that I had left and then wanted to get active in civic affairs. I joined the Seattle Junior Chamber of Commerce, but I also volunteered in the Republican Party and joined the Young Republicans of King County. It was a very activist, interesting organization, and one where, if you looked at the roster of members then, you would find many of the most prominent names in Seattle in the ensuing years. Joel and Frank Pritchard were members, Jim Ellis was a member, and a number of other real activists joined. It was quite an influential club. I am sure that it was there, or in the Municipal League, or in associated activities that was the beginning of what ultimately became Metro. Somewhere in

there, Joel and I had our first meeting.

AK: Do you remember what he was like in those years?

DE: Yes, right from the beginning he was a very wise political strategist. He and his brother Frank—they really came as a pair almost—were the geniuses behind Gordon Clinton’s election as mayor of Seattle. They were very active, but always behind the scenes, and at that time, when anybody even mentioned to Joel the thought of his running for office, he would say, “No, no, no, that is not for me.” He wanted to help others, but it wasn’t for a political office; it was the drive toward the cleaning up of Lake Washington, and Jim Ellis’ leadership with the Municipal League, and pushing for what ultimately became Metro.

That really, I think, was the first big political effort that we got involved in. During the course of that, with some considerable help and political advice from Joel and from Frank and from a number of other young people, I ran for the Legislature and was elected in 1956. In the first session of that Legislature, the Metro legislation came to the floor of the Senate and the House. People now look back on Metro with some reverence and with the thought that was a marvelous step toward cleaning up Lake Washington, which it was, and a beautiful piece of governmental work, which it was, but—and I will never forget—it was terribly controversial.

AK: I understand that some people thought it was some kind of Communist threat; I mean the language used to describe it was sometimes highly inflamed.

DE: Yes, and so when it came before the House of Representatives, it was bitterly contested. I was a freshman, but I was also a member of the Municipal League and part of the group that had helped Jim Ellis initiate this effort, and so I was called on to really participate in pushing it. When it came to a final vote, the Speaker started the roll call machine and the votes built up on both sides and it hovered, and finally when the Speaker said, “The Speaker is about to close the roll call machine,” it was fifty to forty-nine against Metro.

Our Republican leader jumped to his feet to change his vote so that he could be on the negative side for reconsideration, because he thought we had lost it. But, just about that time, I looked up and saw that someone had changed their vote and it was now fifty to forty-nine in favor of Metro, and I just went rushing down the aisle to our leader saying, "Sit down! Sit down!" About that time, John O'Brien, who was Speaker, and who was also in favor of Metro, closed the roll call machine. We had won by one vote.

AK: So, do you think that John O'Brien closed it on purpose?

DE: Well, he closed it—you know the Speaker has some discretion. He said, "The Speaker is about to close the roll call machine," but I have seen Speakers say that and wait for five minutes until things happened the way they hoped that they would.

AK: It was really a near thing!

DE: Oh it was, a very near thing. We almost lost it.

AK: So, you had gone out and had spoken for this and so had Joel. What kind of groups were you addressing—neighborhood groups or business groups?

DE: Oh, I think both. It was an effort to get to as many people as possible. I am sure that Joel was an active participant in the typical Rotary Clubs and Lions Clubs and community groups and business organizations, anybody we could get to. There was a lot more of that going on in those days than today. This was truly a citizen effort, not backed by huge advertising money and that sort of thing, but backed by an awful lot of volunteers, and of course, some good editorial support, which seemed to mean more in those days than it does now.

AK: I'm still trying to get a sense of what Joel Pritchard was like in those early days. I was, of course, more familiar with him later in his life, but was he the same energetic, irrepressible

personality then?

DE: Yes! I don't think Joel changed a bit from beginning to end, from the first moment I got acquainted with him. He was energetic, and you know, I don't think he ever found anybody he truly disliked. If he did find someone who was antagonistic, he would work hard to pull them across to at least neutralize them, and he was extraordinarily successful at that. He had friends both in the Legislature and in Congress and as lieutenant governor on both sides of the political aisle. He was almost revered on both sides.

And as I say, he started out never talking about running for office; he always pushed that aside. It wasn't until the 1958 election when we finally had some younger people decide to step forward. Then Joel did. And Slade Gorton did.

AK: What persuaded him?

DE: Well, I'm not quite sure. I think that we were all together, Slade and I, and Joel, and a number others. Chuck Moriarty had run earlier with me in 1956, and it was the beginning—I think 1956 was the first election where you began to see an infusion of younger people. You began to see the young professionals, especially in the Seattle area, running for the Legislature. I think that got us started on what ultimately became a very big movement and we convinced Joel—I say we, but I don't remember that I had anything great to do about it—but he finally decided that he would run instead of being someone's campaign manager.

AK: Well, maybe by you going first, it made it look more possible, or more like something he could do, too.

DE: I just don't know, but he finally did decide to run and of course, when he put his extraordinary talents to work, he really didn't have much difficulty in winning. He never had a close race, except his first race for Congress, but other than that, he swept them aside.

AK: So, then he came down to Olympia and you all shared a house. What was that like?

DE: Oh yes, that was fascinating. There were four of us: Slade, Joel, and I, and Chuck Moriarty. We enjoyed living together, but we were frustrated most of the session. We'd spend a lot of time talking about legislation or the kinds of things that we were trying to push, but it was a session where there were only thirty-three Republicans to sixty-six Democrats. In other words, we couldn't even avoid having them call questions of consideration and other devices that would shut off debate, so we couldn't even debate openly if they chose not to let us do it. Our leadership was not terribly inspired—of course that comes from those of us who were young at the time and looked on those who were gray-headed as something less than inspired, I suppose. We have all become those gray hairs since, but it was a session of as much looking ahead as paying attention to what was going on. That didn't mean we didn't pay attention—we did a lot of work and effort in the Legislature—but we decided that thirty-three was not good enough and if we were going to come back, we wanted to come back a lot stronger. We set out deliberately, quite aside from the Republican Party organization, which we felt was pretty weak and not terribly effective, and we said we will just do it on our own.

AK: How was that received by the regular Republican establishment?

DE: I think that probably, if you really honestly looked back, the establishment, per se, didn't pay much attention. The Republican Party organization had not been taken over at that time by the conservative element; in fact it was still, if anything, the remnant of the Eisenhower organization that, in turn, had taken over from the conservatives in 1952 during that election. But it wasn't a strong organization and so we went out to seek new candidates.

When we started, Joel said something that I've remembered ever since. It was very interesting and very wise. He said, "Let's all do this, but nobody looks past the next election." Well, you know that was a little puzzling until he explained that, in other words, nobody has any personal ambition; we are all in this together to try to win. After the election was over, we would see where

we were and then decide what to do next. It was the idea that we would put aside personal political ambitions to really get this overall job done. Very wise, a very wise admonition, and one which I think we followed pretty carefully, but it hasn't been followed very many times in politics. Personal ambition frequently gets in the way.

AK: Joel never seemed to want to be recognized as leadership in a formal way. He didn't seek those particular named offices.

DE: No, he did not, but he played an extraordinarily important role from wherever he sat. He was listened to—his ideas, his words on political strategy particularly, were all terribly important, and it didn't really matter what position he held, his influence was very, very important.

It was an extraordinary session in looking back, because we didn't know—little did any of us know that we were going to do anything but serve in the Legislature—but we wanted to serve in a Legislature that was more to our liking, that was more Republican. We learned very quickly that in a legislative body the majority counts, and that was what we were working for as we left that session of 1959. It was a marvelous time for us to weld some friendships, very close friendships that have kept on for years since, and also then to set about what we had decided we wanted to do. We actively went out and sought candidates—we went everywhere. I know that it was either that next election or the one after, but I think it was the next election, where we found Mary Ellen McCaffree, who had been president of the local chapter of the League of Women Voters. Some of the old-time Republicans said, "Well, she's been president of the League of Women Voters; she can't be a Republican." It was that sort of attitude, you know, and we said, "She is in a district where the Republicans haven't won for years and she has a good chance to win. We think she is just fine." And she did run and she did win.

It was that sort of thing, led in very large part by Joel's political acumen—and incidentally from Seattle or from outside of the Legislature by his brother Frank as well. Slade and I remember that we would visit places far outside of Seattle, places where we hadn't even been before, looking for

candidates and trying to stir up Republican interest, and the next election we did succeed. We went from thirty-three to forty, and so we were making big progress.

AK: All these efforts were instrumental in bringing about an important shift, and then, of course unbeknown to you, leading to your strengthened position for the coalition session. What was Joel's role in that?

DE: Preceding the coalition really was the election of 1960 where we had won the forty seats. After the election we sat down together, the same group of Joel, Slade, and Chuck Moriarty and the others who had been together—it was a broader group than that but I am not sure just who else was involved—and we said, "Okay, now what?" We decided the next thing to do was to see if we could install some new leadership within the Republican caucus. My seatmate in the Forty-third District, Newman Clark, who was the Republican leader, had run for Governor in 1960, so he was no longer in the Legislature. The assistant leader was next in line, Damon Canfield from Yakima, and we decided that we would run a candidate against him. Mostly since I had been in the Legislature two years longer than Joel and Slade, they asked me to run for leader, and so I did. Joel was a very important part of that group.

AK: Didn't he introduce you at the Spokane Convention that year?

DE: Boy! Now you are testing my memory. That could well be because there was a convention in Spokane in 1960, which I well remember, because I had gotten married in June of 1959. Then I had quit my job about three months later, much to the amazement of my new bride, but since we were still young and had some money and were child-free at the moment, we decided to go on an extended trip to Europe. We started in January and spent almost six months in Europe, but we knew that there was one date that was necessary to meet and that was the Spokane Convention, the Republican Convention held in June of 1960. And so, we came back to the Spokane Convention before we ever got home; that was on our

automobile trip across country finishing our European trip. We went to that, and that may have been the one where Joel introduced me.

AK: And then you became the minority leader?

DE: We elected forty Republicans, and then came back in December or November of that year to Spokane, and he may have been talking about that. Thirty-nine out of the forty Republicans in the caucus of that year were there, and the night before we went through a lot of effort and work. I think that probably Joel was the one who introduced me and nominated me for leader at that morning meeting. We went into the meeting counting votes as well as we could, and we thought we were down by three votes, and that we wouldn't win.

But somehow, the evening before we had had a big social reception of all the Republicans. The Spokane contingent had a problem; for the life of me, I cannot remember what the problem was, but it was an internal problem and they asked both Damon Canfield, who was the other candidate, and me how we would handle it or deal with it. I wish I could remember what it was; it turned out to be absolutely critical, because the next morning the senior member of the Spokane delegation stood outside the door and corralled the other two members. He apparently informed them that, "We have to vote for Evans; he is the one who really gave the right answer," whatever it was.

We went in there and won the election twenty-one to eighteen. It was those three votes which were terribly critical. Then we thought we had the votes to install new leadership up and down the line, but again I am confident—I don't remember precisely, but I am confident that it had to have been with Joel's advice, that, "Look, let's not do this." He would have been the candidate for assistant Republican leader, and he stepped back and said, "No, let's not do that. Let's invite Damon Canfield to be the assistant leader."

AK: I wondered if it was his suggestion, because again in his own district, after his own victory when they defeated Mrs. Kirk, he was instrumental in bringing her back in after the death of Senator Zednick. He seemed to like to

bring everyone along.

DE: Exactly, which was an enormously important attribute. It is for anybody in a political office, but he did it better than almost anybody that I've known in politics. I am sure that is what happened: we did then by acclamation elect Damon Canfield as the assistant leader. The other two positions were part of the new leadership, Tom Copeland from Walla Walla, and Don Eldridge from Mount Vernon. That pulled the caucus together and we engaged in what turned out to be a very fruitful session, even though we were only forty members. Joel was a very active part of some of the things we did there. As I remember, I think it was that session where the governor got into an argument with the Liquor Control Board and wanted to change the membership of the Board, and pushed the Legislature into getting his bill passed to do that. I don't think that John O'Brien, who was Speaker, was enthusiastic at all about doing it, but he knew that he should carry forward for the governor. He was loyal. Joel led the fight against it.

AK: Now what would that mean in this case—speeches, lobbying other people?

DE: Yes. He was very active on the floor in speeches that were really devastating because Joel would never get nasty but he would just—it was part humor, part ridicule, part—you know he just made it very, very uncomfortable for all of the Democrats. If they had stuck together and were loyal to the governor, they could have passed the bill, but he shamed them out of it, and the bill finally went back into committee and never came out again. So he showed the real power of argument when you are on the right side, or feel that you are, and really speak out and reach across the aisle—which was done much more frequently in those days than today. There were some party differences, but they were not as intense as they are now.

And we had one other bill during that session which proved to be an extraordinarily important bill because it led to a series of events that ultimately, I think, led to my winning the governorship, and that was the public/private

power fight. House Bill 197: I will never forget the number.

That too, was not partisan. It was mostly Republicans, but there were a number of Democrats who supported private power, from Spokane particularly, which of course was the home of Washington Water Power. They just had different ideas. We saw this group of forty Republicans plus enough Democrats to be on the prevailing side, against the Speaker and most of the Democrats and the governor. We actually seized control, literally, of the House for about three days. The Speaker didn't determine when we adjourned or what we did, instead we did, and it was a very hard-fought, tough debate.

I learned a big lesson, that when the Speaker has the gavel, that's pretty important, because he ultimately just waited us out. There was heavy external pressure on members of our caucus, especially some who came from public power areas, Public Utility District (P.U.D.) counties, but thought the bill was okay. It actually was nothing more sinister than requiring a public vote before any county could shift from private power to a Public Utilities District. P.U.D.'s didn't like that much, and finally, one by one, our majority got a little smaller, and a little smaller, until on one vote we didn't have the votes and at that point the Speaker, very quickly, brought the gavel down and the bill was gone out of our control. We didn't have a chance, even to do what we thought was the appropriate process, which would have been to allow a vote on reconsideration and to give us time to try to change things around.

AK: Was that what inflamed people so much?

DE: I think that helped.

AK: You were gavelled down when you were so close—

DE: Yes, it was a long, hard-fought effort. Efforts like that—people tend to get more intensely into it the longer it goes on, and so what started out as a minor skirmish became a crusade. And when you lose it, and especially if you think that you have lost it on a quick gavel, it does inflame people. So that session ended, and I think that we

felt we had made some real strides, but we also realized that it still wasn't good enough. We had to be in the majority to govern and that is what we all wanted, to be able to govern, to be able to get ideas and pass them into law. So we set out to continue what we had started the previous time, and that was to go after more candidates and a stronger House of Representatives.

AK: As for Joel, he claimed not to have any particular legislative agenda; he just thought the Republicans had a better grasp or point of view. He never really could articulate exactly what motivated him. Maybe you can help us with this. Was there some legislation that he cared about enough to make all this happen, or did he just think that if Republicans were in control the whole tone of things would be better? He talked about this almost more as a moral or ethical issue than anything else.

DE: I think that's what drove him primarily.

AK: He did not like Rosellini.

DE: No, he did not, and did not think he was appropriate as a leader for the state.

AK: I think he called him sleazy.

DE: Yes. I think that I would categorize Joel's interest as being just that, wanting better government and feeling that the Republican Party, and the principles of the Republican Party, would be the agent for that change.

AK: Yes. He expressed that—definitely wanting the Republicans to come in, but not just Republicans—a certain kind of Republican.

DE: That is right. I think that he was always a strong advocate of what all of us were trying to do at that time: to be conservative in terms of how we handled the public's money, but at the same time, recognizing that the government was not an enemy. It was an agent for good, and that we needed to do a better job of protecting the environment, because that had not been a priority in the years leading up to this.

I remember vividly—in fact, Joel has used the story a number of times—that when he first ran for the Legislature, he ran into me on the street and said, “I am going up to the Municipal League for my interview, and I don't know what to tell them. What did you do?”

I had been there two years before, and I had been fortunate to get an outstanding rating from the Municipal League. And I said, “Well, I told them that as an engineer, I felt what I thought I could contribute was something to Highways and Transportation and that there were few people in the urban areas that did that. We had let the farmers steal all the highway money, because we were always interested in something else.”

And he said, “Wow, that's great!” So he went into the Municipal League and really decided that, “Okay, that is where I will put my efforts,” and he did.

The Municipal League—of course, I think for a lot of reasons, not just what he said was the reason—but in reality, he was just very good at expressing his ideas of what should happen and came across as an outstanding candidate. That was the way he was rated by the Municipal League, which was much more influential, I think, in those days than today. People responded to the ratings that candidates received.

AK: He was already interested in lack of transit, and other solutions beside more freeways.

DE: Oh yes! Absolutely.

AK: How would he have developed that perspective? He just intuitively knew that would be a critical issue?

DE: I think that would have to be it, because I don't remember that he had any experience, other than perhaps visiting other cities or seeing other places where rapid transit had really made a difference. But, for all of us who grew up in Seattle, as he and I both did, you were very aware of the geographical constraints, and as a result, the need for some very ingenious answers to traffic, which unfortunately we are still looking for.

AK: Now, of course, his other big thing was the environment. Were you already going backpacking and mountaineering in those days with him?

DE: Probably not yet; I think it was probably just after I became governor or maybe just before. That was when we all got together. I had been doing a lot of backpacking, starting as a Boy Scout out of Camp Parsons, and I fell in love with the Olympic Mountains. I went on an extended backpacking trip every summer into the mountains, and I am sure that we talked about that sort of thing. He had quite an experienced mountaineer, George Senner, who worked with him at his envelope company, and so he heard it from a number of different directions.

Ultimately—I think it was probably just about the time that I became governor—he and some others went with George Senner on a climb, and I believe the first climb was up Mount St. Helens. There were a lot of people: there were some journalists, lobbyists, and legislators. They were a mixed group of people, and most of them rookies when it came to mountain climbing. When everybody got to the top, George talked about the other peaks—it was a beautiful day, and you could see Mount Adams and Mount Rainier and Glacier Peak, and all of the rest of them. And George said, “Well, the Mountaineers have a pin that they give to members of the Mountaineers for those who have climbed six major summits in the state of Washington.” The group—they became a group at that time—said, “Well, that’s great. Why don’t we do that?” and that led to a whole series of trips that we went on to climb each one of those six peaks.

AK: I’m not a mountain climber—but what kind of qualities does it take to do that, to reach the top? I can imagine, but what would Joel’s climbing style have been?

DE: Well, I remember our trip up Mount Rainier, which of course was the biggest expedition of all. Mount Olympus was a much longer trip—it’s a fifty-mile round trip to the top of Mount Olympus and back to the trailhead—but on the trip up Rainier altitude really counts. I would guess that of the group that went up, Joel would have been

in the top two or three out of twelve or thirteen, in terms of his physical shape, his physical condition. He was a good athlete, and he was very active. He played a lot of tennis, did a lot of things, so he was in good shape. But as we got up to about twelve or twelve-and-a-half thousand feet, he just ran into a terrible bout of altitude sickness and simply could not continue.

AK: Oh! You’re not supposed to ignore that kind of thing, are you?

DE: No! You’re not supposed to, and physically, if the mountain sickness is bad, you just can’t. And so one rope team, with Joel on it, headed back down toward Camp Muir, and the rest of us finished the climb to the top and came back to Muir.

AK: That must have been disappointing for him!

DE: Well, it was disappointing, but an indication of his persistence is that he went back the next year, and he went up to Camp Muir. This was with several others, but he went up to Camp Muir, and he spent several days at Camp Muir acclimating and then made the climb and still ran into some mountain altitude sickness, but he did it. And I think that is an indication that when he decided something was important, something that he wanted to do, that he wasn’t going to let something as simple as that stand in his way.

AK: Simple?

DE: No, not simple, of course. On the climb to Olympus and back, he and I hiked out the last day, and we were kind of ahead of some others in the group, and it’s a long trail out to the Hoh trailhead, but it’s flat and easy and we just kind of sailed along. It’s a long and somewhat technical climb over glaciers and that sort of thing, but the altitude is only eight thousand feet, so he didn’t have any problems with that, and of course he was in extraordinary shape, so no difficulties.

AK: That’s very interesting. We should probably return to the Republican Party, though. He talked at fairly great length about your struggles to

reform the Republican Party and bring in what he call "the new blood," a new type of candidate. He didn't go into it very deeply, but it seemed like the one area you could not seem to do anything with was your own area of King County. Especially you as governor, ran into quite a wall of, I guess they had been Goldwater supporters and then they evolved to become their own particular brand of Republican, with Ken Rogstad as their leader. How did Joel react to this? He was so good at reaching out to other people, but how did he deal with this knot of resistance?

DE: Well, let's go back one session. Once we came out of the session in 1961, we found that the Democrats were in deep disarray, with deep divisions. The Democratic state convention of 1962 produced a walkout of some of the same Democrats who had been with us on a public/private power fight of the session before. Their objections were to the fact that in their case, the party organization and the convention was taken over by the really extra-liberal Democrats, and they objected strenuously to some of the clauses in the platform that they thought were way too liberal.

Well! We—and I suspect that Joel was either the instigator or certainly thought it was a great idea—we Republicans printed up copies of the Democratic state platform with certain clauses in red instead of black so that they would stand out. We used that as a campaign piece. Seldom was that ever done, but I think it was pretty effective. The Democrats had just gone out too far, and it did two things: it was, we thought, a pretty good campaign piece for that year, but it also helped divide even further the Democrats who had walked out from the rest of the party.

As it turned out, that election we won—we gained again. We went to forty-eight seats and came within just a few hundred votes of winning two more seats, which would have given us the majority. We were two votes short of a majority; it was fifty-one to forty-eight. Sometime after the election, Slade Gorton got a contact from Bob Perry, who was one of the dissident Democrats who asked if we would be interested at all in forming a coalition. Of course, Slade came to me and we got together immediately the same group

of Joel, and Slade, and myself, and Frank Pritchard, and a number of others to say, "Okay, what do we do? What are the pros and the cons?"

We figured that we were going so well that certainly by 1964 we would be in the majority and should we do this, or just wait and be a strong opposition to divide a Democratic majority? None of us could see coming the Goldwater changes of just a couple of years away, and of course, nobody could see the John Kennedy assassination; all of these things were yet to happen. Ultimately, we decided that we would have to deal with the whole caucus, but that we would continue the talks.

The talks continued right up to the start of the legislative session. We had a big get-together of all of our Republican members and their spouses the night before the session and I was able to meet with our leaders and say, "Okay, we will all meet in the Elks Club parking lot and join together to go out and meet with the coalitionists." There was a carload of us, and I can't remember precisely who was and wasn't there with us, but it was essentially the leadership. Slade was there, I know, but I don't think that Joel was. I think there was a car-full, so probably five or less. It was like a B-grade movie: we went out to Cooper Point and down this long dirt road in amongst all the trees and came to a clearing. Here was a little cabin with no lights on, just a fire in the fireplace, we knocked on the door and it was opened by Bill Day, who was known as "Big Daddy" and he was big—three hundred pounds, a big man. We all went in and there we conducted the final negotiations.

We had decided that we would start out by trying to say, "Okay, we're going with the coalition, but Evans will be Speaker, and then we will divide the rest of the jobs," but we'd see what they would say. Well, they didn't want any part of that. Day was going to be the Speaker, and I didn't care that much because I knew that with forty-eight votes, we were going to run the session. We had the votes to really be in charge, and our big concerns then were about redistricting, which could have—if done totally by the Democrats—locked us out for many years to come.

We finally agreed on a coalition. We were fortunate enough to have with us the chief clerk

of the House—he played an important role because for the election of the Speaker, the chief clerk presides until the Speaker is selected. Si Holcomb had been the chief clerk for John O'Brien for many years, but he chafed under John's rather abrupt and abrasive style and it was one of those cases where human relationships played a very big role. In this case, it tipped him over to the coalitionists.

We put all that together and came back and had a caucus the next morning. Everyone had a chance to speak out, but I remember Joel as having an important role in talking about what we were about to enter if we did—because we hadn't made the final decision. He said that if we were going to do it, it was a one-way street. We could not back down; we had to stick together. It was an important kind of adventure that we were getting started on, and then we finally did decide. We walked out of there, and nobody spoke a word to the press, and the Democrats had no idea what was about to hit them.

There was a week of real bitterness and difficulty until everybody settled down, but we did stick together for the entire session. We had our problems within the caucus occasionally—there would always be tension. Then it was always time for one or another of us, but it was usually Joel, sometimes Jimmy Andersen—in a quite different way as he was a feisty old Army infantryman, you know, and he would get up and kind of pound the desk and talk about the importance of going out and, you know—CHARGE—and that sort of thing!

AK: What was Joel's way? What would he do?

DE: Much calmer, but always talking about the need to stick together.

AK: More congenial?

DE: Oh yes, sure, in his inimical style. It all worked pretty well; we had the tough chargers and then Joel, and between them we had a great caucus. It was a group of people who had vastly different ideas, political philosophies, and even ideas of what to do, because our caucus was statewide and had a lot of strength in farm communi-

ties and some very conservative communities as well as the urban areas. The one thing that the Republicans don't have today is strength in the urban centers—in that session over half the legislators from the city of Seattle were Republicans, and of course there are now no Republicans inside the city of Seattle. That made a difference, a difference both in style as well as in philosophy, because then we were representing an urban area, not just the farm communities.

AK: When did this split start to happen?

DE: Well, in '64 most of the focus, at that time, was on Barry Goldwater and on the national campaign. After the session of '63, some friends of mine—they were legislators from down in Cowlitz County—started a "draft Dan Evans movement for governor." And so again, we brought the same group together, the group that I had come to depend on very heavily for advice. It was Joel who said, "Well, if you really want to run for governor, invite two hundred of your closest friends to a 7:00 a.m. breakfast and in the invitation say that you are going to ask them for money, and see how many of them show up." I said, "Well gee, Joel."

AK: Was that like stacking the deck, to make it really hard?

DE: That's exactly what he had in mind, because I said, "Joel, 7:30 at least is a reasonable time!"

He said "No, you want to make it really tough to find out who your real friends are and that is going to give you a clue as to whether you ought to get in the race, or you ought to just bail out."

So we did that, and it was very successful. More than one hundred forty people showed up. We asked each one of them to either give or go out and raise fifty dollars, which doesn't sound like much now, but it was a fair amount in those days, and most of the people were younger and didn't have a lot of extra fifty dollar bills lying around. We got calls from a number of people, who said, "Hey, I heard about the breakfast. Why wasn't I invited?" and we had a second one—

AK: There is your clue.

DE: Yes! We had a second one and we had about fifty or seventy people. We raised about twelve thousand dollars from those two; that ran the campaign for the next six months. It was Joel's very good advice in how to get started and what to do. Then, of course, he was a prominent advisor on the campaign.

We started out a year and a half before the election, essentially full-time. From June of 1963, I was almost full-time, and by October, I was full-time campaigning. Jim Dolliver had been our Republican caucus attorney during the previous session and I selected him as campaign manager. The two of us set out in a borrowed car, which came from a grade school friend of mine who was then in the automobile business, Pat Goodfellow. We asked him for some campaign help, and he said, "Look, I will do something better for you than just money. You go out in my used car lot and find a car that you think that will work, and I will loan you the car for as long as you will need it." Little did he know that we would bring the car back with about seventy thousand miles more on it than when we started, but it was a great and important contribution.

Jim and I and the car visited every tiny community in the state, and began the campaign. Again, Joel said, "Look, you've got time to go out and organize. And you've got a great group of Republican colleagues in the House that you can depend on for getting people." You know, he had just some simple but important advice. We finally began to get a campaign organization, and then we would occasionally have a meeting of all the county chairman, and Joel would give them the word on how to do doorbelling, how to do signs, and how to do all of these things.

Joel would always say, "Now, when you have a meeting scheduled, figure out just at the minimum how many are going to come, and you really ought to make sure that you have got a least that minimum, and then set up fewer chairs than that."

They would say, "That's kind of silly; set up a few extra chairs."

He said, "No, always set up fewer chairs. Always have it in a smaller room rather than a larger one, because nothing makes people think that you're really on a roll than to say, 'Gee, it

was an over-crowded, overflow meeting.'"

Well, the overflow was because we always set up fewer chairs than the numbers that we were going to get. Just the physical thing of bringing out more chairs made everybody feel that the campaign was going well. He had lots of ideas of that sort, that just were so practical and were so helpful, substituting campaign enthusiasm in volunteers for the money, which we didn't really have.

The first poll that the state party had taken in June of 1963, I had three percent name familiarity, but had four percent support. "Well," I said, "That is one percent more than people who even know me."

AK: They don't know you, but they like you?

DE: I was seventh out of seven potential candidates. Dick Christensen, who had been the candidate two years before against Warren Magnuson, was a charismatic Lutheran minister—a young guy—and he decided that he wanted to run for governor. The rest of them, Gordon Clinton and Tom Pelly and others that had been in that poll decided that they were not going to run.

I just kept going, and we had a poll the next January and we hadn't moved very far—I don't remember how far—but after six months of work, we really hadn't moved very far. That was a discouraging time, and there again, we would have a campaign meeting, and Joel would say, "No! No! Don't worry about that!"

AK: So he was good for morale? He had faith?

DE: Well, he was saying, "Look, you're building a good organization, and that is going pay off eventually in the polls, but you've got to give it time to build and get the name familiarity and all that stuff working."

AK: Joel had some concerns about mixing religion with politics. I know that Dick Christensen had no political experience or background. Was that mixture a concern to you, too, besides your own ambitions?

DE: Well—it wasn't a mixture, so much as the

fact of the lack of experience and here was somebody campaigning to become governor who had absolutely no experience either inside or outside politics to prepare him for that job. But it was during that campaign that you began to see the issues of 1964. As I say, the Goldwater people were primarily interested in the national election, but there were also groups of quite conservative, mostly women—they called themselves “women on the warpath,” the WOWS—and they were supporting Dick Christensen.

There was a lot of campaign steam on his side. We got to January of 1964, and it looked bad for a time there, because one thing I had said at the beginning was, “I will not run a deficit campaign. I will not end up putting this campaign and the people who support it in debt,” and we got to the point where there was, literally, no money left. Fortunately, just about that time, we received our first fairly large campaign donation from a significant member of the business community.

AK: Weren't the businessmen kind of holding back?

DE: Oh sure! They were holding back. They didn't like Dick Christensen, but they thought I was a nice young man who couldn't win, and Joe Gandy, about that time, came along as a potential candidate on the Republican side. There were a number of business people who said, “Well, we will back Joe as the candidate for governor.”

AK: They probably would have been more familiar with him, too.

DE: Oh sure! But, you know, as the campaign went on we began to get a little more money. We were never, until the very end of the campaign, really flush, but in November, a year before the election—and this again was a Joel Pritchard idea—we put together a tabloid. It was marvelous: it was cheap, it had lots of information and pictures in it. It was an eight-page newsprint tabloid, and so we printed thousands of these. We had lots of volunteers, and so we stood on downtown streets and passed these out to people as they came along. We did it at 5:00 during the evening rush, the first Tuesday in November of

1963, exactly a year before the election.

AK: And didn't it have mock headlines, announcing you as the next governor?

DE: It had the headline: “Will This Be The Headline A Year From Now: Evans Elected Governor?” And of course, the morning after the election, I went out to the front porch of our house, picked up the paper, and the *P.I.*'s headline was “Evans Elected Governor,” absolutely the identical headline.

It was a very important tool. It did several things: it got some press coverage because it was so unusual, and press coverage was precious in those days. Joel told us afterwards, he said, “Boy, that was a real success.” He said, “The way to really tell if it was a success is that there weren't too many of them thrown on the street.” You usually get a flyer like that and people will look at them and then toss it away. He said, “There weren't very many of them.”

And I think that some of us who stood on the street corners were dismayed by the fact that some threw them away. But we were all told before we went out there, “Now, when it is all over, if you see any of them on the street, pick them all up. We don't leave any mess on the street.” And I think that we probably picked them all up and brought them back so that we could use them again.

AK: Well, it's a very nice psychological thing, too. Visualizing the look of success.

DE: Oh yes! It was, and it stimulated our own campaign group because they were excited about doing it. The campaign worked on from then until June. In fact, we figured that we would put out a challenge—we knew that it would be difficult in the primary if Joe Gandy and I were both still in it, that Christensen would probably win the primary. So both sides wanted each one to get the other one out. There were contacts from the Joe Gandy forces saying, “Well, you are a great young man, and everything, but we could run as a team, and you could run as lieutenant governor, and you know Joe may only want one term,” and that sort of thing. Well, we had put too much time and effort

into it by that time and we said, "No thanks."

But—I think it was Joel, it was certainly the campaign team—as I remember it, Joel would have had an important role in this kind of a strategy. We said, "Okay," as we had just taken a poll in January, and I don't remember whether I was ahead or Joe Gandy, but we were both pretty close and Christensen was still way up, although he was coming down some. We said, "We'll have the state take another poll in June, just before filing date, and whoever is ahead then, will stay in the race, and whoever is behind will drop out." We waited until June, and what Joel said finally came true, that the work and the effort we had put in then finally paid off and the polls started really rising pretty rapidly as the name got out and soon as people understood that this was a real campaign.

AK: And then some money came in?

DE: Some money started to come in, so everything started to really work in the spring. The poll came out, and we were well ahead of Joe Gandy, though still behind Christensen, but again, closing that gap. And I will never forget that Jim Dolliver and a couple of others went down to meet with the Gandy forces to consummate this whole thing, and when he came back, he was absolutely steaming because they refused to back out. They were still trying to see if we would back down and run for lieutenant governor.

AK: But you were ahead by this time?

DE: Oh yes! We were ahead. We were irate! Well, that went on, and about a day or two later I was campaigning in Spokane, and somebody had agreed to fly us in someone's private plane, and word came in on the radio saying, "When you land, don't talk to the press or anybody; call campaign headquarters first." I didn't know what was going on but we landed at Boeing Field, and I called the campaign headquarters. I could hear all of this celebration going on in the background, and they told me that Joe Gandy had just pulled out and had endorsed me. So, the strategy had worked perfectly, and that made it a two-person race which then made it really winnable.

AK: A much clearer contest!

DE: Yes! Much clearer contest.

We had a campaign meeting once a week, and at one of them, John Haydon, who was a Democrat, but a first-rate guy and a very active participant in the campaign, said, "Well, you know that Christensen, gosh, he doesn't have any experience at all. He's never done anything, and besides he probably drinks Scotch and milk." We laughed about that, and then somebody said, "You know, that's not a bad idea, why don't we contrast the two candidates?" Then we got more serious and started. We did this chart of our business experience, and they had all my engineering experience, and then Dick Christensen's: six months running a fruit stand. We went down through the categories: legislative experience, governmental, the whole effort, and it was pretty impressive. We cleaned it up, and again Joel was instrumental in all this. He contacted a friend who ran the *Enumclaw Courier Herald*, and said, "You know, this is really a pretty good measure of these two."

The publisher said, "Oh, that's really great. Can I run it?"

So he ran it as an editorial in his paper, contrasting the two candidates. Then it got picked up by others and it absolutely drove the Christensen people wild. They were just furious, but it was all accurate. Then we used it in campaign pieces, with mailers, and all of that sort of stuff, and that helped turn the tide. As we got toward the primary election, you could feel the tide coming our way, and we got almost every editorial endorsement in the state. So it was a very successful campaign, and a very citizen-oriented campaign, a classic from the very beginning. Joel really played not only a key, but probably the key role, with his advice and the direction and stimulating interest and keeping the whole organization really going.

AK: So, is it fair to say that without him you may never have made it?

DE: Oh sure! I mean, obviously there was a bigger group and we had a strong group, but Joel was a lot of the campaign glue. Slade was very important

as a cerebral strategist, but Joel was the political strategist, the one who could really figure out how to get the most out of volunteers in a campaign that depended heavily on volunteers. And he knew how to get the most out of the campaign money that we had, and use it in places where it would really count.

AK: Did his faith in the campaign keep you going?

DE: Well, it sure helped, because he never—I’ve never seen Joel ever despondent about anything. He was always right there.

AK: That would be pretty valuable.

DE: Yes!

AK: We began this whole discussion actually talking about the splits in the Republican Party that started to appear behind you, you might almost say. Your focus was on the governor’s seat, but theirs was down there at the precinct level.

DE: That’s right and they were working hard to organize and to get the precincts organized, and we—as you can see—we were focused on the governorship. After the election, of course Goldwater lost very badly, and I won, and it came time in December for the reorganization of the Republican Central Committee in King County.

AK: Can you explain your own role in the party structure—as the governor, you’re the titular head of your party, right?

DE: Right.

AK: So, how does that work?

DE: Well, we made it very clear who I supported, and there were two candidates for King County chairman, and one was John Besteman against Ken Rogstad, and it was the Evans people and John Besteman himself who were the governor’s choice. We worked hard, although we were trying to play catch-up, because there were a lot of the precincts where the right wing had gotten in

and won the precincts. We probably could have insisted on going over and having me speak to the convention before they actually had the election, and decided that no, that might be a little heavy-handed. We thought we had it won; we had the votes all counted. We had enough people, we thought. And so they started, and I waited, then was going to go over and speak to them afterwards, and then came the notice of the stunning loss by four votes out of a thousand. We had so many people afterwards who came up and said, “I just didn’t think there was any problem at all, and I had to go someplace where I had to do something else.” People who could have been there, but weren’t—and we lost.

That set in motion a real division that lasted all the time I was governor. I didn’t even go over and speak to the convention after that, I was so furious at what had happened, but I probably should have; I might have set the stage for change two years later. We tried. Mary Ellen McCaffree really played a key role, Slade and all of us tried hard, both two years and four years later to elect candidates and reform the party. We got precinct committeemen, and we worked hard. But we never came close, never as close as we had been, because now with the battle joined, and the party under the control of the conservatives, they could appoint new precinct committeemen and they could make it very tough for anyone from the outside to win control.

AK: That just struck me as intensely frustrating!

DE: Oh it was! It was terribly frustrating!

AK: You had come up and done all of this work, and then you lost it somewhere back here and couldn’t seem to regain it. You almost seemed to be talking in different languages, and yet you were all Republicans.

DE: Yes! It was a strange combination, a strange time, and the splits continued. There were several different groups involved; I mean there were some from the business community and others who were active, and then especially some from Eastern Washington: Spokane and Yakima, who were active Goldwater supporters. But they were

people that I got along with pretty well, and they were supporters of mine as well, and they kept on being supporters during the time that I was governor. Then you had some of the more conservative—it was really before the time of what we call Christian Conservatives—but they were the first glimmer of religious conservatism, which I think is a terrible combination. Politically, we really ought to separate that combination, but the first glimmers were there, and then there were the John Birchers, who were the ones who were really off on the political edge.

AK: Joel agreed to debate a John Bircher at one point; there is a very small newspaper article that said he did that. What was that confrontation like?

DE: Well, I don't remember that. I don't believe that I was there at that debate. I am sure that I would have remembered if I had been there.

AK: I have a hard time picturing how that would go.

DE: Joel would find it almost fun to debate somebody who was so fixed in positions that were so bizarre. But it was a tough group that hung out there, and of course, part of their policy was not to be open, but to be secret and not to admit to membership. I have more letters—in fact, I was looking at some of them in the file recently—more letters from people objecting to my stands against the John Birch Society. And virtually every one of them started their letters by saying, "Now, Governor, I am not a member of the John Birch Society, but I do know something of what they stand for, and you are wrong, wrong, wrong." Well, you just figure that they were very likely members of the John Birch Society and just were told, "Never admit it."

AK: Now, was Joel part of the process when you decided to try to expel them from the Republican Party?

DE: Oh yes! Oh yes!

AK: How did he feel about all of this?

DE: I don't remember precisely, but Gummy Johnson was the chair of the party, and he really was pretty feisty when it came to that group. He had a tough time, but the one thing that preserved us was that the State Central Committee was made up of two people from each county, so it was not population-based at all. The two from King County had no more strength than any other county, and so it was the smaller counties that really were the bulwark of our strength. The meeting in September of 1965 in Port Angeles was a call-to-arms; it was a reading out of the John Birch Society.

I've said afterwards that I have had many speeches where people have fallen asleep during my speech, but I only had one speech that I can remember where people deliberately and ostentatiously got up in the middle of the speech and left. I have re-read the speech, and I would give it again. It was talking about those who espouse extreme policies. But we welcomed others of all persuasions into the party, and the party should be big and inclusive. But it was viewed by the press, of course, as a big reading out of the conservatives and a fight, and they made it much simpler between liberals and conservatives. The press likes a fight, so they like to sic us on each other.

Interestingly enough, the next year, 1966, when I went to a Republican Governors' Convention in Nevada, Paul Laxalt was a candidate for governor, and he wanted to meet with a half dozen of the Republican governors. He was pretty conservative, but he wanted to meet with those of us who had dealt, mostly from the more moderate side, with some of these divisions. He said, "You know that I have a state convention coming up—how do I handle this? What do I do?"

Our advice to him was, "You are not running for head of the political convention, you are running for governor. You are running and hoping the whole state—or as much of them that is necessary—will vote for you." Our advice to him was to stand up and speak out and reject those who were clearly on the edge. At the same time he had such good credentials as a conservative anyhow, that he could afford to do it. He did! And he won, and then of course he later became a very close compatriot of Governor Reagan.

AK: As I listen, I'm trying to get a picture of what it was like to be a moderate or liberal Republican in those days, and struggling with those issues.

DE: Oh, I think, in those days, once we got past some of the political divisions, we just sort of ignored the party organization and went on to governing. We still had people of all persuasions in the Legislature, and there were some that were pretty conservative, but we had loyal caucuses, and they stuck together pretty well during the time I was governor. It was a time of real turmoil; it was the time of the first rising of the environmental movement, and of the next round of civil rights movement; it was the anti-Vietnamese war protests—all of these coming at the same time. It made for a pretty heady atmosphere.

It was an activist time, and it fit with the kind of more activist, more moderate Republican leadership that we had. It led to the election of a Republican Legislature. We took a setback in '64 with the Goldwater election. We didn't win control of the Legislature then, but two years later we did.

We won it because we had really stuck together in the '65 session on redistricting. I had vetoed several bills on redistricting before they finally came up with one that was an open opportunity for Republicans, so we did win the House of Representatives for six years.

AK: Just then, at that point Joel went to the Senate, so he's never in the majority.

DE: That's right! I think that is right, he moved to the Senate just exactly the year that we got control. But he was still an integral part of our team that worked on legislation.

AK: How did he help you legislatively? I know he gave some talks on the income tax, although I am not sure exactly how he felt at the time. At least in retrospect, he didn't seem to think that it would ever go anywhere. But I'm interested in his role as your trusty lieutenant.

DE: Well, we sort of kept the group that had gotten me there in the first place.

AK: The Kitchen Cabinet?

DE: Yes. The Kitchen Cabinet—

AK: He never wanted an appointment?

DE: No.

AK: He just wanted to stay where he was?

DE: That's right. I would have been delighted to have him, but he didn't want to run a department or be in something like that—that was not what he wanted to do. But he and Slade, Chuck Moriarty, and others would all gather together to decide strategy. He helped in Chuck Moriarty's run for the Senate leadership and for minority leader. Perry Woodall had been the long-term leader, and Chuck and Joel and others—Chuck may have won the year before Joel got into the Senate, I don't remember now.

AK: In '66?

DE: Yes, in '66. So, in '65, I think Chuck Moriarty was elected leader, but even though they were in the minority, it was a very active minority. But Joel and all these others joined what we called the DEGOHT group: "Dan Evans Group of Heavy Thinkers," and it was about a dozen and we met regularly during the campaign, and then more infrequently during the time that I was governor.

AK: Did your relationship have to take a shift, with you as governor and Joel still in the legislative branch?

DE: I never thought about it in those terms at all, and he knew that he, or Slade, or the others that I had worked so closely with, they were still all colleagues in the same enterprise as far as I was concerned. I think we all viewed it pretty much that way. That's when we got into the more active stages of our mountain climbing ventures on Mount Adams, and Mount Rainier, and Mount Olympus.

AK: I don't know if either of you ever sat down!

DE: Well, it was really a joyous time, because we finally had the chance to institute some of the things that we wanted to do. We had a first-rate push toward environmental issues. And in fact, the legislative session in 1970—which turned out to be a thirty-two day session of remarkable contribution—was one of the rarest and most productive sessions that I have ever seen. When the legislative session closed, papers, editorially, were saying, "Good job, a great session."

But it was not only the environment, but Joel led the fight for women's right-of-choice, the abortion legislation. That was one of his strong beliefs, of a woman's right to choose, and he carried that battle regularly, both in the Legislature and on the ballot.

The Department of Social & Health Services came into being during that session. There were a lot of things happening.

AK: The environmental legislation, I understand, grew out of a meeting that you had at Crystal Mountain. Who would had been at that meeting? Was that mostly a meeting of legislators or was it a bigger mix of people?

DE: It was really three groups: one was composed of leaders of the environmental movement—the Washington Environmental Council had just been formed, and so we had a coalition of groups, and we had somebody to talk to instead of a number of environmental groups that there had been before. I called the newly elected chair of the Washington Environmental Council and asked if they would put together about a dozen people and come to Crystal Mountain in the fall of 1969 for a three-day retreat. I then invited about six or seven department heads and a couple of people from the governor's office, primarily Jim Dolliver, who was a key player in all of this.

AK: Was Joel at that meeting? He talked about it, but I wasn't one hundred percent sure if he was there.

DE: Well, he may have been, because we did have about seven or eight legislative leaders, Republican leaders from both Houses, and Joel would likely have been an invitee. But it was a key, an

interesting kind of session, because we spent three days talking over all of the environmental issues. We didn't do anything more sophisticated than write environmental concerns on a blackboard, and at the end of the third day, I just asked people to write down their top five. Then we went down the list, and I said, "Hold up your hand if it is on your list," and six issues just jumped out as most important. We reached agreement that the environmental community, if I called a special session would concentrate on only those six, and leave the rest until the next legislative session. The department heads would cooperate in helping do the building of the legislation and all the technical stuff and the legislators agreed that they would give these six the priority. They couldn't guarantee that any would pass, but they would give priority to those pieces of legislation.

AK: If you can't remember if Joel was actually there, then we really can't talk about what he may or may not have contributed to that discussion.

DE: Well, that was a session that was really a joint contribution. I don't remember any one person leading on any one issue. It was just a three-day conversation, really, of people who had varying interests. But it was all focused on one thing: could we come up with a cohesive legislative program of manageable proportions for a special session? And we did, and five out of the six bills passed during that session. The sixth one, shorelines management, was just a little too difficult for the Legislature to handle.

AK: I understand that one passed a little later.

DE: Then it did come by Initiative the next year.

AK: Yes, you did very well in that area. But something much more difficult that did not pass was the income tax.

DE: Yes!

AK: Did you have to persuade Joel about the merits of that, or was he willing to give it a try?

DE: I don't think so. It was not just, "Let's go do

a income tax.” It had come out of a several-year effort to solve a growing problem. It’s interesting, because I see the signs of exactly the same problem coming from exactly the same dimension right now: we were faced with the surge of war babies getting to school age. The prime funding was through the property tax. The property tax was inadequate and special levies grew so rapidly that more and more of them were failing, and the schools were in desperate straits. The first thing that we tried to do, legislatively, was to come up with a plan to equalize property taxes, because the assessments varied widely between counties. We finally achieved that, and then we shifted that portion of the property tax to a state tax to really make sure equalization was going to happen.

AK: Was that difficult?

DE: Sure it was! It was very difficult. People don’t like property taxes worth a darn, and the idea in some counties especially, where the assessments were very low, the idea of raising assessments—or assessed valuations—by two or three times, the people could not understand. No matter how much we told them, “Look, that doesn’t mean that your property taxes are going up that much. What it does mean is that you will have your property assessed at the same rate as your neighbor or someone across the county, and you are not going to pay more or less than they are.” The number of mills assigned against it is what determines how big your property tax is going to be. If you can get enough money to run your schools with the regular property tax—because you’ve got better valuations—you don’t have to have special levies, and you can keep property taxes from getting out of hand. Well—not many people really believed that.

AK: So, as Republicans, was that difficult to talk about taxes in that way? I mean, aren’t many Republicans traditionally anti-tax in any form?

DE: It was, but interestingly enough, the leadership on that came from Republicans. John Ryder, who was a distinguished Republican senator from Seattle, and vice president of Washington Mutual Bank, was the one who really first started this

idea of equalization. It was touted as fairness, that if you live in an identical house to someone across town, you shouldn’t have to pay twice as much property tax, because the assessor simply hadn’t gotten around to reassessing somebody else. Equality was the theme, and along with that was the desire to provide more money for schools. The system was inadequate, and that’s when we started looking at tax reform.

I formed a big citizens committee on tax reform. They did quite an extensive review. One of the key people on that was T. Wilson, who was chairman of the Boeing Company, and it was pretty tough for him, but he did get out and push for an income tax. He said, “This makes sense.”

And of course, it was not just adding an income tax. It was a comprehensive package that would lower property taxes substantially, lower sales taxes, take the sales tax off food and prescription drugs. It hooked the sales tax and the income tax together at a single rate of three and half percent. We thought that was pretty clever, because if Democrats like to sock it to the income tax and Republicans would prefer a sales tax, here was a tax that constitutionally would be linked. So if rates were raised or went down, both would go together, and that would be a bipartisan move, really, in terms of tax policy.

Well—we finally did get two-thirds of both Houses to support that issue.

AK: Did Joel play a role in some of that?

DE: Oh yes! My yes! We had to have all the Republicans—although not all Republicans voted for it. This was the kind of issue where both minorities—the Republican minority in the Senate, and the Democratic minority in the House—said, “We are not going to give you any votes, unless the majority also produces. Two-thirds of your caucus goes with two-thirds of our caucus.” So there was this pressure to get all four caucuses to come up with two-thirds of their membership. And we came pretty close to that. We passed both Houses by two-thirds majority, which was necessary to put a constitutional amendment on the ballot.

Joel and the others in the Republican minority in the Senate worked hard. In the first place,

the Democrats in the Senate majority were more enthusiastic about an income tax than the Republicans were to begin with, but the Republicans pushed hard for them coming up with at least two-thirds of their members, before we would come up with ours. Joel played an important part of the political strategy that went along with what we were trying to accomplish. It was a remarkable achievement, and I think that there were some Republicans who voted for the package more out of loyalty to get it on the ballot than they were to see it pass. Probably some of them voted against it when they went to the ballot box, because almost everybody did—it lost big-time.

AK: Yes, it did.

DE: But we tried again and went through exactly the same process and did get it on the ballot again, and it went down even bigger the second time.

AK: He seemed just resigned about it, and then he seemed to think people just couldn't understand it. They didn't trust government enough, he said.

DE: That was what happened. After the first election, I looked at some of the precinct returns and found that the income tax did best in some areas—I was just looking in Seattle, where I knew the neighborhoods and precincts pretty well. It did best in the most Republican areas and the best in some of the wealthier neighborhoods, and it did worse in some of the poorest neighborhoods, which you just would not believe. It just seems totally out-of-sync with what you think would really happen, because in those neighborhoods they clearly would have had their taxes reduced, and they would have had taxes taken off food and drugs, and they would have not ever paid any income tax. We couldn't really figure it out until we did a little further digging and found that people who were willing to pay—who would obviously pay more—were truly interested in schools and understood what we were trying to do. They understood what we were trying to get at, and that is what they voted for; the ones on the other side just didn't believe. They said, "Oh yeah, you're going take the sales tax off food, and then how soon will it come back on again, and then

you will just raise everything?" So, it was the distrust of government.

AK: Too bad!

DE: Well, it is too bad, because I've done a couple of speeches since, once ten years after, and once twenty years after, and we did some research on how much that tax base would have brought in. Both cases, we would have had more money without any tax increases of any kind in the intervening years.

AK: That would have been more fair!

DE: More fair and schools would have been far better supported, but you never say, "I told you so," in politics.

AK: No, no, I don't think so. Now, Joel was doing all these great things, but then he decided to leave the Senate. Did he ever talk to you about that decision?

DE: No.

AK: It seemed almost inexplicable.

DE: No, and I don't remember what year that was.

AK: His last year in the Senate was 1970. It was the year of his first race against Tom Pelly, where he didn't quite make it.

DE: In 1970, you see, he would have been—that would have been a year that he would have either had to run for the Senate again or for Congress, so he had to make a choice.

AK: Had people been talking to him about Congress?

DE: Well, you know he was very highly popular and surely people were talking with him about other jobs and moving up, all of which he had kind of put aside for the moment. Congress would be an interesting kind of thing, and he felt that Tom Pelly had stayed too long, and was past his time. One thing about Joel was once he decided

something, the fact that Tom didn't retire or wouldn't step aside, didn't deter him at all. And, of course, that created some difficulties, because a lot of people who were strong supporters of Joel were also strong supporters of Tom Pelly.

AK: Well, it must have put Chuck Moriarty in a terrible bind. Tom Pelly was his father-in-law.

DE: Oh, it put Chuck Moriarty in a particularly difficult position, that's right. It put him in a very tough position. I didn't have any trouble supporting Joel very strongly in his race to succeed Tom Pelly, but Tom just ultimately didn't get out of the race, and as I remember, it was pretty close—

AK: Forty-six percent or something like that.

DE: Yes! Pretty close, and that was enough to convince Tom it was time to retire, and for Joel to run again. Then of course, that next election turned out to be a tough one. A very tough one, but I remember vividly, election night, when all the polls and many of the television commentators were touting John Hempelmann's election—Frank Pritchard, and Slade, and even Joel, I think we were all gathered—Slade particularly was such a genius with numbers, you know, and he said, "Oh, congratulations Joel, you've won." We were hanging on and behind, and he was behind for days, you know, but Slade had figured out how many absentees were out there and what was likely to happen with absentees, and he said, "No, you're going to pull them out."

AK: Those must have been tough days to get through.

DE: Oh, they were. It took, I forget how many days before he was finally declared the winner.

AK: I know they had already painted John Hempelmann's name on the door of the office.

DE: But it was a measure of Joel's enormous skill and popularity. I think that he really reached his peak of effectiveness as a member of Congress. He was always in the minority, but he was ex-

traordinarily popular across the aisle. For a time, he was the only Republican in the Washington State delegation. But he worked so well with Scoop and Maggie, and the rest of them, that when Joel wanted something done, he had those very powerful Democrats and then Tom Foley on the House side ready to help. He never burned any of those partisan bridges and built some very strong friendships in both parties. I still see members of the House that I grew to know, both then and during the time that I was in the Senate, who served with Joel and who still tell Joel Pritchard stories and their joy of serving with him.

AK: Now, it's not really clear to a lot of people how or whether the work of a congressman meshes at all with state-level politics. Where they can help with state issues. There were some instances, say, with the wilderness bills or the oil tanker issue, where clearly there was an interface with state and federal levels of government.

DE: Oh yes, I'll never forget the Wilderness Bill. The Alpine Lakes Wilderness was legislation that was pretty well supported by the delegation. And Joel certainly, with his love of the out-of-doors and the wilderness, was a strong supporter, but he got word back to me that, he said, "The people in the president's office and OMB and the Forest Service are all recommending that he veto the bill."

AK: That would be President Gerald Ford by now?

DE: Yes. Gerald Ford was president, and he said, "You've got to come back here and try and get in to see him and do something about it." Joel helped from his perspective, and helped pull whatever strings he could with some of the senior members of Congress—anyhow, we did get an appointment with the president, for me to go in and see him. Fortunately, I was able to get back there, but I discovered the night before the meeting that I had forgotten to bring a copy of this marvelous Mountaineer's book on Alpine Lakes Wilderness. I didn't have it with me, and I called a friend of mine, who had been in my Scout troop and Explorer post, and he was now living in An-

napolis, and I said, "Bill, do you have a copy of the Alpine Lakes Wilderness book?"

He said, "Yes, I do."

I said, "Good, will you bring it in tomorrow? I've got to see the president, and I think this will really help get the bill signed."

He said, "I will do it under one condition, that you have the president autograph the book for me."

I said, "Okay."

I took the book in, and we got in to see the president. Joel, of course, in his own way, talked about all of the marvels of this bill, and we really got into a good conversation. And of course, Gerald Ford had been a long-time colleague of Joel's, so they had that going for them, and then we pulled out the book, and he started looking through it. Pretty soon his staff was standing on one foot and then the other because his next appointments were stacking up. He really got into looking at the book, and really enjoyed Joel and me talking about various parts of the thing.

AK: And Joel could speak eloquently about the area, having hiked most of it during the campaign.

DE: Oh, sure! At the end of the meeting the president said, "Well, I think that this is a good bill," and then he autographed the book to Bill Douglas. So Joel played an important role. I don't know what would have happened, the president may have signed it anyhow, but he was certainly getting a lot of heat from the Forest Service to not do it. And I think that Joel's intervention, and bringing me back there to join with him, probably did help.

AK: Push a little bit more?

DE: Yes!

AK: What about in the oil tanker issue? Now, generally the way it is written up, Warren Magnuson gets a huge amount of credit, but there is also some mention of Joel's playing a kind of go-between role.

DE: Sure, Maggie would get credit, but there again, there could be strong opposition on the

Republican side, from some, and an administration that didn't think some of this was so necessary. Joel pulled some pretty strong chits from people, but he did it in a way that he does best, leaving few fingerprints of what he was doing. He did play a remarkable role, and Maggie deserved credit for his leadership, but you know, he was in the position of leadership, and Joel from the back row really helped immensely in getting that thing through, and of course, gets only a footnote. That was okay by him.

AK: Yes, he didn't care!

DE: He would just take this great satisfaction in seeing the job done.

AK: But it has been quite difficult to trace, just what he did and didn't do, because it is largely invisible.

DE: Oh, that's right!

AK: You get a little warmer idea ever once in a while.

DE: I do remember one that he took on very strongly, and probably was the key to what happened. The Congress authorized money to build a new building for the Library of Congress, the new Madison Building. And as it was starting construction, the House thought, "Well, we are short of office space, and that would just make a swell office building for the House," and they were determined to do that. Joel stepped into the fight. He really led that fight, and he utilized his cross-the-aisle strength, his friendship with Democrats, as well as Republicans, and the same ability he used against the grab of the Liquor Board by the governor—literally shamed them in his own gentle and humorous way. He made them realize that this was a dumb thing to do. They would not get by with it very easily. And so it is now a very important part of the Library of Congress, and primarily because of his efforts.

We all have these collections of Joel sayings, political sayings that carry a load of wisdom with them: "Never look past the next election." And he would talk about those who would puff

themselves up too much, and say to the members, and some of his colleagues and congressman, “This guy’s got a bigger propeller than rudder.” He had a marvelous way of just putting things.

AK: I would like to have a collection of those. I know some of them.

DE: Yes! And you’ll probably get some more as you go through this, but there were a number. I tried to collect four or five together for his memorial service, when I spoke. It was not original to him, but he often used the statement that, “It’s amazing how much you can get done, if you don’t care who gets the credit.” He lived that—he lived that.

AK: Now, one other thing you did during the memorial, which I was aware of, but I’d never heard anyone do quite as well as you, was the telephone trick that he would do. Some of his staff relate that his real calling was as a stand-up comedian.

DE: Oh yes! Yes, he was terrific at that. In fact, I was scared to death, because Joel would normally, if someone would hand him a telephone in the midst of a party someplace, would pick up the telephone and have this absolutely marvelous one-way conversation. It was always clued into either who was at the party, or what was going on politically—and he would just draw in all of this knowledge. It was absolutely hilarious; it was usually poking gentle fun at somebody who was the honoree or the person that everyone was being very serious about. I’ve heard him do that a number of times, and it was always absolutely terrific. That is why I was very reluctant to even try it at the memorial service, but with no phone, I tried and it seemed to work well.

AK: Sure it did. Yes. Are there other things that people should know about him that you would want to say?

DE: Well, of course, when he came back as lieutenant governor, there again, was a place for him to bring a legislative body together. They still would have political differences, but he could

bridge those so readily, and he was almost instantly beloved by both caucuses. He did exactly what a lieutenant governor should do in presiding over a legislative body, and that’s to do it fairly. John Cherberg did that as well, but Joel did it with a style and with a sense of humor that really took it to the next level of being what a presiding officer ought to be.

AK: Yet he claimed he really didn’t care about rules and protocol very much—

DE: He wanted to get the job done and be fair to everybody and keep things moving. And so he just did it with a style that nobody would complain about. The fact that he might have bent a rule here or there—it was what the purpose was for, and it was obvious that he wanted to get to a good result.

Before that, during his last term in Congress, I had the time to serve as a colleague with him when Scoop Jackson died. John Spellman was, I think, seriously looking at Joel as an appointee to the Senate, and I was kind of reluctant. I really took awhile deciding whether I really wanted to do it or not. Ultimately, I think John Spellman was concerned about winning the election that was coming up very quickly and chose me. I think Joel would have probably won. I don’t know how he would have done in the Senate, but he probably would have done pretty well, because the Senate is even less partisan in its way of operating than the House. He would have ended up in the majority for the first time—

AK: Well, we can’t know, now.

DE: That lasted for only two years and then we lost the majority.

But in his last few years, we had lots of occasions to be together. We would be together at parties, and we would get together on Bainbridge Island; he was a great friend of Nancy’s brother, my brother-in-law, Bill Bell.

AK: Supposedly the co-creator of Pickle-Ball.

DE: Oh yes! They all debated who really invented Pickle-Ball. He and Joel were very, very close friends, and so we would all get together on

occasions and it was always fun. I remember, just a couple of summers ago, during his last illness, when I came back, we just had an absolutely riotous time talking about some of the old times.

Joel knew what was coming. The lease on his car ran out, and he arrived at Bainbridge driving this bright red—you know—flashy coupe. And you see, Joel was never much for cars, anything that would run was okay by him, and so this was so out of style. He came up, and we all said, "Okay Joel, what's going on here?"

He said, "Oh, what the heck, it was time to do something, and besides I figure that I needed only a one-year lease, and this is the one car that they would give me for a one-year lease." So he knew he was within a year of dying.

I took him, I think, on his last outing, with Bill Jacobs, who was also a good friend. Joel, knowing that he was near the end, wanted to make a tour of the state, just visiting old friends and acquaintances, the people that he wanted to see. As it turned out he couldn't do it; he had waited too long.

But he did go to Olympia, and Bill Jacobs put together a luncheon with Herb Hadley, who was a legislator from Cowlitz County, who had first started the "Dan Evans campaign for governor." He was an old colleague of Joel's, and was one of the ones that Joel wanted to see. So Herb came up to Olympia and Frank Pritchard and I drove Joel down from Seattle, and he was hurting. He had this big swelling on his cheek; he was tired, but he got down there and he turned on the spark again and had lots of good old stories of past experiences. And later, we started back home and he was sleeping in the back seat. We were listening to a Mariner's game, and halfway home, we heard this groan from the back seat, and Frank turned around and said, "Joel, what's the matter?"

Joel said, "Damn bullpen!"

He was listening to the game, and our bullpen, once again, was giving the game away.

AK: Yes, he lived right to the end.

DE: Yes, he did! Yes, that was the last time I saw him; after we got him home from that event, it was just a few weeks later that he died.

AK: Well, his memorial service was a wonderful tribute to him. It was just thronged with people.

DE: Yes, it really was, yes. In fact, I was tempted to say, but I decided that I better not that, "Joel, you are the only guy I know that could have all three candidates for the United States Senate sitting in the same row."

AK: He had everyone there, the governor and everyone.

DE: Oh! He did! It really was a reflection on the kind of guy he was, just a remarkable friend to so many people, and such a gentle, kind person.

AK: Bruce Chapman made the observation that he thought that Joel was—he didn't put it quite this way—partially in politics because he could meet so many people that way. It was a sort of vehicle for being with people.

DE: Well, that may be. It was such a natural fit, his move from being a strategist and a campaign leader to public office. We were ready to invite him in before he was willing to come, but ultimately it was absolutely the right thing for him, and a real reward to the state to have him serve for so long.

AK: He maintained he never had a plan, that he wasn't going to be a politician, that he was really a businessman; and yet, how many years?

DE: Oh yes—yes!

AK: Do you think at some point that became not true, that he did—perhaps when he went to Congress—become a full-time politician? I mean, I know he quit his job, but did he make the change in his mind?

DE: He was really a full-time politician even before he ran for office. A full-time politician, in the sense that I view politics anyhow, which is the first definition in my big unabridged dictionary, that politics is the art and science of government. That's the way he viewed politics, and his job was in the art of government more

than the science of government. But it was in really trying to recognize that our system of government was a very special one, given to us by some pretty intelligent forebears and fought for by an awful lot of people for a long period of time. It is almost unique among the systems around the world, and that it was worth fighting for. He could not abide those who declared themselves as being in public office, but saying, “I’m not a politician,” or as always running as an outsider—

AK: Yes, running for office, but against the government.

DE: Against the government, and he had no truck for that kind of attitude.

AK: He seemed to have a very special attitude towards government, really pragmatic, focused on problem solving by pulling in as many people as he could. For someone who fought so fiercely for the Republican Party, he was really very nonpartisan. So he always had those two things—

DE: Yes, that’s right. Well, I think he was accustomed to working for so much of his career, working from the minority side, that you had to use a lot of persuasion to get the things that someone on the majority side could get a little easier.

AK: I wonder what his experience would have been if he had ever been in the majority, if some of his talents would have been wasted.

DE: Well—I don’t know!

AK: I mean, he was so expert at that. Is there anything else you would like to add?

DE: I don’t think so. I think we have covered it.

AK: We’ve covered a lot of territory. Thank you.

SLADE GORTON

Senator Slade Gorton was interviewed on April 23, 1999. A longtime close friend and political colleague of Joel Pritchard, Senator Gorton was first elected to the Washington State House of Representatives in 1958. He served five terms in the House of Representatives, one term as Republican majority leader. In 1968, he was elected attorney general for the state, an office he held for two terms. Mr. Gorton was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1980, where he still serves. Although this request came during a busy campaign season, Senator Gorton gave generously of his time to recount his relationship with Joel Pritchard.

Anne Kilgannon: What is your first memory of working with Joel Pritchard? Was it during the Metro campaign?

Slade Gorton: I don’t associate meeting Joel, and for that matter Frank Pritchard, with Metro. I associate it with weekly, or almost weekly, meetings with Bob Dunn, when Bob Dunn was in the automobile business in the Denny Regrade.

I came to Seattle first in the summer of 1953 and was here only until November, in order to take and pass the bar examination, after which I went into the Air Force. I came back in the summer of 1956 and met Joel and Frank. They were inseparable. My memory is a slightly embarrassing one: I had heard about the Pritchards as a part of Republican politics, and I think, if my memory serves me correctly, the first time I met them, I spoke of them in the third person, as of someone who wasn’t there. I didn’t know that I was talking to the people that I was talking about! I don’t remember the subject of the conversation, except that it was about politics. Somehow or another that sticks in my mind, and that is very likely to have been even before some of the first Metro meetings, but not long before.

The acquaintance took a major step forward when each of us was running for the Legislature in 1958, each of us, at least in part, under the aegis of Dan Evans. I was dependent more on Dan than was Joel, because Joel had grown up here and

knew everybody already. I knew absolutely no one and Dan Evans was very helpful.

AK: Did Joel help you as well?

SG: It was mostly Dan, though Joel and Frank helped me somewhat as well. But immediately after we were elected, we found that we shared all kinds of political philosophies and ideas about activism. Four of us, Dan and Joel and I and Chuck Moriarty, determined to share a home in Olympia together during our first legislative session, from January to March of 1959.

AK: Do you happen to remember which house it was?

SG: Yes, it was 2508 South Columbia Street. It was a house that was owned, I think, by Ken Gilbert, who was the director of elections in the office of the secretary of state, and who rented out his house and went out to his summer house during the legislative session. At any event, Joel had small children at home, Dan and Chuck were not married, and I had been married in June of 1958. By the time we moved to Olympia, Sally was pregnant and had left her job on the *Seattle Times*, so she was the only woman among the tenants. We were in this home and she was the house mother in this little fraternity house—that's what it amounted to—and she was taking care of, not one man, but this group of four, while she was very, very pregnant. Our first child was born a week after the legislative session was over.

We spent all of our time plotting how to make the Republican legislative party bigger and more effective and better. In that first term, we ended up—over the resistance of a number of our elders—coming up with the program that we thought ought to be the affirmative Republican program.

AK: Now, Joel did not talk very much about political philosophy during his interview, and yet you say you shared philosophy. Maybe you could articulate what that philosophy was.

SG: Well, Joel's philosophy, in the 1950s and '60s and '70s, was the standard philosophy of the then

moderate to liberal Republican members, that was highly activist rather than reactive in nature. It was that we needed to support education, but to change it. We were early environmentalists, but I think even he, and certainly I, later in our careers regarded many of them as being too far out. He was a cosponsor with me of the Billboard Control Act that has protected our freeways and our scenic highways ever since the early 1960s. He believed in a highly active conservatism, empowering people and local governments to handle their own jobs.

Of course, when he became a member of Congress he supported a form of internationalism with an American lead, not only in the defense of free institutions through NATO, but in the building of free institutions around the world. Clearly, when he was in Congress, his favorite assignment was his Foreign Affairs Committee assignment, and really, in spreading a message of free markets and free people around the world.

We supported Governor Rockefeller when Governor Rockefeller ran for president. The Pritchards and I were among the first handful of people who supported Dan Evans in 1964 when he ran for governor.

Sally and I had two children by the time our second 1961 session came around and so we were down there as a family. Then in the 1963 session, the coalition session, there were twelve or fourteen of us who all lived together in a rooming house. In 1965 and 1967, my last two sessions, again I was there in a home with my own family.

In 1959, when we started, Republicans were such a tiny minority that we had no control over the agenda or what really happened in the Legislature. And so the four of us, and a few others like Jim Andersen and Tom Copeland, did attempt to come up with a set of bills that would express our activist Republican philosophy, knowing that we were not going to succeed, but that we could build on it.

Joel was tremendously active in the next interim and each interim after that in recruiting candidates, Republican candidates, for the Legislature. Obviously, we liked those who agreed with us, but we were interested in Republican candidates wherever we could find them. And both of us, Joel and I—frequently together—went

to the four corners of the state to talk to people whom we thought could be persuaded to run for the Legislature.

AK: How would he go about doing that?

SG: One of the reasons, perhaps, that we made such a good pair when we went together, is that I am sort of abstract and talk about ideas and the like, and Joel was the ultimate pragmatist. He was the ultimate friendly person, with whom the prospective candidate could go away saying, “Gee, I would like to know that guy better. It would be fun to serve in the Legislature with him.”

And of course, he had constant practical advice about how to be elected, how to campaign, how to raise money, and the like. As I say, I share some of these things with him, but I would be much more likely to give a lecture on welfare reform or some other issue that the candidate might have to deal with in the course of the campaign.

Well, we gained a considerable number of seats as a result of that effort in 1960. It was in 1961 for example, that we did pass the Billboard Control Bill, which one of my first memories of real success in the Legislature and something in which Joel was really interested.

In 1961, the great battle of the state House of Representatives was a public power versus private power fight. It was over a bill stating that a public utility district could not take over a privately owned utility without an actual vote of the people. Most Republicans were for it together with private-power Democrats, especially from around Spokane, were for it. A handful of Republicans and the Democratic leadership and the governor were against it. Literally, it was debated on the floor for something like three days with a slight majority in favor until the Speaker, John O’Brien, more or less outside of the rules, terminated the debate.

That created a tremendous amount of bitterness on the part of the Democrats who were on our side of the issue. I think for Joel, and for me, and for Dan, and for the others like us, the battle was much more important than the issue. We were sorry that we lost it; we would have liked to have won it. But we had so much fun engaged

in the battle that it brought us closer together, and didn’t create any lasting resentment the way it did among the Democrats who felt that they had been over-ridden.

So, when in 1962 Republicans went all the way up to forty-eight seats out of ninety-nine, those Democrats were ready to revolt against both the governor and against the Speaker. It was perhaps the most exciting time in the political lives of any of the three of us, Joel, Dan and me, putting together that coalition. Dan, of course, was the Republican leader, the nominal candidate for Speaker. Joel and I were his closest friends. Both Joel and I were close to a Democratic state representative from North Seattle named Bob Perry—perhaps I was even closer to him than Joel—and he was the ultimate conspirator.

AK: Was this the famous story of the dark cabin in the woods?

SG: That was the end of it, but it started the day, literally the day, after the 1962 election. We got authority from our caucus to negotiate with the dissident Democrats and we were smart enough never to reach an agreement with them, because as long as we had no agreement with them, it couldn’t leak. And, as a consequence, on the Sunday—the day before members of the Legislature are sworn in—we were given final authority to see if we could reach an agreement with those Democrats. We met in the cabin at the end of the long dark road—a handful of Republicans, including Joel and me, met with Day and Perry and the rest of the conspirators.

AK: Joel was present then?

SG: I would assume that he was because he was in everything else. But my memory after forty years is not good enough to be very precise.

In any event, we reached an agreement pursuant to which we would nominate and vote for Evans for Speaker, and regular Democrats would vote for O’Brien. The dissidents would vote for Day. And then, if on the second ballot they gained strength—because we never believed that they had as many votes as they claimed that they had—we would, on the third ballot, all vote

for Day. In fact, it happened that way. I believe they got six votes on the first ballot and seven on the second and then everything took place on the third.

But even in the caucus, we didn't allow a vote to take place on whether or not we would do it until about 11:45, just before we would go out at noon and be sworn in. My principal memory about Joel, at that particular time, related not to the substance but to the kind of stress it put us under. We didn't even know when we went out of our caucus where our newly assigned seats were. Dan had placed me down near the front to be an assistant floor leader and Joel was somewhere not too far away. But one young man who was senior to both Joel and me, named Richard Morphis from Spokane—whose nickname was Rigor Mortis and who was really just a silly character—found out his seat was way in the back. He was bitterly resentful, so in the midst of this huge stress, when we were being sworn in and about to vote for Speaker and this great coup, he came running down forward complaining to Dan Evans about where his seat was! This was the most important thing in the world to him. Joel says, "Shut up Dick, and get back to your seat or I'll deck you." I do remember that; whether Joel remembers that or not, I remember that. And Morphis, who was twice as big as Pritchard, immediately ran back to his seat. He sat down and kept quiet until we were done.

AK: Well, I don't know if that was characteristic or not!

SG: No, it wasn't characteristic. I think that is the reason I remember it almost forty years later.

But in many respects, that was a dramatically successful political coup. The session was successful because one of our principal reasons for joining the coalition was that we were ordered to reapportion and redistrict state legislative seats and this was the way that we could at least have a real influence over the process. I was the chairman of the Committee on Elections and it ended up in a deadlock and nothing happened. Then in the 1965 session, after the 1964 election, we could do nothing but redistrict under the court order until it had been completed. I was sort of our captain

and Joel was our lieutenant.

Now, we lost seats in 1964; Dan was elected governor of course, but it was the Goldwater year and we lost a substantial number of seats in the Legislature. We had to conduct a tremendous rear-guard action until Evans was able to take control of the process and then we ended up winning. So in 1967, my last session in the Legislature, I was majority leader, but Joel had moved to the state Senate.

AK: When you finally got the majority, he's out of there. He never does get to enjoy being in the majority party.

SG: He was out; and he never got to the majority. In 1968, I was elected attorney general. In 1970, after one term, he left the state Senate and ran for Congress against the Republican incumbent, Tom Pelly. Our friendship was close enough that I endorsed him against the incumbent. He came close, but of course, he didn't win. He did scare Pelly into retiring two years later and was elected to Congress in 1972, when I was elected for the second term as attorney general. Joel moved into the House of Representatives then, just as Watergate was unfolding.

As attorney general, I made fairly frequent trips to Washington, D.C., and I would always have to deal with Senators Magnuson and Jackson and an overwhelmingly Democratic state congressional delegation. As a matter of fact, most of the time everyone, except for Joel, was a Democrat. So I always saw him. Some of my strongest impressions from that time are when Joel would take me for lunch in the House members' dining room.

I had favored Nixon's impeachment very early in 1974, and had spoken to the Seattle Rotary Club about it. I believe, if my memory serves me correctly, that Frank Pritchard was the president of Rotary, but, in any event, he had gotten me the speaking engagement. Joel's best friend in Congress was a guy named McKevitt from Colorado, Mike McKevitt. It's sort of interesting that he may have been a little more like me than like Joel, and although he was a very outgoing person, he was something of a scholar and a history fanatic. I remember one evening when he took Joel and me

to dinner and we argued the impeachment of President Nixon for about three hours in a downtown Washington, D.C. restaurant. It was one of the times that probably motivated me to run for the Senate more than any other single incident.

AK: Did Joel have his mind made up at all?

SG: Oh yes! The two of them, especially his friend, were playing devil's advocate at that point, but I think Joel knew. He had a pretty strong indication of where he was going to go.

Then I came to the Senate—I was elected to the Senate in 1980. He stayed in the House until 1984, so we overlapped by four years and again began to see a great deal of one another, being in the same city and the same business, though not the same place. We went to several tennis weekends that were his pride and joy. His tennis rivalry with Norm Dicks was one of the legendary athletic rivalries in the capital.

I wanted very much for him to forget about his twelve-year pledge and run again, but that was something he would not do. It was just maybe a year, a year and half, before he left that he met his second wife, Damaris. Maybe that marriage would have lasted longer had he stayed in Congress. And maybe not, but in any event, in 1984 he came back here, and in 1986 I lost and therefore came back here, too. We saw a great deal of one another then.

Each of us ran in 1988: I for the Senate again and he for lieutenant governor. Our campaign headquarters was in the same building, right down next to the Mountaineers on lower Queen Anne.

AK: That's appropriate.

SG: That was a very stressful campaign for me, one that ended up with a very, very close vote, but the atmosphere of the campaign in the headquarters was the most wonderful I've ever been in. It wasn't just the two of us; it ended up with most of the Republican candidates that year, several of whom were successful. And so we were together from time to time when we were campaigning, very, very frequently in the campaign headquarters.

Then, during the eight years that he was

lieutenant governor, I visited Olympia frequently. As you know, and you have much better witnesses than I for this, he was an extraordinarily popular lieutenant governor, because of the same qualities of personality that had made him very popular and very effective in the minority in the House of Representatives. It may well be, in retrospect, that Joel would have not been as good in the majority.

AK: We'll never know.

SG: We can't know about it, because he wouldn't have pushed people hard. He had a significant influence on the issues that he cared about in the House, because he was so well liked. Members of the House—there are not too many that are left who were there then—but anyone who was never sees me, we never talk, without Joel being a part of the conversation. While he was out here as lieutenant governor, they all knew it, and all of his friends wanted to know how he was doing. He was popular in Olympia in that position with members in each of the parties. Here is a man who managed, through his whole life, to be a convinced and very hard working, and at one level very partisan, Republican, but who was just adored by all of the members of the other party as well.

AK: Yes, it is a riddle that I puzzle over, too.

SG: It was personal qualities: lightheartedness, a ready wit, and a genuine liking for almost everyone who was in his profession. One of the great skills that anyone can have in politics is really to like the other people in the business even when one is disagreeing with them, and that was absolutely the key to Joel's success. He liked them, and as a consequence they liked and respected him. He did not win arguments by the force of intellect; he won arguments because people liked him so much and because they knew that every opinion he expressed was honestly his own opinion and wasn't the opinion of some shadowy group behind him. What you saw was what you got.

AK: That's what I have always heard. There was at least one group of people that he did not like,

though, that I am very interested in: the John Birch Society. This is something I wanted to ask you about. I found one little clipping where he was in a debate with a Bircher during the big struggle within the Republican Party. This was during the time when Dan Evans was the newly elected governor and he made the effort to expel the Birchers from the party.

SG: Now there was a classic meeting. It was in Port Angeles set up by Jim Dolliver. I know Joel played quite a role in that, but I don't have a specific memory of it. Most of the time, with respect to the King County party, we lost.

AK: You certainly did.

SG: And the side he was on, and I was on, when we were interested in party organization, was the losing side. He was more active in those campaigns than I was, although I was moderately active in them.

On the other hand, one of the great ironies in Washington through almost all of his career, was the state party is by no means one-person, one-vote. Each county had the same number of votes, and the Evans group, with which Joel was associated, always controlled the state party because it controlled the small counties. You would normally think it would be exactly the opposite, that more liberal activists would be in the metropolitan areas. But the basis of the Evans' strength in the party and his ability to organize—to have it run by people like Jim Dolliver and Gummy Johnson and some of their successors—all stemmed from the fact that relatively moderately conservative Republicans, who were nevertheless very tolerant, were constantly elected from the cow counties.

AK: I was wondering how he handled the frustration of not being able to win these people over? Here he was, winning over people all over the state and refashioning a new Republican Party, and yet in his own home ground, it seemed like your wing of the Republican Party got nowhere.

SG: You know, I don't think that he would ever put it that way. My inclination—and his—was,

"Well, we are in this fight to elect the county chairman, but if we don't, I will spend my time doing something else." Remember, during all of this period of time he held office, and during much of that struggle he was actually in Congress.

AK: Yes, I guess the struggle went on and on.

SG: The latter part, because it did go on, but I think Joel, while he was interested in the party organization, was always more interested in the legislative process. First, in the election of actual people to office, from that very first time when we worked in 1960 and all through his career, he was interested in recruiting good individuals to run as Republicans for office. Both in the Legislature and when he was in Congress, his time was spent on the issues that were before those bodies to a far greater extent than it was on internal party activities. Sure, we all would have liked to have won those contests, but I don't think they were a major negative element in his life.

AK: It was just difficult, because I know he spent so much time campaigning and building the party and working on this.

SG: But remember, it's a little bit inaccurate—and I am sure that he shared these views with me—to say *the* party. There were and are many Republican parties, and the party that we always lost with was the county organization here in King County. We generally won with the state party, and we, for all practical purposes, always won the legislative party.

AK: That's true. Your ideas about this struggle can get skewed because there was so much press on it. It was hard to judge whether this was important or not important, or just what to make of this.

SG: Of course, when we were running together, when I was campaigning to go back to the Senate and he was running for lieutenant governor, it was George Bush's year, when he was the successful candidate for the presidency. Joel adored George Bush, so that was a major part of 1988 being such a wonderful year for him.

AK: That's right. It's always instructive to line up all the pieces and to see what's going on all over the country. Let's turn the conversation away from politics for a moment. Did you do any mountain climbing with him?

SG: Yes, I believe we have a picture of ourselves on Mount Adams with Walt Williams and Dan Evans. He ultimately climbed Mount Rainier. I climbed Mount Rainier once, but it was not with Joel. He was more interested in the outdoor life than I was.

AK: Tell me what his style was going up a mountain.

SG: I don't know, the only time I was ever with him was on Mount Adams, and that wasn't a mountain where you were roped together or anything.

No, my connection with Joel athletically—he was a much better tennis player than I, so I rarely played tennis with him—was Pickle-Ball. He was one of the inventors of Pickle-Ball. He is now being given credit for being the only inventor, but he always made clear that he was just one. I may, for many years, have been the only person in the state who had two Pickle-Ball courts: one in our home in Olympia and one in our home on Whidbey Island. I didn't play Pickle-Ball with Joel an awful lot, because he was a lot better than I was at that, but whenever he came to our home he would play. My memory, especially when we had him up to the beach on Whidbey Island, was, boy, he could hit a soft shot that could land the ball within the back one foot of a Pickle-Ball court ten times in a row.

AK: That's good!

SG: He was very good and tremendously enthusiastic. One of the other neat things, even now, is that I never pick up a Pickle-Ball paddle without associating it with Joel Pritchard.

AK: One of the very last things he did for me was sign my son's Pickle-Ball paddle, and then, when I brought it home I thought, "Well, now you can't play with it; you will have to get another paddle." It was very touching to do that. He stayed interested in Pickle-Ball right to the very last days of his life. Very close before he died, he went to, I think it was Thailand, promoting Pickle-Ball. Well, I guess if you invented a great game like that, you would do that, too.

Is there anything else that you would like to talk about: Joel's political legacy for this state and yourself?

SG: It's easier to say what it is for individuals: almost no one who came regularly into contact with him wasn't improved by the contact. It's just that, you know, Joel was a kind of person that you require yourself to live up to, and if a challenge comes up, you might think about—I would frequently think about how Joel would respond to it. Would he be proud of me with respect to my own response, and I think that is a common attitude.

I don't know that he'll be attached to one specific legislative bill or congressional bill, or the like. He will live primarily in the minds of people who knew him or had served with him, and who were improved by having done so.

AK: That's a wonderful legacy. I think that would have meant a great deal to him.

SG: Good! Good!

CHAPTER 9

IN THE SENATE

Joel Pritchard: I didn't know Moriarty was going to quit. He decided to get married and she didn't want him to stay in politics. Her father was Congressman Pelly, and so he decided to get married and get out of politics.

Anne Kilgannon: Did he just return to his law practice?

JP: Yes.

AK: Did he come to you and tell you this, and approach you about taking his seat?

JP: We were very close. I don't remember exactly, but when he finally said he was going to get out, then I went to the Senate.

AK: Did you have to think twice, or was this just a natural progression for you?

JP: No, it was there if I wanted it. I just needed to make up my mind, and I decided I would. Then we picked John Murray, who had been down here doing work with the legislators on their communications. He owned the local paper in our community, the *Queen Anne News*. So, we got him to run, and that took care of that.

AK: Were there advantages for you? As a senator, you would have to run less often.

JP: Yes, it's a four-year term instead of a two-year term. I guess I was ready for something a

little different, so I went to the Senate.

AK: It sounds so matter-of-fact.

JP: It wasn't. So, I got to the Senate, and Walt Williams was in the Senate and was a really close friend. And some others—Jimmy Andersen was in the Senate, and Jack Metcalf. We had a group of us.

AK: Did politics begin to assume a bigger role in your life—I won't call it a career, but originally you had said you had not intended to make it such a big part of your life?

JP: It was no different being in the Senate than being in the House. You were down here for, say, three months and then you were off. And I had a business.

AK: I just wondered if making the change was a chance to take stock, of deciding where you wanted to go, politically.

JP: No, I wasn't planning where I wanted to go, or any of that.

AK: So going to the Senate was just the next thing to do?

JP: Yes. Moriarty was out, and then who is it? Do I go, or somebody else? We decided it would be better for me to do it. So, I moved to the Senate. That's about all there was to it. I'd been in the House eight years, and I think it seemed like the normal thing to do.

AK: When you moved to the Senate, did you intend to stay there very long, or was it more a year-by-year decision?

JP: I didn't really have a set plan, no. I certainly didn't plan to go to Congress. So, anyway, I came over to the Senate.

AK: Was there any kind of ceremony?

JP: No, they swear you in out here, that's all. I knew the lieutenant governor very well. He was

my old football coach. And I knew a lot of the state senators because they had been in the House, some of them. Some I knew otherwise. Yes, it was all right.

AK: Although this change appears seamless, there still the matter of getting elected to the Senate. We should make some note of that.

JP: I don't think anybody ran against me. I was so busy working on other campaigns and that, that I didn't really pay attention. I had a very hard run the first time because I ran against an incumbent, but after that—

AK: Is it good for the district not to have opposition?

JP: It was a Republican district. I had a person run against me, a Republican, the first time. Then after that, I didn't. Then, if you are considered pretty strong, you don't get strong opposition. You have about a third of members on both sides who practically have no opposition. You say, "Well, we're not going to run against somebody in that district, it's a Democratic district." Unless a guy is really bad, and is just awful, you can't beat him. So, you turn your attention to other areas. So, no, I don't even remember. And I spent my time helping other candidates.

AK: I meant that as a more philosophical question—whether it's good, or whether it's better—makes for better candidates—to have choice, competition?

JP: Well, if you have all your districts as level districts, I prefer to have more districts, what you call swing districts—ones that could go either way—I would prefer that. We thought we could do better running good candidates.

AK: Do swing district campaigns make for better discussion of issues, and more meaningful campaigns?

JP: It also means that you've got lots of people that are scared all the time. When you have some people from pretty solid districts, they aren't

looking over their shoulders every minute, worrying about which way the wind is blowing.

AK: I can see how that would play both ways. So you get into polling, instead of doing what you think is right.

JP: Or you're fearful, and all that business. But it's the individual person. I was pretty strong in my district—I'd lived there all my life, I had all kinds of involvement. My family had been in this area. So, I never had, after I won that first time—and that was running against incumbents and I beat them—any opposition.

I always felt that I wanted to be responsive to people's concerns, and I worked pretty hard at getting around and talking with people, doing it. But I always felt that a legislator is supposed to vote as he or she thinks. Then the people can either throw them out of office or keep them in office. But I don't believe that you take a poll every day to find out which way you should vote. A lot of people have the idea—oh, the public is sixty percent for this proposal, therefore you ought to vote for it. I don't buy that at all.

AK: Did you ever have to take a stand that people in your area would have opposed?

JP: Oh, sure. I voted for open housing—first bill I put in. A majority at that time opposed it; at least that was the prevailing thought. I'm not sure it would have been, if it was thoroughly debated, but that was the prevailing thought. It was, "Oh golly, that's not going to be popular in your district." You'd have that.

AK: You were ahead of the curve there.

JP: I just thought, no, this is the right thing. Yes, I think you stand up on issues. Representative government is not Gallup Poll government. A lot of people have a hard time understanding that. You're supposed to go down there and use your very best judgment. Then, at election time, they can decide whether they like what you've done, or haven't.

The idea that every time you vote you take a poll—you might as well not have a Legislature,

just have a button on the TV. But in theory, we're supposed to be down there, go through hearings, get all the information, and make an informed vote.

AK: Is that why character and experience are so important?

JP: It's always important. It's always critical. Politics without principle, as Gandhi said, is a deadly sin. That's absolutely essential. You've got to have people that you respect and that you really look to, to have character and experience in some place where they've had to make judgments and they've had to stand up to people being mad.

Then, finally, they have to have that sort of good judgment. Besides character and experience, they have to have judgment. And that's kind of, well you know, it's not brains—that's the big ship, small rudder business, which is very dangerous—very dangerous. Yes, the most dangerous thing is a smart guy with bad judgment. But good judgment is important, and some experience and character—and everybody has it in different amounts.

Then, willingness to work with all the people on the floor. I never put a bill in, in either the Senate or the House, or in Congress, that wasn't a bipartisan bill. Because I knew if you can't get somebody on the other side to support it, first, it isn't going anywhere. And that's the only way to make things work. Now, maybe if you're in the majority, and you're putting through the president's program, but I was never in that position.

And I didn't believe in putting bills in just to be putting bills in. I didn't sponsor a great many bills. And I didn't want to sponsor bills just to please some group. That also happens.

AK: Thank you for all your comments. Even though we know these things, it's important to remind ourselves of the fundamentals, what it's all about—so it doesn't get lost, or go unsaid.

JP: That's the way I judge candidates: character, experience, and judgment. That's why, I think, sometimes people who run for office, they'd be better if they'd been on city council or they'd done

something, and then have them jump up and run for something. It helps. Or, if they've been in a position where they've had to—say, they were on a small newspaper, and they're dealing with issues, and the public is getting after them for taking a stand here or there, they had some of this sort of being in the public arena.

We have a problem which deals with all of this subject which is, because the court rules that campaign financing—of using your own money—is freedom of speech, you cannot restrict it. I had a bill in Congress to restrict the amount of money an individual can contribute. That allows very wealthy people to come out of nowhere and run for office and all of that. It gives them an enormous advantage.

AK: Steve Forbes or Ron Tabor types?

JP: He'd been on the school board. But, it allows people to have a great advantage, and sometimes get elected, when they haven't gone through some experience time. That's a problem, and I think it distorts this whole business of reform. Not just lately, that's been going on for many, many years.

AK: What about the single-issue candidates—how do they impact the process?

JP: I'm not really keen on single-issue candidates. They get elected on a single issue, and they go, and sometimes that issue never comes up. They're dealing with forty other issues.

But that also has been traditional in politics. The public is very upset about something, and so they elect Jones because Jones is going to either force the railroads to do something for the farmers, or we're going to go back onto the gold standard, or the silver issue, or foreign policy—they're going to keep you out of war. Then they get elected, and it's something they don't hardly ever deal with.

No, I don't like single-issue candidates. But that's just democracy, and at times people get very upset, they want to send a message. Somebody comes along and hits that note, and my, oh my. If you ever look at single-issue candidates, and then follow what happened when they got elected, sometimes they don't even get on the committee

that deals with that issue. I've seen that in Congress, where they come and they can't get on the committee—it used to tickle me that that would happen.

AK: Is there some way to educate the public about this, so they don't fall into this mistake, some kind of civics class?

JP: No, once you start trying to do that, you start rigging. Because whoever is going to start doing that has their own agenda, and the first thing you know, people are being sort of spoon-fed a certain approach. Democracy is kind of a messy process and it's got lots of flaws, but it's just better than all the rest. People say how bad public officials are, and I always say, "Yes, and the general public's no great shakes, either." Because, at times, they are very irresponsible, or they don't vote, or they vote on, as I say, a single issue, when it's hardly even a factor.

AK: What would you say is the role of the press in all of this?

JP: They have a great responsibility—unfortunately, they're human. See, in this country, seventy-five years ago—more than that—one hundred years ago, in the towns there would be at least two papers, one for each party. If you were a Federalist or a Democrat, or whatever at that time was the party—Populist, or whatever—you took that paper. Then you relished in that paper's approach, and you believed or you went along with that paper. The paper didn't even try to be nonpartisan.

AK: They had it right on their masthead.

JP: That's right. They were the spokesmen for the Democrats, the Republicans, and there it was. But then the papers got to be businesses, and they got to the point where they wanted to appeal to all the people. And now the pitch is, "We're fair, we give all the news," and all the rest of it. Well, papers have bias. People have bias. And the press, reporters are individuals. I've seen some very good ones, and some not so good ones. So, we all like different ones. People I have known, who I

think are very responsible, like David Brewster—I think he is very responsible. I think he cuts it down the middle. But somebody else might like somebody else. A person gets a following, but they also have a great ability to come in on an issue and view it from their perspective.

Legislators and people are very unhappy with the press, often times. I always got treated pretty well by the press. I had a bad experience once though. I'll tell you the story. A representative of one of the two papers came to me and asked me how I thought Governor Dixy Lee Ray was doing.

AK: Were you in Congress at that time?

JP: I was in Congress, yes. And I said, "Well, you know, a lot of people are mad at her for this or that. They're upset." And I said, "Well, let's be fair. It doesn't matter who is the governor, there's always a lot of people in the state who want to kick them in the backside." About a week later, I opened the paper and there was a quote, a headline. It said, "A lot of people want to kick the governor in the backside, said Congressman Pritchard." Totally twisted.

AK: Oh, no. It removed all the context.

JP: Yes, it was what I said, but— So, I said to her representative in Washington, I said, "I've got to write to Dixy. That's what I said, but I'm sure she'll understand."

He kind of smiled and he said, "No, she won't understand."

And I said, "Well, I won't bother to write her then." So, I didn't.

About two months later I was in Washington. University of Washington was in the Rose Bowl, I went down to the Rose Bowl game. Dixy was shaking hands with people. Coming along, she took my hand, looked up, saw who it was and threw my hand down and said, "YOU!" and said a lot of harsh things to me.

Well, then Magnuson had a lunch about two months later and we had the press in and we were shaking hands—a picture of us shaking hands. But that was a clear distortion of just what I said.

AK: That's a very good story—rather revealing.

Let's return to the Senate now—your first term as a senator. What were some of the differences for you, as compared with the House?

JP: You sat individually in the Senate. You don't sit partners. I was there, and there was Marquardt and Twigg. I can't remember whether Metcalf came across then—either that session or just after. Marquardt and I came together because we officed, they had two senators in each office in those days, across the street. You had one secretary for the two. We had a wonderful woman named Hattie Schontz, a lovely lady and sweet old soul, and she took care of the two of us.

I remember I made a point of not talking until all the other freshmen had. I didn't talk on the floor until all the other freshmen had talked at least once. I did the same thing in the House. I've always had a theory that people appreciated it if the freshmen didn't start talking right away. And you gain so little from talking in the Legislature, I just made it a point.

AK: Did it give you time to get your bearings?

JP: I was pretty active in the House, and I think some of the senators thought I might come on pretty strong, so I made a point of being the last person to talk. It must have been three or four weeks before I said anything on the floor.

AK: Then it makes a bigger impact when you do say something?

JP: Or at least the feeling is that you're not trying to be, well—relations in the Legislature, and even more so in the Senate because it's a small body, forty-nine people, how you are perceived and your relations with other people are so critical. It makes such a difference in how you work in your committees. There are all kinds of times when, first of all, they aren't partisan—lots of things have nothing to do with partisan politics. So, lots of times when you're in committee, if your relations are good with other people, why they'll lean your way. But if you're difficult, or you don't understand other people's views, or you haven't been helpful, why you don't get that little leaning. A lot of times you have an amendment and people

don't care. I mean it isn't a big deal in their district, so if you want it, why yes, Joel, go ahead. If you haven't been having very good relations with other people, why all those kinds of little things get stacked up against you.

AK: Who did you think was really skilled in the Senate in your day? Who really knew how to work in that setting?

JP: Marshall Neill was wonderful. In our group, when I was there, Walter Williams was exceedingly good at it. I didn't have a great rapport with Perry Woodall, who was the floor leader of the Republicans. That went all the way back to the Eisenhower/Taft battles.

AK: Was he on the other side of that one?

JP: Oh yes, he was a Taft person. But anyway, just through the years I had kind of always been crossways with Perry, but we got along. But I knew I wasn't his favorite person. And of course he had no use for the governor, Evans, and all of our group.

And the Democrats had controlled the Senate for so many years. Greive had a big majority—he didn't have them all, but he had his pals.

AK: How did you get along with Senator Greive?

JP: I got along fine with Bob. We got along. I respected his skills, I'll put it that way. I appreciated his skills and how hard he worked at it and how he did it. And so I learned how to deal. It was interesting.

AK: Can you remember any times when something would be happening and you'd say, "Oh, that's good, watch how that is handled."

JP: Oh sure. You watch the different ones as they operate, how they do things, their work in committee, how they can be trusted. It isn't always necessary to be liked, but you've got to be respected. That goes to your word is good.

Mardesich and Gissberg were very skillful. I had a lot of admiration for their skills. I got along fine with them. They'd be part of the group that

would peel off from the Democrats along with the Republicans, and we would be able to get some of the governor's things through, the governor's programs. And, of course, I was interested in supporting the governor's initiatives because I felt they were right.

AK: Did Senator Mardesich work with the Republicans to build his own base in competition with Senator Greive?

JP: Yes, Mardesich didn't get along with Greive, and he and Gissberg were kind of opponents of Greive inside the Democratic Party. Now, most things they went along, but there were times when they didn't get along.

But I had some interesting times there.

AK: Can you recall any particular instances?

JP: I'm trying to think of things I can talk about. Well, you watch the relationship between lobbyists and who was pushing who, and the old rule was those who can be pushed will be pushed. If you once establish that no, you can't be pushed around, then people stop pushing you. So, all the pressure comes on those, disproportionate to what it should be.

And I never felt I would have a problem being re-elected at home. I didn't have any outfit give me campaign funds. I remember when I was first elected to the House, why somebody got upset about something and I gave him back his campaign money, and that was the end of that.

I had a couple of times when major customers of our company kind of wanted to lean on us. And one time this fellow said, "Well, you've got to support us," and I walked out and voted against him and showed him.

AK: Did you lose that contract, or was that just a bluff?

JP: No, they were doing business with our company and it was very involved. The lobbyist was very foolish, and I won't say who it was because he's still around Olympia. I know one time one of the salesmen complained to my brother, something about how I was going to vote,

because one of their customers didn't like it. Frank straightened him out very quickly that business was not part of our politics, and we were totally independent, and that was it.

AK: It must have been helpful having that firm line, otherwise you'd always have to weigh and justify everything.

JP: Well, I know, but lots of people, they'd hear, oh gosh, we've got to take care of this guy, or that guy's a big customer, or so on—

That's one of the things I liked about Evans and Gorton. I remember the time when somebody, something—Dan wouldn't even listen to it. Just nonsense. And Slade was the same way. And Walt Williams was that way.

AK: Were you, in a sense, lucky that you didn't have to go down that road, that you didn't have trouble getting re-elected?

JP: Well, I didn't have to. I had some very tough elections, but my theory is that you establish that you're going to do what you think is right, and that's it. It's sort of like being a judge; you're going to call them the way the way you think. You may not agree, but that's it. And once people know that, then they don't start to play games with you. Just because you're socially friendly with someone for years, why that doesn't mean—

One of the toughest votes I had in Congress, that bothered me a lot, was the bail-out for Chrysler, because I had some very close friends of mine who were in that business. Really good friends, and they came back to D.C. and I couldn't vote for it. I'd vote for the New York bail-out, but that was a government entity and we'd had a lot to do with it. But where do you draw the line with private companies? Now, the Chrysler bail-out worked, they paid all the money back, it was a great thing, but I wouldn't vote for it. And it was very difficult. No one was urging me not to vote for it, and here were these very close friends of mine, and I felt really sad about it.

AK: Were you able to explain your actions, your stand, to them?

JP: Well, that's the point—you have to live with yourself, and you have to establish that.

Now, you can't have sort of emanating, always, a holier-than-thou. If you kind of push that out, then what you're sort of inferring to all the other legislators is, well, I have a higher standard than you do. So you've got to do that without insulting their level of integrity. That's one of the difficult things is you have your standards, and if you get a little preachy about it, why, then it's a big pain. In fact, I'm always a little suspicious of those who do a lot of preaching about their honesty. The guy that runs, you know, "Buy your car from Honest George," I figure oh-oh. And the same way with those who would talk about it. If somebody else wanted to say something, fine. I didn't.

AK: Well. If you're really honest, you shouldn't have to say anything.

JP: That's right. I had the same feeling about those who advertised their religion. That's fine, but when you get advertising it—

By far, the best skill I had in the Legislature were people skills, because there were lots of people who were smarter than I, or knew more about the law, or this and that. I was pretty good on people skills, knowing who you could deal with, and dealing with people, and building up respect back and forth.

Well, like we got the abortion bill through by one vote. Gissberg was sort of leading the charge against it. It was unusual in that time, in that most Republicans were for it, and most Democrats were opposed to it. That was how it split, because the issue is mainly a Catholic-Protestant issue. It has nothing do with conservative Republicans, none of that.

AK: I wonder how many people today would even know that?

JP: Well, they don't. But this is 1970 when it went through, in '69, yes, in '70. And it was my last issue before I left. And Gissberg realized we were right near the end of the session, so he was holding back. In his own mind, and he told me this, he was sure that even if we got the thing through, it

wouldn't be close enough, and they wouldn't be able to transmit it to the House, and it would get bogged down in the final hours, the final days. We were within a few days of the end. And he'd be able to delay it.

And there were three or four, I don't know how many, but there were a number who were voting against it, but were friends of mine. So, I went to a number of them and said, "Look, this is going to be kind of messy, once we get it done, up or down, so let's get it out of here. And, if it's all right with you, I know you're going to oppose it, but I think when we're done, we'll just ship it over to the House and get it out of here."

"Oh, yeah, yeah. If you want it. But I'm going to vote against you."

I said, "That's all right. I understand that." So, after we voted it through by one vote, there was a little bit of wrangle over were we going to immediately send it over to the House.

AK: Isn't that automatic, that bills get sent over?

JP: Well, it's generally automatic, but it doesn't have to be. I can't remember the details.

AK: Were people a little surprised that it passed?

JP: No, no. It was going to be close, they knew that. But no one had even thought about this, that I had talked to some of them, so that when we moved to move it over to the House, and Gissberg thought he had the votes, five or six people that had voted against it on the issue, voted with me on moving it over. It was a little thing, they didn't even think about it, and they were voting for Joel—if you want to send it, sure, why not? That got it over there, and we were able to get it out.

And Lois North, she was offering it in the House with some people, but she was kind of the lead one on it. And I and Fran Holman, and I forget who—

AK: Holman and Bailey and McCormick.

JP: Yes, anyway we had some. It came over from the House, it went and then I had to get Durkan, and Durkan gave me the vote to get it out of committee. And we had this John Cooney falling

down the stairs—furious—I mean running down the stairs, because we’d gotten it out of committee, and Durkan had allowed it out of his committee. Cooney was just furious.

AK: Even getting it out of committee was not an easy thing to do?

JP: No, because they had a majority of Catholics on the committee. And when Cooney came up and said, “How could you let that bill out?”

Durkan said, “Well, in fact, I talked with my professor over in Gonzaga.”

“Who did you talk to?”

He said, “I can’t remember, something like Father Johnson, or something.”

Cooney said, “Why would you talk to Father Johnson? For heaven’s sake, don’t you know he’s a Jesuit?” Not being a Catholic, I didn’t know the inner workings, and Cooney talked like, of all people to talk to, he’s a Jesuit! And I wasn’t up on that, you know.

But, anyway, we got it out of committee, and it was one of those things, and then over in the House and then back and forth. Finally, it came back over, and we got it through by one vote. Then it went back to the House. They were going to add a couple of little changes. They said, “Well, we’ve got this, we’ll have to send it back.”

I went over and got a hold of them and I said, “It’ll never get out. You can’t put it on.”

And my relations were good enough for them to say, “Hey, if we can’t do it, okay, okay.” So, we voted it through, and on it went.

AK: And then it went to the Governor’s desk, right?

JP: Oh, of course. It got through, and Evans, of course, signed it. He favored it. The point of it was, that little vote of moving it out by some people—

AK: People who were not supportive, but who did that for you—

JP: Yes. Now, if it had gotten into a big foofraw, and somebody early had said, “Okay, you’re voting against it, and we’re going to try to stop

it,” but nobody had done that. Gissberg told a friend of mine who was there, he said, “Oh Pritchard, I didn’t realize he had gone out and touched some other people.” So those are the little things.

The other thing about it is, if you find that legislators are doing it for personal gain, or they need this, or they want to look better politically, and they’re using it for their own building up of themselves, and they’re always coming to you to do this or that, he wants to make a big show, and this and that—well. But, if he’s doing it because it’s an issue and it makes sense, then you don’t feel like you’re being used.

AK: Just for somebody to puff themselves up—

JP: Yes. It comes back to your feeling—sometimes there are people who you disagree with strongly, but you respect them. When I was a freshman here, guys like Dan Brink were pretty liberal Democrats, but they were excellent citizens, and you disagreed, but you respected them because they weren’t doing some self-promotion all the time. You learned pretty quickly who’s trying to use the thing—

One time on the floor, I remember a couple of press guys said, “Is this session going to go on all night? So-and-so’s talking and talking.”

And I said, “Get those TV cameramen to turn their cameras off and they will stop talking.” So they did. They turned off the red light and he stopped talking. But there’s a certain amount of that, oh, the press is here, they’re going to get a lot of attention. They’re thinking they’re going to be on the news and all.

It’s no different than in your life, who you respect in your neighborhood or in activities that you have. You get some people who come along, they make a lot of sense, their motives are right, all the rest of it. You start off with thinking, I like to work with that person, and you’re going to support them or work with them, unless there’s some reason not to, because you like to do it. But somebody else, they’re always a pain, and so you sort of start opposed to them, unless there’s a really good reason to work with them. It’s just human relations, and here it’s just very magnified. Everybody’s running for office, you’ve got

everybody from the outside pushing on them, all of this business.

AK: And when it all works, abortion, say, is made legal in the state of Washington, or not, depending on all these little human interactions—

JP: Well, of course, that went, and we had to turn it into a referendum to get the final votes. It would have gone again. Later on, the Supreme Court came along and changed it. Our law was just a four-month deal, the first four months of pregnancy.

AK: What was it that got you started on this particular issue? You put a lot of effort into getting this abortion bill passed into law, and in reading over your statements in the Senate journal, you demonstrated a very sensitive understanding of this complex issue.

JP: This all started because I was sitting next to Dr. McIntyre having dinner over at the McCaffree's—they were friends with Dr. McIntyre. He was head of the OB/GYN section for the state medical and he started telling me about some of their problems in this whole area of abortion.

AK: Problems because at that point it was an illegal procedure?

JP: Oh yes. So the wealthy families were flying their girls to Japan, it was a package deal. And the middle income would go up to Vancouver, and the poor people were taking the illegal abortions and the bad stuff.

AK: So the botched-up ones were coming to him?

JP: Yes, and the doctors felt like they were in an impossible situation. So, I told them I would look at it as a medical issue, and to do that they would have to put the bill together and have it be under the auspices of the state medical society. So, they had their convention, did their bill, and passed it at a rather large convention because they got quite a bit of notice about it, and passed it pretty handily. I think, as I remember, it was seventy-five percent

of the doctors at the state convention voted to support this position. Then we brought it to Olympia, and it took two sessions to get it through. It became very controversial.

AK: It was surprisingly quite open. There weren't a lot of restrictions.

JP: It was only the first trimester, but no conditions. But, oh, the father—it had the approval of the father of the child, if the woman lived with the father. If she didn't live with the father, she didn't have to get his approval. And that was it.

It got to be very close—one vote, and all this business. It was a major push. And you get caught up in those things, and then it becomes more—

AK: There were a lot of women who came down to testify?

JP: We had all kinds of organized efforts—it kind of built.

AK: Does that kind of effort—sign-carrying and marching and all—does it help the cause?

JP: Well, it took two sessions, and as I say, we had to pass it through as a referendum. Couldn't get it through as a bill. But, we got the final votes on the basis that we'd let the people make the decision.

I then ran for Congress in '70 and it wasn't much of an issue. It wasn't a big deal. But in '72, my opponent, who had been a lawyer for one of the Catholic churches, made it an issue, and then in certain Catholic areas, why, I got beat pretty bad. It became an issue in that election, but then it wasn't really an issue for me ever after. I was on one side. That was it. It never bothered me.

AK: In your own thinking, did you do it for the doctors, or for the women, or for both?

JP: Not for the doctors. No, I just thought it was right. We had a situation that was bad, and I asked the doctors to sit down and put together a solution. When they came up with this thing, I thought it made sense. So I took it from there.

Today, neither side would like it because, the thing was, you had to do it in the first trimester if you were going to do it. Otherwise you had to carry the child to term. You can make a pretty good case that that's a pretty reasonable position.

AK: It's moderate, yes. Did such challenges bring out the best in you, a chance to exercise your skills?

JP: Well, it brought out the best and the worst in people. That would be it. I had a lot of advantages in that atmosphere. I had a very good district. I had a lot of supporters, so that I had a lot of freedom. I remember somebody came up and said, "Well, I don't think you ought to vote for that, and I'm really upset."

And I said, "Well, that's all right, and in that case vote against me."

"No one can beat you, so that doesn't work."

I said, "I can't help that." That's what the person said, and I said, "Don't blame me." But then, of course, I ran for Congress and got beat.

AK: Just a temporary setback. Thinking of relationships in politics, and how important they are, I wanted to explore your relationship as a legislator with Dan Evans as governor. I know you were one of his lieutenants who shepherded various pieces of his program through the Legislature. Of course, I would assume that for the most part you agreed with what Governor Evans was advocating, but what I was wondering about was his stand on the income tax. I thought that you were not a supporter of the state income tax idea.

JP: I made speeches for it. But, well, I came out of it saying there is no way to do it. We tried to fashion this deal where we would take the property tax and the sales tax down, and we would have a three-legged stool rather than a two-legged stool. It was not the idea that we were going to increase taxes, but we were going to have a more stable tax thing that wasn't just dependent on two. It would be dependent on three sources, theoretically.

And I made some talks to groups, and after talking to different groups, I said, "Ha! It ain't

going anywhere, because nobody believes the Legislature when you say you're going to take this tax down. It's, 'oh yeah, but then it will go back up.'" So I said, "This is silly. The income tax is not a viable answer." First of all, it took a sixty percent vote to make the change, and it had to be done by the people. I said it's just not a possibility, it doesn't make sense.

AK: Haven't we been hobbled ever since by our patchwork tax system?

JP: You go down to Oregon and they sit there and talk about the fact that they have an income tax and a property tax, and they don't have a sales tax, and how it hobbles them. If you read the editorials in the *Oregonian*—one time, I remember I read about how they're handicapped because the businesses are all going to Washington.

And the articles in Washington said they're all going to Portland. I do think that it causes problems in the border cities, because the old rule is you live in Washington and shop in Oregon type of attitude. And people buying cars and not paying—all of this business. I remember I had a friend who was in Alaska years ago, and he bought a car as an Alaskan, and he had some kind of link where he got out of paying the sales tax. And he was kind of proud of the fact that he'd wiggled this deal around. I thought, hey, if everybody does this, why it's really wrong.

We've always had this evading taxes as sort of a game, and so you have all these wrinkles. Until they changed it—was it '81 or '82? They wiped out a whole lot of those little deals that Packwood and all those people had put together back there. If you have discretionary spending, if you are wealthy enough to have discretionary spending, you could do all kinds of things to get around taxes. Now, I've always thought that most people didn't really gain by that because in their manipulations to get around taxes, they did things that really didn't make sense. I had friends of mine, and I'd say, "Well, why are you doing that?"

"Well, let me show you how the tax thing works."

And I'd think, "They're changing how they do things just to get around taxes." But some people really resent paying taxes. My God, they'd

do anything to get around paying a tax. That's kind of silly, I think.

But you don't want to hear my whole thing on taxation.

AK: Yes, certainly I do. I want you to tell me why Republicans wanted the flat tax and why Democrats supported a graduated tax concept. Was this an ideological difference?

JP: Well, one, it was talk. You don't find many of them standing up and saying, "I'll vote for an income tax." They talk about it in theory, the theory being that a graduated tax—it's called a regressive tax—if you have a graduated tax, then the burden falls more on those who supposedly have more money. The problem with that is that those people with more money had more flexibility getting around it.

The idea with the sales tax is everybody's got to pay. But of course, in our state, because we took food out of it, that has some regressivity. It's a factor in that food is a substantial part and as you go down the economic scale, food is a much bigger part to somebody at the lower end than at the higher end. So there is some progress—I can't think of the word—in our tax by not taxing food.

Then we have a very high property tax in our state, which means that people that have fancy homes pay more. In most cases, the whole theory on taxes is to figure out as one of those old senators back in D.C. told me, "Don't tax you, and don't tax me, tax that man behind the tree." It's someone we don't know, somebody else.

So we'll tax business. Well, if you tax business, it goes on the cost of goods and services, so you pay it one way or another. But, of course, they are structured to appeal to the voters and it's easy to talk to the voters about it.

In most cases it isn't going to change. The easiest thing in the world is for people to talk about an income tax, because there is no way of an income tax being put through at sixty percent of the vote. The few times they've tried it, it's just been a disaster. So, no, I very quickly just said no on the income tax. I went out and made some talks and found out a lot of people didn't trust the Legislature. They're not going to do it, so let's not waste our time on something that

isn't a viable answer.

AK: Didn't Dan Evans push for an income tax more than once? Didn't he try again?

JP: Well, I only remember one time when he had really made a try. But because he had got so publicly out there, then his opponents used it, and used it, and used it on him. Every election they'd bring it up, and of course, his opponents in the Republican Party—it was bitter. They liked to hang labels on someone.

But it wasn't a big issue for the legislators. It wasn't any big struggle on the floor; it never got anywhere. It was a trial balloon and it rolled out there. And that was the end of that.

AK: Income tax—tax reform—was one piece of Governor Evans' program that didn't go anywhere, but he was much more successful in his efforts in the environmental area. He was really ahead of the times there. I believe that Washington had the first Department of Ecology in the nation.

JP: He was a big outdoor guy, a mountain climber, skier, all this stuff. He believed in it. You could see the growth coming, and he believed we'd better buy and save some of these things, and so he worked with the environmentalists. He got some people on both sides of the aisle to buy into it.

And in the early days we did a substantial thing with billboard control. We came in and put that in—that was a big step, that was something. The garden clubs were concerned about it. But that was before the environmental movement hadn't got so far out in left field.

Dan was very strong. We went up to Crystal Mountain and had a retreat up there with Evans and leaders in the House and Senate and all, and came back with a package of environmental bills. It was very far-sighted. The deal was made, and Dolliver was there, and I remember working it out, and then we went to the Legislature and it went through. I would imagine that would have been '67 or '69, right in there. And he came up and thanked the Legislature—I remember the night we got done, and he came up and said, "You

did a good job, some coordinated things were done, which showed some forward thinking.”

It reflected Dan Evans’ interest and his pitch was that you get hold of land that was still available out there and saved it, and tried to kind of lead things. It wasn’t looked at so much as a threat to public or private land ownership—it didn’t take land away from people. It was a much more benign approach than what you have today. The whole atmosphere was softer.

AK: Would this become Bill 137, cosponsored by Senators Williams and Mardesich, authorizing the acquisition of open space land?

JP: Yes. And Mardesich was a very smart Democratic senator who didn’t get along with Greive, so we’d get some votes on the Mardesich side along with the Republicans. Sometimes we had a majority to go in. Yes, that was the open space bill.

AK: Would this land be then used for parks?

JP: It could be used for parks, or for areas which we were attempting to save, some of the open spaces around cities so that you didn’t have that sprawl go everywhere. Grab some of that land when it was very, very cheap. But it was a bond issue. I’d have to check, but it went back to the people and they had to vote the bonds, and then the land was bought and saved. But it was an Evans initiative.

AK: There were several bills having to do with use of space and promoting recreation. Evans signed a bill establishing a scenic and recreational highways system. And there was a movement in Seattle then—the beginning of this idea—to use the air space over freeways, to build over top of freeways.

JP: That was Jim Ellis’ idea. It’s terrific. He’s my personal hero, number one in the world. He’s a terrific person. He did the Metro, he was the father of Metro. He now has this project of a greenway all the way from Cle Elum to the Sound. They’re buying property, and they’re trading property to get a green belt all the way. I was MC

at their program last week.

AK: Jim Ellis was working on a whole raft of bills at that time for his Forward Thrust project.

JP: Oh yes. I was very involved in Forward Thrust. A whole lot of things we did so that down the road there would be land available, there would be that capacity. His use of air space was just so original. Other cities follow it now, but he put the convention center over the freeway—he’s the father of the convention center. He’s done all kinds of things.

AK: Very far-seeing. He seems to know what’s coming.

JP: Oh yes. And he cleaned up Lake Washington. It was so bad people couldn’t swim in it, and he led the battle to clean it up. He’s sensational.

AK: The bills he was promoting at this time seem to be structured in a different way from the usual. They are described as permissive, as allowing cities to take certain actions, rather than requiring that they do so—a kind of opening up of possibilities or creating opportunities rather than restrictions. And this was meant to assuage Eastside municipalities?

JP: That’s true. He believes in the city being able to exercise, not in telling the city. He’s very wise. I was involved in a lot of things that he was involved in, and we are close, personal friends.

AK: Quite a few bills having to do with cities occupied that session. You cosponsored with Senators Greive and Williams and Uhlman one on limitations of indebtedness of local governments.

JP: Yes. Now, Uhlman became mayor of Seattle, and Walter Williams—anytime I’m on a bill with Walter, I’m totally at ease because he was so strong, so smart, so good. We were trying to put some limits on the amount of property taxes—they could raise property taxes, millage against that, and we were trying to put limits on there. I believe that’s the one where I had to do the

switch—we let Herrmann have an interim committee on insurance, studying insurance, and he became the insurance commissioner out of it. It's a long thing, but I worked very hard to get a limit on some of those tax things, and then three or four years later the limit was cut off because a different type of approach was used. Yes, Walter and I were trying to hold down the increases in some of those local taxes.

AK: The urban areas, especially Seattle, seem to be really struggling with change in these years. Initiative 226 had failed, and the cities were exploring different ways to structure their tax base, to increase their funds by increasing their taxing authority or bond limits or through direct grants. Governor Evans complains that Mayor Braman of Seattle is “weeping and wailing” for more money. Perhaps the heart of the issue was that cities were being asked to take on more and more social programs without the funds to do so.

JP: I can't remember, but I'm sure that could have been the case.

AK: Governor Evans was examining the state's social programs at the same time. Institutions for the care of the mentally ill or impaired seemed to be getting a lot of attention.

JP: Yes, I think they were trying to get away from warehousing people and have them in more normal situations and a more humane way of doing it.

AK: Why did this issue become so prominent—was there a change in thinking or a rise in problems? What prompts institutional change?

JP: I don't know. That started under Rosellini really, with Garrett Heyns—he made a lot of good improvements. That was the place where I thought Rosellini did some good work. It was just a new way of handling people, and Dan was also reinforcing that and working on it.

AK: I was just reflecting about unintended consequences with the decentralization of mental health care. You break down these big warehouse-

style hospitals, but community care facilities were not funded to the extent that they could take over the care of all these people. That led to a lot of these people eventually falling through the cracks and swelling the chronic homeless population. Of course, this took years before this pattern was understood by the public. And, as I say, this was unintended—

JP: You had the question of, is it better to warehouse or have these people running around—you got into incredible arguments. Some would say you didn't fund it all the way through to make it right and another group would say, let me show you the money we've increased, and we're spending more money on people than we were, and da, da, da. It's the fact that the rules now on how people are taken care of are so much more—we have so many more people. And more state employees doing this, and they are a major political group—state employees. The truth of it is that all of this money for supervisors—it's sort of been this deal of if you were spending the money, fine, it was right, but we've gone from here to here, and we've tripled the amount of money—it isn't getting to the person it's being spent on—all the arguments.

AK: Well, what do you think, how should we handle this issue?

JP: I don't know. I am clearly not an expert, nor was I ever on the committee on state institutions. I generally tried to be helpful in areas, but I never had any expertise in that area.

AK: Part of the changes in thinking about how to care for people included the creation of the umbrella agency of the Department of Social and Health Services, an Evans initiative. What was your feeling about this approach?

JP: Well, we'd say, let's get all these things together so we can coordinate. And then you get them all in there and they say, God, you've got to break it out. So, we break it out into pieces, and then we put the pieces back together because they're not being coordinated, and da, da, da. It's kind of back and forth.

You get to an area of government, and whether they're in one of these mega things or not, you still have this area. And then you get into the people who are appointed to do the work, and how good are they, and do you get a lot of political hacks in there. By and large, we had the feeling that Evans put good people in, pretty good people, and he worked on it, and from the time he went in to the time he went out, there was a lot of progress made. But if you talk to Dixy, each new governor comes in and—

AK: Another area of consolidation in this administration was the Department of Transportation. Did you have any involvement with that effort?

JP: That was a big deal, and of course, there was always a fight—does the governor control this or not? Evans got some control over it through his work with Gissberg and Mardesich, because the highway people always wanted to be totally separate, totally, because they had a stream of money—they had the gas tax. And it had to be used for that, so they didn't have to worry about funding. They played with the transportation—they had an interim committee. There were only two interim committees in those days, the Legislative Council and Highways. Those guys got taken care of, their highways got taken care of, all this, they worked a deal and then they would be not really responsible.

Evans got in there and he knew lots—he was a construction engineer and he knew all about highways. And he'd been on Highways, so they couldn't run around him. He reasserted quite a bit of responsibility and control. And I thought it was very good, but it was kind of a long battle. And the legislators hated to have him come in, because they had their own little deal—like Al Leland, called Asphalt Al. He was a Republican from the east side, and he was big in Highways. Oh Lord, they wanted to keep all that under their Highway Committee, and yes, and then, who appointed them, who was chairman of the Highway Committee, and all that.

Now you have the chairman of the Highway Committee appointed by the governor, and the governor has quite a bit of influence—not total control, I mean, but a lot of influence. Evans did

go back and get the governor and the administration back into some relationship. I thought it was a step in the right direction.

AK: Evans also talked about diverting some of the gas tax money to rapid transit. If only that had happened!

JP: That's been going on—everybody wanted to get into the gas tax. And there was a big battle over the ferries, you know, and they finally got the ferries. The ferry lines were ruled an extension of highways.

AK: I'm not sure what part of the program this was, but Evans was looking at dedicating the whole coastline, from the Columbia to the Makah reservation, as a recreation area, perhaps like in Oregon where all the beaches are public and not privately owned like here.

JP: Oh, Lord, yes, they are. Well, I don't know how they are in Oregon, but I can tell you anybody can walk on your beach. I'm a beach owner and anybody can walk on the beach, all over the beach. They're not supposed to pick up too many things on the beach. They can't haul all your wood off and they're not supposed to park, camp and sleep on your beach—

AK: But isn't there still a difference—in Washington you can own a beach, but in Oregon that isn't so.

JP: You own the beach, but what does it mean? You're talking about tidelands where the tide goes out. You can't keep anybody off the beach—it's very hard for me to explain to my mother, no, you can't go down and chase those people off the beach. She says, "Well, they're sitting on our beach." And I say, "Mother—" Oh, you know.

A lot of that is federal, it has a lot to do with the Indians, access to Indians. And street ends—that's a big deal still being worked out—every place on the map where the road comes along and stops. That street end goes through—technically it goes through, but the people on both sides split the difference or something. So, not only can they walk on the beach, but they can come down

anywhere on street ends—that's still sensitive and all the rest.

AK: It seemed like a good idea, the coastal recreation area, but evidently it wasn't an idea whose time had come.

JP: Evans led some real battles to have money put in for buying public lands, while they were still available. And, often times, I was one of his people in the Senate. Sometimes I sponsored the governor's bills in the Senate.

AK: I noticed that you were a cosponsor of a bill to establish a stadium commission, a project favored by Ross Cunningham. This bill was successful—Dan Evans signed it.

JP: It was to allow the city to build it, wasn't it? We weren't building it for them. It would be implementing, either the city or county could do it if they wanted to.

AK: Given the present controversy about the Kingdome and various stadium projects of this day, what is your opinion—should it be a tax-supported thing?

JP: Well, if the city wants it. The state doesn't need to be into it. They ought to allow the county or city to do what they want. I don't believe it's the state's business to be in it.

AK: Yet it seems to be a state issue now—the present session is very wrapped up in the discussion.

JP: You get into it in some way—one of the ways they do it is, they say, "Hey, if we do this, we'll increase the amount of state taxes, and it will go up, and da, da, da, and can we get a share of that?"

AK: But before the fact, prospective taxes, future taxes?

JP: As you make it. Like the hotel/motel tax, which goes to local governments. So, you get into some of that. But, in most cases, the state would be better off not to get into where they're building

it or doing it directly. If there's some scheme of helping, I don't object to that. But it's a decision of a city or a decision of a county.

AK: So, the Kingdome was an all right thing to support?

JP: Everybody's got their own thing. I'm a big baseball fan. Basketball is fine, and football—I'm a University of Washington fan. I could care less whether there's pro football. It isn't something of interest to me. I know some people are. I think they could very easily not have a pro football stadium and have it go away, and nobody would really care.

AK: Aren't they really private businesses though? Why should the state get involved?

JP: Well, sure, but in today's world, if you're a major city, and you don't have some of these facilities—it's the old business of that's the attraction and that's what makes you a major city.

AK: Just to push this a little, and not your ballet, say, or your opera?

JP: Lord, look what we put in—we put money in the opera and ballet and all. We have all that in Seattle. Seattle has those things. It has the arts, it has the sports, it's got all the different things. And that is a factor in your tourism, and your conventions that come, and all that business.

AK: I can see that from Seattle's point of view, but what about Eastern Washington?

JP: There again, if the local people do it, that's one thing. If you have the whole state doing it, well, but of course, up and down Western Washington, the people come to baseball games.

AK: One last issue I'd like to discuss from your Senate years, one that you list in your "Key Issues" publication, was Senate Bill 49, the Thermal Site Control bill, to do with nuclear energy at the Hanford facility.

JP: They were coming in with the possibility of

a whole lot of nuclear power, and we thought we ought to set up some proper procedures. We thought that this thing was coming.

AK: The bill mentions establishing thermal power facilities, including nuclear generation. It mentions an increased need for electrical power—rising energy prices. Now, when you are involved with a bill like this, do you first study up on nuclear issues, power issues? This is so technical, a specialized field—how much can a senator know, or need to know about such a field, in order to regulate it?

JP: It's better if you know about these things. You have hearings, and you say, this is what we want to do, and you have people come in, and in the process, why, you learn things.

But I'm no great student. I was not a technical person. I was a policy person, and then you get technical people and you work out the details. But I think, by and large, senators are better as policy people rather than getting into the nuts and bolts. If you are in a legislative body you're setting policy, not counting the pencils and erasers. You're on a board, and then you hold people accountable. I'm not very keen on these people that try to do it all, write all the details, do it all, you know, but I think you have to thoroughly understand the underlying issues.

AK: To understand the implications—

JP: That's right, what it means, what are the driving forces, what are the underlying things. But I was never a great detail person.

AK: These experts, the nuclear technicians, they have a vested interest in promoting this, in making it sound safe and viable. How can you tell if they are telling the truth?

JP: You have people from all different sides and you have to trust some people. You have to go on their background, their history, their experience. What's their track record? And, if you touch the right bells in that, why, if somebody is off base, it pops up. Sometimes later on, you find you got hoodwinked, but that's all in this area of judgment.

I think, dealing with people, you get to where when you've dealt with a lot of people over the years, you get to know all the little things people do—well, that person's reputation and his track record over the years. And you have a number of people who you can ask about people—you have a pretty good network back in the community. Somebody will call you, get a hold of you, and tip you off that Charlie Jones—he's kind of bright, but he's crazy.

And you want to be careful, or something pops up there, and that's why it should be sort of a difficult thing to get bills passed. There should be quite a number of hurdles, and in each one of those hurdles you have a chance to kind of review and look, and as it goes along, why, it sort of sifts through and sifts through, and not always, but generally, these things pop up. And that's the process.

AK: Does it help to go to these sites, to go to, say, Hanford?

JP: I think that you go, but it's very easy to get carried away. It's sort of like being flown to some country and getting the royal tour, and then you've seen and heard what they want to tell you. And I think you have to be a little careful—there again, that is sort of a judgment, and a feeling.

AK: The nuclear issues seemed particularly difficult to sort out, to me, as a nonscientist.

JP: Well, that's the technical side, but the underlying things are pretty basic. And it's not that someone can sit in there and say, "I know it's safe. I know it isn't." I know that. You set up different safeguards and a procedure. Then you say, "Does this make sense?"

But the "Key Issues," I was just trying to show here was a number of different things, just sort of grabbing five or six issues, and showing that you are in a number of areas. They were things I was involved in. There were a lot of things that were crucial, but these just happened to be bills that I sponsored as a member of the minority; and every bill, you will notice, is bipartisan.

AK: You touch on a real variety: Senate Bill 47,

for the establishment of a new Department of Environmental Quality—that must be Ecology; Senate Bill 50, dealing with oil pollution, especially in the Sound; the abortion issue; Senate Bill 53, an executive request bill to create the Department of Transportation; Senate Bill 49, as we discussed, the bill safeguarding nuclear energy production; and Senate Bill 69 that sought to eliminate professional gambling in the state while allowing bingo and raffles and such as conducted for charity by, say, church groups.

JP: Yes, we tried to set up some procedures—I don't mind people doing a little gambling, but I don't like to have third parties taking money out, and getting into politics, and all. But it's been going on for ten thousand years!

AK: Well, you tried to put your finger in the dike.

JP: They were the bills that I had sponsored and worked on, and so I put them out there. I was trying to paint a picture, a favorable picture, of myself—that's what you do in this business. You have to realize this is a campaign piece. I put this out because I was running for Congress.

AK: Of all the things we've talked about, what would you say would be your most memorable or most important contribution to the state Senate? What do you feel really stands out for you?

JP: I guess the abortion bill, because I was so far out in front on that and it was such—

But, a lot of the others, it was really just management. It was Evans—Evans was governor, and much of this I was involved in.

AK: There was a special session that year, which ended in February, and by March you've announced that you are going to run for Congress. It made the newspapers in March of 1970. When had you actually decided to do so?

JP: I didn't know I was going to run for Congress. I went to lunch with some people and was telling them how Pelly could be beaten, and it was time for somebody else to run. And they said, "Why don't you do it?"

And I said, "I don't know." Then I got in my car and I remember driving home and saying, "I think I will."*

***Frank Pritchard:** Our first run for Congress was against an incumbent, Tom Pelly.

Anne Kilgannon: Yes. How ironic that you had helped him win, and then turned out to challenge him.

FP: I'd go back to Washington D.C. for something and he'd take me around to some of his House colleagues and say, "I want you to meet the guy who got me elected and saved my life." We were very close, and I was appalled when Joel told me he was going to run against Pelly.

AK: Did he make that decision all by himself? Did you know he was thinking of it?

FP: He told me. He never asked me how to vote, he always made his own decisions, but he always let me know about them.

He and three or four newspaper writers had had lunch down at Rosellini's, and they were talking about how things were, and about how Tom had gotten old and conservative and unresponsive. Finally, one of them said to Joel, "Joel, if you feel this way, why the hell don't you run?" Joel thought about it, came home, called me up, and said he was going to run.

AK: Just like that?

FP: It might have been a couple of days, I don't know.

Pelly had gotten very caught up in that anti-communism crusade and that really turned us off. The Christian anti-communist crusade—these people got their religion and politics all screwed up.

AK: Did he go as far as Harold Kimball with it?

FP: Oh no, no. But he was like so many. When they first get back there, they come out here and they want to know what we think because they're going to represent us. And then after a few years, they come out here and they tell us what to think.

AK: Is this where Joel got his idea of term limits, watching that? You go back there, and if you have a limit, you don't turn into one of those?

FP: Yes. We talked a lot about how Tom was getting so much more reactionary. Actually, his administrative assistant, Ray Hibbard, had come out of Bremerton and was in tune with the shipyard workers and people like that. And while he was there and alive, he kept Tom on the moderate or liberal side of issues. But he died and Tom—

AK: Drifted?

FP: Drifted to his more natural feelings. I remember, I won a speech contest—Joel and I were big on Toastmasters—so I gave a speech there that Truman was a great president. I'd done some research and reading on it and I came to that conclusion. So, I was feeling very good, and I remember the next day Tom was in town and I was talking to him about something and I mentioned that. He was appalled that I would think that Harry Truman had been a good president, let alone a great one. That bothered me that it bothered him. Anyway, he had been getting more and more reactionary.

FURTHER THOUGHTS

LOIS NORTH

Former state Representative Lois North was interviewed in her home on February 3, 1998, concerning the passage of the Washington State abortion law. She had worked closely with Senator Pritchard to maneuver this controversial legislation through both houses of the Legislature and describes here the strategies crafted by Senator Pritchard.

Anne Kilgannon: You were telling me that you had actually met Joel before you were a part of the Legislature.

Lois North: Yes, that's true. I was a lobbyist for the state League of Women Voters, and Joel was a member of the House. The League had, for many years, been interested in legislation that would see to it there was automatic redistricting and reapportionment of the state Legislature every ten years, as is called for in our state constitution. And so we were working on a constitutional amendment that would, in effect, give the Legislature so much time to do it. If they came to an impasse and couldn't carry on, then a commission would be established, and the commission would do the job. This was to put the fire under the feet of the legislators to get the job done. Joel was a great help. I appeared before the House Committee on Elections, of which he was a member. He was always very supportive and very friendly.

AK: Were you successful?

LN: Oh, no. We did two initiatives to get the job done. This was a longstanding dream, but that's a pretty tough one to get the Legislature to relinquish control of that job to a commission.

AK: So, that was what brought you into politics?

LN: It did, and I had small children at that point, so that it was very hard to do this lobbying in Olympia. When I felt that my children were old enough, then with the backing of my family, of course, I ran for the House, and that was in 1968.

One thing I would like to say about Joel in remembering him, he was always very supportive of new candidates running. He felt that you needed new blood, new ideas in the Legislature, and that was the strength of both political parties. He made a point of coming to my house, which is right across the street from here, where I lived in 1968—I think it was in the evening—and spoke to a group of my supporters who had gathered to urge me to make the race. He was so enthusiastic and wonderful with the group, and I thought to myself at the time, “My gosh, this man is taking an evening off from his family, away from home, and he's working on this project.” I always appreciated that.

During the campaigns in the future, he was always very willing to cooperate on a picture if we needed one for our campaign brochure. He was always good to talk to for advice.

AK: Was he particularly supportive of women? He shows up as supporting a lot of different women's issues. Was he notably supportive of women candidates, or just generally supportive of anybody?

LN: He was generally supportive of both men and women, I have to say. I think he was sympathetic to women's issues. Certainly you would be if you were one of the prime sponsors of this abortion reform bill, which he was.

AK: I just wondered if he was trying to recruit women into the Republican fold.

LN: I didn't have that feeling.

I have to tell you when I first went to the House, out of ninety-nine members there were five of us women. We were a very definite minority. I saw a vast change in the attitude of the men in the Legislature from the first session that I served, which was '69, until, I would say, ten years later. Ten years later we were recognized more as a partner, a working partner, and not some little unusual frill that had suddenly arrived on the scene. It was a very wonderful thing to see, but it did take time, and I have to be honest that the first ten years there were tough. A lot of people don't realize that today, because Washington has the highest representation of women of any of the fifty states, in the Legislature.

AK: Sounds like you were part of the wedge that was making that true.

LN: Yes.

AK: I know some men didn't treat you very well, but where would Joel be in that spectrum of how he worked with women?

LN: He worked very well. He treated you as a working co-partner, and none of this—some men would pull out the chair for you to sit down and treat you like you were a lady at a party, or something or other, and that wasn't what the Legislature was all about. Joel was: "We were in this working on problems together." That was his attitude.

AK: He was already "there?"

LN: Yes.

AK: That's good to know. That helps to explain some of the things that he did support, as he already had this awareness.

Now we get to the main issue, which is your work with him on the abortion bill. Was 1969 the first time it was ever mentioned in Washington State?

LN: Yes. It was the first time that you had legislation formally introduced in both the House

and the Senate. Joel and I worked together on this project through both the '69 and the '70 sessions. As we progressed, we realized that we were never going to be able to pass this very controversial legislation unless we made it a referendum to the people. It was a very hard compromise for both Joel and me because we felt that the issue had so much merit it could stand on its own two feet. But, we soon could see that we were not going to get enough votes to support it unless the legislator could say, "I think it's fair to refer it to the people and let them decide." So we soon added that to the bill to make it go a little bit further.

The biggest thing that I think both of us felt was that the present situation was so unfair to the poor people in the state. The wealthy woman could take an airplane to Japan or to England, pay for an abortion, and come home again. But those who weren't economically well off were caught and trapped, and could not get any help in a situation of an unwanted child. So they resorted to these back-alley hacks and many of them were butchered, and some of them died in the process. It seemed like a very unfair situation.

AK: That seemed to be Joel's position. He told me that he met a doctor at a dinner party who talked to him about the medical aspects of this and the unfairness of it, and also having to patch up these women who had undergone illegal abortions in not very good circumstances. He saw it as a medical issue and as a fairness issue. That was it for him. That was all he needed.

I don't know if you want to talk about your own motivation. Was it similar?

LN: Yes, very similar. The same thing that I saw. So I'm sure, for Joel and I, those were the two primary driving reasons for this.

I also felt that the Legislature was so dominated by men at that point, and, as I said, there were only five of us in the House, and in the Senate, zero. No women. When I first went over to the Senate in the 1975 session, they had to create a restroom for the women. There wasn't any, so they had to take a senator's office and convert it into a powder room for the women, because, if they didn't, we would have to walk across the rotunda over to the House side to go to

the restroom.

In the '69 session, the bill had a terrible time in the Senate. It got out of the Senate Committee on Judiciary, but the Rules Committee locked the door when they met. It was all men, very heavily dominated by Catholics. The Catholic Church was the main opposition at this point. Joel simply could not get it out of the Senate Rules Committee, and so, on April 12, 1969, I worked with two other freshmen legislators. Now remember, I was really green. This was my first session in the House, and to even think of doing this, I think I had more courage than sense.

AK: Maybe those were the only kind of people that would do this. Did Joel approach you?

LN: No. He did not know what I was doing.

AK: This was all on your side?

LN: All on our side, all very hush, hush. I was afraid to tell anyone because I thought if we did somebody would be aware and block the move, and we would never get a chance for the subject to get out on the floor and to be discussed. I did make an error. I've learned since then that I should have gone to the Speaker of the House, Don Eldridge, and told him what I was going to do. Ever since this instance, whether I was in the House, the Senate or the King County Council, I've always done that. You always let the leadership know ahead of time; you don't spring surprises.

AK: At least not big ones like that.

LN: No. It's really not fair to the person who's presiding. But, anyhow, the three of us were ready and we added it because it fit in chapter nine of the criminal code, and the bill that we were considering had come over from the Senate and was a criminal code bill in chapter nine, and so we offered it. It was like a bombshell when it hit the floor.

AK: Is this your amendment when you were trying to tack it onto this other bill dealing with police powers?

LN: We took the whole abortion bill and tacked it onto another bill. That's often done.

AK: This is engrossed senate bill 387, sponsored by Senators Anderson and Walgren?

LN: That's correct.

AK: This is the one where they make this little quip afterwards that they were fathers of this new amendment?

LN: Yes, that's exactly what happened.

So, we got it out on the floor and of course there was an immediate move by the Catholic members of the House to lay this whole issue on the table. That failed. Then I knew there was more support in the House than we had realized.

As we went through amendments and discussion it became clear to me that we clearly had a majority of people who would support this provided it was a referendum, but that we didn't have two-thirds which is necessary in many of the amendment processes. I could see that we were running out of time. The cut-off time for bills to be considered from the other house was twelve noon, so I stood and moved that this be made a special order of business at 11:55 a.m. allowing all the other bills that were on the calendar to be heard and discussed. When 11:55 came, the Speaker announced that, "By the rules that we had adopted for the cut-off, we could not go past twelve noon." In other words, I had thought that if we put it at the end we could take the afternoon to debate the abortion bill at leisure, but that was not the case.

AK: Not one of those deals where they stop the clock?

LN: He was ruling that we were going to stop at noon. So then, I simply withdrew the amendment, because I realized there was no point in killing a perfectly good piece of legislation to which we had attached the amendment.

When I came back in 1970, I knew that the total climate had changed. You could feel it.

AK: Had there been protests? Had women

organized?

LN: There had been a building of public support, and enough legislators had seen polls and had been in touch with the people in their districts. Clearly, the majority of the people in the state felt the law should be changed.

AK: Was there an organized women's movement that helped push this? Were there groups that would come down to Olympia and lobby this?

LN: The Women's Political Caucus, the National Organization of Women—

AK: So, women were beginning to organize. When did NOW start?

LN: NOW came on the scene, I would say—you'll have to check with them—in '71, '72. Shortly after this. And the Women's Political Caucus hadn't really come yet.

I would say that Planned Parenthood, which was not a women's group, was probably more interested in this than anyone else.

AK: How about the League of Women Voters?

LN: The League of Women Voters was very supportive, but it wasn't on their study agenda. They didn't have a declared position on it.

AK: You were really ahead of the curve?

LN: Yes.

AK: You were ahead of the federal effort, too?

LN: Yes.

AK: Where does Washington stand in this? Were we one of the first states to legalize abortions?

LN: Yes, I believe that's correct. There have been adjustments made to the law. Actually, in 1970, we passed the bill in the House and, believe it or not, the Senate did pass it by a vote of twenty-five to twenty-three. Now, when the Senate bill came over to us, I had to make a pitch on the floor

of the House, "Whatever you do, accept the Senate bill. They are in no mood for any revisions. They are in no mood to even go to a conference committee. It's either take it or leave it."

They had added on certain things, like the consent of the husband would be required if the man and the wife were living together. That for a minor who was under eighteen who was unmarried, it required the consent of the parents. This was not as clean and pure a bill as we had hoped for. One other clause that was interesting: the Senate had added that you had to be a resident of the state for ninety days. This was to prevent outside people coming in from other states. They had this thing in their minds about an abortion mill, so to speak.

AK: I know that some people—I think it was Senator Gissberg—tried to prevent state money from being used.

LN: That's right.

AK: That would have disproportionately affected the poor women.

LN: Yes. He did that, and that was defeated over there. He also was the one who was responsible for "you must have lived in the state for ninety days" because he didn't want people coming in from outside the state.

AK: Was that wrapped up in the state money issue, who would pay for these things?

LN: Yes. I think he was a very reluctant person in this whole procedure. I know that he said he didn't believe in abortions, period, so he was doing everything he could to tie it down.

AK: Limit it, slow it down, put out the roadblocks?

LN: Yes.

AK: When it was stuck in Rules, was it the first time it was stuck in Rules, or the second time in 1970 that Joel tried to do some fancy maneuvering to get it out of Rules?

LN: In the '70 session, what Joel did very early in the session, was to try to move to change the Senate rules, the rules of procedure.

AK: That was considered rather incredible.

LN: Yes. We had discussed this in the House, also. So often the Senate Rules would be the graveyard of bills. They would move out of committee with a majority vote, "do pass," and then just languish and perish in the Senate Rules Committee. He was trying to change the Senate Rules to be a calendaring committee. One where, if a bill came into the Rules Committee, it could sit there seven days but then it automatically had to move out. The senators were just devastated at the thought of that, and they did accuse him that he was doing this simply to get the abortion bill to move out of Rules Committee. It did not pass and he was not able to change the Rules Committee.

AK: But then Senator Holman made a motion to do some kind of maneuvering to break it out of Rules? Something unusual, also?

LN: He moved to relieve the Rules Committee of the bill, which was almost unheard of. You can do this under extreme conditions. You can move to relieve a standing committee, like one on health, education, or welfare, or labor, or whatever. You can move to take it out of that committee if you feel that the chairman and the committee are not giving it a fair hearing and a fair chance.

AK: So it's quite a slap?

LN: Yes, it is. It's one that, by the technical rules of each club, you just don't do this very often. So, for Fran to do that—and I remember Senator Bailey stood and said, "Do not support this move by Senator Holman. I promise you that it will get a fair consideration in the Rules Committee today, and if it isn't out by tomorrow I will join Senator Holman in what he's trying to do." Then the Rules Committee met and the bill came out.

AK: Senator Bailey was in Rules?

LN: Oh yes, very much so.

AK: So he did have a stick to wield, then?

LN: Yes, he did. A very fine gentleman.

AK: He just wanted to say, "Give me one more chance."

LN: Right. And Fran realized that was the situation, and that's what happened.

AK: Who was holding it up? I know Rules is secret—

LN: It is secret, but if you look at the membership—and I don't have it in front of me—more than half of the members were very devout Catholics, and they had been told this was a no-no. I was really surprised when it did come out. Even more surprised that it got the required twenty-five votes.

AK: It was something like twenty-five for and twenty-three against, and one missing or absent. Pretty close.

LN: Yes. That's why, when it came over to the House for us to concur, I knew that we had to concur or just forget the whole process, because it was passing by such a squeaky margin.

AK: Joel was doing some other things, too. It seems that he was part of getting women to come down and testify.

LN: That I am not familiar with and I can't speak to. In the clippings that you gave me I saw where, twice, different groups came from Seattle, primarily to lobby. I was not involved in that and I think I mentioned to you that Marilyn Ward would be the best chance because she was very active in Planned Parenthood, and I think that was the spearheading group.

AK: There's one instance where the sergeant at arms tries to prevent them from coming in. Slade Gorton, who was the attorney general, comes and says, "You're wrong. Let the women in." Then Joel afterwards gives a speech saying something about being ashamed that that had occurred.

LN: The amazing thing is that the real leadership on the passage of this bill came from the Republicans. And, today, they are so active in the voice for the unborn, and you almost have to pass a litmus test to be recognized by the Republican Party today, that you are against abortion. At the time that I was serving there, the governor, Dan Evans, was very supportive of this. Slade Gorton, the attorney general was. Joel and I were leading the charge. Republican senator, Republican House member. The leadership came from the Republican Party.

AK: When do you think that started to change?

LN: I would guess in the '80s, late '80s. It's just a very different party. Here we are in 1998 and it's totally different.

AK: It's just interesting how there can be these big shifts in who makes up a party and what their big issues are. I imagine that at this time the Democrats represented more of the working class, which is in this case were more Catholic, and that's where their disapproval of this came from. That's more, perhaps, who they were at that time, but now they seem to be made up of different groups of people, less dependent on the working class.

LN: I can remember campaigning in subsequent years, and when I would go to the doors of homes as you do, and I would be around a Catholic church in a parish, the absolute hatred in the eyes of the people who looked at me at the door. It was bone chilling, and it was on that one issue. We might see eye-to-eye on everything else, but on this one thing they could not forgive or forget. It was kind of scary.

AK: Did you ever feel threatened?

LN: Yes. And I just backed off the porch and left, because that's about all you can do.

AK: While all this was going on, was there an organized opposition? You hadn't really given them much time.

LN: No.

AK: Just the legislators, themselves?

LN: Yes, and the church.

AK: I know Margaret Hurley spoke strongly against this.

LN: Oh, very. She and I were probably the leading debaters on the floor in the House. She's a very eloquent speaker, and she believed very sincerely in everything that she was saying. There was nothing fake at all, no.

AK: The arguments that you were proposing, the fairness issue, the medical issue for safety, were most senators and legislators open to that, who had any room to maneuver, shall we say?

LN: Yes. I would say that. I don't want to use the words "science fighting emotion," but the statistics of the butchery of women and the deaths and the harm that was going on, you couldn't ignore that.

And then the economic factor. Everybody knew that the well-to-do woman could get relief and the poor woman could not.

AK: For you, you were focusing on the women?

LN: Yes.

AK: Now, the whole issue seems to have shifted to the fetus.

LN: Right.

AK: And the woman is just sort of the vessel. The arguments were couched in very different terms, then.

LN: That's right. It's changed a lot over the years.

AK: I was going to go through some of the procedures that happened. We talked about your piece.

In '69 when the bill was introduced on January 29, the first reading, it was cosponsored

by Joel Pritchard, Senators Bailey, McCormack and Holman. Then Senator Gissberg tried to postpone the bill indefinitely. What would that mean, it would just be put on some back burner and never be heard of again?

LN: Right. It would languish in a corner and that would be the end of it. That's a killing motion: to take this out of this whole arena; we're not even going to consider it or discuss it at all.

AK: Isn't that rather unusual?

LN: Yes. It reflects his total opposition to it. That it was abhorrent, and he didn't want it around at all.

AK: And then there's that lovely phrase: "debate ensued." And then one senator, Senator Atwood, was excused.

Then a call of the Senate was ordered, and that's when the sergeant at arms locks the chamber. You were telling me that that also was a rather extreme procedure.

LN: It is, and it's very dramatic when that move is made. Everybody kind of winces. You do have to go to the restrooms—the sergeant at arms—and you do have to get the people out of the restroom and they're forbidden to go downstairs to get a cup of coffee. You must be at your seat, in place, and everybody must be accounted for. So, when somebody calls for a Call of the House, you know one, that the vote is very close and that every vote is going to count and, two, this is a very emotional and controversial issue.

AK: It certainly sounds dramatic. Do they actually lock the doors?

LN: Oh yes.

AK: I didn't know if that was a figure of speech.

And then they vote on Gissberg's motion to postpone it, and that doesn't pass. Then it moves to the Judiciary Committee. And then, on February 17, it's reported out of that committee with the majority "do pass." But Gissberg, Ridder and Dore have a minority report of "do not pass."

Then, procedurally, it automatically goes to Rules? Is that the case?

LN: Yes. Because a majority of the committee did vote it out with a favorable recommendation of "do pass." The three who did the minority report, as I understand it, were all on Rules, and they all figured they could stop it and kill it in Rules.

AK: If they couldn't stop it there, they would stop it later. We don't hear of it again until the extraordinary session. Does that mean it's just stuck?

LN: It's just sitting there.

AK: Nobody's doing anything?

LN: No.

AK: And then a big demonstration of women come, that March 29 demonstration. This is where Charlie Johnson, the sergeant at arms, tries to stop them. I guess they have identifying arm bands on.

LN: They had arm bands and he was objecting to the signs they were carrying. They were going to come and sit up in the gallery, and he didn't want them to be seen.

AK: This is 1969. You've got Black Panthers; you've got all kinds of people coming down here. Is this a really tense time where people are afraid of violence in the chambers?

LN: No. I think it was the Senate establishment, again, not wanting to give one inch to this cause or to these people, and figuring if they did get into the balcony, the television cameras would pick them up and it would get exposure on the news.

AK: So, they were just trying to keep a lid on it?

LN: Right. Absolutely.

AK: In the paper when they write about it, they called them the "damsels" and the "ladies" and

all this stuff. The language is just—

LN: That's typical of this era.

AK: It reminds you of how far we've come when you read this.

LN: Exactly. And, as I've said to you previously, being one of only five women in the House, such use of words, mannerisms, that was typical of that era. That's gone.

AK: Looking back, reading the newspapers, the disrespect was palpable. But Joel Pritchard seems to come down, and also Slade Gorton, and let the women in, saying that, "No, they do belong there." There is a rally and there are speeches given. Did you give a speech at this point?

LN: No. You see, this was all happening on the Senate side and I was busy with business in the House and not aware that this was even occurring.

One thing I was going to tell you. When I did tack the abortion bill in in April of '69, Joel heard about it over in the Senate and he came immediately running across the rotunda cheering on from the sidelines like a coach with the team: "Keep at it!" He was really very nice and very supportive.

When the amendments started coming thick and fast, he would call out to me and say, "We may have to take some, Lois, you know," because we had a very liberal bill in the House. He had already experienced this in the Senate and knew that they were going to tack on all these amendments, so he was trying to say to me, "You may have to give a bit on some of these in order to keep the bill afloat and alive." That was the first that he knew about it. So then he rushed right over to see what was going on.

AK: Was that unusual for a senator to run around like that?

LN: Yes. Because you're usually involved in the business in your own chamber—and if you've got things that are on the agenda that you want to speak for or against—you're minding the store, in other words. So that was unusual, but he knew this was a highly unusual event.

AK: And he knew you were a freshman, and probably a little nervous?

LN: Yes! And so he was like a kind coach who was trying to help you out. Because, when I do look back on it, my word, I had not had the legislative experience to be engaged in something that controversial.

AK: The same day, March 29, is when Senator Holman makes his motion to relieve Rules of this bill and Senator Bailey says, "Give me a day." But, by April 12, it still seems to be stuck in Rules. In '69 it stayed stuck in Rules and nobody gets it out. But in 1970 you all try again. Is it a different cast of characters or basically the same people?

LN: Same people. If you don't at first succeed, try again.

AK: Did you meet and strategize with each other?

LN: No. In the material that you gave me, and in looking it over and revisiting all of this, I am kind of surprised, but again, remember I was a freshman, and I didn't understand. After I had served five or six years, I would know how important it is to talk back and forth between the two houses. But I was green, and Joel was busy, and we just didn't get together and confer very much. That's the way it worked.

AK: It was his practice—and certainly on a bill like this he did—to always make sure he had a Democrat with him. In this case it was Senator Bailey, so that it would be a bipartisan measure. Did he advise you to do that, too?

LN: I knew that as a freshman in the House. When we were sponsoring the bill, it was a mixture of Republicans and Democrats, yes.

AK: That was sort of his trademark to do that.

LN: Well, it was not just Joel's, I have to tell you, it's everybody. When you're trying to sponsor legislation in the House, you want to make it clear that there are people from both parties who are supportive of this, and you don't want it to look

like just a Republican bill or just a Democrat bill.

AK: Otherwise it would have gone down in flames?

LN: Yes.

AK: So, you try again, and this time you have a group called the Citizen's Abortion Group lobbying for it. They show up a little bit in the press, but not very much.

I didn't quite understand. Was it a referendum in '69 as well as '70?

LN: Yes, because in the '69 session Joel and I did discuss this and we both understood that it wasn't going to go anywhere unless we, early on, added that in. In the committee process in the Senate it was certainly added on. Ours didn't have much committee action, but we were fully aware of this and intended that that would be part of the bill.

AK: Were you on any of the relevant committees that discussed it, or were you just on the sidelines?

LN: I was not on a relevant committee.

AK: Joel wasn't, either! He said something to me—that legislators would just prefer to get it off their necks and give it to the people, so that he thought that was a good strategy. But that's a pretty high-risk thing to do if you haven't got a lot of organizations to campaign for it. There was some concern that the women's groups were not really ready for this, that you were a little ahead of them and they didn't have the finances or the organization to take this and run a referendum campaign. There was, in some of his things, some worry about that. But yet, that seemed like it was the only way to go.

LN: I see. I was just confident that it was going to pass.

AK: Did you just "know that?"

LN: Yes!

AK: Well, that's how you get things done.

But again, people tried to kill it. There's one big debate in 1970 that Joel tried to avoid, but got pulled into a little bit, over the meaning of "quickening," of where to draw the line. It seemed like abortions were legal up to a certain point of gestation, and then they weren't?

LN: Senator Day added the amendment "up to four months." He is a chiropractor, and I assume that he had some medical training or background. I think Joel's reasoning was that quickening was a little more—many women do not feel life until five or five and one-half months, and then the kicking starts and it's very exciting. To make it four months was very specific, and on the early side.

AK: The idea of quickening, basically, was to build in a cushion where you've got a little time there? You can say you don't feel it or you do, and it seemed like he was trying to blur the line. He also was citing ancient English law and going way back. I don't know if he was attracted to that sort of ideal or not.

Senator Day tries to drag him into this, and he just kept saying, "I will not discuss this." Though, of course, they are discussing it. He seems to have kept that concept up until quickening was established. He said it was a medical thing and that doctors could establish it, not just the woman, and that's what he wanted to go with. He was successful, I believe, in that?

LN: The bill we passed had Senator Day's four month limitation in it. And that was one of the things I was not happy about, and it was hard to speak on the floor of the House and urge the House to just accept the Senate and what they had done. It's one of the things you have to swallow to make a little progress, and so you just do it.

AK: One of those half loaves.

LN: Of course, the further along in the pregnancy that you go, the more dangerous it is to abort a child to the mother. It should be done, medically, early. I know that.

AK: They were having this debate about quickening and then Senator Bailey moved that, “The rules be suspended, that the bill be advanced to third reading, the second reading considered the third, and the bill be placed on final passage.” He’s just trying to move it along I assume?

LN: That’s right, and that is done very often, because after second reading you are through with the amendment process. The third reading is just a formality. You just read the title again and then you take the vote. His feeling, I’m sure was, “We’ve debated this thing, we’ve had enough time on it, let’s get it up and out of here and over with.”

AK: In fact, that’s what happened. Senator Gissberg demands a roll call. So it passes twenty-five to twenty-three with one absent. It’s signed by the president of the Senate on February 5, and then it comes over to you at that point?

LN: It came over to us on February 3.

AK: Your second reading in February 3, and the third reading is February 4. You passed it.

LN: Then it goes back to them to concur, and then we’re all through.

AK: Then it’s signed by the governor. Did you have a party, or did you just move on?

LN: No, I’m sure we had a party.

AK: It was a big moment. Did this make your name?

LN: It did and it set me on a path where I was the chief sponsor for women’s legislation. The state equal rights amendment, which is a part of our constitution. I was the prime sponsor for ratification of the federal equal rights amendment, which did not get enough states to go along.

I worked on revision of rape reform laws, and those were tough. I was in the Senate at that point. Again, the men were very concerned that this was going to give women too much of a chance to accuse people that they had been raped. But we worked that out and made a vast improvement on

it, which made a huge difference in the amount of cases that have been tried.

Then, the Displaced Homemaker Act, because at this point we found many women who were being abandoned by their husbands and suddenly had to support themselves and had not trained for anything. That I remember working on.

I worked endlessly for day care centers for working mothers. At that point it was not widely accepted that a company or a governmental group or school should sponsor good day care facilities for children.

So yes, we were sort of prophets crying in the wilderness, if you will. But finally, we got to the point where it was as though all the good legislation that you could think of was placed on the books in this state to help women and to protect them. Then I moved my efforts into the environmental field.

AK: It’s a wonderful record. Did you know this was the direction you would go in? Did you go into politics with this in mind?

LN: No, I didn’t. As a lobbyist when I was in Olympia, I was fascinated with the legislative process and I thought the meeting of many minds on a law and the different perspectives that were shown—the debate, the discussion, the amendment, the fine tuning of it—was a fascinating process. A very creative and exciting thing to watch. So when I ran, I was not for any particular cause. It was the whole procedure and the process of the Legislature.

AK: You jumped in with both feet. That is a marvelous record.

LN: Thank you.

AK: Did you have other occasions to deal with Joel Pritchard?

LN: Yes, because of being in the same political party and attending many events.

I always had great admiration for his civility, that both political parties should treat each other with respect and that there was a certain decorum. I’m sure that as he presided as lieutenant governor

in the Senate, he would be very fair and very conscious of the proprieties that you don't have one party yelling at the other. That you don't try to be unfair or unscrupulous. That, indeed, you preserve an image of debate and discussion and orderly procedure. He worked both sides of the aisle extremely well. He had friends on both sides, and to me that's what makes the legislative process work.

AK: You said that he thought being the lieutenant governor was the crowning of his career.

LN: I remember in one of our conversations that he had been in the national Congress for twelve years and he had always said, "That's all I'm going to do. That's long enough for anybody," and I agreed with him because I think you get burned out doing a particular job. I served twelve years on the county council, and that's long enough. Let somebody else come along with new ideas.

He said at that time, "I think being lieutenant governor would be a great position. Presiding over the Senate, and kind of making sure that people got along and worked well with each other." I remember him saying that, and then years later he did follow through on that.

AK: I didn't know that had always been his idea. Something he was interested in.

LN: Yes. He had mentioned it to me several years before he actually filed for it.

AK: That's interesting. Are there other stories or things you want to say about him?

LN: Oh, he was a great guy and a wonderful person to work with. Always pleasant and always fair.

AK: Thank you.

move on, or was it that the current congressman, Pelly, was vulnerable?

JP: No.

AK: Did you feel you had achieved what you wanted to do in the Senate?

JP: I didn't really. It was really strange. I just sort of felt like it was time to move on.*

AK: Well, at that time you were forty-five years old. I was looking at that, and I couldn't help but wonder—people do start to evaluate things about that time. Was that the case for you, perhaps?

JP: I was going into a mid-life crisis! Well, it was such a long shot, and then Pelly said, if I'd wait, he'd give it to me. Or, that was the inference. But I didn't believe that you ever got anything by that method. I said that's not the way to do things. So I ran. We had a wow of a campaign. It was great.

AK: I'd like to hear about that. I imagine running for Congress was different—on a different scale—than running for the state Legislature. Aren't the districts larger?

JP: Well, we did it the same way, which was just with volunteers. We had only—I think we raised \$40,000 and ran the whole campaign. But we had hundreds of doorbellers, and we had other volunteers, and we did all these coffee hours and bus stopping. We did all these things, and actually, we won in every Republican part of the district.

CHAPTER 10

ENTERING CONGRESS

Anne Kilgannon: You were telling me about your decision to run for Congress. It seemed a little happenstance—you hadn't thought about it before the chance conversation at lunch?

Joel Pritchard: I hadn't really thought about it, no. I hadn't been planning to go to Congress, no.

AK: Was there something on the national level that drew you into that sphere?

JP: No, no. There wasn't anything in particular. I thought I'd been in the Senate long enough. It just sort of seemed like the right thing to do, and I came back and told my brother what I was going to do, and he thought I was crazy. Then I just kind of went around and called on a number of my friends.

AK: Were you just tired of what you had been doing at the state level? Did you feel ready to

***Anne Kilgannon:** Why did Joel quit the Senate? He didn't quit to run for Congress, he just quit. Was he tired of it?

Frank Pritchard: I think he was tired of it. I never really knew why, but it just kind of made sense. But this was a switch, I'll tell you, to run for Congress.

AK: Had he ever talked about being on the national scene before? I know he was interested in foreign affairs.

FP: No. We had always talked a lot about national issues, and we had both become more and more disenchanted with Tom Pelly—not personally, but with his positions.

But the Democrat running was not very strong—Hughes, a nice guy. I had dinner with him the other night. He worked in the state department, but he was not known, and Pelly had done a pretty good job of currying favor with the unions and so they always endorsed him.

And so I won all the Republican areas, but I really got beat bad in the Democratic areas. And Pelly ran first in Ballard and places like that. Our efforts had been—most all of our doorbelling and all of our work, all our networking, was all through Republican districts. Of course, I had a lot of Republicans that weren't happy with me doing this, but we did carry Mercer Island, and we did carry the Republican areas. But, still, we got beat.

AK: This first run, though, did it teach you what you were up against, what were your weak and strong areas?

JP: Yes, but we had redistricting the next time, and that was changed some. We lost Mercer Island, we lost Bainbridge, and so it was in some ways a little different district. But then, in '72, it was a totally different campaign, because Scoop Jackson brought in John Hempelmann to run. He had worked in the summer for Scoop, and Scoop had this idea that it would help his presidential election if he were to have a solid Democratic state—it would show coattails. And he was pretty close to it. It would have been the only state north of the Mason-Dixon Line that would have been one hundred percent. And since this was a pretty good district for Democrats, why, it looked pretty possible. And it was.

AK: It was a very close race in 1972.

JP: Close, yes. It was a very even-up district.

AK: What was it like to lose in 1970, your first try? You had never lost before.

JP: I had worked in campaigns we'd lost a number of times. I wasn't surprised. The general feeling was that I had done better than people expected because Pelly was an incumbent in my own party, and endorsed by labor and everybody. In the early going, people said, "Well, you'll get about twenty-

five percent of the vote."

AK: You certainly did better than that.

JP: We got forty-six and a half percent. So, we felt we'd come pretty close and we'd had a good election. We didn't have any debts. We never spent money we didn't have. So, it was pretty positive. The editorials in the papers said, "Well, it was a good try, but that's the end. Now you, Pelly, get your last two years—your twenty years—and it's time to move on."

But now, that wasn't the feeling of a lot of certain people in the party, different ones who were not keen about me coming in, and there were some real efforts after that to block me out. They went to Spellman.

AK: Was Spellman a more conservative Republican?

JP: Yes, well, yes. This is sort of the anti-Evans group who controlled King County. They went to Spellman with Boeing as the finance guy. He offered the money and Rogstad offered the organization and Pelly the incumbency, and it looked like if they had all that, anybody could win it. But John Spellman and I kind of had a face-off, and John backed off and said he wouldn't run.

AK: That must have been quite a meeting.

JP: This was Rogstad and his crew. They wanted Spellman to run.

AK: Wasn't Spellman King County executive at that time?

JP: Yes. Rogstad led the forces against Evans—that was their big thing. Spellman wasn't part of it, but they went to him and said, "Hey, you can go to Congress. We'll give you this and this and this."

AK: Instead he ran for governor. Was he already thinking of it?

JP: No, he hadn't made up his mind one way or

another. We kind of talked. So, I ran. Oh yes, they had some others—who is the guy who took me to lunch and said, “Well, we all agreed on a third party.” I would pick somebody that would be agreeable to them, they would pick somebody, but it wouldn’t be one of their own—it wouldn’t be me, it would be some third party. This was John Fluke. He took me to lunch and made this pitch.

I said I might buy it, but I doubt my people would buy it. We just plowed ahead, but there was a lot of pushing and shoving going on. That part of the party just sort of went off and did other things.

AK: Did they finally get behind you when you did run?

JP: I did get most of their votes, but they weren’t happy with me. But that’s all right. I didn’t make a big deal out of it.

AK: Well, when you did win, you were the only Republican in the delegation—the only successful Republican.

JP: Oh yes, yes! I was the only one, and so they were kind of—

AK: Stuck with you?

JP: Yes. But they went off and did other things, and then they just had to accept me. And we had our own organization and our own structure in the district where we were. They just really didn’t like Evans, and they didn’t want his kind of people in. But Slade was in office; he was attorney general. And Evans was in, and I was in. And I always tried to work very closely with Spellman and got along very well with him. So, those were the officeholders, that was what there was.

AK: It looked like the tide was going your way.

JP: Well, we were in office.

AK: That’s what counts, generally, in politics.

Now, in 1972, when you were elected, there was a newspaper quote saying, “You can’t be a Pelly, your district is different now.”

JP: I had no intention of being a Pelly. Tom worked very close to stay with the unions, but I wasn’t going to buy that. I worked on maritime issues, but I tried to maintain some independence, and one of the ways was not to take their money. Not taking any PAC money is a great help to a congressman, and we didn’t take any PAC money. And we didn’t run big-money campaigns.

Well, after the election was over in ’72, Hempelmann had come so close that everybody—you know, he was kind of the fair-haired boy and they were going to do this and that to keep him viable. So they got Mayor Uhlman to make him head of consumer affairs for the city of Seattle. He had to get his federal funds though through a committee headed up by Slade Gorton, the attorney general. His plans had to be approved, and he had a lot of trouble getting his plans approved and passing muster with Slade’s statewide committee. In the middle of it he was very anxious to push consumer affairs.

AK: Wasn’t this the heyday of Ralph Nader and his crusades?

JP: Yes, it was. And so Hempelmann came in with a proposal to do a survey on the high cost of drugs for senior citizens. It had sort of a political ring to it, you know. So the drugstores said that’s not fair to put us out here and compare one to another. Then he agreed, “All right, we’ll do a blind poll. No one will know where it’s from. You fill it out.” After the druggists got it, one of the drugstores got a call from someone who said look under the stamp on the return envelopes, and they had numbered all the envelopes that they had sent out. We were right in the middle of Watergate at this point, so Uhlman fired him, under a lot of screaming and yelling. With that, he was gone. He tried to run and everybody said, “John, forget it. You can’t do it.” So he was out.

And we worked very hard with people at home, so when we got to the next election, why, I won easily. And the result was, from then on, I wasn’t challenged.

AK: Then you could just get down to the business of Congress if you are not always looking over your shoulder—

JP: Yes, if you are perceived to be strong, then you are strong, and then you don't have to fuss with it. The coyotes, they jump on the wounded elk, not the ones that are strong, so this thing works, you know. I was very lucky and never really had a serious contest.

AK: After that close one.

JP: After that. The district became more and more Democratic, but we really never were seriously challenged. Once you get in that kind of spot—so, that was it. I only had three elections in my time that were competitive—which I call competitive—out of I don't know how many times I ran, but it must have been twelve times.

AK: Why were you the only Republican to make it, to be elected in 1972 in the state delegation?

JP: There were incumbents in there. I replaced a Republican, and then I got in there and made it a solid district. The others were all challengers that were running against incumbents. A lot of it is breaks. But if you get in where it works right, then you're accepted in your home state, or whatever it is, depending on the district.

Certainly Sid Morrison and Rod Chandler, they could have stayed there in the House as long as they wanted to and would not have been challenged. Sid was very strong. So was Rod. But one chose to run for the Senate, one chose to run for governor. By staying in the House as I did, and making it clear to all the Democrats that I would not run for the Senate, and I was not organizing to run for the Senate, they all got off my back.

They accepted that we have to have at least one Republican, because many times I was helpful to the delegation. We had to have someone on my side. You have things you've got to do. There are things you can do, and so you've got to have at least one person, one Republican.

AK: You also, perhaps, worked well with your Democratic colleagues because you often voted with them—you were certainly a moderate Republican.

JP: I made one thing clear—I voted the way I wanted to, but I sure didn't hold back in advertising any time I voted with the Democrats. I made sure I got lots of publicity. I think in many cases the perception was more than it really was, and it gets lots of attention, so I made a big thing out of it. You vote how you want, but what you can advertise and what you can talk about is something else.

And the big issue was I had gone there opposed to the Vietnam War. I had gone to Vietnam, you see.

AK: Did you go before you went to Congress, before the campaign?

JP: Yes, I went over there on my own.

AK: How did you do that?

JP: I went to a travel agent. Everybody said, you can't do this. Well, you can. Packwood gave me a letter.

AK: Did you make this trip with your congressional race in mind, though?

JP: If I had decided I was going to run, I had better go over and find out what's going on in Vietnam. So, I did that.

AK: What did you get to see? I would think there would be a number of restrictions, traveling in a war zone.

JP: Oh, I got around. One, Packwood hooked me up with the land reform effort that was going on. Then, I talked with soldiers. I had been in a war, so I knew all this war business. And I talked with all kinds of people.

I came back three weeks later and said, "We went in for the right reasons, but it's not working and we'd better get out. You can't wait to get out on our terms." They were making it extremely difficult for us to get out. So, it was kind of hanging out there and I stepped up and said, "We ought to get out." And when people would talk, I would say, "I've been there. I went over there." And if they would talk about the war, "Hey, I was

in the infantry in the South Pacific. I was in the war. I can tell you.”

AK: Your own experience gave you a credibility, a basis—

JP: Yes. So, I could say what was going on and explain why we had gotten into it. You had to thoroughly understand the history of it, the background, why we were there. It wasn’t a pleasant choice. No, it was a very sad thing.

I took that tack which immediately identified you as sort of—well, there were about twenty percent of the Republicans. The war was being supported by the majority in Congress on both sides.

But I had no feeling, no sympathy, or any connection with the young people that were raising hell. Just none. If they didn’t want to be drafted—okay, take your punishment. But that’s the law, and what really got me was the fact that we weren’t drafting across the board. If you were in college, or you were this or that, there were so many ways out.

AK: It became a matter of class—the lower class had fewer ways to avoid the draft, so they were disproportionately sent over.

JP: Yes, it was. Also, a lot of hell raising on it was just hell raising, because it was the sixties and it was a great excuse to go out—it was the excuse for everything. So, I really felt tough about those young students. As long as our troops were there, we ought to get them out, but this business—I really believed a lot of that prolonged the war. I know in Congress it did not help to have people sitting in and stopping traffic and all that. It just made them mad. I think it is a misreading of history to think that the so-called young people’s demonstrations really helped stop the war. Or, who was the gal who went to North Vietnam?

AK: Jane Fonda?

JP: Oh yes—I would put her jail, see! I mean, I really would! I just think that is awful to make common cause with people when your own troops

are out there. I just—so, I had nothing to do with these “peaceniks,” but I was standing up for getting us out. I felt we ought to get out and all that, and I did not back off when I got to Congress when the heat was on.

AK: Your own son was drafted, I understand.

JP: Yes, he was about the last guy to get drafted. And he would have gone to Canada, but he didn’t want to embarrass me. He got in, and then the war was really over. But he did go into the National Guard. He did his year of service, and then belonged to the reserve, or one of those.

AK: So he didn’t have to go to Vietnam then?

JP: No, because it was over before he would have gone through the training and everything. And he would have gone to Canada before he had gone, but he didn’t want to embarrass me, and he knew it would embarrass me. What he did was, he did his basic training, and he did his thing and then was two years in the reserve—his monthly or weekly camp, summer camp. He’d go for all that stuff. All because his old man was in office!

AK: I was just thinking about how your own kids were of that generation. Did they talk with you about this issue?

JP: My daughter was overseas on a student abroad program in Greece, and Frank was in college. But, we all talked. They thought it was nuts and we ought to stop the war. My mother was the best. She said, “Enough’s enough!”

AK: I just wondered if you were influenced by your family, by your own children’s views.

JP: No, I don’t think so. I don’t believe that young people have any great knowledge. I gave a talk at Seattle University and said, “No, you have got to learn patience. Experience.” This idea that young people had some new knowledge in something, I thought was just nonsense. They can—all this business—ugh, you know, give me a break. Go do your reading. That was my attitude toward them. No, I didn’t think they brought any new

insights into it. But I was not a lover of the new—

The people that stopped the war—what really stopped the war were the body bags going home and people saying, “What for?” It didn’t have to do with all this, but that got the publicity. What changed it was a majority said, “We want out of this thing. It isn’t worth it.” And it wasn’t.

There were a lot of reasons. It is very difficult when you don’t have a line. Now, in Korea, there were never any people behind the lines that supported the North Koreans. It was the Army, and you were either winning or losing, moving forward, or not. This thing in Vietnam, you didn’t know who was for what or who, and it was impossible.

AK: Certainly Vietnam overshadowed this whole period. Were there other issues that had that same influence as you were moving into the national arena?

JP: The other big issue was Watergate and whether you were going to support the president.

AK: When did that emerge as an issue—at what point did it become a matter to deal with?

JP: Well, it happened during the election. I was asked about it. It broke the day Hempelmann and I were debating on TV. That was the first question they asked me in the debate, something about, “What about it?”

It was kind of a “what happened and who knew what, da, da, da?” and I said, “Well, a lot of people don’t like Dick Nixon. He’s a very controversial person, but nobody ever said he was dumb, and this is one of the dumbest things I ever heard. I can’t believe that Nixon, who is as smart as can be in politics, would have anything to do with it. I don’t know.”

And Hempelmann said, “Well, yes, he’s a bad guy, but, yes, he’s too smart for this,” and we went on.

AK: It’s too bad you weren’t right about that—it was incredible.

JP: And it was such a tiny thing. They wanted to find out how much money Howard Hughes was

giving the Democratic Party, and so they said, “We’ll go down and look at the books. We can do that.” And they had a stakeout so that if the police came, they would get out of there. The trouble was, the police car was short on gas, so one of the policemen said, “Oh, just take my own car. We’ll drive over.” And so they drove by—and on that whole thing—

So, I was back there in that. But, once it got started, which is very easy, once it gets started, then—And when they got the money for the guys that had been put in the local prison, instead of getting safe money, they went in and took money out of the presidential campaign money, that had come from a bank. So, now they had to say, “Oh, that’s part of the CIA.” God, it was just incredible!

But there we were, and I would not sign up with a lot of them and say, “We know the president is innocent.” I said, “I don’t know. We are going to have to wait and see.” So, it was played that way.

Being the only Republican back there—and both senators Democrats—why, we got the pressure on us. But I said, “Well, we’re going to see.” So it made it seem as if I was being tough, when what I was doing was just saying I’m not going to make a decision until they bring it to us.

AK: So the press portrayed you as a maverick Republican, and you were just trying to be judicious?

JP: Yes. If we’re going to play a judicial role on the floor and make a decision whether we send it to the Senate floor for impeachment, why, we have to reserve judgment until we get all of it. And I refused to say anything, and they made a big deal out of it at home, and in the long run it was helpful to me. It was, again, something that made it look like I wasn’t a down-the-line party member. And, of course, the public—anywhere, but particularly in this state—they loved that.

AK: This state is well known to be independent-minded, yes.

JP: Yes, and all I was doing was normal. But they made a thing out of it because there were others in there, in the caucus, who were pushing. And

they had this big thing to sign—a postcard. Sign the postcard that says to the president, “We know you are innocent.” I said, “I can’t do that.” Well, that got attention: “Pritchard refuses to back President.”

AK: When you are caught in the middle of something like that—something potentially inflammatory—do the possible press headlines flash through your mind?

JP: No, we were just doing our stuff.

AK: I know we will return to the subject of the Nixon presidency, but before we delve too deeply into that subject, I’d like to hear about your debut as a congressman, what your feelings were about this new chapter in your life. I understand that you flew to Washington, D.C. on New Year’s Day. You were then forty-seven years old.

JP: Oh, a freshman congressman is nothing—let me tell you—nothing. And I was the last one to be elected.

AK: So did everyone else have their assignments and offices, and all?

JP: Oh yes. They had all gotten in, and then the guy wouldn’t park my car because he had Hempelmann on the parking roster, not Pritchard. I loved it! I got the biggest kick out of that. He wouldn’t let me in—they said no. I said, “Where’s my parking?” Finally, I said, “No, he lost. I won.” That was great fun.

Another story—a guy gave us two football tickets to the pro football game, a friend of mine. He couldn’t go at the last minute and he said, “Hey, I can’t use these, here.” And so we went out there, and it was so cold—so cold that at half time, we quit. We left. I said, “I’m just dying,” and this other guy said, “I’m freezing to death.” Then we got out there in the parking lot, and it was a rented car and I couldn’t remember what the car looked like. We walked up and down those parking rows. We were saying, “It was a dark car—” You know, I’d come in the night before, and got the car—and, oh God, I remember walking and walking.

AK: Oh no. Did you have to try different cars?

JP: No, no. There was this enormous parking lot, and we had just parked and gone in. Then we were out there, and I remember wandering around freezing to death, thinking, “Let’s see, which one? Down here?”

AK: Well, you were off to a good start—keeps you humble!

JP: Yes. But I knew people and I quickly made some great friends. Jerry Ford was there. He’s the nicest guy in the world, very nice. He was the minority leader, and I went over to see him.

In 1972 we had a really good class, our freshman class. It was a pretty big class for Republicans. We had a strong class, a lot of good guys in it—Trent Lott and Thad Cochran and all these different guys.

I had some great friends in there, and we immediately started doing things. It’s easy when you’re in the minority, a freshman in the minority. It isn’t hard if you use your brains at all. The expectation of people isn’t very great and so you get out there and hustle and work and do things and be active.

I was very disappointed I couldn’t get on foreign relations. I didn’t advertise the fact, but I was. It took me five years to get on foreign relations, because that’s what I really wanted to get into. And finally, I did.

AK: Were you interested in that committee because of your experience in Vietnam, what you had learned there?

JP: Just generally. I had always been a great reader of history, and that was my great interest.

AK: Was that something that drew you to Congress? I mean, there’s not much call for foreign affairs at the state level.

JP: I really enjoyed national issues and was able to put a lot of time into them. I thoroughly enjoyed Congress.

But we thought we’d be in a very hard reelection, so, boy, I was back out to my district—

I came back and back.

AK: How often would you fly back to Washington?

JP: Every other week. You have to do it—sometimes you do it every week. You're flying, flying, flying. After the first year—that first election—I stopped flying that red-eye because it's really hard on you.

AK: It sounds pretty grueling. And then you'd arrive all bleary-eyed.

JP: It was dumb. I don't think it's good to do that.

But, like I said, I thoroughly enjoyed Congress. I loved the work, the issues, the people. My class was full of bright, highly intelligent people, and most of them had great integrity, just a really high level of citizenship.

And I was very lucky in that I went into the Wednesday Group, which was thirty Republicans. I got taken in there, and that really helped me because I was all alone in my delegation—the only Republican. John Dellenback was very active in it and he helped me. I later became the chairman of it, for three years. It was a big activity of mine.

AK: Tell me about this group. What kinds of things did you do?

JP: You'd have a discussion once a week. You'd gather, and then we moved into where we had retreats, where we could bring national speakers and that, and go off on a subject for a weekend. I found it very stimulating, very bright. There were some wonderful people.

There are so many things you can do if you like issues and that. When I first got there, the Library of Congress had a whole series on issues and I went to every one of them. There weren't a lot of congressmen that went, but I did. I found

that once a week, to go in there, it was learning—you would get into an issue and bring people in and ask questions. If you're curious about things, why, there is just no end to what you can learn.

And the committee work—of course, when you're in the minority and you're a freshman, you have time. So, you can really put the time in. I spent lots of time on the floor, listening to the debate. Well, I just really felt like I had found a place that fit what I like to do, what really got me going. I loved the issues, I loved the discussion, I loved the whole bit!

AK: Did you find it a quantum leap from working at the state level?

JP: It's about like baseball, going from the lower league to a higher, bigger league. The people are smarter. The staff are smarter. The debates are a little tougher. Everything is a little tougher. There are people in the state Legislature clearly as smart as a congressman, but it's a little faster ball game, and that adds a certain extra zest to it. It's more competitive and I'm a very competitive person. I love the challenge.

AK: What happened to your business life? Wasn't Congress a full-time commitment?

JP: Oh yes, yes. As soon as I went off to Congress, that was the end. I was out of the business.* But I had enjoyed it—I had been twenty-five years in the envelope business and had a wonderful gang of fellows that we'd built up over a period of time in that business. My brother remained in it the rest of the time.

AK: So you never came back to the business?

JP: No, I never did.

AK: Then all you had was your congressional salary? I understand that it is quite expensive to

***Anne Kilgannon:** When Joel went to Congress, he resigned from the company?

Frank Pritchard: Oh yes. He had to. Not only that, he and I both had some stock in the company, not much, but he sold that out so there would be no conflicts of any kind.

AK: So, then he had no other income except his congressional salary?

FP: That's right. In fact, when he went to Congress, he had a nice little portfolio of stocks, but he cashed all that in so there wasn't any way anybody could say, "Well, he voted for this because he had ten shares of IBM or whatever. And you don't make a lot of money in Congress, I'll tell you."

AK: And it's quite expensive to live back there, too.

FP: It's terribly expensive. The only good thing is that they've got a whale of a pension plan. He had to live on what he made.

AK: Well, he seemed completely uninterested in money—

FP: That's true, he had no interest in money, but he had a great feeling about debt. He never wanted to be in debt, and he was quite frugal without thinking about it. This goes back to our father in the Depression years.

Even down here in Olympia, when he was lieutenant governor, I used to think he was nuts, but he let his secretary, Carol Hudson, handle his checkbook and everything.

AK: Well, those are details—

FP: I don't think he ever reconciled a bank statement. He relied on his staff: "They're doing it, they'll do it right, it'll be alright."

AK: And it worked out.

FP: As long as you have a secretary!

live in D.C.

JP: It is, but I had a little bit of stock in this company and over the next four years I was paid off that. So it gave me a little extra money, which was very helpful because the kids were in college and all that.

AK: I read that you had to give up your home in Seattle and then just had your summer home on Bainbridge Island.

JP: Oh yes. It was a pain. The saddest thing was I got in the Boeing slump and I had to sell it—I didn't do very well. But the biggest thing was getting it sold and getting it out of there, a pain in the neck. But we had this little place over at Bainbridge, which was just fine. And I stayed at Kirby Torrance's place.

AK: So when you flew back to Seattle, you wouldn't have a home to go to—

JP: Well, in summertime, you can go anywhere you want. The kids used the beach place. But I didn't live there. I lived in town. When you're in Congress, it just takes up all your time, your energy, everything. So, I stayed at Kirby Torrance's quite a bit. He had a coach house over at his place—he called it a coach house, but it was an apartment over a garage. It had a ladder and everything. It was very adequate and I could stay there a lot. Bob Davidson and I had an apartment up on the side of Queen Anne for a year or two, and we shared that. He was my administrative assistant and so we would both use it. It was on the side of Queen Anne, just a little, little place, halfway up the Counterbalance. It was kind of a basement, but it was adequate.

AK: Besides your business life, I imagine the move to Congress had a big impact on your family life.

JP: Yes. It is very difficult for people that have children. My kids were up in college, except my youngest one. She was in high school. She stayed and went to high school there, in D.C. But, if I had to do it over, I would have lived right in D.C. I lived out in northern Virginia, close to where her school was, which was a long way into town. It wasn't too bad for me, but it added to the fact that my wife didn't get very involved in things.

AK: Just too much distance?

JP: Yes. Now, she didn't like politics particularly, and didn't really get involved. It's a very difficult place. The thing to do is to get involved.

AK: It's a whole culture—

JP: Yes—get involved and be involved and have some activity that you enjoy and that so that it takes on some meaning. So, well, it wasn't very long, she moved back to Ohio, where she was from, and then we got a divorce.

It's very difficult for people that have children. I have serious questions about people who move back there with little kids, because they are either there or the kids are out in the district. Wherever you go, it's a big stretch. I think it is. I think they can be in lots of political things, but I think they ought to wait until their kids are up, at least up in high school. I think it is very disruptive, and I think it's very hard on the spouses. It's a very difficult situation for them.

AK: I read Jim Wright's biography recently and pretty much the same thing happened to him. His wife just got so tired of canceled dinners and him not coming home and him just never there. It just seems like Congress is all-consuming and you can't really have that much of a life outside of politics.

JP: Now, there are wives that thoroughly enjoyed it. They get involved; they're active. The right way to go for a wife—a spouse—is to get involved in some area that has a connection with politics or government. So they've got their good little thing they're doing and working on.

AK: Yes, then they have something to do, something that is their own.

JP: Some role to play, but it's not easy. It's very hard.

AK: Did this family issue, this stress happen to a lot of people?

JP: Yes, quite a few. And it depends where the kids are and all. But I think it's a very difficult thing and when I see somebody with little children I just think, "Hey, go do other things." It is possible, but oftentimes it is very difficult, particularly if you are from the West Coast. Now, Congress is structured—or used to always be structured—on the basis of living right close in. Somebody an hour flight anywhere up or south or north. But, when you go across time zones, I think it's very difficult, very difficult.

AK: All that takes a lot of stamina. How did you keep in shape?

JP: Physically? Oh, that's not tough. I played in the gym a lot. It's a great way to make friends.*

AK: That was primarily a male-only arena, I assume?

JP: Well, it was. You didn't have that many women.

Sports are a help to a fellow. When I went in the service, we started playing on a company basketball team. And I went to Marietta College and started playing on the football team. Then everybody knows you—it's a help.

And I could play sports—I played on the

***Frank Pritchard:** He and I did a lot of mountain climbing and we did it with friends. In most cases, they were people he had attracted. Wherever he went, he would build a group, it seemed.

Anne Kilgannon: He had to have someone to play with—tennis, and whatever. That seemed very important to him.

FP: It was very good. He and I both had gone through life feeling that exercise and physical activities were important, but we did it differently. He loved games, and whatever he was doing, he always made a game out of it. To get him out and run five miles like I do, or did before I had my accident, to work out alone—he didn't like working out on equipment.

On the other hand, I've been working out all these years, usually alone. I can remember going out and running around Mercer Island ten miles in the rain and snow. People say to you, "Gee, wasn't that marathon tough?" You'd think, "Yes, but not near as tough as going out all by yourself on a Saturday morning, when you'd rather be in bed, and running in the rain." That's kind of the difference.

Over the years, I would be working out in a gym all by myself, and he'd be on the tennis court with people, playing. That was kind of his *modus operandi*. But he stayed in good shape. He did enough so that he was active.

The interesting thing is, he's the one that got me doing this. I remember—and this goes back to about 1957 or 1958, we were walking up Madison, which is pretty steep, and I was huffing and puffing. He stopped and he looked at me and he said, "You ought to start working out." I hadn't had any real exercise since college. I said that I thought that was a pretty good idea. So, the next day I signed up at a muscle factory, and I and some of the guys at the office would go over every few days and work out. I've been doing it ever since.

He and I would suggest things to each other and very often do them. If someone else had said that—

AK: Well, that would be a different matter.

FP: Yes, but he had suggested it, and it made sense. And it worked.

AK: Maybe he knew just the right moment.

baseball team, I played on the tennis team, I was in the track meet. I played a lot of tennis in Congress. I hadn't played tennis since I was a sophomore, no, junior, in high school. But I got started again and love to play! I played a lot—we'd have tennis tournaments and all.

And then, I played tennis with a lot of different people in Washington, and you know, it does help. I played with George Bush, and this guy and that guy, and all the rest of them. If you can play well enough—and I'm no great tennis player, but I can play well enough—you're in the game.

AK: Does it help break down barriers, build camaraderie?

JP: Oh sure. You get a chance to be with people, you know, go down and play paddleball and then the next day we're in a meeting, and, see, he's the

chairman of the committee. You get on a little different basis. No questions about it. I made a lot of connections. I played, I enjoyed it—and you do get to be, as the old story goes, "one of the boys."

There's a whole lot of facets to being successful—how well you do, or what.

AK: It sounds very effective.

JP: Effective, yes. And it's part of your relations with other members. There's a variety of things that go into that: how you deal with them, and people have got to keep their egos under control, and they have got to keep their staff—how many you have, how you direct them—don't let your staff do this promotion of you, which they'll do, thinking they are pleasing you. I didn't do much—I didn't have a press secretary after the first term. I got rid of that.

AK: Staff sounds very critical. How did you choose your staff members?

JP: My rule was: Never hire anybody you can't fire.

AK: That would be somebody you are beholden to?

JP: I would hear these guys talk about somebody, "Well, it's the state chairman's niece, and I can't fire her, but, God, she's awful." I didn't hire political people. I hire people that were bright and able. I took care of the politics, they took care of the office. We made sure we were responsive to the district. I had able people—you get bright staff people, you get good people.

AK: Your first administrative assistant was Robert—Bob—Davidson.

JP: Yes, he was the youngest AA on the Hill—twenty-three.

AK: Yet he sounded quite experienced.

JP: Well, he was a marvelous guy. He's the guy who really did the zoo in Seattle. He was just terrific; he was a bright young kid. He was Icelandic, from Kent, got a scholarship to Harvard, and he had come back and helped when we ran Bruce Chapman for city council, I guess it was. And Bob had been active, so I had him, and I had Herb Stone, who I had known in the envelope business. But Herb had also gone to Harvard, and was a tennis player, and those two people really set the tone of my office.

And then I had Maury Hausheer back with me all that time. We ran all kinds of things. We got seniors from high school, from eight different high schools, and brought them back there for a week, and had them live with our staff, and show them the whole thing. And we paid for it, you know. We raised a few bucks to pay for it all. And then we sent them back home with a slide show for them to show their school. We had all kinds of things like that. And Maury was head of the civics teachers of Puget Sound.

AK: So Maury was originally a teacher?

JP: Yes, he was a teacher. He was a bright, able guy, and he had been a legislator in Iowa years earlier. He was very able. So we got him to come back—we hauled him in.

We got these very good people. Then, if you have a good office—a good person comes in and is surrounded by good people—

And we had Steve Excell, who runs Paragon now, up there in Seattle. And he was terribly bright and smart.

So, we had these very able people. And we had a baseball team, and we had lots of fun, and we did things together.

AK: How many people did you have on staff at any one time?

JP: Congressional staffs are big. But we didn't have a big staff—nine people. You could have thirteen. I paid my people the most money I could pay them and then had fewer people.

AK: How does it work? Were you given a lump sum to work with?

JP: You get so much money, and you have the people you want. My theory was you get the very best people—we had these very bright, able people—and then you pay them.

AK: And you had Mrs. Morris, back in Seattle?

JP: Yes, Isla. She's a wonderful person—had never worked for a living—from a well-known family in Spokane. She did all these things. She was a great leader and a great person in political life in Seattle. I remember when I hired her she said, "I've never been paid before." She had never had a paid job, but she was terrific and set the tone.

We got very busy with senior citizens—we put in a senior citizen group.

AK: Was this your senior intern program?

JP: Yes, and we told them they could always spend more time than I told them, because they just loved to be around the office and doing things.

They would be in for about six months. But we made very sure that our senior interns did not work on campaigns. We would be very careful.

And we had community interns. A lot of times we had Democratic interns—we worked it so that we had a cross section of people from the community.

AK: So your office was a bit like a revolving door, bringing in people for a period of time and then cycling them back out into the community?

JP: Yes, you don't have them for too long. See, at that point, you're trapped—six months is long enough. In that time they would get a ten-day trip to Washington, D.C. and would be back there and get acquainted. It worked.

Their job was not to do policy, their job was to listen to senior citizens and go out to senior meetings and report. Not to stand up and talk. Now, they could explain a little bit, but their job was to report what was going on.

AK: Bring the information back to you—their concerns and whatnot?

JP: That's right.

AK: You say in your literature that working on senior issues was one of your goals as a congressman. What was happening to make that such a focus?

JP: Yes, we worked very hard on senior issues. But it was just the usual. We were just a little ahead of the curve on that one. But in some ways I think we've gone overboard on giving seniors benefits.

AK: Many of them are not exactly needy.

JP: No, and poverty is no longer a hearing aid, it's a baby bottle. Now, I get on the bus, it's twenty-five cents because I'm a senior in Seattle. Well, that's wrong! But that's the way it is. You get on a ferry, you get a cheap deal. But it's been very popular for these political groups to do that. I wasn't very keen on the benefit deal, but I do think you build the network of people, and help,

and all the rest.

Anyway, we were very involved in that. We had some wonderful seniors who were our interns, and they were terrific. We had lots of fun with them and they enjoyed being around highly motivated, good, young people. It's that old story, you get the right kind of people and then they attract other good people and you set the standard high.

AK: Did other people also have senior interns, or was this an original idea from your office?

JP: I don't know. No, I don't think so. A lot of these things are done now, but this was a little ahead. And we put out a booklet for seniors. All these things—you know, we just went at it. So, yes, we built a base, a network of people, and we tried to do it right.

AK: I'm sure you did. Another important element—another set of relationships—that played an important role in your effectiveness as a congressman was your relationship with the rest of the state delegation. Could you describe your relationship with your colleagues?

JP: We had a very good relationship. There was Scoop Jackson and Maggie—Magnuson—over in the Senate. And then in the House there was Julia Butler Hanson, and all the ones elected in '74.

AK: That would be Lloyd Meeds, Mike McCormack, Tom Foley, Floyd Hicks, and Brock Adams.

JP: I was very close to Hicks, and I got along with all of them. They accepted the fact that there had to be at least one Republican. So, they were very helpful in that they didn't go out and really help my opponents. And they didn't encourage people to run against me. And Maggie was a great friend. We worked on things together, so that we had a great relationship. I did not run against Magnuson, and you had to kind of get these guys to understand that I wasn't going to run for the Senate.

But I had a good relationship with them, and I really enjoyed it, and we all got along great and

worked together where we could. And where I couldn't, I'd say, "Hey, I can't vote for this." And then, we didn't bad-mouth them. My staff was not a source of political bad stuff, which is often the case. We were not a political organization chewing on the others.

AK: I didn't realize that sort of practice would be standard.

JP: Well, that goes on so often. In so many states it's just constant warfare between the offices who are in one party and the offices in the other party. And they were always working for some guy to run against. It was just constant, all the time. And we were just, "No way."

AK: That must have been appreciated.

JP: Oh yes, it was. But, at the same time, when there was an open seat, then we would go to work.

AK: Well, that's different.

JP: Yes, that's right. But I would not be involved in the elections against the incumbents. No, I wasn't getting into them. And they appreciated that, and then they didn't get into mine. But, as I say, if there was an open seat, we would.

And when I left in '84, we were five and five—Dan Evans, Slade, Chandler, Morrison and myself. So I thought we got there the right way. But, if you are one out of seven or eight—

But you have people who want to do that—work against incumbents—but I don't like useless exercises, and I just wouldn't be a party to it.

AK: Your style was always more bipartisan—

JP: We worked together.

AK: What was your relationship with Senator Jackson?

JP: I was probably less connected with Scoop than with the others—our relations were cordial, but not terribly friendly. Hempelmann had been his assistant, and he had really gone on the line to get John elected. And John had lost.

AK: Awkward, yes. Were you and he able to move beyond that, recover from that, after a while?

JP: Oh yes. We just worked along and after a while we got along fine. At the end, just before he died, we had some nice talks and a relationship. I thought Scoop was a great senator. I wasn't as keen on him as a presidential candidate. They have to take some stands when they're president, with which I was less enthused.

AK: Didn't Senator Jackson adopt a more hawkish point of view than you?

JP: I thought he was a very good senator. He was a Democrat and had a one hundred percent labor record—one of the few in Congress that had it—and we had areas where we didn't agree. But that's true of everyone.

But Maggie was a charming old devil, and we were kind of *simpatico*.

AK: Was he about at the height of his power then?

JP: He was chairman of the Appropriations Committee. But, of course, when you talk about power, his influence, that has to do with getting money and things, which I'm not that thrilled about.

AK: Senator Magnuson was certainly well known for bringing home to Washington State all kinds of federal grants and projects.

JP: Oh yes, but of course, that all comes out in the whole way they ran it for forty years back there. Maggie had his way of doing it, and he was a smart guy. He just had shrewdness, native shrewdness. And he was a legislator—even when he first came out of college—he was a legislator here. Early on, why, the press said that he was one of the stars of the Legislature here. He had great charm and he was a smart cookie, and he knew how to do things and never ran against an incumbent his whole career. And he was in the right place at the right time. Things just sort of broke all the way up for him.

Well, I don't want to get into Maggie stories, but I got along very well with him. My brother

had been the campaign manager for Art Langlie when he ran against him, but Maggie was great at turning the page. He didn't hold grudges and he didn't remember slights. He told me, "One of the best things you can have in politics is a short memory."

That was his forte. He would probably have been better off if he hadn't had quite as much alcohol as he had, but he was something else.

AK: Once you got to Congress, what happened to your relationship with state-level politicians? Did you keep in touch with what was happening at the state level?

JP: Oh yes, Evans and Gorton and all the people, these were all friends of mine because we had done all this campaigning together. You are not as involved, but you know, you keep the connection—a certain amount. That just naturally flows. And it's a great resource.

I was not as close when Spellman was governor, or when Dixy was. I was never close to Dixy, and it was at a time when I was so involved in Washington, D.C. But I never understood her. I know she was ill-suited to be in the job. Lots of people don't belong in that kind of a job and she was one of them.

So, then Spellman came in as governor. I was closer to John. He had a lot of battling with the Legislature. I did try—I put on a conference in which we brought the governor and all the Republican legislators up to Hood Canal to a resort there, for a two-day conference, trying to get everybody together. I did that. We put it on trying to get people—legislative leaders—and John Spellman to all work together. Well, it didn't have any great effect—but I did try. So, I wasn't that close.

But anyway, that was what I did at that time trying to be helpful. And in the campaigns, because I didn't have any real opposition—they did run people against me—so I could be helpful to other people, and I tried to help.

AK: Would you come and make appearances for people, endorse them?

JP: Oh sure, you do that. But I'm not very

threatening, so on the campaigns I didn't come off as nasty. But I tried to be helpful, and you know, you do what you can.

AK: You say when you got to Congress, there was lots of time to learn. Were there particular people you thought of as mentors, people you watched, that you thought really knew the ropes and were skilled?

JP: A guy named Conable from New York—I thought he was the best congressman I've known, a superb person. He later headed up the World Bank.

AK: What in your mind made him, or anyone else, a superb congressman?

JP: Well, the first thing, you go into his office and there was not one political thing in his office. He had Indian art. He said, "I get enough politics. I want to at least sit away from it." He would put out a newsletter and everyone would read it because it was so good. Once a week, send it home, you know. Everyone would read Conable's because it was so good. It was so insightful. He finally just got tired of being the Republican in the minority across from Dan Rostenkowski on Ways and Means so he got out. He had a wonderful memory—he could recite poetry, Shakespeare. I asked him how he did it. He said his father had a dairy and his father would recite poetry, and while they milked the cows they would recite poetry back and forth, and he learned.

AK: What an interesting sounding person.

JP: He was a Marine, a lieutenant there in the Marines in the Pacific. He was a superb person. And Bill Frenzel, now they were both in the Wednesday Group, but Bill Frenzel was outstanding. He was good! And he was a great friend of mine. Lee Hamilton—a Democrat—I had a high regard for. He's back there now. And I really liked Mo Udall. Now, I didn't always agree with everything he did, but I really liked him, and I liked the way he operated. There were quite a number of congressmen—

What I would try to do is, on every committee,

I would try to identify somebody that I really respected and thought was really good, and who also would kind of approach things somewhat the way I did. And then I would watch their vote and what they said on a bill, and I tried to use other peoples' brains. Because, I figure, I'm not smart enough to know everything about all these committees, and all this stuff, so you pick the person that you think does—I mean, you don't automatically do what they do, but if you see them doing something, it makes you stop and check. So, on any bill, I would always check my person that was the vote guy. It didn't mean it was the ranking Republican or anything, it was just that person who was my check on the bill, or on the committee. They're sitting through the hearings, they're going through it all—and so I would use their brains. That was kind of a technique I used.

AK: It sounds pretty effective. As I was reading over the issues, I wondered how anyone would master such a variety of topics.

JP: Well, there are some of them that do it all out of their own little staff. I think that's quite dangerous, because these staff get quite caught up with themselves and have their own little prejudices and all of this. After a while, you know, you get to know who you can trust, who you don't, and what you know. And you've got to do a lot of reading. You've got to read what's going on—you've got to be up on what's going on.

AK: Were newspapers useful guides, sources of good information and views?

JP: You do read the *Washington Post*, the *New York Times*, and the *Wall Street Journal*, and the *Christian Science Monitor*—very good on foreign policy. I always had those papers. And, if you are interested in things, you get a connection with people, and you start to build that network of people and ideas, so you feel comfortable.

My theory is, if you only have your own vote, why, you're not much. You can't do anything with one vote anyway.

AK: So the way to accomplish things is to build coalitions with people?

JP: Yes, and you have to feel that when you do something, why, you're going to carry some votes with you. I worked a lot with Al Gore on the missile program [*please see article "Beyond the Freeze," in Appendix D*]. I really liked what he did there. We worked very well together.

You know, you build some coalitions, and you have some groups, and you take on some battles. I took on the tobacco subsidy because my roommate had all the information, but with the dairy farmers on his committee, they'd just kill him. The tobacco boys on Agriculture would have killed my friend's dairy deal.

AK: Which congressman was this?

JP: Tim Petri—very able. He was a very smart guy. He was my roommate for two, three years. He's in Congress now. But he gave me good leads on information. I suppose of the most enjoyable fights I had—two were losing—one was trying to stop the tobacco subsidy. We came fairly close.

And an even bigger one was the Tennessee-Tombigbee Canal—the ultimate boondoggle, awful. And again, we came close. We did hold it down some. I don't know how many millions of dollars we cut. That was great fun, because you take on all the powers. They came in and they wanted to put Chittenden Locks under question—whether the Seattle locks would operate any more. Well, it was a joke. They were just trying to scare you, you know. I think we did hold up the second phase of what they were trying to do down there—it was just awful! But, anyway, that was two that we lost.

Two smaller battles I was very involved in, one was when Congress tried to take the top floor of the new Library of Congress. We defeated that. That was great fun. Maury came back that summer, and my daughter was involved, and we helped all the librarians, and we got librarians—particularly college librarians—all over the country to start bombarding Congress. And we won that one!

And the other battle was when they were going to move out the west wall of the Capitol and put in offices for the committee chairmen—at enormous expense, and do away with that original wall that Jefferson had laid. We killed

that one, which was great fun, after the committee chairmen all sat down with the boys and decided they were going to do this. I stopped that. I have a very nice award from the Architects of America. They gave me a little award for that, and that was kind of nice.

AK: Yes. I noticed that several times, throughout your career, you weighed in on the side of historic preservationists. It's a theme that runs through your record. Can you tell me what preservation means to you?

JP: I think it is very, very important. History—you have to maintain history. Oh yes, I've been involved in a lot of that. You have to respect your history and understand your history if you're

going to make proper decisions.

AK: Of course, as a historian, I have to agree with that.

JP: I read history every night. I have this wonderful set of books. I ought to show you—there are all these Bruce Cattin and C.S. Forrester, and all these guys. And back in the fifties, sixties, and seventies they had this series going, and they have them now—*Heritage*. But it's not a magazine—it's not the same—they've got, oh, seven or eight stories in each book. They're good, they're well done. They're some chunk of history, and I find them delightful, balanced. And that's not easy, but these books are wonderful.

FURTHER THOUGHTS

KIRBY TORRANCE

CAMPAIGN FINANCE COMMITTEE

Kirby Torrance: I was trying to make a living as an insurance broker. I was not in politics, but Joel called me one day and wanted to know if I would have lunch with him at the Harbor Club, which was in the same building where I worked. He said he had decided that he would like to run for Congress and would I be his finance committee chairman—that was the term that he used. I said, “Gosh, you know I haven’t even thought about it, but I would certainly help you in every way.” Well anyway, to make a long story short, I agreed to do it, and but I said, “You know Joel, if you run into someone else that could be more influential or whatever in that area, I’ll be the chairman until you find somebody better.” Never did find anybody better, and so I was chairman, and then, I think for the next couple of campaigns after that. I spent a lot of time at it.

Anne Kilgannon: You must have done a good job.

KT: I told him at the time, you know, I said Frank helped me out—one of the finest times I had in all my life—so I said I would certainly help in some capacity. The truth is I did a good job.

AK: Would it be your job to track contributions?

KT: Well, my job was mainly, I guess it would be

as a facilitator. We organized a system—it was Frank’s design, and it was very successful. We didn’t know at the time that we were making anything new, it was fairly simple, really. You get ten people like myself, who would get ten people themselves each, who were supporters of Joel, who would agree to do what they could to raise funds. The first episode was to get the ten people to get the ten people to have a pledge breakfast.

AK: There would be a hundred people right off.

KT: I think that was about it, I think it was a hundred people, was the idea. You get a hundred people to contribute one hundred dollars, how much would that be? It would be \$10,000.

AK: Ten thousand dollars was quite bit of money.

KT: Well, I remember that first campaign, as I remember, we raised \$43,000. We had to play the lead, we got the ten people, and they would put this together and have meetings—go over names, who somebody would know. And so with that, my job was to help them, if I could, get the ten people that they needed, or whatever, and so we began to accumulate a list of people who would help.

AK: Wasn’t that Joel’s real strength, was that he had huge lists of people that could do things?

KT: I am coming to that. We had what we called a “pledge breakfast,” and the breakfast was very successful, and somebody at the breakfast made a pitch for the money. The amount of money we asked for was one hundred dollars. The funny thing was that we kept it at one hundred dollars for years afterward and never did change it, I don’t think. I forget who it was that made the pitch, somebody that was good on their feet, and they pledged on a card that they would give the money at some time, on the installment plan, or one hundred dollars now, or whatever. We found that anybody that pledged to give one hundred dollars—absolutely you could count on that as sure as night follows day. We never worried about that afterwards.

We didn’t know that at first, but we found

this was the case. If they said that they would do it, they would do it. Even to this day, if I have some kind of deal where we raise some money for somebody, if I say something about pledges, people say, “Well now, do we need to get a check from them or what?” I say, “Never mind, don’t worry about the money. If they say they will do it, don’t worry about getting the money now. If they say they will do it, they will do it. May have to follow up a little bit, but they will do it.” And that was an important thing to learn, because you never put any pressure on anybody. You say, “Oh fine, that’s good.”

So over time what happened was, this builds up, and we kept a list of everybody that contributed and the list grew and grew gradually. One of the techniques that we used—I did this—was to make a finance committee out of the people who donated. Most contributors gladly agreed to serve on this committee. The list snowballed and pretty soon I had a letterhead that would be clear down to the bottom of the page.

AK: Would it be an honor to be on that list at a certain point?

KT: Oh sure! All this time we’re building support and all these people here are, gee whiz—

AK: They want to be on the bandwagon?

KT: They want to be on the bandwagon. Over a period of a few years, you know, two, three, or four years, people would say, “How much money do you think we’re going to need for this campaign?” In other words, where are we going to get the money? And my answer always was, “We’ll get whatever money we will need.” But what happened was that pretty soon we had built a list of hundreds of names over a period of years, and we could go back to the same people who had given us a contribution and say, “Hey, we have this problem and we need \$20,000,” or whatever it is. “We need some more money,” and we would get it. It was like—how would you say—it was like a safety deposit box. “Oh, you need some more money?” and then we would go get it.

AK: There it is!

KT: Well, it wasn’t always that easy. But that’s what happened, and even after Joel got to Congress, you know, we never changed that one hundred dollars because we didn’t want to impose on anybody. We wanted to make it comfortable if somebody asked, “How much should I contribute?”

“Well, contribute whatever you feel like. We would like to at least have one hundred dollars.”

Well, some guy would say, “You want \$5,000?” And you knew then that something might be wrong, and so we never pressured anybody.

AK: So, say if someone wanted to give an extraordinary sum like \$5,000, would that mean that they would be trying to buy influence?

KT: Yeah! It might.

AK: So, would you turn it down?

KT: Not often, but we actually would turn down contributions. Frank and Joel, we left that up to them to decide what to do, and they would tell me, and then I would take care of it. It was done that way. This was a credit to Joel and Frank’s character, as far as politics were concerned, that if anybody ever thought for a moment that by contributing to Joel’s campaign they could buy a favor out of Joel that was not right, that was a mistake. They didn’t want the money, and as a matter of fact, I remember some customer of Frank’s printing company said that if Joel and Frank weren’t going to do so and so about some political matter, well then, they were not doing the printing. Frank said, in effect—and this is a little bit of a simplification, but the bottom line was still the same—Frank said, “If that’s the way you want to do business, we’re not for you; we won’t do your printing.” That’s the way it was.

A lot of people understood the name of the game. If you had some problem, Joel would listen to you. If it was acceptable, he would support it, and less acceptable, he wouldn’t support it—I mean—the fact that the person contributed had no influence.

Of course, we didn’t have to raise the amounts of money they do nowadays. It’s just terrible what

is happening nowadays.

AK: Well, I think you didn't use TV much then.

KT: No, we didn't. When Joel got back to Congress—he told me this—he told his friends in Congress how he raised money for his campaign, and the people couldn't believe it; they had never heard of such a thing. It was, "You've got to find some rich guy that's going to give you a bunch of money or otherwise you can't win, you know."

AK: But he did win!

KT: Yeah! I think that Frank and Joel invented that system, wherein you raised a small amount of money from a large group of people rather than a large amount of money from a few people. I was the one who facilitated it. I ran with the ball, so to speak, and helped organize the group. One of the things that I thought was very good was that list of people on the letterhead. It told people that sensible people in Seattle who were well known citizens were supporting Joel and they ought to support him also. There are a lot of people that are not active in politics and they wanted to know who to vote for. Maybe they want to help in a modest way, maybe they only want to do the contribution. So they need to have some way, and the impact of that is like a snowball. Over time, he had a list of hundreds of people that you can invite to a party, or ask for money, or for votes, or whatever.

It was like opening the safe deposit box. It wasn't that simple, but it wasn't a grandiose amount. I remember the last fund-raising meeting that I went to, when Joel ran for lieutenant governor the last time. We had a meeting of the finance committee as it existed at that time, and we met at Joel's apartment up on the First Hill. There had been some plans that if Joel got into trouble—it looked like he was going to win, but if he got into trouble and needed an advertising program on TV—we had a plan to blitz the voters just before voting time. If I remember, it was a \$60,000 item. And so we had this meeting, and by this time I'm just another member of the committee, and so we were just going to talk it

over. Everything in the campaign was going fine, and it looked like it was going to be all right, but I said, "Well, what about this emergency TV plan?"

One of the principles that the Pritchards and all of us agreed on was that we never commit to spend any money that we didn't have, so we never went in debt unless it was guaranteed by a third party. So what we did, once in a while, was—if there was an emergency and we didn't have the cash on hand—somebody on our committee would guarantee that the expense would be paid. And then we would go raise the money and reimburse the person who guaranteed the money if necessary. So I said, "Now wait a minute, what if it turns out that Joel needs this TV campaign? What about it?"

"Well, I guess we should do something about it."

"Yes, I think we should, too. We should make it possible so that we have the money available if we need it."

And so everybody agreed. Barney McCallum suggested it and I agreed, that we would all guarantee part of the \$60,000. We just passed a piece of paper around, and you put down how much you would guarantee, and then we went ahead and instructed the finance committee to raise the money that we needed. If they failed, we would be on the hook. We did that.

But anyway, as it turned out, that was Joel's last campaign, and it turned out we didn't need the money; we didn't have to spend the money. That's how we did things.

AK: Very low key!

STEVE EXCELL

PELLEY CAMPAIGN 1970

Steve Excell was interviewed on April 23, 1998. He first met Joel Pritchard in the fall of 1967, when Senator Pritchard was on the University of Washington campus participating in a political debate. Steve and his future wife, Patsy, both students at the time, were in the audience.

Steve recalled: I was a young college

Republican type, which was a rare breed in those days when everyone was protesting the war in Vietnam. There were Students for a Democratic Society and the Black Panthers, and probably the smallest political group on any college campus in those days was the Young Republicans, or College Republicans, as they came to call themselves.

There was a debate between state Senator Joel Pritchard and Representative Joe McGavick, both of whom have since become dear friends. It was over the eighteen-year-old vote. Joel was in favor of the eighteen-year-old vote, which was a hot issue because of Vietnam drafting so many young people, yet they were not being represented by the vote. Joe McGavick took the classic, conservative position why eighteen-year-olds shouldn't vote. We were in the audience, and walking out of there we said, "If Joel Pritchard runs for anything, we're going to support him." So, we did.

We met him and got to talk to him afterwards. We communicated with him and got to know him as a state senator. We kept in communication, and it became part of a long friendship.

Steve worked on Joel Pritchard's first congressional campaign in 1970, and became an early staff member when Joel was elected to Congress in 1972.

Steve Excell: Tom Pelly was a nice fellow. He was not a mover and a shaker, he was kind of the old guard of Congress. He was getting up in years, and he openly talked a lot about how he wanted to run for one more term only, because it would be good for his retirement.

Probably his only major accomplishment at the time was getting the federal money for the Shilshole breakwater and marina, helping the Port of Seattle. He was viewed as part of the old, stodgy Congress, the old seniority system, as not being effective even as a minority member in trying to shape the national agenda.

In those days in Seattle there were a lot of younger business people who were up and coming movers and shakers, active in city council and mayoral races. A lot of them ran as citizen legislators, left their businesses and professions, and went down to Olympia to serve in the

Legislature, when it was truly an all-citizen Legislature.

Interestingly enough, Joel Pritchard and Frank Pritchard and a number of his friends were early Pelly supporters in the early fifties, when Taft and Eisenhower and others were stalwarts in the Republican Party. But it just became a time when enough was enough. Joel thought twelve years in office for anyone was more than enough.

Anne Kilgannon: That seemed to be the magic number for him.

SE: Yes, the magic number. By that time he had served a term as senator and six terms as a House member, and he said, "Turn it over to younger folks with young ideas and more energy, and get the hell out of town." That's something that has kept with Joel throughout his entire career. Whether it was business or Congress or lieutenant governor, don't overstay your welcome. Frank Pritchard always used to joke: "Joel, know when to get out of town so you don't embarrass the family." It was almost part of the family ethic—get in and make a difference, and then know when to quit. Don't use it as a sinecure for your retirement.

In some respects, the race against Pelly was also a race about styles. It was kind of the stodgy, plodding, life-long employment in government in one job, versus go in and make a short-term difference being a responsible reformer. But knowing when to quit and pass the reins over to somebody else.

Interestingly, in the Pelly race, Joel ran against the old Congress, which was in those days controlled by the Democrats. Almost every committee in Congress was controlled by a Southerner—ever since Reconstruction.

AK: That's a long time.

SE: Yes, they sent Democrats to Congress and it became a tradition. They had lots of seniority, so they took over the committee structure. I remember during that campaign, we held a press conference against the southern-dominated seniority system in Congress by having a press conference in front of the Kentucky Fried Chicken

stand on Aurora Avenue. I don't know if the Kentucky Fried Chicken stand is still there, but it was a good backdrop in those days to make the point that a handful of southern states should not be controlling both houses of Congress.

That race was a heartbreaker. I have to admit, of many, many dozens of political races I've been involved with during the years, that was the most fun. And you really felt you were working for reform.

AK: Did you feel you really could win in 1970, or was it just a good try?

SE: We thought we could win, and nobody told us we couldn't.

This was also during the time that the civil rights movement had blossomed. And it was the time that the environmental movement was starting. It was the time that people were getting active against the war in Vietnam. There was a feeling that public involvement could change the course of history, and you weren't just doing what you did last year and in previous years. There was more of an activist feeling that you could actually make a difference.

AK: The solid ice was breaking?

SE: Yes. Anyway, it was a very good race. I'll give you an example of things: Joel was very careful never to attack Tom Pelly, personally. Yet, he was quite attackable. Pelly was afraid of flying. So, here's the congressman who represents the First Congressional District when it used to represent half of Seattle—Boeing, the jet city—and he took the train back and forth. We figured out that Tom Pelly had spent over one term of Congress just riding the train. But Joel refused to use it, so I remember taking that information and putting it in a plain, brown envelope and mailing it to the Democrat in the race. I said, "I've been hours finding this out, and I'll be damned if we're not going to use it." It turns out the opponent in the race ended up going down to the train station and greeting Pelly. Pelly ended up, poor guy, running down the train tracks into the Seattle tunnel because all these Democrats were down there picketing poor Tom Pelly.

Some of those things are the falderal that happens in campaigns that Joel never would have blessed if he had known about them. But those of us who were young Turks at the time didn't have the same class Joel did.

We had fun in that campaign. It was a good campaign—hard fought, but it was just not meant to be.

AK: Not quite. I understand that you went back to D.C. and moled your way into Congressman Pelly's office and tried to find out what his positions and record were. Could you tell me about that?

SE: It was kind of funny. I was in my last year at the University of Washington, and there was a special studies program to go back to Washington, D.C. for a quarter. It turned out to be a very historic quarter, because it was right after Kent State. Everybody wanted to talk to students—any student from any place. We met with Wally Hinkel, the Secretary of the Interior, the Friday before he resigned from the Nixon administration over Vietnam on that following Monday. And we met with Mike Mansfield, the majority leader of the Senate. It was just a meeting of students—if you said you were a college student, they wanted to talk with you.

That quarter I spent doing opposition research on Pelly's voting record and all that kind of stuff. One of the ironies is, one of my roommates in this group—we stayed at the old Dodge House Hotel, long since torn down—was Mike McKay, who later became the U.S. attorney for western Washington and a good friend. He was working as an intern in Pelly's office that quarter. He used to come home talking about "that doddering guy, nice guy, but, boy, not effective."

AK: And you, were you writing this all down?

SE: I was making mental notes of all this. This is a funny anecdote that I've told Mike. He went back to work in the Pelly race that summer and I went back to work in the Pritchard race, and we needed to know Pelly's position on what was emerging as the two-hundred-mile limit on fishing at that time, which later became the Magnuson

Conservation Act. So, I called Pelly's office and the person who answered the phone said, "Congressman Pelly's office, Mike McKay speaking."

I thought, "Oh, no, here's my old college friend." So I said, "This is Sven Swenson in Ballard. I'd like to know what the congressman's position is on the two-hundred-mile limit."

"Oh, Mr. Pelly supports that," and "he's working this and doing that."

I'm writing all this down, so he says, okay, that's where he is. That tells you the kind of fun you can have when you're a starving college student in campaigns.

I did accumulate a ton of information. Not just in opposition research, but on issues—where the federal spending was. This was before people really got a handle on federal spending. Where Vietnam was—everything effecting wheat farmers to soup to nuts.

AK: Would this help Joel figure out his own positions and what he was going to do? Did he have a particular focus, that when he went to Congress he wanted to do certain things? Or was he just generally interested in national affairs?

SE: He was interested in a lot of things. He was pretty much a Renaissance man in that he could be a good generalist and just apply common sense. As a citizen legislator I think it surprised him how specialized Congress was. People get on committees and spend their entire career on nothing but pension issues, or some obscure tax issue, or they're on the Defense committee, and they're not even dealing with defense—their specialty is military intelligence. So, they get into these subcommittees. I think Joel was quite surprised at how specialized it was. I don't think that hit him until after he got back there.

The other thing that pleased him—he was quite surprised at the intellectual level, and that the smarts and life experiences were richer. This was almost like going from high school to college, when you went from the Legislature to Congress. The best of each legislature went up, or the best of each mayor or county office went to Congress. Some of the best and brightest people were there on both sides of the aisle. Joel liked that. He liked

being with people who had ideas—people that understood history. People that knew about issues. He was a constant sponge for information.

AK: He seemed to learn best from other people, not necessarily from written sources.

SE: That's right. And he didn't want to be the smartest guy—he wanted to be around the smartest guys. Joel always said, "Don't be afraid to hire people that are smarter than you." He really liked surrounding himself with people who were bright and had a lot of ideas, and were well spoken, and had very enriching life experiences. He was not one of those who had to be the smartest guy in the room, or have the spotlight on him.

If he went to a function and there were people there from the embassies, he would find that interesting. If there were mayors talking about urban problems, he'd find that interesting. Joel wasn't one of those that had to be in the limelight, or it had to be his issue. He had a wide bandwidth in terms of things he was interested in.

He had always been interested in fiscal responsibility as a general tenet of government—that no matter what you believe in, whether it's more or less social services, or more or less defense spending, or whatever it is—the dog-gone budget has to balance. I think that's a little bit of the businessman in him. Fiscal responsibility was something he believed in. He wasn't like a lot of members of Congress who were very narrowly focused. Joel was very much a generalist.

OFFICE ASSIGNMENT

Steve Excell: When Joel actually got to Congress, by the time the votes were counted in that race, there was such a slender margin, we weren't even sure that he had won. In fact, John Hempelmann had already been back there as the nominal winner before the absentees were completed.

Anne Kilgannon: What was that little time period like, that time of waiting?

SE: It was interesting. I was back there going to law school at the time, and I got the job of drawing

for office space—which I want to say was a broom closet in the Longworth Building. In fact, I think they had already engraved John Hempelmann’s name on the door—they assumed that it was going to be Hempelmann because they were trying to read the election results from election day. The count narrowed down to a few hundred votes in the end. It was one of the squeakiest elections in congressional history, one of the tightest elections. Finally, it was sometime in December, heading toward Christmas, that they finally realized that Hempelmann wasn’t going to win.

It was just a few days before drawing for office space, and what they do is, based on seniority, you move up on office space. For the entering freshman class there is no seniority, and there was this large entering class—people like Patsy Schroeder from Colorado, Trent Lott was in that class, William Cohen, who is now Secretary of Defense, was in that class. It was a huge class of people that came in as a kind of new Congress versus the old Congress.

So we drew for office space. Fishbait Miller was this good old Southern boy—he used to go catfish fishing, and he had his old 1940s car parked in a reserved spot right in front of the Capitol steps—and he ran, behind the scenes, the House of Representatives, in terms of what you got for office space and desks. He looked at me and I was a young, wet behind the ears, twenty-three year old law student at the time. He looks at me and says, “Are you Congressman Pritchard?” I said no, and he said, “Well, I heard you were a young boy.” Not that young, because Joel was in his early forties. But word was this Joel Pritchard was a young guy.

So, we drew for office space, and we got dead last. We couldn’t have gotten a worse number. By the time it came down, there was a broom closet in the attic, and there was this one down on the first floor that was a triangular-shaped building, so that it had an odd space where none of the walls were straight. Then, they gave us some extra space up in the attic that we lovingly called the cage.

AK: Did you actually work up there, or just use it for storage?

SE: We had word processors up there that ran—in those days they used to call them Robo machines, with paper tapes that are perforated. That’s how mail got answered—here’s a letter on Vietnam, here was a letter on Watergate.

AK: I understand that Joel took the small part of the office and gave the staff the large part.

SE: Yes. He never had a desk—always had a sofa, a sitting area that became the staff lunchroom. If constituents were in town, it was a place they could sit when Joel was on the floor. He thought it was demeaning to sit behind a desk and talk down to folks. He’d rather have a conversation circle, and make it into a meeting and gathering place.

CONGRESSIONAL ANECDOTE

Steve Excell: This is another great Pritchard story. Joel’s very first month in Congress was in January, and after the inauguration the next big event is that the White House has the congressional reception for all the members of Congress. It’s black tie. It’s a chance for Congress to be with the president. It’s also a chance for the new members to see Congress and the president in action, to actually go to the White House. It’s a big deal.

Joel had to go and rent a tux, because he had never owned a tux. The reception was at 7:30, and it’s 7:00, and Joel didn’t have a car. He says, “I need to get to the White House. Can you drive me?”

I said, “Sure.”

I had a red ’69 Volkswagen beetle at the time. The instructions said go to the northwest gate, blah, blah, blah, and present this card. So, we’re getting to the White House and about a block away here’s this row of black stretch limos all lined up at this gate. So we get in there with this red Volkswagen. We get to the gate, and the uniformed executive protection officer looks at the invitation and says, “Can I see your ID, please?” and Joel pulls out his congressional ID. And he says, “Okay, proceed.”

There are cars bumper to bumper going up to

the diplomatic reception room at the White House—they're all black limos. There's like ten limousines ahead of us, and here's my little red Volkswagen joining the motorcade. The Marine honor guard is opening the doors of all these black limos as they arrive at the White House entrance. Here's my filthy, dirty '69 Volkswagen red beetle, and from the car in front of us, out gets Warren Burger, chief justice of the Supreme Court, with his white mane.

All of a sudden, Joel and I realized this, driving up to the diplomatic reception room of the White House, is a big deal. We kind of blew this. We probably should have gone in the other gate. But Joel's not sweating it. He gets up there, and I said, "Do you want me to pick you up after?"

He says, "No, I'll bum a ride home with somebody."

Here he is at the White House, and he's going to bum a ride home with somebody, and he's the one that's not upset about the Volkswagen. I'm the one going, "Oh, my God, they're not going to believe this! This is embarrassing!" To Joel, it didn't matter to go to the White House reception in the only non limo. It didn't bother him at all.

VIETNAM LAND REFORM

Steve Excell: With Vietnam it was: how do you get out of a war you didn't start? The Nixon strategy was clearly to do that from a position of strength, and try to drive North Vietnam to the bargaining table, the Paris peace talks, by making the price very heavy if they didn't. And try to end the war with a truce rather than a victory or a defeat. At the same time, the Democrats who were part of the seeds of starting the war in Vietnam during the Kennedy years, their idea was: cut our losses and quit. So there was lots of strain about how to end the war, and it was starting to take its toll domestically.

And the people who were over there were disillusioned, fighting a war they weren't allowed to win. And trying to prop up several puppet governments in Vietnam—the governments never having the heart of the people, except for the merchant class in the bigger cities, because there was no land reform. Joel worked with Roy

Prosterman at the University of Washington law school, and he thought that if Vietnam was ever going to have any credibility, they were going to have to restore ownership of land back to the peasants, so they could farm.

Anne Kilgannon: How did Joel come to that understanding? It was still pretty radical for the time.

SE: Yes, it was radical. Joel bumped into Roy Prosterman at the UW and was intrigued by his thinking that you can't run an old feudal class system and have a stable government. You're going to have a series of puppet governments until the people feel they have some say. That's a bit of what the struggle was against the French, and the struggle of the North against the South, even though there were some problems with trying to use this as a toehold to spread Communism and other things. There were dialectic struggles going on, but a practical problem was that you can't disenfranchise the public from the land when you are dealing with a peasant population.

Joel was quite intrigued with land reform and some of the aid packages that went to Vietnam. He finally made several trips over there to see things at firsthand. Some of the things were quite shocking. It really came upon Joel that you could not solve Vietnam and win the hearts of the people with money—which is the classic U.S. foreign aid.

Joel had examples of going out to rice paddies and here were rusting power pumps—they had electricity, but the pumps were all sitting, rusting—they weren't connected. And here were all these Vietnamese on bicycle pumps, bicycling like mad to pump the water from one rice paddy to another, because that's the technology they understood. They did not understand electricity, they did not understand motors and pumps. So here were these old rusted bicycle pumps that were thirty years old and still being used. And all the U.S. foreign aid stuff stacked in a corner, rusting because it did not fit their culture or timeframe. There, labor is so cheap and labor is valued—and I don't have a job if I'm not on that bicycle pump. There are a lot of complications to this.

It was a time that Joel was also interested in poverty and world population—what was happening in Bangladesh, and other things around the world. I think that’s part of him becoming enamored with the Rockefellers and the Rockefeller Foundation, and the issue of how do you get a handle on world poverty in Third World countries. How do you bring Bangladesh and Ethiopia and countries like that into the industrial age? How do you get a handle on population and birth rates so the poorest of the poor don’t have five or six kids, and high infant mortality rates, and short life spans? Joel really thought it was a problem that required a solution at some point, that the world had to face up to poverty in countries that were in constant state of decay in terms of poverty getting worse, public health getting worse.

AK: He was interested in the foundation of these issues—their root causes?

SE: Yes. Vietnam was still partly a third world country, yet it wasn’t as bad as some of the poorest of the poor. When Joel went over there he realized how incredibly complex it was, and that it was not something the U.S. could control remotely with money or votes in Congress.

AK: Did Joel think that the typical American response was just clumsy and wrong-headed?

SE: Yes. And Joel’s an interesting guy—he was an infantryman during World War II, in the Pacific. I think he’s one of those guys that are profoundly proud of the military—he was proud to serve his country, but he wasn’t proud of what that war did to people. The war really impacted him in a negative way.

AK: He didn’t glorify it.

SE: No, not at all. But he respected the veterans and the sacrifices that people made in their lives to go out and win it. But it was not something he wanted to repeat for his kids—war is hell. “War is a lot easier to get into than out of,” he’d say. I think he saw Vietnam as a kind of quicksand: you got into it and now we’ve got to figure how to get out of it.

Vietnam bothered him. He was very much anti-war. And yet he wasn’t real comfortable handcuffing the president. He really respected that the president had to speak for the country, that there be one foreign policy. And yet he was uncomfortable that the war had to go on in order to set the stage for a peaceful end.

AK: He did speak out against the bombing of Cambodia and he was against the draft.

SE: Yes. He thought they ought to move toward a volunteer army and to calling out the reserves. In the reserves, basically, you had a lot of people who were professionals who were active in the reserves, but it was inconvenient to their dental practice, or whatever it was, to go fight the war in Vietnam. So you’re going to draft kids from off the street, the ones who couldn’t afford to go to college. That bothered Joel.

AK: The inequity of the issue?

SE: Yes. Bruce Chapman, a good friend of ours, wrote a book called *Wrong Men in Uniform*, which basically made that point. Joel really believed that those who signed up for the reserves ought to be called out first, before you recruit people off the streets.

And that was more his view of the eighteen-year-old vote. He thought, basically, that this was picking on the disenfranchised because they can’t fight back. Doctors and dentists and lawyers vote, and they’re in the reserves, and it’s a big disruption in their lives. That was part of this that made Joel very uncomfortable.

And yet, he didn’t want to handcuff the president from dealing with it. He had some respect that you have to have the chief executive officer and the commander-in-chief run it. So, it was a very uncomfortable, unhappy time for Joel. And, of course, he got the wrath of the anti-war movement—even though he was pretty much anti-war—because he was a Republican. Republicans were always more doubtful, and people forgot that the doggoned thing started with Kennedy, and in a serious way with McNamara escalating. Because Nixon was in office, it was, well, you’re a Republican—end it. And it wasn’t that simple.

It was messy. Those things were very un-fun.

SENIOR ISSUES

Steve Excell: Joel was old school: you respect your elders and your parents and your grandparents. Even in his first campaign, you'll see it mentioned about taking care of the elderly. Nursing homes and state institutions weren't much to scream about in the 1970s. You didn't have interim care facilities in group homes. You were either in a state hospital—a pretty stark place—or you were in a county welfare setting. The privately run nursing homes were expensive, and quite frankly, were not that good. There weren't many standards back then, and there wasn't much policing of it. So the elderly kind of got warehoused.

Joel thought there ought to be some solution around all that. He had a lot of different views about aging that was a holistic philosophy. One is that you have a responsibility to take care of your own health—eat right. Joel never drank, if he had a glass of wine it would be rare. Once or twice a year at some occasion, someone would hand him a glass of wine and he might drink it. And he did not worship food. He believed in being physically fit and going out and exercising every day. He thought you had some responsibility not to be a burden on your family. On the flip side of the coin, he thought you had a responsibility to take care of your family. And, as a society, you had to respect elders. He was very concerned about that.

Joel cared about that whole issue of how you handle aging, how we treat people, and what's the role of state and federal government to make sure people aren't out on the streets. How do you regulate nursing homes? He had friends in the nursing home business, so he saw it from all sides, from nursing home operators to the patients. And he had a number of Grey Panther types that he talked with—there was a mixed bag of folks. But it was something he thought that needed to be attacked.

Joel saw this as an issue when it wasn't an issue. People weren't yet paying attention to aging, and weren't paying attention to Social

Security and nursing home standards. He was way ahead of the curve. One thing that Joel saw was that people were living longer. He remembers his parent's set all dying at age sixty. Life expectancy before World War II was about sixty, sixty-three. Now, people were living longer and Joel saw that. He said, "This is a culture shift for America. How do we deal with it?"

He did care about the elderly issue, but I think it was one of those issues that frustrated him, because I don't think he ever found the solution. I think he defined the problem, but it's one of those things that is still eluding Congress today.

MADISON LIBRARY ISSUE

Steve Excell: The big coup d'état in the time I was there was the Madison Library battle of 1974. It happened a bit like an accidental firing of a gun setting off a war. What had happened was that the House offices were small and they were cramped, but politicians are loath to build new buildings for themselves because they catch hell at election time. So here was a building that was just breaking ground across the street for the Madison Library addition to the Library of Congress. The poor Library of Congress had all these historic manuscripts in just normal warehouses, without any protection—rotting, mildewing, all throughout the Washington, D.C. area. They had things going back to the Jefferson administration that weren't properly stored and archived.

Representative Teno Roncalio from Wyoming was House chair of the "Joint Library Committee" and he got the assignment from Speaker Carl Albert to steal the new building as a House office building. The building was really designed as a library with proper humidity controls, lighting for paper preservation, heavy floors—it was really designed as a working national library, not as a classic office building.

Joel came back into the office and said, "What a shame this is going to be. It's too bad we can't do anything about it." So the staff says—we're all looking at each other—we can do something about this. This was happening just after school got out in June, and Annie Pritchard, Joel's

daughter, had come back to be an unpaid summer intern in the office to get some experience and find out what her dad did for a living. We said, “We could save this library.”

Maury Hausheer had come back as a teacher intern, so we had two interns in the office, one of whom was the congressman’s daughter, so I figured we couldn’t get into too much trouble. I said, “Do you want to do this, or not?”

And Maury said, “What do you think Joel says?”

I said, “Let’s do it and pray for forgiveness.”

We went and arranged an appointment with Jack Anderson, the most widely read syndicated columnist at that time. Anderson was a muckraker and most congressmen hated seeing their name in his column. This is how it started careening out of control—he said, “This is a scandal!” All this time it was kind of a whisper thing in the House, and then Jack did a nationally syndicated column, talking about Congress conspiring to take over the Library of Congress building.

Then Joel said, “Oh, no, I’m in trouble now.”

A bunch of guys said, “Way to go, Joel.” Some of his friends said, “Good show, Joel.” Joel said, “I can’t believe it. Half of them like it and half of them don’t.”

I said, “Well, you don’t have to do anything more.”

But he said, “Oh, we ought to try to help.” So, Joel kind of gave us this grudging go ahead.

Maury started calling the librarians at colleges and universities. He went to the University of Wyoming and got them to get on Teno Roncalio’s case about stealing the library. May as well get those hometown librarians that are voters. Annie Pritchard and I went down to the *Washington Post* and we got the *Wall Street Journal*, and I think in a week, without a single press release or anything, we had a couple of dozen editorials in national magazines and newspapers.

We were these little, young Turks, you know—I was only twenty-three—and the next thing you know, this barrage of press hits and then Joel comes back and says, “Oh, my God, they’re beating me up.” There were some of those that wanted the office space. Joel says, “I guess we’re committed now.”

We said, “Yeah.”

He says, “I don’t want to make any enemies. I want to save the library, but I don’t want to make any enemies.”

The press kept cavalcading on this thing for about a two or three month period. Finally, Joel came in one day and said, “Oh, I’m done for now.”

I said, “What do you mean?”

He said, “Teno Roncalio went to the well of the House and announced that the Madison Library takeover is over with. And that he’s resigning as chair of the Joint Library Committee, and that not in any single thing that he’s ever been involved with in Congress has he been heaped on with such abuse by people around the United States.” And Joel said, “Oh, oh, oh.”

All of a sudden, all the press came out lauding Joel for saving the library.

Anne Kilgannon: But he believed in it?

SE: He believed in it, yes, and he encouraged us to do it. But, it was: don’t go and pick on the Speaker by name. Don’t go pick on Teno Roncalio by name. Politely try to figure out how we can stop this thing.

AK: So, he had rules of conduct for you?

SE: Oh yes. We couldn’t be nasty. And he didn’t want to get credit for all this. He didn’t want to see his name in print.

Daniel Boorstin, who was a fairly famous American historian, was the new Librarian of Congress, and his assistant Adoreen McCormick, were just eternally grateful to Joel. They had spent fifteen years planning this facility, and now that it was coming out of the ground, it was slipping from their hands. It took this young Turk, Joel Pritchard, to kind of stir the pot.

But the way Joel insisted things be done, it wasn’t personal. It was interesting—here was a guy who really took on the Speaker, and took on the committee chair, but because of Joel’s style, he didn’t want the credit. Not one press release got issued in Joel Pritchard’s name. It was done quietly, in a way that the issue was raised to be a national issue without being personal about it—classic Joel Pritchard style.

Interestingly enough, after this battle was

over, he gained a lot of respect in the House for being a force for change, because he did it the way that you don't go call names. The way you'd do it today, you'd have a ton of press conferences, and try to get on *60 Minutes*, and you'd blast the Speaker, or you'd be blasting Newt Gingrich, or you'd be blasting Trent Lott, and you'd get your point. You don't care whether you're a Republican or Democrat. By blasting the authority figure, it becomes a big scandal—a them versus us battle. But it just wouldn't be the way Joel would do it. It was: figure out how to fix this, this is a problem, and we don't call names, and we don't want the credit. So, you did things more quietly. You let the merits of the issue carry the day, not the personalities.

AK: Yet, were people aware of who worked this?

SE: Yes, they were aware, but most of these editorials never mentioned Joel by name. We kind of asked for that. This is a problem that needs to be fixed, but we don't want the credit. Classic Joel Pritchard: There's no limit to what you can accomplish if you don't care who gets the credit.

The Madison Library was this quiet campaign Joel wanted to have happen, but I think he would have preferred that it stop one level short of Teno Roncalio resigning in frustration. He would have been more pleased if he'd just happily thrown in the towel. I remember the day he walked in and Teno Roncalio had resigned. Oh, my God, it's not the Pritchard style to force a resignation. It wasn't really Joel that forced the resignation, it was just the public outcry.

AK: It was the issue—the library.

SE: It was the issue. But it was classic Joel to let the issue carry the day, not the personality. But it was a great battle.

THE WEDNESDAY GROUP

Anne Kilgannon: Quite early on, Joel joined the Wednesday Group, which became a very important connection for him. I believe he was the sole freshman to join at that time, and then, within

three years, by 1976, he's leading that group. Can you tell me more about his activities there and their significance?

Steve Excell: Yes, the Wednesday Group was the more reform-minded, more progressive-minded Republican congressmen. Pat Goldman was the executive director of the Wednesday Group, and she was pretty savvy. John Anderson, who later ran for president, was also head of the House policy group, developing policy for the minority. He was a good policy thinker, but there were a number of them—I can't remember them all now—but they were all pretty good minds. They were problem solvers: How do we get a handle on poverty? How do you get a handle on the war in Vietnam? It wasn't really a chatter group that just talked; they actually tried to think through issues on their own.

They didn't try to change the House as much as they tried to galvanize their own thinking. How did we get into Vietnam? How do we get out of Vietnam? What is the strategy? How do we work with the Democrats? How do we work with the Nixon White House administration? I don't think as the Wednesday Group they ever tried to push legislation, but it helped galvanize the thinking of some of the more progressive problem-solving-oriented members.

It was very collegial. They were not threatening to leadership or to the Democrats. At the same time, they tried to do value-added thinking and research. How do you keep from making welfare a lifetime entitlement and spreading the benefits to a wider group of people in need? Are kids more at risk than adults? They started asking fundamental questions about various topics that started reshaping thinking. I think the Wednesday Group, in some respects, had a positive impact on things that were happening in Congress.

It wasn't a radical group that was sitting there with its own agenda—take or leave it, we're not playing your game. They participated in the total process. They just used this as a way to start thinking about things, and shaping their own thinking. A lot of the issues were messy back then—civil rights was messy, Vietnam was messy. The Wednesday Group saw the Nixon administration as floundering on welfare. They were trying to

go for a negative income tax at the time. A lot of things became very topical. The environmental movement didn't exist until the early 1970s, basically, and so what was a responsible environmental policy? They started raising these issues. In previous decades, Congress didn't know what the environment was.

So, it was a very progressive group, very useful. And I think it also forged some alliances with people from different parts of the country. They were all pretty progressive in their own states, in kind of the older vintage. They were really a minority before Joel got there. Joel's class brought in more of the moderate to liberal Republican types. These were really isolated folks in previous years.

AK: It sounds like they needed a group just to keep going.

SE: Yes. I think Bill Cohen ended up joining the Wednesday Group. Over time, a lot of Joel's class joined.

AK: Would this be something you'd be invited to join, or could you self-select into the group?

SE: It's a little of both. It's kind of the political dog-sniffing—do you fit? It's that kind of thing.

AK: How did Joel come into a leadership position in that group so quickly?

SE: Joel had the knack of working well with folks. He worked well with Pat Goldman. He was willing to give up some of the control of the agenda to be the moderator. Joel filled that role very well. He had his own way of being effective with that group. I think he was probably one of the most universally liked.

In those days, there was competition among some of them—what William Proxmire was to the Senate Democrats, some of the Wednesday Group folks were to the Republicans—doing sound bites and headlines. There was one fellow from Wisconsin who had a news conference every week. There were a number of players like that, and Joel could work with them all.

The Wednesday Group was a good crucible

to do some creative thinking about tough issues. And a block of these folks later became leadership in the House and later on in the Senate. At that time it was a fairly important group.

AK: It fit with Joel's penchant for surrounding himself with bright people and learning from them.

SE: Yes, he had his antennas out. He was always a sponge for information, and the Wednesday Group was one of those valuable sources of information. It was a way to get connected to some of the people who were there before him. It was a useful experience.

ARCHITECTS AWARD FOR CAPITOL

Anne Kilgannon: Joel got an award from the Institute of American Architects for a preservation effort for the Capitol building in the early 1980s. I understand that some senators or congress people wanted to add a wing to the historic building for more office space—the seemingly perennial problem. And that, besides changing the whole façade of the building, would have disturbed the cornerstone laid by President Jefferson. Joel was able to prevent this from happening, but I was unsuccessful at discovering much more about it. It was another behind-the-scenes project. Can you tell me more about it?

Steve Excell: Yes, he worked on that. There were a number of them that helped, and he was part of the group.

The front face of the Capitol, that faces the Washington Monument, was built of soft sandstone. And the dome was in danger of collapse at some point, because the sandstone on the face was crumbling. They had to do something, structurally, with it. But the architect of the Capitol is pretty much a captive of both the Speaker and the majority leader, so you've kind of got to do their bidding. I think the architects of the Capitol, if they had their druthers, would have done a faithful, historic preservation with structural supports—which they ended up doing, eventually. The pressure came on from the leadership on both

sides: let's make the Capitol a T-wing. You would have the House and Senate wing and then there would be this huge office space wing. A whole bunch of us could have office space in the Capitol building. That would be prestigious, wouldn't it?

AK: It would be a travesty!

SE: Yes, without any respect that it's a historical building. You walk up the front steps of the Capitol, and you go on the lower level, and you immediately walk below the dome where the crypt was prepared for George Washington's body, but the family decided they wanted him in Mount Vernon, instead. There's all sorts of history attached to the front.

It is true that some senior members of Congress have hideaway offices—Maggie and Scoop each had one—in the Capitol building. They are usually down in the basement, and they're pretty dungeon-like, with battleship gray walls—not really what you'd call fancy. In those days, members could go down and have a drink and play cards, waiting for some action on the floor late at night. So, hideaway offices were one of these little prestigious things.

And now here was a chance for everyone to have an office in the Capitol building. Joel, and a number of members who were more historic preservation-oriented, were polite but constant critics, to keep heading that off. The architects around the country thought it was awful, and the National Trust for Historic Preservation. Historic preservation was just a vanguard issue at the time. The National Trust went from next to nothing as a kind of little, nonprofit to being big. And at the same time, every city started looking at—instead of urban renewal—urban preservation. There was a real turn around in that time frame.

AK: Was Joel ahead of the curve of national interest on this, or just with it?

SE: He was part of it. There were a lot of folks beginning to say, let's preserve Pioneer Square, let's preserve the Pike Place Market. He was very much in sync with preserving the best, don't preserve everything.

AK: Did Joel come to this understanding by himself, intuitively, or did he meet with Trust people or other preservationists?

SE: No, it was pretty innate. He had this innate respect for history and for preserving history, both physically and as history you can read and see. He wasn't really part of the effort to preserve Pike Place Market, and he wasn't really a part of the Pioneer Square historic preservation group, or Allied Arts and some of those. But he cross-pollinated. Alice Rooney, who was director of Allied Arts, was an intern with us for a couple of weeks back in Washington, D.C. She later headed up the Pilchuck School of Glass. So, there was some cross-pollination—some touching, tangentially.

But Joel was pretty much driven on his own by some of the history projects. He's always had a history project. I can't think of Joel, anytime in his career, that he didn't have a history project that he worked on, almost like a hobby or an avocation. He always had one.

AK: To return to the Capitol building preservation, how did this group manage to thwart the proposed expansion?

SE: Actually, quite a few members ended up signing on letters and petitions that resulted in it being stopped. I don't know if Joel did it single-handedly, but he was fighting it while I was there. There are 335 House members and one hundred senators, and I think the list of people who opposed this was about forty-five or fifty. This was the minority fighting the majority to make this happen.

CHAPTER 11

IN THE SHADOW OF VIETNAM AND WATERGATE

Joel Pritchard: I've had a rather bumpy road with the veterans from the very start. Right now they are madder than hell at me because we wouldn't go for that veterans deal.

Anne Kilgannon: Do you mean the issue of the World War II monument, all the controversy about the site and design—its placement on the Capitol campus?

JP: I've always been crossways with the veterans, but that had nothing to do with this decision. It was just that I went out there and thought, "I don't think that's the best place for it." Mike Lowry also had come to that conclusion. So my relations have not been very good because I didn't always support all the things that the veterans groups wanted.

Like when I first started as a legislator, there was an efficiency study that came in on things that the state was paying for, and one of them was we were paying half of the salaries for all the veterans officials in the state—V.F.W. officials and that. They were paid, and half their money came from the state.

Well, see, people that weren't in the war fell all over themselves to help veterans, politically, right after the war. Why the Legislature couldn't do enough—and the noisiest one of all is always the guy that wasn't there. So when I came in there was this issue, and obviously I said, "Hey, that's one way we can save some money. We shouldn't be paying their salaries." And everybody agreed, "Yeah, we shouldn't be paying it." If the American

Legion wants to have a state chairman and if they think they want to pay him, they should—but the state shouldn't.

Well, they worked this magoozle, and I said, "By God, we'll stop that." So I talked with some of my pals, Norm Ackley and some of those others, and we said, "We'll knock that out. I'll offer an amendment. By God, we'll do it."

Well, that night, I got up and all of them were up there in the gallery—they all had on those overseas hats—and when I got all done, there were only seven of us that still voted to knock it out. Ackley and Pat Comfort—all veterans, see. But the heat! And they said, "Gee, what did you get me into!" And we'd laugh about it.

But that was sort of the start with me. Then, when I ran for Congress, I remember there were five of us on the ballot. I was the only veteran and they endorsed the other four because they didn't think I was one of them.

Anyway, I think we ought to treat veterans very well if they're wounded. If they have any problem, they ought to be really taken care of. We got the GI Bill—my God, we got a special home loan. This business of forever-after, the guy gets an added deal—when he takes a state test for something he gets an advantage. See, I don't think you ought to be giving all these advantages just because you responded to the call of your country.

AK: And who knows whether you really served or just sat behind a desk?

JP: Well, of course. So, I just don't agree.

Anyway, that got me crossways with the veterans and it seems like I've been— But it had nothing to do with this decision of the memorial.

AK: Yet, it seems to me that you were very supportive on some veterans issues. All your literature during the Vietnam era is very strong in its message about accounting for POWs and making sure they weren't forgotten.

JP: Oh yes. One of the things we missed there was that people had this terrible feeling that the Chinese would come in, as they did in Korea. The truth of it is, the Russians were doing the push in

Vietnam, and the Chinese weren't. When the war was over, the Chinese and the Vietnamese had real battles. But the feeling about POWs—we couldn't just—

I didn't mind bombing them back into the Stone Age; it's just that you can't do it. You see, bombing is so overblown—whether you go back to the German war, or any of these wars, bombing always adds resistance. It makes the people tougher, in every area, London, wherever it is. You bomb people—and particularly the Vietnamese—they were good at digging. Hell, you put people down in holes, you don't do anything to them.

AK: What did you feel should have been done—how this could have been handled?

JP: It's really tough because when they made the split, why, a million North Vietnamese marched south—left their homes and went south to get away from the Communists, which is a hell of a thing for a million people. And that was a carryover from the colonial period, the French. Though we were pushing, saying to the French, "Hey, it's over. You can't do it." The French were really appealing for us to come in there and take over and all that. But we didn't.

AK: This was during Eisenhower's time?

JP: Yes, this was after the war when the French came back into Vietnam. And then they finally got the French out and it was a legitimate thing. The North had their part and the South had their part. But, of course, you're not going to have some lovely la-di-da democracy in those countries. They aren't that far along. So, there it was. And it was totally wrong for the Vietnamese to start pushing south and insisting and there wasn't any question but that Russia was putting the money, the arms and the stuff to do it.

But we were not realistic about what it would take. And then once we got in, we wanted to get out in a proper way. But the Vietcong wouldn't let us out. I mean, it was heady wine to be defeating the Americans, the biggest country in the world. The leaders in North Vietnam were so awful to their own people—their willingness to

kill people. God, they just poured those people south.

And then we were trapped with a structure of government of all these generals in the south. And then you have all the farmers—most of them are tenant farmers of the wealthy people living in Saigon. And the Catholic Church—lots of Catholic churches—they pushed a lot. They were a major force in South Vietnam. If you go back and look at who was pushing this, look at the villages—the Catholic villages that were in *LIFE Magazine*, where they were trying to hold the Vietcong out. And Cardinal Spellman playing into that, "We've got to stay there." I'm not very keen on getting religion mixed with anti-Communism, and the Catholic Church had their people in there.

The sad thing was, it's an extremely complicated deal once we started with the advisors—and that was Kennedy. After that first meeting with Khrushchev and feeling like he got kicked around, he said, "We're going to have to stand up and be tough."

And they said, "Where?"

And Kennedy said, "All right. Let's do it in Vietnam."

And so, we started sending in advisors—and we started this thing. And then you get so many in and you've got to have troops. And the other side is pushing you around, so you keep doing it, and doing it, and doing it. Americans can't sustain a long war—four or five years is as long as it goes, and we were in there seven or eight years, at least the years when we had a lot of troops. So, I can see how we moved step-by-step, and you can almost make a case for each step. In other words, you're here, and to do the next step, well, it seems to be sensible.

AK: Except in the long run—

JP: But you keep going. God, Nixon wanted to get out of that war so bad, but there's this whole other business that says, "You've got to have the honor of your country. You don't just run off." And then when you do run off, and you leave, and you know—I mean, my God, it was awful. It was very difficult for Nixon. He said, as Brinkley reported it, "I'm not going to be the first president in American history to lose a war."

AK: So he lost the country instead.

JP: Yes, that's right. And there was support, broad support for the Vietnam War all the way up—there was still a majority case in '70, '72. But everybody was trying to decide what was the best way to get out of it. But it's very hard for a country to cut and run, when we have this policy of containment.

And one of the great fallacies was the domino theory—I never bought it, but people did. It was if you collapse here, then will you collapse there. And this thing is going to roll on—

AK: Little wars all down the line of the Pacific—all the way to Australia.

JP: Well, they'd have had a little hard time getting across the water. Still, we had these horror stories, you know—if it isn't this place, it will be the next one, and you've got to stand up to them, and where are you to stand, and da, da, da.

But it was an impossible place and it was almost beyond the country's capacity at that point for it to politically stand up and say, "Hey, we made a great big mistake. We did it wrong. And all the people that have been killed the first five years was for nothing. Or all those people that are in prison—all these killings—we sent your son in and now we're just walking out because it was a mistake." You see, that's really hard.

AK: So they just kept sending more sons in, and getting in deeper and deeper.

JP: Oh course! That's right. And so what they say is, "All right. Let's make an agreement here to get ourselves out with some kind of—" Well, some kind of what? If it had been easy, it would have been done. Hell, there wasn't anybody that really wanted to keep the war going. No, there really wasn't.

AK: Besides your trip to Vietnam just before you entered Congress, have you been back there on other occasions?

JP: Oh yes, I've been back. I went there in '81, flew into Hanoi, with Representative Stephen Solarz. It was fascinating.

AK: What was the purpose of this trip?

JP: Solarz wanted to go in there. He's the chairman, and if you're a Democrat and you're chairman of a committee, you can go anywhere. He wanted to go and he wanted me to go with him, and I said, "Sure." He said it was still a mess, the power wasn't working very well. But we flew in, we got in there and it was kind of interesting.

We had some meetings with the prime minister. They were looking for money and it was, "We'll make some deals with you on people—MIAs and all this stuff—but you have to give us money."

And we said, "We're not authorized to give money, or what have you."

We then went that night to the Canadians or Australians—one of them had an embassy in there. There were a few countries that had embassies. And we were taken down into a "safe room." We went in and there were six or seven ambassadors there and they talked to us. They said, "This country is just a basket case. They are growing less rice today than they were at the height of the bombing. They know how to run a war, but they don't know how to run a country. It's a mess and they're just having a terrible time." They had taken the farmers and put them in these collectives, and it was just awful. But it was interesting to go there.

Then we flew south and landed in Saigon to refuel—you always refuel on credit in all airports, but they wouldn't do it. So we sat there for a couple of hours. We had the money. I said, "What is the story?"

The captain, or whoever it was, said, "We've got the money, but this is a violation. Everywhere you do this, but they are just trying to hassle us. We'll wait another hour. They've gone to Hanoi to give them a position."

So, we got out. We walked around that airport and it was like a ghost airport. There was one Russian plane way-way-way at the end. This was where I had flown in last time, and then it had been a regular kind of airport, you know, and now—

AK: It sounds eerie.

JP: Yes. We went in a couple of rooms where they had restaurants, and there was a bartender over there. You looked around and here was all this stuff, and it was just like a ghost thing. We walked around, and went by a place, and a woman came up and whispered to me, “Take me out.”

I said, “We can’t.”

And she said, “I worked for the Americans, and I was this and that. It’s awful, it’s awful here.”

And I said, “We can’t get you across the tarmac.” We couldn’t do that.

AK: Imagine the international fracas if you were caught!

JP: We might have done it, you know. You could have walked some clothes back there and said, “Here, put these clothes on.” But I said, “We’re not breaking the rules here, we can’t.”

AK: Think how much you would have risked.

JP: Sure, it would have been a big ho-ho, and if we had got the woman out, it would have been all kinds of publicity and a big, big deal. But that’s not—

Finally, they gave us the go-ahead and we flew out. I can remember when we went over the border, the pilot said, “Well, we’re just flying over the border now.” We were out of the country—I said, “Whew! That’s nice.”

And I went back there three years ago and spent a lot of time there.

AK: And did you see much change over those fifteen or so years?

JP: I went for four weeks and it was really impressive. All the collective farms had been chucked. They are all back to individual farms and the farmers are doing very, very well, once they got the government out of there. It’s just terrific. And nobody calls it Ho Chi Minh City, it’s all Saigon.

We went all through Vietnam and the country is doing quite well, and they are really growing. But they have so damn much corruption in their government that it is really hurting. Businesses don’t want to go in there because you get hit up

for this thing, and then that, and this, and it’s very disappointing. But the farm areas are doing very well. TVs, bricks instead of thatched huts, the people have things—motorcycles.

AK: So it’s those concrete things that you can see that reveal the true status of a country?

JP: Oh yes. The farmers are doing very well. The businesses are doing some. But it was impressive. We were in Saigon, in these different places, and it was fascinating—it really was. I spent four weeks there and it cost me \$4,200 to do it, and we worked every day doing these interviews.

AK: In what capacity did you go there?

JP: I wasn’t in Congress then, and they didn’t even know that I was a lieutenant governor, didn’t even tell them that. I just went there on the staff—I was the photographer for this group of land reform people, the Rural Development Institute. This is just something I’ve been involved in. They do this all over the world, and the head of it is right here in Seattle, Roy Prosterman. It’s a great thing.

AK: So, you went there as a private citizen? And how long have you been involved with this group?

JP: Yes, I got hooked up when I went there that very first time. I have watched this land reform thing. If you get farmers to own their own land, it’s amazing how well they do.

AK: Well, yes, then they can care about it, and make long-term plans.

JP: You bet. We were in a place, and we said, “What’s the big difference?” And the guy reached down, and he looked back up and he said, “My pig.” I always thought if I wrote a story, the story would be *My Pig*.

AK: Ownership, and the pride that goes with it—then you care for your soil, you do all the extra things.

JP: Sure, the whole thing—they’ve been very

successful. They even exported rice the last few years. But they do have a problem—their population growth is so strong, they've got millions of people, and these farms—

AK: Yes, that's a tough one. Intertwined in people's memories of Vietnam, the Vietnam era, was the Nixon presidency and then Watergate. I'd like to back up a ways and take a look at the struggles between the Ninety-third Congress and what some have called the "Imperial Presidency." In 1974, during your second term, Congress and the president were battling over the issue of executive privilege. Congress appears to have been trying to reinvent itself—carve out a new role for itself and put through some internal reforms.

JP: This is standard. It's two parties, and the Democrats were running the Congress because they just had an overwhelming victory and felt that they ought to be more assertive. It wasn't a monumental step—maybe the press was playing it. It was accentuated a little because the Vietnam War was supported by about half the Democrats and about two-thirds of the Republicans. As it got more and more into a question of supporting the president, it was a mix. It really wasn't a partisan thing as it had been with Lyndon Johnson. It was a separate thing.

AK: It seems like Congress goes through surges where the president is very strong for a while and then Congress asserts itself and brings him down a peg or two.

JP: Of course, and that always happens when the other side wins. What happened here was that the Republicans had gotten closer—I think we got up to 194 members, which is much less than what the Democrats have now in Congress. That was the highest it had been in years and years and years. The Democrats had controlled it for sixty years—it really wasn't forty like you hear—it was really sixty, because there were a couple of little blips in there. From 1930 all the way to 1994, so that's sixty-four years—a long time.

And it's a great mistake to let either party control the Legislature for more than about twelve

years at a time, because you get into all kinds of bad habits.

AK: Because you're entrenched, you get sloppy?

JP: Yes, and the old chairmen get to where they're just gods. It's a very bad situation, and then they start breaking all the rules and getting away with it.

AK: We've had several Republican presidents though, so it's not been all Democrats. And why do you think the public votes in one party for Congress and another for the presidency?

JP: Because we're the only country in the world that can. They have the parliamentary system and we don't. The public likes checks and balances, and we have a system where you can elect the president and you can elect your congressman. This was especially true after the Civil War. The South was Democratic, and if the Democrats came even close in the rest of the country, they controlled Congress. There were no Republicans coming out of the South in 1940, so it was almost a cinch that the Democrats were going to control Congress.

Then they had that other great issue that allowed them to control it—they had "bracket creep." Bracket creep allows you to take in more money without ever having to vote for it. If you're the party that believes in spending, but you never have to tax anybody—vote on raising taxes—it's just tailor-made. You just can't miss. You see, Jackson, Maggie, myself, none of us ever voted on a tax increase, but we got more money all the time. People moved into higher brackets, and when you got into the seventies, it became Middle America that was getting into these higher brackets. And they don't have the disposable income—that made a difference. Finally, we stopped bracket creep and slowed down this business. But nobody ever got beat because of the deficit.

AK: It just didn't seem to be an issue for a long time.

JP: No, everybody would say it's bad, but they

didn't want to knock off entitlements, and you have to knock off entitlements. So, there we are! What a deal!

When we talk about the parliamentary system, their weakness is that you get into multiple parties—like what's happening in Israel today. You have two or three little fringe parties and they've got big swing, because they make a difference, often, in a coalition.

AK: So the minority can control the majority?

JP: In a sense, yes. Because they say, "Look, if you don't have our eight votes, you don't have a majority." Nobody is the first vote; everybody is the last eight votes. And that is a weakness in their party system. You're much better off in government if the majority party has a real majority. Then they can put their programs through and be held accountable.

AK: When Nixon campaigned, he talked about controlling spending and taxes, and that he wanted revenue sharing. What was your position on sharing revenue?

JP: I thought it was a lot better than taking the money and spending it in Washington. Revenue sharing helped the locals. It offset taxes that the locals would have had to apply. In a perfect world, I would rather have had them cut the tax back, but with revenue sharing, the cities and counties would get money.

AK: But would they get the same amount of money as they paid out? There was an argument that the federal government was keeping more money than it was passing out.

JP: It always does—it sticks. You've got agencies and such. But the cities just loved it because it was federal money—it was free money. They didn't have to vote it.

AK: Why was revenue sharing so controversial?

JP: There were those who didn't want that money going back because they had programs in D.C. they wanted. They felt they were jeopardizing

their special programs and entitlements, and they thought that that would be a bad thing.

It was a strange collection of people that didn't like it. You had liberals who didn't like it because it possibly cut into some of their national liberal programs. And you had some conservatives that didn't like it, who said, "Hey, instead of sending the money back, don't collect the tax, and make it work." It was one of Nixon's brighter things, politically.

The conservatives and moderates in the Republican Party had been fighting for one hundred years—particularly going back to Teddy Roosevelt's time and all that. They've always had this battle that went on and on and on. Eisenhower and Taft—and then along came Nixon. If you're an old basketball player, well, the shirts thought he was a shirt, and the skins thought he was a skin. Because, by being tough on Communism, he appealed to the conservatives, while being progressive in some of his social programs, he appealed to the moderates. He straddled it and made it work.

AK: Where does Goldwater fit into this picture?

JP: Goldwater was over. He lost. He got beat badly, and Nixon wasn't going to go down that road. In fairness to Goldwater, it was right after Kennedy had been shot and all that, and they had made him out to be an extremist. Now, Goldwater was much more moderate than Reagan, but he would say tough things that could be repeated. And he wasn't as smooth and slick about how he did it, and so he came on as the hard line. So, it was luck and timing. He came in '64 and that was a great disaster—but we, here in this state, won the governorship, which was the great amazing thing.

AK: When you look at Goldwater, at Evans, at yourself, at Nixon—the Republican Party is all over the map in what it stands for.

JP: Both parties do that. When you've only got two parties—if you have five or six parties, everybody can have just what you like—but if you have two parties, the difference between, say, a southern Democrat and a liberal city guy from

Boston, you couldn't believe how far apart they spread.

AK: Nixon began the session with the Ninety-third Congress with three challenges: he refused to spend appropriated funds, claiming the right to impound money against the wishes of Congress.

JP: They went to court and forced him to spend it.

AK: That seems rather arrogant—and unconstitutional—that Congress would vote for certain programs, and then Nixon would just hold the money.

JP: I don't know if it's arrogant, it's just saying, "Hey, these programs aren't needed, and I'm not going to spend the money." But, anyway, they went to court and ruled that he couldn't do that. What he was trying to do was a good thing, it's just that he was trying to get at all those things that get jammed into bills that have nothing to do with the bill—the Christmas trees. But they wouldn't let him.

AK: The other two challenges to congressional authority were not allowing his staff to testify before congressional committees, and he refused to stop the bombing of Cambodia. You came out against the bombing.

JP: That was a big issue. I wanted to stop the war, and they wanted to stop the war. But the more you read about it, it's tough to stop, because Russia didn't really want to stop that. The hardliners didn't want to make it easy for America. It was a big deal, knocking out the number-one country in the world. They didn't mind killing two million Vietnamese—the killing went on twenty to one, you know. It was kind of a mess all the way around. It was very controversial and very hot.

But I had no respect for the Fondas—I felt real hard on all of that stuff. We had to get out of there, but it wasn't a matter of making common cause with the enemy.

AK: But tell me more about your position on Cambodia.

JP: It was expanding the war. The problem was that the Vietcong were using Cambodia as a way to run their supplies in. And here you get into this—if you're running the war you want to stop it, and if you're trying to get out of the thing, you're saying, "Yes, we can understand why you're trying to do that, but let's not expand this thing trying to stop it." I certainly didn't criticize the people on the matter of them doing something tricky—it was straightforward. It was just a matter of, does this fit our strategy of getting out?

AK: I thought that the issue was one of secrecy, of lying about the bombing?

JP: You can't run a war and everyday put out a press release about what you're going to do next week. That's another thing—hell, Congress couldn't have operated World War II if we'd have had to run down there and say, "Next week we're going to invade France."

That's why I wasn't sympathetic to those guys who published the Pentagon Papers. We were in a war and our soldiers were being killed, and I took a dim view of people that were aiding the enemy, in my opinion. But, oh God, it was a hot issue.

AK: You certainly picked a difficult and exciting time to be in Congress. What was the pressure like, of all these momentous issues?

JP: It was like any other issue. There's debate—it wasn't unpleasant, you know what I mean. It was hot debate—so many things going on—the issues.

In truth, as a freshman and a minority, your vote was important on a key vote. The Watergate issue got very important because Nixon didn't have the votes, and all of a sudden, we freshmen—they paid attention to us. You see, they were having trouble getting people to serve on the Judiciary Committee, so they stuck a bunch of freshmen on there. It just wasn't thought of as a great committee. And then about four or five months later, wow! And several of my friends

were on there—Cohen, Caldwell Butler from Virginia, and all these different guys were in my class.

AK: So when the burglaries first came to light, and then their trial, which was in January, people didn't really know, I imagine, in the beginning—but things began to come out?

JP: To start with, campaign dirty tricks, my Lord, everybody was doing them. As far as I was concerned, they were trying to find out how much money Howard Hughes had given the Democratic Party, because he was playing both parties. So they decided to run down there and look at the books.

And if that police car hadn't run out of gas, like I said, they wouldn't have taken a private car back, and if they had, they'd have gone by the stake-out standing in front of the Johnson Pancake House—and they drove right by because they were in a private car—and one thing led to another. Then they picked up the guys that put them in jail—why'd they do that?—to get them out, and they went up and got some money. The money had been given to the presidential campaign and it wasn't good money—it was real money. It had come out through some banks, some stuff down in Florida—somebody had worked a deal.

And so, with that, that turned it around. They had to say, "Well, the CIA was mixed up in it." It's sort of like a big ball of string, and as they pulled one little thing, another little thing came out. These two guys—the reporters—they kept going on and on, and it just kept unraveling. And, if it hadn't been a Democratic Congress, it never would have gone.

AK: But what did you think about it all?

JP: It was dumb. I felt like, what a dumb thing. The issue itself was nothing, but you start covering up, and so the cover-up becomes the deal rather than the event itself.

AK: What do you think Nixon should have done differently?

JP: He should have fired a couple of people and said, "Hey, that's it." But they'd just won a big election and they were dead sure they could stonewall this thing. They weren't going to impeach the president over this thing! But, as it went, it was incredible how little things became—

Then they got Cox in there, and then Nixon insisted on getting him fired. We were with Elliot Richardson the night they refused to fire him. Our group was going to have one of these "firesides" where we'd have an official person come in and talk to our political club, the Wednesday Group. And he was scheduled that night, and he said, "I'd just as soon get away from the House, anyway." So he came over, and he gave us all this background, and also told us all about getting rid of Spiro Agnew, and how important it was to get rid of Spiro.

AK: Yes, that was happening then, too.

JP: Wowie! He was taking money in the vice president's office, because he'd always been getting money from highway contractors when he was governor. And they kept bringing money to him.

We were going along—this thing was spread out, you see. It kind of went along and went along, and it kept getting a little worse, because this little cover-up hung onto that little cover-up—and on it went, and it just got worse.

AK: Once it got started, there didn't seem to be a way out.

JP: He had to get it stopped. If the other party controls the investigation, they're not going to stop it. You just keep grinding and stuff keeps dribbling out. And Cox, you see, wouldn't turn it off. That's why they wanted to get him fired. And people kept coming up with little things, and as they did, people would go down and testify. If they didn't testify, it was really tough because you had kind of built this scenario about how it is, and then it's not quite that way. And every time it jibes a little, oops, there's another mistake.

AK: Well, it just looks like people are lying and covering up something.

JP: Of course, covering up, you know.

AK: It's like a contagious disease.

JP: People were trying to get this thing done and get behind it, and they couldn't.

AK: To me, the language on the tapes—it was all pretty sordid.

JP: Nixon always talked that way. Have you ever been around Lyndon Johnson, any of those guys? Oh, my gosh!

AK: I don't think people like to think of their president as talking like that. Besides all the foul language, he came across as really small-minded, mean.

JP: They didn't know about the swearing and all that until you get way down the road. The tapes came out, that part, later. You've got to remember, Nixon wanted to be a regular guy. You go all the way back to where he didn't make the team, all of that. He was very bright. When I was around him, when freshmen would be around, he loved to talk politics.

AK: It was his life.

JP: It was his life. He had nothing else. He did nothing else. He was not a person with friends.

AK: Do you think that was, perhaps, the root of the problem? Did he lose perspective because he had nothing else?

JP: As I say, if he hadn't had the Watergate thing pop up, his management of the country—being in a minority position—was quite good. His foreign policy was excellent. Important things like what do you do with China, and what do you do in Europe? It was really good. And Kissinger was really good. They were very able.

And here they had this little pimple that was causing them all this trouble and they couldn't get it pushed aside, and at first people couldn't believe this was going to be a big problem.

AK: Should we see this as a national tragedy, in the Greek sense of the word?

JP: Yes, it was a sad thing. Lots of things in Washington, D.C. have gone on and went on that were much more serious than whether they were breaking in to look at books on how much Howard Hughes gave the Democratic Party. But the whole business of the cover-up, and then it starts coming unglued—and then things happen.

I knew some of the people. John Ehrlichman was from Seattle, a friend of mine, a very fine person. He wasn't always liked because he was kind of tough, but John was a very good person. But it was a tragedy because a whole lot of people went to jail. But once you start down the road, well, there it is. Or if you jump ship like John Dean did, then you're a pariah, and from then on everybody acts like you're a traitor. It's a no-winner. It's a sad thing.

I was listening to the tapes when they threw in the towel. It just happened that I was up there. They had a place where you could go in and listen to the tapes. A guy came in and said, "It's all over. He's quitting. He's getting out."

AK: And what did you think? How did you feel about it?

JP: At the time, I remember another fellow, Bob McCloy, we looked at each other and said, "Might as well." This thing had gotten to the point where it was damaging him as president. He couldn't operate.

Nixon, first of all, was not liked. He wasn't a popular guy. So when you get a person who's not popular and he gets in trouble, then who wants to bail him out? There's no reservoir of goodwill, of saying, "Yes, he's been terrific here, I really liked him." The press always disliked him from the very start when he went after Helen Gahagan Douglas, and then you get into Hiss, the Pumpkin Papers, all that stuff. With the press, it was wowie! It was very hard for him to ever do anything right. So there he was.

AK: What about Congress? What was the feeling in Congress?

JP: Well, of course, Congress—that’s run by the boys who want to beat him up. The situation was tailor-made for the event.

AK: All the forces came together?

JP: Yes! And enjoyed it!

AK: It was a mess—

JP: Yes, but government isn’t neat, and it’s not touch football back there.

AK: I imagine Watergate overshadowed the whole session—

JP: Vietnam and Watergate, yes. But it wasn’t so much the losing part, we’d lost. But how do we march out?

AK: How much did the POW issue prolong the war? Did it delay leaving, the concern about maybe leaving behind American soldiers?

JP: They had the prisoners of war—now, there’s a real difference between the POWs and the MIAs. I’m a little harsh on the MIA situation, I think it’s been used politically, used by people—I was there, spent time in Vietnam, went over when people were coming out.

But the POW was something different. They were awful to prisoners of war. It was almost like they were trying to make it as difficult as possible for us to get out of there. What they wanted to do was humiliate the biggest country in the world, and take a lot of casualties, and have us run for cover.

But we wanted to get out, but they didn’t think you had to do it that way. And then, a lot of people were saying, “Is this what we lost 50,000 men for?”

AK: And the more people that were killed, the worse it was.

JP: More people were killed in Korea than we lost in Vietnam, but that was totally different.

AK: At least there, there was more of an

outcome—a clearer goal.

JP: Yes, Korea was part of containment. And we were in there with a group. In Vietnam, we were on our own.

AK: Congress seems to be grappling with the balance of power issue, especially with respect to the conduct of the war. They passed the War Powers Act in 1973, a major piece of legislation, to address this situation.

JP: Yes, I supported that. I think it was pretty balanced. It doesn’t totally restrict the president, but you can only be in there for a period of time, and then it has to be approved by Congress—

AK: Yes, sixty days—so you can still do Grenada-type actions, but not Vietnam.

JP: No, you can’t do Vietnam. You see, we went into Vietnam without ever declaring war, and even worse, we didn’t take war taxes. Of course, that was the real deal, so no one was paying for it except our grandchildren.

AK: You were one of the few Republicans to vote against the bombing of Cambodia. You rather stood out, in fact, in the press accounts—locally and nationally.

JP: I guess I was, yes. Well, I didn’t mind taking a stand. It didn’t bother me—I shouldn’t be cavalier, of course, and say it didn’t bother me—but whatever I thought, I was going to do it.

AK: How did you come to this position?

JP: Well, I went to Vietnam. I think that sharpened my views. And I’d been in the war.

AK: Had other congressmen been over to Vietnam, to see for themselves?

JP: Oh, sure, lots of them. And I was pretty much a student of foreign policy. That was my greatest interest. I just thought it was time to get out, that’s what it really amounted to.

AK: I was trying to identify why you were ahead on this issue—

JP: I was very strong and debated Al Swift on TV in Seattle over Desert Storm. I thought it was absolutely essential we went in. I felt very strongly about that. So, it isn't that I'm some kind of "peacenik." I think wars are just awful and you have to be very careful.

At times, like in the time of Hitler, delaying standing up, you ask for greater troubles down the road. These are very difficult judgments, and very good, well-meaning people can have very strong divergent views, because they see the thing differently. I'm not critical of those, except those who were out there—the Jane Fondas really bothered me. I'll leave it at that.

AK: Congress, in its attempts to regain some control over foreign policy, also began to review old legislation—some of it dating back to World War II era and even earlier—and discovered that there were hundreds of bills that gave the president different national emergency powers, some of which could be interpreted to wage undeclared wars like Vietnam. So, Congress made attempts to straighten out all this—

JP: Oh my, yes. The War Powers. Many congressmen—and it's not unusual with people—they wanted to be critics, but not to be held accountable. They want to be able to stand up, criticize the president, then have the president make the decision, and then be able to go ahead and keep criticizing. Not really stand up and take on the heat—I found that prevalent in society.

AK: But, wasn't that a good idea, to clean up all this legislation? To draw some lines of responsibility?

JP: Oh yes, the War Powers thing was a very good thing. Yes, and line up where responsibility is and who should do what, and what they can do.

AK: To clarify—

JP: Yes, in fairness to everybody. Because we got into the Vietnam thing with that phony Tonkin

resolution. That was used as our declaration of war.

AK: Why did Congress never declare war in a proper way?

JP: They didn't want to—why declare war? If you've got a war, and you don't have to declare it, nobody gets hung. But that's just human nature.

AK: It's just a question that gets asked. The whole situation seems strange, in retrospect.

Besides these issues having to do primarily with the conduct of the war, Congress was also examining other areas of contention with the executive branch. I was a little surprised to find that Congress was without one, but in 1974 they created the Congressional Budget Office as a way to have a more complete overview of the national budget.

JP: Oh yes, and we're still battling over that. We now have a budget office, yes.

AK: That allowed Congress to generate their own analysis of the numbers and programs.

JP: That's right. What we needed was to have everybody agree on the numbers. And then you can agree on the policy, and that was a good thing, yes.

AK: It seems very rational. That would also allow for greater discipline and accountability.

JP: Yes—rational. And I think Jerry Ford was president at the time, and of course he had been a member of the House—a very fine person—and he saw the need for things like this.

AK: Also, I imagine in response to Nixon impounding of authorized expenditures, the Budget and Impoundment Act was passed at this time.

JP: I think it set up some rules on what you have to spend. It's silly to say that they always have to spend the money.

AK: Again, to clarify lines of responsibility, and straighten this out?

JP: Housekeeping, yes, but important.

AK: Perhaps in line with all these developments, but the staff for Congress was increased tremendously during these years.

JP: That had to do with getting re-elected.

AK: I thought these were research staff, dealing with the increased load of information needed?

JP: Oh no, that was the excuse. They went from five or six people to thirteen staff people, and the committees went double or triple. Some committee chairman would have one hundred and twenty people on his staff.

AK: That sounds like a lot.

JP: Yes, and of course, they make a king out of the committee chair. It used to be that you would have a person in your office in your home district, maybe one or two, and then you'd have maybe five back in Washington, D.C. But one of the ways that the Speaker keeps all his troops happy is that he gives them more staff all the time. By giving staff all the time, they make the guy stronger, politically. He can do more in his home district. He can be more responsive. That's one of the worst words there is—being "responsive." So every little group can get massaged, and somebody takes care of them, and people love it. So, we've got these enormous staffs.

AK: I was wondering if the issues were becoming more complex during this time, necessitating these increases?

JP: You have so many think tanks and so many groups that are doing studies on this stuff, you're better off in many cases to bring in that material. They may vary, but they've done a lot of the work. To think that you've got to sort of start over with staff people—yes, they did some—but an awful lot of it was, I think, massaging either the congressman or the people back home.

AK: Did your own staff increase?

JP: No. What I did was, I had the lowest number of people I could have, and then paid them as much money as I could. Because my theory was that good quality staff people keep you out of trouble a lot better than a whole bunch of eager-beavers. Somebody came out and did a survey on how much money the different staffs paid women, and I came out the highest.

AK: As an equity issue, you mean?

JP: There was quite a difference between what women were paid and what men were paid in those days. I came at the top, but the report was never printed in the Seattle papers.

AK: I wonder why not?

JP: I don't know. I was the only Republican back there, you see. But I didn't do it to beat them. I paid the most.

AK: Well, did you pay your women staff the same as the men?

JP: If they had equal jobs—I paid per job. I wasn't interested in this business of who's equal, or is it the job—what does it get? I had guys like Maury—I had great people. I didn't hire political people, because I wanted to do well. I would be the politician, they'd get the work done. But it was interesting that somebody came back to do a report on it and it never saw the light of day.

AK: Do you think that was because it didn't support the conclusions they had wanted?

JP: I'll leave it up to somebody's imagination why it wasn't. Maybe there was an election coming down the road or something. Wouldn't be me, I didn't have any problem with the election after I got some good breaks, so that wasn't it.

AK: I know you say that Congress is always trying to reform itself, that there is nothing so remarkable about these different pushes, but you went into Congress yourself saying, "Congress should be

more open.” This seemed very important to you, especially the seniority issue.

JP: Oh yes. We tried, we tried.

AK: You did make some changes.

JP: A little bit. But that’s the way changes are made—incrementally. But you’ve got to move things along. That’s the way. It’s a real problem when some people can’t take increments, they want a big change or they won’t support it.

AK: You can’t throw everything out.

JP: No. And Julia Butler Hansen from our state tried to revise the committees. She was on the committee to revise the committees, and she quickly came to the conclusion that the Maritime Committee ought to be split and the transportation part go into Transportation and the fisheries into Maritime. It made sense. Oh well! You should have seen them land on me—Dingle and all the rest. Because: Power! Chairman! Subcommittee chairman! And all this. You’re going to do away with our committee? They were aghast that a member of a committee would vote to do away with a committee. Wow!

AK: Unheard of—

JP: I remember Dingle sitting down and saying, “Pritchard, I can’t understand you; you’re a fine person.”

I said it was crazy and this ought to be in this and this ought to be in that

“Well, we’d lose it all. The staff here would be fired.”

I said, “Well, yes.”

Julia got a few things through, but she got a lot of things stopped because it ran up against the old bulls.

The Democrats made a push. They came in in ’74—really had a resurgence in ’74 because they had the stuff after Watergate and all, so they really rode that baby in. I had the highest increase of any Republican in Congress, but I had a few breaks that made that possible. My opponent-to-be, John Hempelmann got into a problem and so

he got knocked out. So, it was fortuitous—it worked. But when the ’74 class of Democrats came in, one of their big freshman pictures—they had this big, big class—was: we’re going to stop this seniority business. What they said was, “You’re going to have to vote these chairmen in.”

So they had a few that got knocked out. But Foley got put in as chairman of Agriculture because Poage was kind of a crazy old guy, quite a guy. But he wouldn’t take any nonsense from these freshmen, and they kind of rebelled. Even though Tom Foley asked them all to vote for Poage they turned around and voted him as chairman. It was a great deal for Foley. He was the youngest chairman in Congress.

They did make some changes, I just have to say it was just some, a few. If the Democrats took over now, you’d have the most God-awful crew of chairmen that I’ve ever seen, in my opinion. Because now, not having the Southerners, you’d have the big-city boys, and they’re not even touched in an election—Wrangle, Dingle, all those guys. I think they’d be a miserable bunch.

AK: Besides the seniority issue, there was the idea that meetings should be open, which you favored.

JP: Oh yes. And they opened up some meetings.

AK: That made some headlines. And then there was the issue of a pay raise, which you were strongly against.

JP: Yes. But I took the money though, didn’t I?

AK: Once it’s through, I suppose there is nothing you can do about it.

JP: Yes, I did oppose it. I testified against the pay raise here for lieutenant governor too, when they did the last pay raise here.

AK: Isn’t the pay raise for elected officials tied to raises for other categories—judges?

JP: Yes. And what it should be, instead of being held down, it should go up with the CPI. You hold it down and then you make a big jump. It ought to

be a certain amount of purchasing power and it ought to go along with everything else.

AK: That sounds quite rational. And franking privileges—you came out pretty strongly against them right away.

JP: I was opposed to that because of how I'd seen it work. It used to be the strongest thing in getting re-elected.

AK: All that free mail—it is quite a gift.

JP: It's an enormous thing. It's the old deal that you have the right to send home something to tell the people what you're doing. So you send those things home over a two year period and my gosh! A freshman asked Sam Rayburn what he should do to get re-elected. Sam said, "Well, I'll give you three: use the frank, use the frank, use the frank." They just poured that free mail out. I thought it was wrong and I didn't like it.

We tried to be very careful, but I kept getting people saying, "Send me your newsletter, send me your newsletter." We tried to be very careful to make it factual, not to send out too many, and have them on subjects. But still, if you don't use it, people say, "You're not communicating."

AK: Not keeping in touch.

JP: Yes. It is such an advantage to incumbency.

AK: If it's any comfort to you, your newsletters read well. I got a lot of information out of them. I had a better sense of what you were doing.

JP: Do they? Thank you. Of course, you have to remember that we put the best face on it.

AK: But they don't actually read like political puff pieces.

JP: I know, we were pretty clever!

AK: In the first years of your congressional service, your committee assignments were the Merchant Marine and Fisheries committee and Government Operations. We should discuss your

duties on these committees.

JP: Oh, Government Operations—miserable committee! We're supposed to be oversight for agencies and that. Jack Brooks ran it for a thousand years. He was Lyndon Johnson's shotgun and he wasn't a very nice guy. He was an interesting guy and he was always nice to me, but he was kind of a nasty Texan. Nobody really wanted to be on that committee. I didn't think we did much.

AK: How did you happen to be on this one?

JP: I didn't want to be, oh Lord, no! But I couldn't get on the committees I wanted. My predecessor had made a big deal out of being on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries committee. Well, the truth of it is, this isn't a very big committee, not a major committee.

AK: But it was very important to Seattle.

JP: Yes, oh yes. So, I would be on that committee, because of the fisheries and maritime. It was appropriate from the standpoint of our area. But I didn't have very good committees when I first got there. They stuck me on Government Ops and I didn't have any power to get anything—I was the only Republican from the state, so no one was trying to take care of me.

But finally Cunningham gets elected. Brock Adams goes to the Cabinet—Transportation. I'd been trying to get on Foreign Relations every time. That's what I wanted to do, that was my interest. With Jack Cunningham, the leadership—John Rhodes—went to the Speaker and he said, "We've got a new man."

And they said, "We're not giving Brock's assignments to the Republicans. You've got to dig it out of your side. Figure out how you do that."

Of course Cunningham didn't like the committees they were talking about, and nobody wanted to give him one. Finally, I went to Rhodes—and Government Ops was my major committee and the other was my minor, but no one in the district thought that Merchant Marine and Fisheries was a minor committee, but it was, it was classified, majors and minors—but,

anyway, I went to John and I said, "I'll give Jack my major committee."

And John said, "Oh, boy. Can you really do that?"

"Yes, nobody at home knows what Government Ops is, and I don't think it's worth a heck of a lot anyway, but we've got to get Jack on a committee."

So Rhodes said okay and thanked me. Then he came back a day later and said, "Congressman Pritchard, is there anything I can do to help you?"

I said, "I've tried to get on Foreign Relations."

He said, "Gee, I wish there was an opening on Foreign Relations."

And I said, "I think maybe I could arrange for an opening because I know somebody who is going to be retiring, and they might be willing to get out two months early. We can wait."

He said, "You really got taken last time. Don't wait for this gang, they'll do it to you again. I think we've got a little leverage right now. Let me see what I can do. You see if you can get the person off."

Well, she was very nice and said yes—she was a friend and said, "Yes, I'll get off two months early."

So I got put on, which gave me seniority over the other two guys on the subcommittee. And then the guy died and all of a sudden I'm the ranking member—just where I wanted to be. That's what I enjoyed doing and spent ninety percent of my time at.

AK: That was great timing—good luck.

Returning again to Congress and its efforts to redefine itself as an institution, Congress seemed to be getting more involved in diplomatic-type issues that some people thought belonged more to the presidential sphere. Some of the actions involved Panama, and then there was the whole issue of Senator Henry Jackson pushing for the easing of the restrictions for Soviet Jews to immigrate, and his tying of that measure to trade issues. What, in your mind, was the proper role of Congress in that area?

JP: They're a partner. The trouble is that the groups who have an interest in whatever the issue is find out that they can move Congress easier

than they can move an administration. So, they get in there and make it a political issue, and then the political thing drives it. Then you have foreign policy driven by groups, whether it's the Greeks in America, or the Cubans in America, or whether it's the Friends of Israel in America. They get driving the policy and maybe it isn't a big number, but for those people it's a critical issue. People in politics learn that the way you win is not to be on the majority side, but on the "hot button" side. I took exception to some of those things—and got crossways on some.

AK: Did you oppose Henry Jackson on this one?

JP: No, I didn't. I should have, but I didn't. I was brand new. He would come roaring over from the Senate, and he'd come rolling through, and I wasn't that sure of myself. And so I said, "Well..."

And, of course, the drop of the people who got out went down substantially, but you can't ever say that in this state.

AK: Can you explain what you mean?

JP: The number of Jews that got out of Russia substantially dropped after the Jackson-Vanick bill went through.

AK: So it backfired?

JP: Well, you never would have said that because the Jewish community thought it was wonderful, and the people in Russia—that were the real people—felt it gave them strength. Solzhenitsyn and them, they all said, "It's wonderful, it's wonderful. They're standing up behind us." But if you look at the raw figures, during this period when that first passed, why, the Russians cut down.

AK: Nobody noticed? They didn't know?

JP: Oh, they knew it. But you get into this—it's a Communist issue, it's the Jewish community, and it was just fraught with things. We did a lot of things to help and we paid money—for everybody that went to Israel, they got so much money, and if they came to America, they got half

that much.

That would be added in the committee, and then the people from New York would sort of fight over which one of the members got to offer it to the committee. The state department never put it up, the administration never put it up. It passed every time. We have enormous—have you ever looked at foreign aid?

AK: Oh yes.

JP: Where it goes?

AK: Yes, it's very unbalanced.

JP: Right, very unbalanced—but it's not politically unbalanced. It's just unbalanced on needs. But it's fraught with all kinds of emotion, a carry-over with these people—

AK: You mean for not helping the Jews enough during World War II?

JP: We did. We got in there and stopped it.

AK: Yes, but I mean the carry-over from the restrictions placed on Jews trying to immigrate, or escape during the war—there were a lot of people turned back. Roosevelt not giving the okay to allow the boatloads to come over.

JP: A lot of them came, but it didn't go as much as some people wanted. Our ability to affect what was going on inside that country was minimal. But it is portrayed now as if—well, I had some sympathy with Roosevelt. He was trying to work out the deal as best he could. We had a war on and all the rest of it—the real thing was that you had to defeat Hitler. But, easier said than done—all these things are.

But the politics of it, the groups would get very good at it. We had a very important responsibility in Turkey in NATO and keeping them beyond the Iron Curtain line. They were on the firing line, and they went to Korea with us—they really stood up. Then when that thing hit with Cypress—which was started by the Greek colonels, not the Turks—why the Greeks in this state went ape!

I stood up for the Turks. Yes, I got very involved in all that because I was one who took the Turkish side in the House. It was very difficult. The administration was trying to slow down, but it's a “freebie” for a congressman. He becomes a hero with the Greeks. There are no organized Turks in America, and so it's like doing the thing in Cuba. You've got to beat up Castro if you want to be popular in Florida.

On the other hand, I got a lot of involvement with different people in the State Department working with these things. The more you do, you feel like you know what's going on. Fortunately all that paid off. The Turks have been terribly important to us. They stood up to Russia, and we stood up for the Turks. The Greeks—well.

AK: A lot was happening. This is also the time of the Yom Kippur War, at about the same time as Spiro Agnew's resignation from the vice presidency, and when Watergate was heating up as an issue. The tension of all these things happening more or less simultaneously—

JP: Which war was this—I was not on Foreign Relations then. This was earlier.

AK: This was the October, 1973 war, when the Arabs attacked Israel and wiped out their air force in a surprise attack, and Nixon delayed the American response for a few days, rather critical days.

JP: We wanted the air force back in there. I don't think there was any question, but we were trying to get the thing turned off. We stood up; we re-supplied them.

AK: Yes, in time, but apparently the Israelis did not think it was a sure thing at all. I remember reading in a biography of Golda Mier about the tension of waiting and waiting for the Americans to come to their aid. They weren't assuming anything.

JP: Because of our concern with the oil deal, and whether the Arabs would cut us off.

AK: Which they did, they did make good on their

threats. It was a very tense time, internationally.

JP: After, I went over there with Javits, after the next war. The Camp David Agreement had guaranteed Israel 50,000 barrels of oil a day. They decided they'd have a couple of Republicans carry the message for the president. Javits was from the Senate, and I went from the House, and we flew to Khartoum and met with the president and guaranteed him the 50,000. The Arabs threw a mild threat, because Sadat had stood up and supported the Camp David Agreement. Somebody was mad and threatened him, and so he was all nervous. So we flew over there. It was an interesting thing to do.

AK: What position did you take on all this, the whole Israeli-American relationship?

JP: I believe that we have a special relationship with Israel, and that we should make sure that they are not run out of that country. What I was concerned about was that I didn't think that we should be always in the position that whatever Israel does, we back them up automatically, which is the way we have done it.

I went to Israel in 1970 as a private citizen, like I went to Vietnam. Kirby Torrance and I went. I spent some time with some Jewish leaders and they gave me a driver. They were not too pleased when I went down and spent four days with the Palestinians. And I didn't live where they wanted me to—I lived at the YMCA because my brother and I were involved with the Y and somebody got us a room there. They also had Palestinians there at the Y, and that was a no-no. I think I was rather suspect! But, anyway, I spent time with Palestinians in the camps.

AK: Was this hard to do? Were there barriers or restrictions about free movement?

JP: I just went there. I had people I knew, and they thought I was going to Congress, so some people with APAC here arranged to meet there. And I spent time going down to the YMCA school in Jericho, and I went to a kibbutz. I went to different things. I went to Palestinian things. It was probably two to one in time. I spent two days

with the Israeli people for every day I spent with the Palestinians. But I wanted to hear the other side, and that doesn't get you many brownie points when you say, "I want to hear both sides," because their attitude is, "We'll tell you what the side is."

AK: Did you learn something new by going, gain new impressions?

JP: You get more of an appreciation. Then, as you read other things, it fits in. You've got to have a structure for your information to stick. You need a filing system in your head so that these things stick. And you have an interest, and an understanding, and you build on it.

AK: Was this unusual? Was anyone talking to the Palestinians at this point?

JP: There wasn't a lot of it, no. As a congressman—that's how Adlai Stevenson's niece got run out of Congress. She was a Democrat from New Jersey, but she met with Arafat to hear what he had to say, and they ran her out of Congress. It was very harsh. And they ran Percy out.

Yes, there were a lot of hard things done, and they were quite active in Janice Niemi's campaign against me. I don't mean to make a big deal out of it because I had lots of groups that I fought with. But I sort of liked to fight with them all—I didn't like to think that I was anybody's pet seal.

AK: It seems more statesman-like to want to hear both sides, not a bad thing at all.

JP: The amazing thing is that most everybody thinks they want to hear both sides, or they infer they do. And sometimes they do, and sometimes they don't. I think you're much more sure of your own feelings—you feel better if you've gone down the road and feel you understand the arguments on both sides.

And hey, it's perfectly understandable what these groups do. All these groups are trying to do what they think is right. It's just that if they get real good at it, too good at it, they can twist American policy.

Kennan wrote, I thought, a very interesting article or a book on this business of not allowing

groups that come from other countries to run our foreign policy directed at that country. But it's just normal—they're interested. I mean, the Greeks come, and they would really like to start a war with the Turks, when you get right down to it. The bitterness is just awful. But it's the Turks, the Armenians—it's all over the world, and you have to just be careful not to let that group set the foreign policy of the country.

The foreign policy should be what's best for America. We want peace in the world. We want to be a force for good. We want to be positive in helping. But we shouldn't be anybody's partner—that was very difficult.

AK: Aren't we, in a sense, Israel's partner?

JP: We're partners of a lot of different countries. When I say partners, I mean we get to where—it's particularly if they have political muscle—and Israel has a lot of political muscle.

But that's the way you do it. Every group tries, but they're just a little better at it. Other groups try, too, whether it's the wheat farmers or whatever. Everybody is in Washington trying to do their interest.

AK: Can you think back to the Yom Kippur War, for a moment, and the Arab oil embargo. There's a whole year then, in 1974 or so, of struggling with inflation and gas shortages and unemployment—conflicting needs with conflicting solutions. How would you go about setting priorities in a situation like that?

JP: When you're judging one of these events, there's so many things that come in, whether it's unemployment at home, all these things.

AK: Yes, it seemed very complicated, but how do you balance all these issues?

JP: Different people have different responsibilities. I would take one side, but I would certainly make the arguments for the other side and respect people. I did my best not to make enemies out of my opponents.

AK: Reading over the record, this must have been

a heady time to be in Congress. There are so many things, both national and international, breaking at this time. With the oil embargo, things just became so difficult—all the energy policies and economic policies that struggled to deal with the situation. I wondered what it was like to work on these very critical issues.

JP: I have to say this—I went to the Middle East a number of times, but my major effort was in the Pacific and Asia. I was the ranking Republican because of a fluke—a guy died, so I got on the subcommittee, and all of a sudden, I'm the ranking Republican. We have the boat people issue, and we have all of these things going on out there, and that's where I spent most of my time and effort.

One of the things that turned out that was nice was that there was no real difference in Asia—after Vietnam—between Democrats and Republicans. Between how Congress felt and the White House felt. There was pretty much agreement in working it out. And there were lots of things to do—battling—but there was sort of an American position.

AK: Was there agreement about helping all the refugees coming out of the war?

JP: All were helping the refugees. And our deal in Afghanistan—I was up there in Islamabad, up in Pakistan. This whole thing went along, and I was working in that area. It started in Pakistan and went all the way around to New Zealand—China, Japan, and all the different areas, Korea. And I was not in a highly partisan area as far as our foreign policy. We were now mainly trying to take care of the mess, the aftermath of Vietnam.

AK: There was some hardening of lines, though, wasn't there, when people did not want to give aid to North Vietnam after the war?

JP: Oh, North Vietnam. Their attitude was, you give us money and we'll tell you more about who we killed. I went there with Solarz, and we didn't give them that, no. They were brutal, nasty. They were awful to their own people in many ways, and they just did a miserable job. But once they

started to give ownership of the land back, their country started to come back.

AK: I wanted to find out a little more about the energy issues of that time of the embargo, if we could return to that issue for a moment. Particularly, there were a whole package of issues that people were struggling over, having to do with discovering or creating more independent energy sources—and these are all tied up with various environmental issues. Where did you stand with regard to the development of alternative fuels, and other solutions being proposed?

JP: I was trying to be practical. I wouldn't buy the whole environmental package because we were dependent on oil and we needed things. You can't stop the economy—the idea that we'll use bicycles or what have you. We did move up the amount of gas, the mileage.

AK: Do you mean changing the automobile standards for fuel efficiency?

JP: Yes, there were standards put in. There were all kinds of things that were pushed along. I went down there where they had these big windmills, down there on the Columbia River. I've got a picture of Scoop Jackson and Dan Evans and myself standing there behind the windmills. People were looking and were for trying everything—nuclear energy.

AK: Was this part of Henry Jackson's push for energy research?

JP: Yes, and then we got into the whole business of nuclear energy. Some countries were using that. We had all these groups, you know, saying, "No, no, you can't do that, you can do other things." Then, somebody else says, "Well, you can do that, but you can't do this."

AK: You were a proponent of rapid transit development.

JP: Yes, and also a proponent of raising the gas tax. There was an effort to raise the gas tax, and when we got all done, when they finally got it on

the floor, Elizabeth Drew wrote a story in the *New Yorker* or somewhere, about how there were only twenty who ended up voting for raising the gas tax. And I was one of the twenty. But it made a lot of sense—our gas is much cheaper than the gas in other countries. Yes, at that time, I thought it made a lot of sense.

AK: Did you see this as a conservation issue?

JP: It was in part conservation, it was in part driving people to raise the standards of the gas mileage. It was a whole series of things. But, my, oh my, when they got right down to it, everybody ran for cover, it just seemed to me. So we didn't get it through. But I thought—I was willing—that that would be just one piece, one piece.

AK: What was your position on the fifty-five-miles-per-hour speed limit? That was another controversy.

JP: I don't remember it being very controversial; I don't remember. A bigger thing was that we had it rigged around so that it was very tough to get natural gas to be used in some areas. We had more natural gas than we had oil, and so we did free up some of that, but, my, oh my, the politics in there with the oil companies and the states—using Canadian natural gas, which made a lot of sense.

One of the things that my brother said that was very smart when I first went back, he said, "We ought to make an economic entity between Mexico, Canada and the United States, because they've got oil, they've got natural gas, and we've got things they need. If the three countries would cooperate, we could do a lot of good." It didn't sell very well, but I just remember him telling me this. It was about the only advice he gave me.

AK: There was a great deal of discussion about the issue of windfall profits of the oil companies at this time.

JP: That was another one. This was all in the package. When you have an emergency, people aren't averse to taking advantage of it. They always put it in the context of "we can do this, if we'll do this." But, you have to remember, it's

easy if you're a congressman from the state of Washington to stand up on all those issues, because we don't have any oil.

AK: Much harder if you are from Texas.

JP: Or Oklahoma and all those.

AK: There were so many competing interests, and points of view—the oil-producing states, the people freezing to death in New England—

JP: That's right. And all of them make a good case for however they are approaching it.

AK: What about the Trans-Alaska Pipeline—did you take a position on that?

JP: I was very strong on that, very strong for the pipeline. I was very strong for the development of oil in Prudhoe Bay.

I think one of the phoniest issues that ever came down the road was the environmental issue at Prudhoe Bay. I've been to Prudhoe Bay. People don't go over the Brooks Range. The caribou are over scratching their backs on the oil line. I think, yes, we ought to be careful about the environment, particularly where people can go out in these areas. But we need as much oil as we can get. And it was shabby how the labor boys and the oil companies made it so that you had to ship that oil to the Lower Forty-eight. I told the press that. I said, "Here's an issue," and they didn't ever pick it up.

We could have shipped the oil to Japan and it would have been cheaper. A lot of that oil went all the way down, through the Panama Canal and came up, oh, and all the ships that carried it had to be made in American shipyards—twice as expensive as they should be. Everything about it was just really bad.

But I've been to Prudhoe Bay, and to me that was a place where we ought to be willing to bend a little, because we need oil until we get ourselves into some other kind of mode. The pipeline and all the rest—I was disgusted with my committee. It was my committee.

AK: Would that be the Maritime committee?

JP: What in the world did it come out of—I can't remember—it might have been Maritime. Anyway, but I remember the amendment. It was the Maritime Union, which gives more political money than any union there is, per member. And they have a lock on all this with the Jones Act, and how if you have to ship things to Alaska, they have to go on American ships. Can't go on a foreign one, so it costs more money. It's all tied up. I tried to break that and I couldn't.

Same way on cruise ships—that's why cruise ships can't go out from the state of Washington. Now and then you can work something out, but no, cruise ships go out of Vancouver, B.C. It's called the Passenger Act. It's the same deal. So, we haven't built a cruise ship since 1956—so we don't have cruise ships go out of America.

AK: How can this be in anybody's interest?

JP: Well, the Maritime Union—because they don't want that. They say, "If you break that rule, then the next rule will be on materials being shipped." It's like everybody—the gun nuts, or whoever it is. They say, "Oh yes, but that's just the first step."

AK: I see. What about the need for deep ports for these super oil tankers?

JP: I was very involved in stopping the tankers from coming into lower Puget Sound. But Maggie got it going, and I was very helpful in getting it through the House.

AK: Was this because of pollution concerns?

JP: Yes, but to bring large tankers into lower Puget Sound, I mean below the San Juan Islands, and we have the refinery at Ferndale. You've got to be responsible for your part, I mean if you're using the oil, and all the rest of it. But to bring it in the lower Puget Sound—I had a very strong conflict with the governor at that time, Dixy, because she didn't want to put that restriction on.

AK: She thought everything would be all right?

JP: Oh yes. She didn't want to stop it. But Maggie

did it. He got it through the Senate, then we got it over in the House, and it was in the final days. Actually some Republicans had stopped it in a procedural move—Jack Cunningham, who was a short-term congressman, very conservative—but he realized it had to be, and I got him to go to the appropriate person to turn him off, and we got the thing on as an amendment. And it all went through.

On things like that, I'm very strong on the environment—in certain areas—like air, the quality of the air, and all the rest of it. I'm just not a lock-stepper.

AK: That actually seems to be one of your most notable political characteristics—your independence.

JP: That would mean you're squishy from both sides' point of view.

AK: That's quite a description! Let's look now at your perspective on defense issues that dominated these years of the early 1970s. Trident submarines and Minuteman missiles were under discussion then. The Trident, of course, is made right in your area, and operates out of Puget Sound.

JP: That didn't make any difference. It wasn't so much the base there. The question was, do you have Trident submarines? I thought we went a little overboard. I objected to the Navy's pitch which always was that the Russians were building more submarines. But they went to sea about one day in five of our ships going to sea. To equate one equally and to keep coming up on the Hill and saying, "The Russians are building more and more and more, and we've got to build more and more and more." I think there was some need, but it's like anything, it gets carried away. It wasn't as bad as Star Wars, but it was pretty close.

AK: It was a lot of money—money just pouring into it.

JP: Of course. Any of these weapons systems—but if you do get into a war, you don't want to be on the back end of the technical. That was the great thing. We were ahead in most everything in

the technical, and we have been, and it's very important.

I'm a great person for having the research and having things, but you should be careful what you buy. But, you've got to be out there ahead of the curve, and we are. You get scared by the proponents talking about what the Russians had when, in many cases, their work was slipshod. Their scientific backup was way down.

They got such a jump out of having Sputnik fly around—everybody seeing it going around the world—wow, wow, wow. We needed a space program and that was very good. It was such an effort for Russia, they had to use so much of their very best talent, which they did. And a lot of their resources. Some people make the argument that that was a good way to starve them. You get them into an arms race and they can't maintain the rest of it. But there were so many reasons why the Russian country came apart—that's one, but it didn't help them.

AK: We will return to this issue of nuclear weapons later in your career, as a reoccurring theme. Besides weapons systems, the other debate involved ending the draft and returning to a volunteer armed forces. I know you held strong convictions on this issue.

JP: Yes, I was strong for that. We are one of only two nations in the world who have a volunteer army, Britain and America, over the years, except for wartime. One of the things that really hurt the Vietnam War was that we had a draft, but it was not a fair, equal draft.

AK: It turned out to be class-based.

JP: Yes, and this was not true during World War II. Then everybody went; everybody signed up. You did it—you wanted to. Then when we went to Korea, they used the Reserves, the National Guard, all of those kinds of groups, and they realized they could never use them again because if they did, they wouldn't have them. So they were never called up in Vietnam.

AK: Do you mean people would refuse to join the National Guard after Korea for fear of being

sent overseas?

JP: Sure. The Korean War just really took all this reserve, because that's who they grabbed right away. So they weren't going to do that, and so went to the draft—which was not an honest draft and it soured people so bad on the whole thing.

But, the volunteer army is a remarkable success, because what you need is not masses of people, you need highly trained people. In the Army and Navy—the Navy's always been in a different category as far as their appeal—but the Army did a remarkable job after Vietnam of rebuilding, raising up the technical, the educational levels, the management levels. People like Colin Powell and all—it was brilliant.

And we got out of having that draft. You see, you have to have, I can't say a popular war, but you've got to have one that is supported. The draft in the Civil War almost stopped the war—those draft riots in New York were just terrible. So, it's very tough, a war like Vietnam. And you also have a very hard time maintaining the war—after two or three years you've either got to get in or get out. That's the other thing—Vietnam went on so long.

So, I was very strong for the volunteer army.

AK: Wasn't part of the success was the fact that they began to pay them more and gave them better conditions?

JP: Oh, sure. You upgrade the whole thing, and then you don't need as many people.

AK: That's a big change. Another issue that evidently engaged you—at least in so far as you have a lot of correspondence and press and it features prominently in your newsletters—was your work on saving the hospital in Seattle—

JP: Yes, now we're talking about the Maritime Hospital.

AK: First of all, what is a Maritime Hospital?

JP: They started way back in the 1800s when ships came into ports and sailors needed some kind of attention. It was the War of 1812, they

developed some hospitals in these ports. The sailors would come in—their health was bad, scurvy and all that, so they started developing them. They became sort of an entity of their own.

AK: I had never heard of them before.

JP: If you go to Seattle and you look up on the hill there, to the right off Beacon Hill, you'll see that beautiful, brown, lovely building. They had these hospitals, and they've gone on and on. They're backed by the Maritime Union.

AK: Was that the connection—your membership on the Maritime and Fisheries Committee—beyond being a congressman from Seattle?

JP: I'm on the committee, and people—the budget offices—having been saying for years that these things are very expensive, that they're not very good, and that we ought to transfer this into some other kind of public health.

AK: Do only merchant marine people go to these hospitals or are they open to the general public?

JP: It's merchant marine. They sometimes use it for others—Alaska would come.

AK: I guess I'm surprised that there would be whole hospitals just for one group of people.

JP: Oh, the merchant marine is big, and they contracted with some other government groups. The whole point was, at that time we were growing and we hadn't gotten to this point where you cut down on the beds. The idea was that we were going to have to have hospitals, and here is a perfectly good hospital sitting here, and can't we use it? We went out to get it for the locals.

AK: Did you want to open it up for general use, then?

JP: They made it into a general hospital. It was a big effort on the part of the delegation to save the hospital, particularly those in the Puget Sound area. We did spend some efforts. The press kind of rode it. It was a local issue, are we going to save

this hospital, or are they just going to let it go?

AK: It looked like you were lobbied pretty hard. A lot of groups came and talked to you.

JP: Everybody was pushy, but we were all for it. The truth of it is that after a while they've so changed the amount of beds that you need in the city—hospital beds—that I suppose somebody could make the case today that we really didn't need it. I don't know because I haven't followed it up. But it is a resource and people use it, and people are there, and it has been put into the public, and it is functioning. The question was whether they would just turn it down, lock it up and forget it. We saved the hospital.

AK: I guess I'm still a little confused. Do merchant marine people still use that hospital, but now other people also get to use it?

JP: I was on the hospital commission so I should remember, but I can't. I'm sorry. But I'm sure it still contracts with groups in the Northwest to take care of some of their hospital needs.

AK: You did go to bat on that one. Another issue of that day that got a fair amount of attention was the discussion about founding a consumer protection agency. These are the Ralph Nader years, when he was at the height of his prominence.

JP: Oh yes. He's just awful. Early on, I went to a session with him and was really turned off by his attitude, his publicity, all of this business of the cult. It played well and the press loved it, and these groups loved it.

AK: I remember the big splash of his investigation of Ford Pintos.

JP: He had some big successes, and then it got carried on and on. I didn't like him personally, and I didn't like all this personal aggrandizement and all of this. I found him to be a pain in the neck.

The marketplace is a much better place to do that than to try to write rules in Washington, D.C. But the consumer groups wanted it, and

they're big around here. You think you can solve problems that way, but I don't think you solve many problems with laws. As a result, I think that we've skewed the thing so that we get the coffee-in-the-lap lawsuit and all of that. I'm really hard on that.

I think people have to be held responsible for their actions. I think if it can be shown that clear intent—I'm not going to use it, but my friend has this bill in to make sure that women's shirts don't cost any more than men's shirts at the cleaners. Well, if that's true, then have a shirt guy open up and give them the same rate. If he can do it, why, there'll be a market there for it. I mean, for the Legislature to pass a law that says you can't charge— But, being in the manufacturing business, I can figure out reasons why—there's more variety maybe. Men's shirts are a system—they roar through the system, and stuff is all made for it.

Okay, if there is some other way, people will figure out some way to do it if they can. But to put a law in that says, "This is unfair," well, people will raise the price if they can get away with it. And if they can't get away with it, it will come down if the market is there. It epitomizes the worst in the Legislature, trying to solve problems that they can't.

AK: That sounds like what you called micro-managing. It's easier to get hold of a small issue and run with it.

JP: And getting into details rather than policy.

AK: Back in Congress, in the context of rising prices and inflation stemming from the fuel shortages induced by OPEC, you were making some efforts to help fixed-income people, especially the elderly, deal with their economic problems. There was at this time a push to increase Social Security benefits. Were you a part of that effort?

JP: Today, seniors have it the best, and I think we've made a mistake. Of course, I would meanstest a lot of this. If people have adequate means, they shouldn't get breaks. But it's so popular with the older groups, and they're big voters—the

AARP. That's why we can't get the CPI into what it's really supposed to be. The Consumer Price Index is overstated, just because they don't want to have Social Security cut. Even though the Consumer Price Index is supposed to be accurate, it isn't—but you can't touch it because AARP won't let you.

AK: Too much riding on it?

JP: They don't care. They just say, "Is this going to cost me? Then I don't want it." So we are just killing our grandchildren—your kids.

You didn't need that lecture, I'm sorry. I give talks on that.

AK: That's okay. I can see you feel very strongly on that topic and I hope we get a chance to explore it further, later. But, back in the early '70s, senior issues looked quite different. Isn't that the period when stories were appearing in newspapers about seniors living on dog food?

JP: Oh yes. And we had senior interns. What I was trying to do was to keep up with what was going on. I wasn't trying to send information so much to them, I was trying to get them to send information to me. But we had a book we put out—in those days they didn't have books that showed you where you could go for different services, so we produced those and gave them out to people.

AK: According to the news stories, the price of food was just skyrocketing in 1974. A lot of people were experiencing real difficulties.

JP: The energy crisis and farms—there were a whole series of things.

AK: This was the year the government sold a huge amount of grain to Russia, and the price of bread rose in the United States. It almost looked like the left hand didn't know what the right hand was doing.

JP: There was a terrific push by the farmers to sell the grain because we were producing lots of it. And we were trying to stabilize our relationship with Russia—this was part of trying to get along with Russia. We were doing a little *détente* about then, it seemed to me. It was something that was down the road, I mean, it had been planned for awhile. But it was a real effort by the agricultural community—and "ag" is very strong.

AK: But it had an unfortunate impact on the country.

JP: I'd have to look at the real economics of it—what happens is, people say, "Oh, it really raised prices." Then you go back and say, "Where was the raise in this thing? What was it?" Then they'll say that rain didn't come that year and the thing fell off. I've become a cynic on some of this.

FURTHER THOUGHTS

KIRBY TORRANCE

ISRAEL TRIP

Anne Kilgannon: I'd like to talk next about your trip to Israel with Joel just before he went to Congress. You not only visited with Israelis, but you visited the Palestinians, which was pretty radical, I think, at that time. You stayed in the YMCA—much to some people's consternation.

Kirby Torrance: I was amused because, you know I was a working stiff like everyone else, but then I wasn't very poor, but that is one thing about Frank and Joel. They never spent a lot of money on anything unusual. I think Frank made most of the arrangements for Joel and me. We stayed at the East Jerusalem YMCA. It was lots of fun for the two of us and it only cost five dollars per day for each of us.

AK: Now, that wasn't just to save money, though, was it?

KT: No. I think it was a matter of finding a nice place to stay. It was in Palestinian territory and they were very cordial with us.

AK: Did it allow you a certain kind of freedom of movement that you might not have had otherwise?

KT: It allowed us a low profile. East Jerusalem was a Palestinian stronghold, still is I guess. And

the YMCA was well located near all the sightseeing in Jerusalem.

AK: When you think of someone running for Congress, you just don't picture them staying at the Y.

KT: I'll tell you that was typical of Joel Pritchard. Throughout his entire life, he lived very simply; he wasn't interested in things that were extravagant or ostentatious. Frank is the same way, and I think Joel was maybe more so. Joel had very modest ideas of a car—he had a car in D.C., a Volkswagen, that would barely run. But anyway, we stayed in the East Jerusalem YCMA; it was very modest, but it was adequate, it was clean. Frank was very active in the YMCA, so why couldn't his brother stay there?

AK: What kinds of things did you do when you were there?

KT: Well, you know, as it turns out it was one of the most interesting things that I ever did in my life. Shelby Scates, the political reporter, was always interested in Joel. Shelby wasn't the only one, but he was the primary one who said, "If you are going to run for Congress, you should know something about the Middle East thing, because we are involved in it, like it or not."

Joel took that to heart, and he told me, "I should know first hand what the problems are in the Middle East, and the way to do that is to go over there. Would you like to go?"

I said, "yes." I mean just like that, I said, "yes."

AK: Were you particularly interested? I mean, how did he happen to invite you—you were just free at the time?

KT: Well, I was a friend, and I had helped in the previous campaign against Pelly, that first campaign for Congress. I think I had been working with him, and was obviously interested in his success, and he thought maybe I could get away from my business.

AK: How big of a trip was that? How long did

you go for?

KT: It seems to me it was like ten days or so. All told, I was gone a couple of weeks, I recall, because we met up in London before we came home. I went to Paris first and then I met him in Athens, Greece. From there we went to Israel, and you had to go via an island, I believe it was Cypress, because of the politics of the Palestinians versus Israelites. You had to come into Israel that way; you couldn't come into Israel, as I recall any other way.

The purpose of the trip was to find out as much as we could about Israel and the Palestinians as to their politics, geography, economics, social aspects—as much as we could find out what the problems were.

AK: Did he arrange meetings with people before you went? Was it an organized tour?

KT: Yes, oh yes! We didn't just go there, and I think that Frank knew all that. And then, he got some help from some of the newspaper people, too. For example, we had an interview, which was pre-planned with the *Christian Science Monitor* reporter for the Middle East, who as I remember lived on an island right near Beirut. We had arrangements to meet with him. In Beirut, we met with representatives of the Fifth of June Society, with representatives of the oil industry and with American University people there.

We had an interview with one of the top persons in the Israeli State Department in charge of U.S. affairs. I remember he really tried to be nice to us. He said, "Now, would you like to see some of the geography in Israel? I can get a taxi and driver for fifty dollars a day." He said we could have a car and a driver and make a two-day expedition out of it. "We'll pay for one day, and you pay for the other one. I'll work up an itinerary, and he'll drive you up to Nablus," on the Sea of Galilee. Then it was arranged that we would see a kibbutz, and we spent practically a whole day on one, and ended up in Tel Aviv and then back to the YMCA.

We didn't get to Hebron and we didn't see much of Tel Aviv, actually. We were headquartered in Jerusalem. Then the next day, we went

south and east to the Salton Sea, stopping in Bethlehem, and then Jericho, where we visited a Palestinian leather factory. They made black leather brief cases there and they gave us one. I still have mine. From there, we went to the famous site known as the Masada, which was a mountain fortress conquered eventually by the Romans after a long siege against the Hebrews of ancient times. We went up there, up the mountain.

AK: I've seen pictures of that place. Very dramatic.

KT: Yeah! It's on the tourist route. Everybody goes there. And then we went over to Gaza and came back up to Jerusalem. So that's what happened. The next day we did the conventional tour of Jerusalem and then we went to Beirut.

We had interviews—someone had arranged this for us with the Palestinians there—they call it the Fifth of June Society. We met with them.

AK: Would that mean the PLO, or some other group?

KT: No, they were simply a propaganda organization espousing Palestinian issues, their side of the story versus the Israeli side of the issues in Palestine. Joel and I were much impressed with the caliber of the people we talked with. They were young attractive men and women, who spoke impeccable English, quite intellectual, obviously very well educated people who gave us lots of pamphletary information.

I got on their mailing list and I still send small contributions to organizations in Beirut.

AK: So, it's turned into a life-long connection?

KT: Oh yes!

AK: Would you get to talk to ordinary people, just in the street kind of thing? Would Joel get to meet just anybody or was it just all prearranged visits?

KT: We weren't monitored particularly closely. We took a tour through Jerusalem, for example, when we went in a taxicab. We were on our own.

It was the taxi, us, and the driver. When we got to Gaza, the guy said, “I don’t want to take you guys into this Gaza Strip; it’s dangerous in there.”

And we said, “Oh no, it can’t be that bad.” You have this gate to go in from one side; we went in from probably the southeast side of Gaza and come out the north side of Gaza and go back up to Jerusalem. We came to Gaza from Masada, and we said, “We’re just tourists.”

He said, “Well, okay. I’ll take you there, but I’m going to roll the windows up, and I’m telling you this, if a problem arises, we’re leaving. That’s all there is to it. You can’t get out of the car and the windows must not be opened.”

We said, “Fine.”

So, we didn’t talk to anybody in Gaza, because we didn’t get out of the car. In every intersection, there was a guy standing on a platform with a gun held across here, on a little tower, you know. It was obviously sort of a tense place to go to, but we went in and went out.

AK: You could get some impressions anyway.

KT: Yes. We got the impression that it was kind of a tense place! And so we went in one side and out the other, so that took care of Gaza. So meeting people on the street, necessarily, we didn’t really do a lot of that. We did get a lot of input from Palestinians, mainly from the Fifth of June Society and from our visit to the American University in Beirut.

Our contact with the Israelis was mainly in an official capacity. We started with someone from the State Department; well, they are guarded in what they were going to say or do. We really didn’t discuss anything with them particularly except that they knew that we were there to see the area, and they extended the courtesy of an interview, and arranged to have us take a car to see Israel that way. So, they did their duty.

We also met with some of the oil people. We spent some time in Jerusalem, and then we went over to Beirut. That’s where we saw the Fifth of June Society people, as I remember, and we met with some oil people, and we took a tour from there, from Beirut over to Damascus in Syria and we went through the Baka Valley. Over the years I’ve seen reports of activity in Baka Valley.

Unfortunately, over the years I have seen the destruction of Beirut, too. We went into some Palestinian refugee camps, and that was a real eye-opener. The refugees were getting support from UNICEF and it was eleven cents per day, per person. We saw the refugees in camps, particularly in Lebanon, but also in Jordan. It was sanitary and they were there—they were existing in those camps and the ones in Jordan.

AK: Didn’t people live in them for years?

KT: Years! They’re still there. Twenty-nine years later, and they are still there. The thing that I was impressed with—and Joel was too, we were in agreement about that—was, as we saw it, it would be like all of a sudden someone took a third of the people from Seattle and said, “Now you’re going to live in Portland, so start moving.” They move down there, and all of a sudden the Portland people say, “Well gee, we’re sorry you guys had to come down here, but we don’t have a lot of room down here.” How would we like it if somebody moved into Olympia here, you know, just outside of town, 10,000 people living in a refugee camp in the outskirts of Olympia? How would Olympia react to that? And that’s what happened to those people. President Truman made it possible for the Israelis to have a home, and God knows six million people were killed in World War II, and God knows that through the generations they all have had their troubles, but to me, it wasn’t quite fair that the Palestinians would have to take on such a load. It could have been done more equitably.

AK: Yes. The solution ignored the fact that that country was not uninhabited.

KT: Yes! The Palestinians have lived there as long as the Jews have, and they were treated—it’s hard to explain, to justify. It’s justified in one way, and yet it’s incongruous because it’s not justified in another way. But if you believe in your religion that God intended you to go home to Israel, and that’s your country, and that you have the approval of the United States—I mean, that gives you the liberty to do a lot of things that you wouldn’t unless you believed all of those things. But there

are all kinds of segments of thought within both the Palestinian camp and the Israelis camp.

AK: What position did Joel take?

KT: Joel, I think in his own mind, he felt about the same as I do about it, but he wasn't called upon to lay down his life for either cause. I think that he felt the same way that I do, but then, reality is something different, you know. Granted, there has to be a place for the Jews. Are you going to eliminate that place? You can't do that, and God knows, I mean, I think that during World War II there was a boat load of people that showed up off the coast of Florida, and the United States turned them back.

AK: Yes, I've read about that incident.

KT: So, it's a terrible problem. It needs to be handled even-handedly. Actually, I think that gradually it's coming around to that. It's taken a long time, but it's hard to get a good solution.

AK: So, when you were there, would you talk, you and Joel, about all these things? Would he be trying to find some kind of solution in his own mind, or just trying to learn about it?

KT: I think what he was trying to do was learn what their problems were, and we didn't get much help—any help, really—from the Israelis. We didn't ask for it, I guess we knew where they stood. But we did get a lot of viewpoints from the Palestinians, from the Fifth of June Society, and from some of the American University people in Beirut.

AK: So, his first task then, was simply to understand?

KT: Yes, to try to understand what the problems were. I think it was very important, because even to this day you have to have a lot of skill to deal with that, politically, trying to work out something that everybody can live with.

AK: Was that his mode? Was this Israeli trip typical of the way Joel would approach these

kinds of problems? Would he go there first of all and find out what the situation was really like, and then try to find that middle ground solution? Not take one side or the other, but try to find a common ground?

KT: Yes, find out what the truth is.

AK: There are plenty of ideological types that would go, thinking they already have the truth. Even if they went there, it wouldn't change them. But Joel, I'm guessing, would go with an open mind to see what it looked like, not to confirm what he already thought.

KT: Yes! Oh yes, he went there to see what it really was about, and I think it helped him. He was in the position to make decisions—of you go this way or that way on any particular issue. But those issues have been coming up over and over again, you see, and we're still working towards a solution. Maybe we're going to get it. I hope so. That was the idea.

AK: Was he particularly drawn to the refugee issue on this trip? Later—throughout his congressional career—he worked with refugee groups from several different countries, from Southeast Asia and in Pakistan.

KT: Is that right? I didn't realize that. That makes sense though. Well, we saw the refugee situation first hand, you know. We went into the refugee camps.

AK: Was it such that a compassionate person would come away with a lifelong commitment to aid people in that situation?

KT: You couldn't help but feel a little sensitivity, you know what I mean—the homeless—

AK: I just wondered if that was maybe the first time that he experienced that situation firsthand, and that after that he was more attuned to those kinds of issues?

KT: I think it's quite possible that was the case, because that was his first experience with that.

We later learned that there were all kinds of Palestine refugee camps; Jordan itself had a lot of refugees. We spent most of one day there in a refugee camp outside of Beirut. As I remember, we didn't stay overnight. We spent several days in Beirut, and while we were there we made a one-day round trip to Damascus. Traveling by car to Damascus was like going to a movie. To me it was very exciting. It was hard to believe, but it was strictly a tourist trip.

On that trip to the Middle East, to Israel, Lebanon and Syria, I understood the problem. I understand the Israel problem today probably better than most of my friends do, by far. We found the geography of Israel and Palestine and Lebanon interesting and the Mediterranean climate delightful. We learned more about that, and we knew more about the politics, we knew more about the economics as a result of that trip. Travel is very educational because when you have been someplace, if you read an article ten years later, or a year later, you say, "Oh yeah—I've been there." It's much more interesting and it comes alive to you. So the trip was very worth while.

Joel and I talked about the trip to the Middle East many times and I think if he were here now he would agree that the answers to the peace problem in Israel are perhaps too simplistic. Both Jews and Palestinians claim a home in Israel and justifiably so. In the past several decades, the Jews, with help of all kinds from other parts of the world, have had the upper hand. But this may not always be so. So the goal should be for Israel to be the true home for both Jews and Palestinians. This means that Israel must do much more than they have in past years to make room in Israel for the Palestinians. They must learn that they both need to coexist in Israel in peace.

STEVE EXCELL

COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS

Anne Kilgannon: I'd like to talk now about Congressman Pritchard's committee assignments. I know he was somewhat disappointed in his committees. He had really wanted Foreign Affairs, but there he was in Government Operations and

the Merchant Marine and Fisheries—important to Seattle, but not exciting.

Steve Excell: Yes. He did a number of things. When Joel came back to D.C. interestingly enough, he did a series of courtesy calls. This was classic Joel, but it really worked for him. He asked people for advice. He always said that people were never afraid, they always wanted to help, and if you ask for advice they usually give it.

He was the only Republican in the delegation. He went and met with all the delegation members, and got their advice in how to go about selecting committees. He went to the Nixon White House and talked to John Ehrlichman and a number of people there. He just got a lot of advice on how to go about it. Everybody from Tom Foley to the Nixon White House was quite helpful, because Joel was just that kind of guy.

They said, basically, figure out you're not going to get on Ways and Means, you're not going to get on Foreign Affairs. You're not going to get on the big committees, so start someplace and make your mark, and when you get some seniority you can work your way up to those committees. Do something that meets your hometown constituents' needs.

In those days, fishing issues were hot—it was the time heading towards the Boldt decision, and the fishing wars between the state and the tribes were going on. The debates that still ensue today between Canada and Washington and Alaska were raging. Fish were a big issue, so Merchant Marine and Fisheries was a committee that nobody wanted to get on.

AK: Wasn't the two-hundred-mile limit already an issue?

SE: It was already kind of an idea. It came up in the campaign as a concept because almost every country in the world was declaring a two-hundred-mile limit, even if it violated international law. So the U.S. was one of the last holdouts.

The Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee was doable. It had some relation to Northwest issues; Gov Ops had no relation. You sit there and figure out how the government counts paper clips. But it was the committee that was available. I think

Joel would rather have been on another committee—Interior, where you deal with parks and recreation, things that are Northwest. We have a lot of federal lands, things that became parks while Joel was back there—the wilderness bills, and Alpine Lakes, and that kind of stuff.

Instead, he got Government Operations. It was headed by Jack Brooks of Texas, a good old Southern boy—one of those chairs that he criticized during the campaign. You got nothing out of that committee unless Jack Brooks said so. It was run as a fiefdom. I knew, over time, as soon as Joel got enough seniority—and if it wasn't seniority, at least goodwill built up, or something—he would make the shift to either Foreign Affairs or Interior or one of the other big committees. I don't think he was particularly interested in Tax. He might have gone on the Commerce Committee because of consumer issues. There were a lot of committees he would have taken over Gov Ops.

It was a big entering class, and those people who came from much bigger states, like California or New York, got more help getting plum committee assignments. There was what they called the Committee on Committees that actually made the assignments. The Republicans were allocated so many minority slots, and they decide who goes where. If you come from the bigger states, you've got more folks lobbying the Committee on Committees.

AK: Because Joel didn't have really challenging committees when he first came to Congress, did that actually turn out to be a good thing? Did it give him the chance to learn the ropes and build relationships?

SE: Yes. In those days, freshman congressmen were to be seen but not heard. You didn't speak on the House floor, or you didn't put things in the Congressional Record. But that started changing with this class. This was very much an activist class in both parties. When you have the likes of William Cohen and Trent Lott in a class, along with activists on the other side of the aisle like Patsy Schroeder, it was very much an activist group.

They didn't sit still for very long. I think in their second year of that first term, they started

speaking out against the war. They started making themselves heard. I think that class advanced further than the old seniority system that said unless you were there ten or fifteen years, it didn't count. They were making their marks. Just about the time I left was the time Joel was starting to get some clout. In the late seventies and into the early eighties, he was actually starting to get clout, to where he could make things happen.

WATERGATE

Steve Excell: Watergate was a very unhappy time for Joel. You don't want to be unpatriotic and bash the president of the United States, and you don't want to be disloyal to your party, and yet, somehow, you've got to get this thing over with. And the president is wounded. It ended up resolving itself with the Nixon resignation. It was a painful time to be a Republican in Congress. It was so un-fun that a lot of Republicans didn't run again. It became such a burden.

Anne Kilgannon: How did Joel handle it? Did he kind of wince his way through it?

SE: It made it more difficult just to do everyday business, because the whole Nixon administration had their attention diverted.

AK: So Joel's effectiveness would be that much less, too?

SE: Yes, exactly. You feel like you're caught in a morass: We're here to do certain things and we can't even do them now. You can't call John Ehrlichman because he's spending twelve, fourteen hours a day with his lawyers plotting strategies. And you couldn't even get things done in the other committees because everybody wanted to go and watch Sam Ervin and the Watergate hearings.

I think Joel, as well as others, really thought hard about whether they wanted to run again—not because the prospects for Republicans were dim, but because it was awfully un-fun. You spent all your time—everyone—that's all they talked about. It didn't matter whether they were the

Speaker of the House, the ranking minority member, or the congressional delegation, no matter who you bumped into, it's, "What happened at the hearing today? Did you hear so-and-so's testimony?"

AK: It sounds like a big soap opera.

SE: It was. The rest of Congress shut down. People didn't even bother holding hearings on legislation. It became the national pastime, televised full time.

Looking back on the decade of the seventies, there was a lot of vindictive hate: you had riots in the inner cities, you had in-your-face protests over the war, some hating the troops, some wanting the truce but against the government, the Watergate hearings, Kent State. Everything became a divisive, black-and-white issue, and Joel was very much a person who dealt in grays.

The Congress really started breaking into caucuses, even more so. There were a few little groups like the Wednesday Group around, and they were pretty tame and benign. But then there was the black congressional caucus, and there was a feminist caucus—everything fractured. Those things bothered Joel a lot. It was not his style that the country was moving away from speaking with one voice, having consensus, civility, intellectual problem solving. Joel often talked about those times, because Watergate and Vietnam and these things were very troubling for everybody, but particularly for Joel. It just ran against his grain.

SEATTLE PUBLIC HEALTH HOSPITAL

Steve Excell: What used to be called the Marine Hospital was crumbling and in disrepair. The U.S. Public Health Service ran it, and it was a big money loser. However, there were certain classes of health beneficiaries of the federal government, like the Merchant Marine officers who are injured while on duty—anyone who works for a shipping company—who are entitled to use the facility. The shipping companies pay fees into pension and health benefit plans, and then they are allowed to use the Public Service hospitals. Today, everyone says "go buy health insurance," but it wasn't that

common back then.

The other groups that used it are military—active duty and retirees that don't have access to a base nearby. At the time, we were in the process of shutting down Fort Lawton and Sand Point, so the clinics and hospitals that had been available were gone. The only place left was the Public Health Service Hospital.

Tom Beyers, who then ran a free clinic then called Country Doc, and is now the deputy mayor working for Paul Schell, had the idea that it could be saved. Tom also had the vision that health care was going to be a growing business. These beneficiaries, over time, needed to find solutions before the hospital closed its doors. So Tom led the charge. He caught Joel's interest because of the plight of the beneficiaries who would be stuck without the benefits they were entitled to under the service they agreed to render to their country.

Joel, also, didn't want to see the building just get boarded up—it could be just literally closed and waiting to go under the wrecking ball, or to be recycled for some other use. So Joel went to bat with Maggie, and Brock Adams was part of this, too. He had the Seventh District, the south end of Seattle. So they said, let's try to save it. They got the Nixon administration to reverse the decision to close it, and they got some riders attached to bills. Joel had the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee and Maggie had the Commerce Committee, which had a health subcommittee, so they had these rostrums to work these things.

Anne Kilgannon: Wasn't that going against the trend of budget trimming?

SE: It was. Those were the days of starting to tackle the budget problems, and moving away from the Great Society to fiscal responsibility. But case by case, you fight for your little piece—pork is what the other guy fights for.

It turns out that it was eventually taken over by PAC Medical Center, and the military created a system which allows you to get health care at any military base—just go in and show them your green ID card as an active duty person, or your gray card as a retired person. Now they handle it like health insurance, so eventually it was possible

to close the hospital.

AK: But their actions allowed for a breathing space, for this transition to occur?

SE: Yes, they needed that transition time.

Interestingly enough, this shows how nonpartisan Joel was. Probably the biggest beneficiaries were the people who were trying to offer public health care programs in the inner city of Seattle. People like Jim McDermott used to practice there. It was one of those truly nonpartisan things that was not being handled well by the national administration, who didn't know what the circumstances were. Joel filled that gap.

It was a good battle. I think the place would have closed without Joel, because ultimately it was a Nixon administration decision. And Congress in those days was having a hard time making the president spend money—he always found ways to frustrate them. The Nixon White House was in a kind of war with Congress over impoundments.

AK: Well, he squeaked it through, somehow.

SE: Yes. I think Joel talking to Ehrlichman and those folks made a difference. So, there it sits today, an active hospital. And it has since expanded—it has a new wing on it. The building has been recycled.

AK: Yes, making the preservationists happy, too. It's quite a handsome building.

SE: It's art deco. It turned out to be a plus for the city. It's one of those great little battles that was won.

URBAN HOMESTEADING PROGRAM

Steve Excell: Joel was helpful to labor. At that time, Seattle was recovering from what was called the Boeing bust, and people were literally turning in the keys to houses and moving out. A lot of labor unions, primarily being public spirited, had invested in a lot of assisted housing. The way it worked was you got loans to build an assisted

housing project, and it went to low income people or the elderly for twenty-five years. At the end of twenty-five years, you got the building for covering the operating expenses and paying back the loans. Almost all of the big labor unions had these. If there was any payback, it was at the end of twenty-five years—they didn't make any money off of them.

And then, all of a sudden, people moved out. All this HUD housing was empty—single family homes, apartment complexes, retirement centers—and HUD was trying to foreclose on the loans. These houses and projects were all over the place, the Central District, Wallingford, Wedgewood, you name it. They were there in what used to be affordable, working-class neighborhoods in those days. And HUD couldn't sell them because there was no market; there wasn't a house selling in those days. Everyone was trying to bail themselves out. They let the houses become vandalized and some of them got torched. There were hundreds of these that HUD repossessed, foreclosed on the mortgage, and people turned in the keys and left. They went looking for a job elsewhere. It was really awful.

So, Joel had an idea: instead of sitting and waiting for these buildings to be burned down, you're better off giving them away if you can't sell them. They're costing you money trying to police them. He said, "If these houses are worth zero, give them away to somebody who has the resources to fix them up so they're not a blight on the neighborhoods." And Joel started to work on that.

It was a good idea. Seattle wasn't the only place hit by the recession in the early seventies. Eventually, it came to pass where HUD agreed, through legislation and other things, to cut their losses. If they couldn't dump property in a reasonable period of time, to get the best price they could, in some places they turned them over for free. They took applications. Seattle was the first test pilot area for this, and it worked. Some of them sold for next to nothing, and you had to agree to do the fixing up—they had a repair list and you had to agree to what you had to do. A lot of young people bought houses back then and did the sweat equity, and fixed them up. There were two or three hundred of these houses around. They

were very obvious because the grass was three feet high in front, and there was spray paint, and they were boarded up. You felt sorry for the neighbors. Some blocks had two or three of these.

Anne Kilgannon: It could mean the death of a neighborhood.

SE: Yes. Joel's Urban Homesteading Program was part of the answer. He went to bat for the sponsors of the low-income housing projects, which included the Archdiocese and people other than the labor unions who got caught up in this economic collapse. Joel got right in there with Maggie and Scoop and went to bat for those who got stuck with the HUD single family homes in the neighborhoods. Those kind of issues got worked together.

FLOOR AND SPEAKING STYLES

Anne Kilgannon: One of the roles of a congressman is, of course, to make speeches on the floor in support of legislation. Can you describe for me Joel's style of speaking when he was addressing the House of Representatives?

Steve Excell: Very few floor speeches and amendments. It was his style to go and talk to folks in the cloakroom and in the gym and in the hallways, and sort of convince the committee chairs or the subcommittee chairs or the minority or majority leaders he had a better idea, and to work it quietly. In those days with the Democratic Congress, he'd go talk to Tom Foley, who was working his way up in the ranks. He worked more one-on-one, convincing colleagues on the merits of an idea.

At that time, we were just beginning to play the TV cameras, and while the TV cameras weren't doing C-SPAN every day, the reporters were up in the gallery. The one thing that came with that new activist class with Joel was a more in-your-face style: thirty or sixty second sound bites and going for the newspaper headlines. A lot of folks went for hero amendments. They didn't care whether they passed or not. It was: I'm trying to get points with my constituency and

to get a name.

Joel was one of the few in that more activist class that came in that did not bite with that style. He would rather go play racquetball in the gym with somebody, and get a chance to ask a question or drop an idea. Or, find somebody across the aisle who would be a better spear-carrier. It was more one-on-one. Let the idea carry its weight. Don't do the in-your-face kind of confrontational politics for the credit. It was just a style thing and it worked. Joel was very effective. On a lot of issues, he prevailed and nobody ever knew that it was Joel Pritchard behind it.

And good things happened. He worked behind the scenes with the Nixon administration also, to get funding for hometown projects. There was everything from supporting the Columbia Basin irrigation projects to getting funding for the first Metro buses. He worked behind the scenes on that one.

AK: Was Joel a good orator? When Joel Pritchard stood up to give a speech, would people listen?

SE: They would. And he has the world's strangest speaking style. He had great wit, great enthusiasm. He can give a stem-winder of a speech and there won't be one complete sentence in it, because he was like a machine gun of ideas and enthusiasm, and he can tell a humorous story. He can wave his arms and get excited like Mike Lowry could when he was governor. When you edit his stuff or you listen to it, you realize there wasn't a subject, a verb, an adverb, and an object. He just keeps going in a stream of consciousness. But he can give a hell of a speech.

AK: Yes, but you always know what he means, though.

SE: Oh, yes, exactly. It translates perfectly. He used to moderate these Washington State Society dinners—it's an annual bash in Washington, D.C. with everyone who works there from Washington State, from the administration, the military, and on Capitol Hill. All the companies and employers and organizations sponsor it. Salmon is flown in, everything from the Northwest, and it's usually held in some big hotel. Joel would do his famous

telephone call thing, and ad lib and do quips. Or he would have Mark Russell come in and he would try to outdo Mark Russell in comedy, which is crazy if you're a politician. He'd do all this zany stuff.

I remember a great story. He was giving a speech at the Seattle Rotary, and we were driving up to the hotel, and he hadn't prepared a speech yet. He used to belong to Rotary, so this is the good old boy's club—this is even before Rotary admitted women—back in the Dark Ages. He said, "I've got to talk about something. What's in the *P-I*?" The headline in the *P-I* was, "Congress Held in Low Esteem in National Survey." It was how, among all these professions—ministers, movie actors, garbage collectors—congressmen were rated the lowest. Of course, this was during the time of Watergate when Congress and the White House were all in a morass. So, he said, "All right, I'll talk about that." I think, "Oh, my God, what's he going to talk about?" because he hated prepared speeches. He liked to speak extemporaneously, off the cuff, that was his style.

So, he went in there and the first thing out of his mouth—I'm sitting there eating my lunch and he's giving the speech—and he says, "You know, I had this interesting experience. Last night my mother said, 'Joel, I finally figured out what you do for a living.' And he says, 'I said, Mom, do you really know what I do for a living?' 'Yes, Joel. I heard about it from my friends.' 'Well, Mom, what do you think I do for a living?' 'I heard you play piano in a whorehouse.'" And Joel said, "Thank God my mother didn't know I was a congressman." He just made it up. The whole place was in stitches. Just off the top of his head. He was just incredible that way.

He's like no public speaker I've ever met. He was entertaining, friendly, exciting, humorous, witty—and he never gave a prepared speech in his life. He couldn't, even if you gave him one. We tried that—it didn't work. He couldn't say your words. He had to say it off the top of his mind. He'd go into any setting, from the White House to a speech on the floor, to a group and endear himself to that group, and communicate exactly what was on his mind. And there wouldn't be a complete sentence. He usually got the facts right, but once or twice he might have misspoken

a billion for a million or something, but generally speaking, he was pretty damn good.

AK: He would just sweep people up with his enthusiasm?

SE: Totally. Captivated them. And it was a strange speaking style. He didn't give prepared speeches; he didn't speak with the kind of eloquence that you read in the Gettysburg Address or some other famous speech. And yet, he captured his audience. You almost had to be there—reading the text of something that somebody transcribed, versus being present at one of his speeches—you wouldn't get the flavor. You wouldn't get his animation and all that. He's a very strange public speaker, but a good one. It's very odd.

AK: As a staff person, would your job have been to give him the facts and then he just ran with them? Was that the idea—you just make sure he knows what he's talking about?

SE: Most of my job was helping Joel with his initiatives or the daily calendar—what these bills are, some factual analysis. We got lots of clutter in the office—various lobbyists would come in, letters would come in, phone calls, telegrams—that's how old this was that people actually telegraphed their congressman. So, you kind of boil it down. This is what Boeing says, this is what the wheat growers say.

Joel, often times, didn't like dealing in paper. Now, he always had paper, because he had to read it, and he was always prepared for every vote. He was very careful about making votes. Pelly had such poor attendance that Joel always pledged to have good attendance. He used to say, "Showing up is ninety percent of the reason for success in life." He really tried. It really killed him if he missed a vote because of having to be out of town or having a health problem. He'd go in there sick with the flu if he had to make a vote, because he thought it was an obligation. He really took it seriously.

He would prefer to spend time being briefed. He enjoyed talking to people, and he never talked to anyone too much, including us staff people who he saw every day. Usually, familiarity breeds

contempt—after a while you can blow off all your co-workers and just do your routine. But Joel wasn't that way. He enjoyed interacting. So, he'd much rather sit down for five or ten minutes and get briefed on something than just have you put something on his desk—his coffee table—and then run off with it. Or, him running out of the office and you'd hand it to him on the fly. He'd rather be five minutes late and talk about it. He communicated much more verbally—orally—than most people. He was a very people-oriented person.

He wasn't like some lawyers or governors I've known that love to read stacks of paper and think they're a judge, and sit there with their red pen, making notes on the papers. He did almost everything verbally and quickly. If some issue came up, he'd say, "Let me talk to John Ehrlichman now," and he'd pick up the phone right now. He thought issues were always ripe for solving at a certain time. And if they weren't a problem, don't get stressed out about it.

MAURY HAUSHEER

TENNESSEE-TOMBIGBEE WATERWAY

Maurice Hausheer first met Joel Pritchard in 1969 when he was still a state senator. At that time, Maury was a teacher and athletic and activities director at Bellevue High School. After Joel Pritchard was elected to Congress, Maury was a summer intern and then went to work with him as a staff assistant in 1974, and in a short time became the legislative director of the office. Maury remained there until 1983, shortly before Congressman Pritchard left office in 1984. When Joel Pritchard was elected lieutenant governor in 1988, Maury again came to work with him until his retirement from office in 1997.

Maury Hausheer: The idea for the project came in the early 1970s. This is how it happened.

The Army Corps of Engineers is an organization that likes to build dams and waterways and massive public works projects. It's been one of the favorite agencies of the U.S. government for a long time because members of Congress like it

very much, or have liked it in the past, because they would come up with ideas and projects and the Corps would eventually build them. Also the Corps had a natural tendency to expand and to build bigger and better projects—and more and more of them—all the time. Many members of Congress liked that very much. The Tennessee-Tombigbee became one of its largest projects ever.

The project hooked up the Tennessee River with the Tombigbee River in northwestern Alabama and northeastern Mississippi. This was the main waterway. It was a fairly substantial waterway, probably a hundred and fifty, two hundred miles, just digging out a lot of dirt and putting in a canal. A massive undertaking, where you dig something that's quite wide, a canal which in some places is about two-hundred miles removed from the Mississippi River. You make another waterway.

Anne Kilgannon: How wide would that be?

MH: I cannot remember the width. Fairly wide because you'd want to have it so it could easily handle two barges. Then you'd have locks along the way. It started out with an appropriation of a few hundred million dollars and it quickly grew. I think before it was finished it was at least thirteen billion dollars. It grew and grew and grew.

The way Joel Pritchard became involved primarily was that he was approached, first of all in early 1981, by a lobbyist from the National Taxpayers Union. They saw this as a boondoggle and a waste of taxpayers' money, and wanted him to offer an amendment to strike it on the House floor when it came out of the Appropriations Committee.

AK: Why would they come to Joel? Or were they going to a lot of members?

MH: I think they were going to a lot of people and what would happen is that most members of Congress didn't want to take on the members of the Appropriations Committee and its public works subcommittee. People don't want to challenge them very often.

AK: In case they may want something?

MH: Oh yes, because they might want something, and you usually want to keep fairly good relations with members of the Appropriations Committee, because they can appropriate money for enterprises in your district.

Joel didn't look at it that way. He seldom asked for money for our district. So, here was somebody who could take a shot at it.

AK: Was he known for this?

MH: People knew this was the kind of thing he might like to do. They came along and made this presentation and it made a lot of sense. Then another group came, one of the railroads. Mind you, the railroads didn't want this—

AK: No. I imagine it was competition.

MH: It's competition, and one of the railroad people had been a person who Joel knew, and he talked to Joel about it. Another person came with the railroad that was headquartered in Kentucky, a person by the name of Ed Whitfield. He was a member of the Kentucky Legislature. He was a lawyer and he represented the railroad. He was a very charming fellow. He's now a member of Congress from Kentucky, but at that time he was a Democratic member of the Kentucky House and now he's a Republican member of the U.S. House. He explained all these things very well.

Then another group that came on board when Joel showed interest was the environmental community, the Sierra Club, the Wildlife Federation, the Environmental Defense Fund. All these people came on board too, because they were going to tear up a lot of the environment and they felt it was really bad.

The reason that Joel was able to do this was that he didn't want anything from the Public Works Committee.

AK: He was free?

MH: He was free, because he didn't think that it was the goal of members of Congress to raid the public treasury. Many members feel that is their primary purpose in Congress.

So, he agreed to offer the amendment.

AK: Would that just be a parliamentary maneuver, or would there be a lot more to it?

MH: He agreed to do that, but you have to prepare if you're going to have a chance to get the votes. You've got to make an effort to get the information out and create some sort of support for this. So we started doing that with the help of these various groups, the National Taxpayers Union, the railroad people and the environmentalists.

AK: Were they working with each other?

MH: Yes. They worked some with each other. And there were newspapers that didn't want it either. The *Wall Street Journal* editorial section opposed it. The *New York Times* opposed it. The *Washington Post*. Most major newspapers opposed it because they had seen this as a boondoggle.

So we tried this. In 1981 he offered the amendment on the House floor, but we spent several weeks leading up to this, trying to get people to support the amendment on the House floor.

They were also trying to do this in the Senate, too. Senator Percy of Illinois at that time was trying to kill it in the Senate, and he couldn't do it. He couldn't get the votes. Part of this is because of the makeup of Congress, and that the Public Works Committee and Public Works Appropriations subcommittee are very strong.

AK: And those legislators would have a lot of clout?

MH: Yes, they have connections and they get people to go along with them. The leadership of Congress, the committee chairmen, the ranking members, tended to go with the committees. In other words, the leadership of Congress on both sides of the aisle would oppose this and would vote to keep expanding the project.

AK: Does every project go through? Do they ever say no?

MH: I'm sure they do, because there isn't enough money to cover everything.

AK: It sounds like a locked-in system.

MH: What they did this time was get in line. Maybe you didn't get the money this year to start it. And you have to remember that the Corps of Engineers has to do a study first. Once they agree to do the study, they've already spent some money.

AK: It's like a wedge?

MH: It's a wedge, and I would think ninety percent of the time if they do a study it means they'll want to build it, and can find a reason for building it. That's probably changed some now because we don't have as much money.

AK: So it's just a question of money? It's not a question of merit?

MH: You could find people who wanted this. Probably the chambers of commerce in these towns around where it was built. The governors and legislators of the states, from this area, many of them would want it. They thought this would be an economic windfall.

Joel took on this effort to stop the project, once in 1981 and then again in 1982. He came close, but we couldn't do it. He came closer than we expected. We had many people joining in, thinking that this was a big waste of money.

AK: When you came closer than you expected, was that because Joel was very skilled at getting people to see this?

MH: I think that's right. He talked to a lot of people, a lot of members about it. And we put out a lot of information about it to other members, lots and lots of information. It seemed to me that almost all of the facts were on our side. We had the research service of the Library of Congress do a study on coal shipments. It took them several months, but it just blew the whole thing away. It would never pay to transport coal on this waterway.

AK: So the stated reason to build this was not going to pan out?

MH: Yes. I'm sure it's now being used, but it's not going to pay for itself. In other words, it's a gift. It's like giving money to an area, investing in something that really doesn't bring that much prosperity to the region. It's like taking money from one person and giving it to someone else. This is the reason it was being built.

And then, of course, as it went along you'd find that different streams needed to be straightened out. The Alabama River eventually had to be straightened out, that ran down to Mobile, which they ultimately hooked up with. The project is now in place, and we'll probably never do this again in the immediate American history. This was a large project, which probably never should have been started.

AK: Is there some evaluation? When this is all done, and it doesn't bring all this economic prosperity, and it destroys all this habitat and whatnot, does anyone go back and say, "Oh, I guess we shouldn't have done this?" Or do they just keep moving forward?

MH: It's been finished now for some time and things are forgotten. You don't worry about it anymore. You don't go back and study it.

AK: So, no one really learns anything from this? There's no accountability?

MH: We learned some things from it. The Corps of Engineers doesn't have the power now that it had at one time. Also, we don't spend money like we used to.

Let me give you an example with the states of Alabama and Mississippi. For instance, part of the original agreement was that any bridges or roads that had to be fixed because of the building of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway, the states had to pick up the costs for bridges, roads, and things like that, that had to be moved out of the way.

AK: That probably cost quite a bit.

MH: Quite a bit of money. I remember, and this is going back to the early 1980s, Alabama was supposed to come up with thirty-seven million

dollars for roads. They got out of it because the chairman of the Appropriations subcommittee of Public Works, Tom Bevel, was from Alabama and he just stuck the money in the appropriations to pay for Alabama and for Mississippi's share of the road and bridge construction.

AK: Did anyone have any objection to that?

MH: Yes, they did, but they feel they're helping the state. That's quite a burden for the state, and so you wouldn't want them to have to do that, even though that was part of the agreement to start with.

AK: It sounds like there's just constant slippage with all the money kind of rolling down the hill.

MH: That's true. I don't believe you could do this today, because we don't want to run that kind of a deficit. We have found that the federal government is no longer as generous with public transportation. For a while they were helping build subway systems. Then when they discovered that in many places few people used them, and they became more conservative with their spending of the money. They want the local groups to come up with a larger share before they will help.

Yes, here you had the National Taxpayers Union, which doesn't want to spend money on most things, the environmentalists, the railroads, and I'm sure the trucking industry, and things like that opposed, but normally what you did was, if it was authorized, you built it. And almost anything could be authorized.

AK: Did Joel build coalitions with other members? How did he go about this?

MH: You have to remember that Joel was very popular with members of Congress. They liked him personally.

AK: That goes a long way.

MH: That was part of it, yes. From both parties. Also what you have here is a situation where many newer members of Congress voted against Tennessee-Tombigbee because they hadn't been

conditioned to think of pork-barrel projects yet. But we were surprised by the number of people who, even though they thought it was a terrible thing, still supported it.

AK: Because they had to, for some reason?

MH: They wanted to, because they might ask for something sometime.

AK: Were there hearings?

MH: The hearings were stacked. In other words, this was going to pass. Yes, there were hearings on it, but it didn't make any difference because the people who wanted it were there in Congress, and they had everything locked up, and so that wouldn't do any good. The only way you could possibly defeat something like that would be on the floor of the House or the Senate.

AK: It really says something about Joel that he could come even close to defeating this.

MH: Yes, it does. I remember some members, very important members, committee chairmen saying to him, "You may want something from us someday. Why are you doing this?" He said, "I don't want anything that cannot be justified."

AK: Could they have harmed him or his district in some way?

MH: No. What can they do?

AK: There was some talk about doing something to the Chittenden Locks.

MH: The Ballard Locks? I suppose they could, but I think there would be other members or the senators wouldn't go for that. You wouldn't want that to happen. Yes, somebody thought about that.

AK: He wasn't on any of the appropriate committees to deal with this. He just took this on kind of out of the blue?

MH: Yes. He took this on mainly because some other people would not do it. There was a

Democratic congressman from the Philadelphia area, Bob Edgar, who was also very active in this, too.

AK: Were there any repercussions?

MH: Not that I know of.

AK: It would be hard to measure, wouldn't it? Something happens or it doesn't happen, who really knows why?

MH: Yes. He had a fairly good relationship with Tom Bevel, the congressman from Alabama, who was very important. Bevel invited him to come down and see it, and Joel came down and flew over it, but he didn't change his mind.

You have to also remember another thing about this, once it gets started and gets along then they say, "Wait a minute, we've already spent two billion dollars on this."

AK: To say no all of a sudden would make them look like they'd made the wrong decision.

MH: Yes. This is already started. It wasn't really too late, but they used this excuse—it's already begun. We've made plans in the area and things like that. But it primarily was the digging of a big ditch. That's what it really was—a long, wide ditch.

Also another group that really wanted it was the construction industry—the construction contractors. They loved this because many of them had big contracts involved with this. The Building Trades Unions loved this for the same reason. The greatest beneficiaries were the freight shippers and barge owners, of course.

AK: If you have to also rebuild all the roads and bridges, that goes on for quite awhile.

MH: Oh, sure. We're now concerned more and more about our deficit so the federal government probably won't be doing this again in the immediate future.

AK: In the end he came out of it, and he felt good that he had come close?

MH: Oh yes. Looking at the facts, he felt that it was the wrong thing to do, wrong way to spend the taxpayer's money. I know he had no qualms about it, because it was something that he thought was right. I agree that it was right, especially when you studied the information. It was unfortunate that Congress didn't have the courage to stop it.

AK: That's revealing of how he worked.

TOBACCO SUBSIDY

Anne Kilgannon: The other thing that Joel mentioned, and I guess he didn't achieve this either but it was a good fight, was taking on the tobacco subsidy. I don't know if I understood this correctly, but did he take this on as a favor to his friend Tim Petri or did he take this on just because it interested him?

Maury Hausheer: Primarily the latter. Yes, he and Petri were sharing an apartment at that time, and Petri wanted to do it, but then he realized he was from Wisconsin. Let me give you some background here.

American agriculture works together in Congress, so the agriculture committees, the dairy industry, the wheat growers, the soybean growers, the corn growers, the pork growers, the beef growers and the tobacco growers and rice growers, they all work together and support each other's requests in Congress. The members of the Agriculture Committee tend not to vote against one of their groups.

AK: Because subsidies are a concept they wouldn't want to question? Is that the idea?

MH: Yes, but some groups don't want subsidies, too. The apple growers don't want subsidies. Whatever the position of that group is, you support that. That has tended to be the way it has gone. Once the Agriculture Committee says this is good, the agricultural appropriations go along with it, then this is what is accepted. So the tobacco industry had the protection in many ways of all the other agricultural groups.

Congressman Petri of Wisconsin felt he

shouldn't challenge this. He was a fairly new member of Congress and felt he didn't want to take this on—probably shouldn't do this, because he didn't want to endanger at that time the Wisconsin dairy industry.

AK: But yet something was happening that bothered him?

MH: Something was happening, and so Joel decided to do this. Not necessarily as a favor to him, but he was interested in it. But this didn't have the power behind it. It didn't have the environmentalists, but it did have the National Taxpayers Union. They certainly wanted to stop it.

AK: Could you explain for me what a tobacco subsidy includes?

MH: My understanding, and I think this is still true, is if you look at the tobacco program in the United States, it's a program that came in the 1930s to save the tobacco farmer. The early 1930s, '33, '34, something like that. It's Depression-era legislation where you said, "Okay, these are allotments. You can raise tobacco on these places and you'll be guaranteed a certain price for your tobacco. But you can only grow it on these allotments, this particular strip of land, this acreage right here." Most of these people had their own tobacco farms at that time.

If you went to the Department of Agriculture, the local office, over a period of time you might get this plot of ground right here. You might want to change that, and on this property here you have you might be able to grow tobacco, but you have to give up this one. It's a trade.

AK: I thought that growing tobacco was quite hard on the soil.

MH: It is.

AK: If you grow it in the same field all the time, doesn't it deplete the soil?

MH: Tobacco is extremely fertilizer intensive. There's an incredible amount of fertilizer put on

tobacco.

So that went along, and what happened through the years, the next fifty or sixty years, was that also these would change. A person would die, he would leave it to somebody, his widow, then his widow would maybe have a lot of money and she would give it to a church or to a synagogue, or banks owned them—various things. It ended up that maybe, at the most, twenty percent of the people who farmed the tobacco owned the tobacco. They were renting it from someone else, because there was a guaranteed price for the tobacco.

You had to finance the program, the Department of Agriculture to watch over it, and so it took some money, but usually tobacco prices, at least in that period of time, you didn't need the subsidy for it because they bought it on the world market.

AK: So people were making their money anyway?

MH: They were making money anyway. It was sort of a promotion of tobacco, saying we guarantee this. And this is a Depression era thing, it's no longer needed. Lots of rich people now own these things. They don't farm it.

AK: They're not even growing tobacco and they get money?

MH: No, no. They're growing it. They own it. They own the allotment, but they have somebody else raise it for them. They lease it.

It was a big thing in the South, in the culture and everything else, and they had the protection.

AK: So, it's more of a right than an economic thing? Is that it?

MH: Yes, it's a right. They get the money guaranteed, but since they're already making it, the government isn't exactly handing them money. They aren't handing them checks all the time. But you have a program. I'm sure that there was marketing going on and things like that that was part of it, so it took some money. It's not as much money as the American public tends to think it is.

The only other groups were the AMA and the

American Lung Association, people like that. They wanted this change.

AK: Yes, I can see how groups like that wouldn't want the American government to be supporting farming of cancer-causing crops, because that's pretty inconsistent. Is that the part that bothered them?

MH: Yes, that's a part of it, for health reasons. But several members of Congress—we were sort of surprised with the vote because I thought it didn't have a chance—it came within ten votes of being adopted. It was not considered good to take this on. This was not something that you normally challenged, this group.

AK: Would every congressman who had farming in his state not want to go against this?

MH: Some.

AK: Same as the people on the committee?

MH: Some, yes, because they would be told by the dairy industry, for instance, or the fruit growers or something like that, "Let's leave well enough alone. Everything's fine." Shortly after this, a congressman from North Carolina became chairman of the Agriculture Committee, and his area was primarily a tobacco growing area. So you see, you have people work back and forth, and they use the excuse, "Look at all of the widows who depend on this for their money."

Then there were people and this was the way they made their money because the other farming didn't work that well, so this was a very nice way to make some money. There are two or three states where the allotment does not work where you're allowed to raise tobacco. One is Maryland, one is Connecticut, and one is Wisconsin, but Wisconsin and Connecticut raised very little. Maryland does raise some, but I think it's a different quality. But in Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, North and South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, those are tobacco regions and it was part of their culture. You'd hear the cries about, "I sent my kids to college because I had the tobacco allotment." There were these kinds of things.

AK: This is a really naive question, but if they don't actually get any money and they don't really need the money to prop them up because the prices are good, why are they so attached to their subsidy? Just tradition?

MH: It isn't the subsidy necessarily, it's the allotment. If you let other people grow it, there will be competition.

AK: I see. So the subsidies are tied to who has the right to grow tobacco at all?

MH: Yes. Entirely.

AK: No new person can set up?

MH: No. You can't go to Kentucky and get a piece of land and say, "I'm going to raise tobacco."

AK: That's the critical difference, then. So it's a totally closed market?

MH: It's a closed market.

AK: And how do all the free-market people sit with this?

MH: They don't.

AK: Is that one of the arguments against this system?

MH: Parts of agriculture have not been a free market in the United States for many years.

AK: But never quite as closed as this?

MH: This is really closed, yes.

AK: If you want to start a dairy farm, you can.

MH: You can start a dairy farm.

AK: I didn't realize that this was it. No one else can ever grow tobacco unless their grandfather did?

MH: They could buy an allotment.

AK: But you just can't make that decision?

MH: No.

AK: That's the difference, then. So there's a real lid on it.

MH: Yes, right. There's a real lid. And there's a culture thing, too. There have been many studies that have shown that many of these people who farm tobacco, who own their allotments but still farm it, they would probably be better off if they raised something else. But they are so used to this and it's profitable. They don't want to take the risks of doing something else that wouldn't have the guarantee that this has.

AK: I imagine you've got an investment in equipment and all the sheds, the drying sheds.

MH: Sure. And you know how to do it, so it's become part of the culture. I think you'd find many times even medical doctors in the South tried to disconnect themselves from the fact that they live in a tobacco culture and tobacco might have been killing people. They knew it, but they compartmentalized it.

AK: People are very good at that.

MH: So that was a very interesting thing, and that was also tried in the Senate. Senator Hatfield tried to do that.

AK: Simultaneously?

MH: Near the same time.

AK: Did they work together on this?

MH: No, because it was totally different in the Senate. It wasn't going to work in the Senate and they knew that, but they got about thirty-five votes in the Senate.

AK: Again, how would Joel go about doing this? By disseminating information? By talking to people?

MH: Yes. And everything else. And it's not a popular thing. I think if you asked the average person at that time about subsidies—if you used the word subsidy it bothers people, and when you do that then people say, “Hey, this isn't right. This is harmful.”

It was an easy thing for many members to vote for the amendment. They loved to have it on their record, but at the same time there are other people who don't want to do it because they don't want to bite the hand that feeds them. You have to remember also at that time both political parties were strongly backing the tobacco industry and trying to get tobacco money.

AK: Do you mean campaign money?

MH: Oh yes. They didn't want to challenge the tobacco industry. It wasn't the industry itself so much as the tobacco growers and farmers and the people in the culture. The industry was probably going to get tobacco anyway.

AK: I wonder how this even benefits the tobacco industry. These aren't necessarily the most efficient producers and the soil must be just worn out. You wouldn't think you'd even get good tobacco this way. I sound like a real free enterprise promoter here, but it just doesn't sound like a very good way of going about producing anything.

MH: No, it isn't. In these areas it's institutionalized. You can't get away with this in Kentucky with that kind of a position, you can't do it. Nobody's going to challenge this in Kentucky. Kentucky has more allotments than any other state. North Carolina is second, but Kentucky is way ahead of everyone. You don't challenge it in Kentucky because people are afraid of change. They don't want to change.

In fact, you would think with the anti-smoking campaigns in America right now that they would deal with this, but they won't. That's what is interesting. They say we want to get you to stop smoking, but we don't want to stop raising it—that wouldn't be right.

AK: What are they going to do with it?

MH: They're just trying now to milk it for tax money, that's the idea now. They don't really want people to quit smoking, they want to get the tax money.

AK: It's quite a bucket of money.

MH: You bet. If they were really interested in health they would make it a drug and ban it. Really regulate it, or something like that. But they don't want to do that because it's such a money-maker. Especially if you can add a tax, and tax, and tax to it. Most of the people who use tobacco are lower income, and you're taking money away from them when you tax them.

AK: But it's a socially acceptable way of doing it?

MH: Yes. True.

AK: Sin taxes. It's always been that way. If you can't go for real taxes, you go for sin taxes, liquor or whatever. It's pretty hard to argue against.

MH: Yes. But Joel felt good about doing this. He liked it. This wasn't nearly as difficult for him as the Tennessee-Tombigbee event.

AK: What exactly was his angle on this? Did he talk about it as a free enterprise issue, as just a fairness issue?

MH: A fairness issue. This isn't the way we should be operating. It doesn't need it, and why not make everybody compete just like everybody else does? Have the same rules as anybody else.

AK: So it was kind of a business philosophy point of view?

MH: Yes.

AK: When you say he was offering an amendment, an amendment to what? To something routine, or was this coming up in some way?

MH: This was on an agricultural appropriations bill.

AK: That would be the occasion?

MH: Yes.

AK: How did he feel about the other agricultural subsidies?

MH: He usually voted against them.

AK: So he's pretty consistent. It wasn't just tobacco, it was the whole idea?

MH: Yes. He voted against the sugar industry. The area he represented of course didn't have agriculture, so he could easily do it.

AK: Do you think he would have voted differently had he been from an area that needed agricultural subsidies, say the apple growers?

MH: I doubt it. I'm sure he told you about the Chrysler bailout.

AK: A little bit. He said he voted against it even though some friends of his were involved in it.

MH: Yes. People who were supporting him in his election, big supporters.

AK: Chrysler people?

MH: These were Chrysler car dealers from the Seattle area and he said, "No, I don't believe in that." But he said he was wrong. The bailout by the government worked. He thought it was such a bad precedent and told them he would not do it. But it worked and he admitted as much.

AK: The government shouldn't be giving money to businesses, bailing out private businesses?

MH: Yes. It's a bad precedent. He probably wouldn't have gotten elected in a district like that, so I can't see him very anxious to do things he really didn't want to do. Sometimes he would vote for something he really didn't care about that much, but not if it made a significant difference. He would vote for something that other members

wanted if he felt it was not detrimental to the national interest.

AK: There must have been, I don't know how many, things that would fall into that gray area where so-and-so needs this or wants this and it doesn't hurt you. You can't really see that it does any harm, so you might go for it.

MH: That's exactly what happened.

AK: Would he consider that "team playing" important?

MH: Yes.

AK: He wasn't one to just be rolled along into

things, though.

MH: No. He would stand out like a sore thumb sometimes, but he liked people who tried to work together. He thought that was the best way to do it.

AK: That's interesting, because he was kind of independent and at the same time he has this, shall we call it, sports mentality of being part of the team.

MH: Right.

AK: I wonder how he reconciled the two strains of his personality.

MH: Sometimes it was difficult, but he liked to strike a compromise.

CHAPTER 12

SERVING UNDER PRESIDENT FORD

Anne Kilgannon: Gerald Ford became the president, in August, right after Richard Nixon left office. So a new era began, supposedly a time of healing from the wounds of Watergate and the bad taste of the last days of the Vietnam War.

Joel Pritchard: The key was making Ford vice president.

AK: Did you understand at the time that you were probably also making him president with that appointment?

JP: No, people didn't think Nixon would be impeached and completely run out. It was kind of questionable. The White House wanted Ford because they thought he could help them with the impeachment process in the House, because Jerry Ford was highly thought of by the House members on both sides of the aisle. They liked him very much. I think that was part of the push.

What they did was, they asked the Republicans in the House to send up two, sometimes three suggestions for vice president to the White House.

AK: Gerald Ford was at that time minority leader, wasn't he?

JP: He was minority leader, and we were to give our suggestions all to Ford, and Ford would take them up. Well, if you're giving them to Ford, you might as well put Jerry on as one of the two.

AK: What other names came up—the might-

have-beens of history?

JP: Everybody had different names. It was anybody.

AK: I just wondered if there was some clear second choice.

JP: I gave them Dan Evans, and I forget who else, it didn't make much difference. But everybody had Ford on theirs, because Ford was taking them up. So he took them to the White House, and they made Ford vice president.

But Spiro Agnew had gotten into trouble, clearly on his own. It would have been a disaster if they hadn't got him to resign—the people that did it were Richardson and Ehrlichman. Richardson was attorney general, and they worked on that and got him out. They could see there was a possibility, and they just couldn't have Spiro Agnew as president because they knew he had troubles.

So when they got the clear, hard evidence on him, of the money these guys were bringing into the vice president's office—these were the highway contractors who'd been giving money, and that was standard procedure in Maryland as far as we could tell, and they continued to do it—so, well, Jerry became vice president. And when Nixon got out, he became president, and Ford asked Rockefeller to be the vice president.

AK: And how do you think Ford felt about all this, this sudden elevation?

JP: He was not pressing it. I can remember the day he was picked. He and I had a talk about a bill and he seemed to be so focused on it, and later I asked him, and he said, "No, it was after we'd talked that he got the call to come down."

AK: But did he know it was in the works?

JP: He knew it was sort of in the works, but they said, "You'd better come down." So he called his wife and said, "Get me a fresh shirt and I'll meet you at the White House, because this thing may happen." It was still a "may." I remember him saying that he asked his wife Betty to bring a clean

shirt down to the White House.

AK: In case there were photos?

JP: You'd want a clean shirt if you were going to be vice president. And at that point he became the vice president. It was in the works for about two weeks. At that point most people didn't feel that Nixon would be impeached, but it was hard to say—there was stuff floating around.

The decision of the White House to stonewall it is what really got Nixon in trouble. But they'd just won an election by overwhelming odds, and so it was just hard for them to believe there was any trouble at all. There again, everybody knows about it, the *Washington Post* and the whole thing. It just slowly kept coming apart like a ball of thread. It just kept coming off and coming off.

Finally, the president did resign. Ford became president and he really was very good. He was a very good president. He had a very tough time because he had Congress overwhelmingly opposed to him. He made a lot of vetoes on issues, and he understood them well.

It always irked me that the press treated Jerry Ford as if he wasn't very smart. He was in the top half of the law school at Yale. The fact that he was an All-America football player doesn't make him dumb. But he didn't talk rapidly.

AK: Isn't that just a Midwestern trait?

JP: He had a rather slow manner of speech, but he was a very good person, very decent. I think he performed well.

This Vietnam thing was just dumped on him when Nixon left, and there it was. It's one thing to say we'll get out, but how do you get out? It's sort of like a strike, or a war, or anything—they're a lot easier to start than stop. It was very tough. In essence, he had some very difficult things to work with, and I know that I really felt for him at times.

AK: People had a tremendous distrust of government by then—disgust even—and then they looked to him to do some kind of miraculous healing.

JP: He did bring back the White House. He was the one who brought back stability, and performed. I think he certainly deserves a lot of credit for that. And he had a pretty good team with him. Dick Cheney was his chief of staff, very able. They had a pretty well-run operation.

AK: Is being in Congress a good preparation for being president, as opposed to being a governor?

JP: It's a little different. You're not an executive, but you are with all the issues. I think that if you can manage things, being in Congress at the national level is a help in that you've been dealing with the issues, and you know the different forces, and who is who.

A lot of people in Congress are legislators rather than administrators, and you can get by in many ways as a legislator without any management skills at all. You're an issue person, and you don't have to manage people. So, these are different skills. What you'd like is someone that has the management skills and also has a good understanding and experience with the issues. And some of it is in governors and some of it is legislators. There's no one way that it works best.

AK: For yourself, as a congressman, did you get a lot out of being an issues person? There were so many different things that you had to deal with.

JP: It depends on the committees you're on. I mean, if you're going to affect public policy, it's pretty much in the issues. And it's the committees that you're on where you have it. I was very pleased finally to get on Foreign Relations. I had a hard time getting on. That's where my interest went.

You get to be aware, and you hold hearings. A lot depends on your experiences and your interests in what you've known before—what you read—and all this business.

AK: During the Ford presidency the big issues all centered around energy and the economy. There was double-digit inflation and record unemployment and all the intricacies of how those interconnect. Those were the difficult issues that shaped the discussion in those years.

JP: Of course the energy issue was a big one because it did play out through the economy—the long gas lines and all of that. We had to be reminded how dependent we are on oil, and we and Europe were very dependent on oil from the Middle East. When you had dislocation in the Middle East, then that runs rampant, and you have it one place and another. And of course it affects the price of oil, the world price.

AK: They had the oil embargo.

One thing that interested me, in reading over all the different issues, is how you might have felt about—how Congress deliberated about—the mixture of public and private efforts to deal with the energy crisis. About where to draw the line—how much should be public money and effort, and how much should be private initiative, including individuals conserving and how oil companies operate. How did you draw that line in public policy matters?

JP: Every one of them is a different situation.

AK: I wondered if you had some kind of philosophy that guided you when you looked at these complex issues.

JP: You can't come at it with a formula, because each formula has to be different.

AK: Some people seemed to, but you are saying that's not how it worked for you?

JP: I know they do, and I think that's a great weakness. We got the energy crunch; there were a variety of things. One is that we had to make better use of natural gas. That's one thing there was an abundance of, and for a variety of reasons we weren't doing a very good job with, I didn't think. We had all kinds of funny old rules in there that held it up. We were heating with oil, and there was lots of natural gas. We could get it from Canada, we could buy it, and it made a lot more sense to heat by natural gas than with oil.

Then there was all the business of substitutes and attempts to put money into substitutes like shale. We can do it now, but it's proved to be a failure—it costs much more to process and

produce gas out of oil shale than it does other things. But we had to try these things.

AK: Is that the role of government, to smooth the way—

JP: I think in that case you have to, when you're going into something that needs research, that it's pretty hard to raise money for, for something that there wasn't any great— But there were private initiatives. We also were in there with the government. We had the ethanol—there was a big push to see whether that would work, because our ability to grow wheat and all the things that go into it.

At the time we made some pretty tough standards for mileage on cars. Of course that, coupled with the fact that cost of gas got so much more expensive, all of a sudden the mileage on cars was a factor.

When we got all through, we were going to raise the gas tax. We have a much lower gas tax than any country in the world, and I have a personal theory that in our transportation we've spent, I think, a disproportionate share on the car and too little proportion on the highway. If you want to have good transportation, you need a car and a road. We spent our money on the car and very little on the road compared to other countries, and what I think is needed.

AK: By roads, do you mean the upkeep of the infrastructure?

JP: Yes, the upkeep. When you go out and drive your car, how much do you spend on the road and how much do you spend on your car? The road is just as important as the car, but nobody looks at it that way.

AK: It's just "there."

JP: It isn't just there. And so it started with quite a bit of push, and when it got all done there were just nineteen of us in the House who voted for the gas tax. I mean it's difficult, because a gas tax sounds terrible. Who wants to pay a gas tax? Then people go out and buy a \$20,000 or \$18,000 car—I was for putting less money in the car and more

money in the highway.

AK: You were also in favor of mass transit, rapid transit.

JP: Then you get into other modes of transportation, some of these things don't work and some of them do. Today in our cities—you couldn't run Washington, D.C. without the Metro there. It's been a great success.

I had worked very hard with the chairman of the Speakers Bureau in the campaign to get rapid transit into Seattle, and we came very close. We got fifty-nine percent of the vote but it took sixty percent to get it passed. I think that was too bad. The money we were going to get all went to Atlanta, and Atlanta has a good system down there. You just can't move people by automobile.

We weren't able to make the changes. We did put some pretty tough guidelines on the manufacturers, and with the high cost of gasoline—it was a combination of things.

You had those, and then you had air standards the other way. People don't appreciate the fact that we have cleaner air today than we had back then, but we do. When you have automobiles carrying people, it gets pretty difficult in both those areas. Most cities in the world, almost all cities, are just choking with traffic today. Whether you go to Cairo or Bangkok—you name your major city—they have a hard time with their traffic. To be successful, you have to have a variety of ways of moving people.

I got quite involved in that in the House, but I wasn't a major player because I wasn't on Transportation.

AK: It does seem like people tried all kinds of things, but in the end, there was no big overall energy policy hammered out, despite the clamor for one. Congress, the president, you kind of tinkered around the edges and didn't quite grasp it.

JP: Yes, it just sort of evolved with some of these things.

AK: Was the country just not ready, despite the long lines and whatever?

JP: Everybody had their own ideas of what they wanted in energy, and what they want is cheap gas. They want all these things, and there's no free lunch. And people don't like change. If you ask them what they want in transportation, they want all these different things. When it ends up, they still want to get in their car and drive to where they want to go, and get these other people off the highway and get them into rapid transit. Get other people doing other things.

AK: Oh yes, those other people should do the changing.

Another issue that engaged Congress in the mid-seventies was setting up its own budget office. You began in office before these things were in place, or they were just coming in, and I wanted to ask you if you thought these reforms made a difference. One of your clippings had a colorful description of the process. You say, "The federal budget hits Congress each year like a tidal wave, with a three-hundred billion dollar proposal to be passed in only five months." And how you thought that this was sort of crazy. But that finally Congress had its own budget people.

JP: We ended up with a better budget process. It seemed to be more manageable. It was a better way to do things. There was more process to it and the different pieces had to fit in. The Congressional Budget Office had their own way, and they're doing it to this very day.

AK: Did you feel you got better information? A better sense of the whole, the big picture?

JP: If you wanted it, I think you could get better information.

AK: Did the Budget Impoundment Act of 1973 change your process? I mean, in your committees or whatever, did you do things differently with respect to money?

JP: We had very little effect on the big things. In Foreign Affairs we got foreign aid, but foreign aid really went through Ways and Means.

AK: I see. Another theme I was trying to track

was the effect of the people's loss of faith in government, their loss of confidence in elected officials. How did you respond to that?

JP: If you read history carefully, that's been going on and off all the way. But I think between Vietnam and Watergate, it was kind of a down time.

AK: Did you try to counter that—did you do anything actively to address that?

JP: You counter it best by people who are in positions of responsibility operating in a good way.

AK: Did people write you letters about this, or ask you about it in public meetings?

JP: I held lots of public meetings and then I had these sessions where people could come and get five minutes with me.

It was also campaigning. I had a district that, as I went on, became more and more Democratic. So I felt I had to do a very good job of getting there and talking to people and being available. I've always believed that if people feel you understand their issue, even when you don't always vote the way they want, that's one thing. If they come and they don't feel you understand what they're talking about, it just infuriates them. So I tried to be there, to where I could at least talk with them and listen to them, and these five minute things were pretty much their talking to me about what they were upset about.

AK: What kinds of things were people coming in with?

JP: You'd have the Vietnam War and you'd have Watergate. And then you'd have all kinds of things that they'd be upset with, like they were trying to get their cousin into the country—it was just an endless procession of things.

AK: Would they just come to your district office, and you would listen?

JP: No, I would go to a church basement, or a

school, somewhere in the community. I'd send out a mailing and ask anybody who wanted to, to come in. I would stay there all day, and they would line up and it would be five minutes at a time. We learned to do it in the open so the person could see all the other people waiting. They would talk to me, and when they stopped talking I'd ask them questions, and at the end of five minutes they'd bring up another person.

AK: Would you or your staff be taking notes?

JP: I would send the person to whoever, a person on my staff, if there was follow-up business that was supposed to be done.

AK: How did you come to think of doing this?

JP: I got the idea from going through Chicago. I saw Senator Percy—there was a picture in the paper showing a lady, an African-American lady, talking to Senator Percy. In the line was Senator Percy, and he was being grilled, or listening, or something—talked to—and the lady had some problem. And I got to thinking, that's better than my just talking to people, so I set that up that way.

We did it for a number of years, and then we got to where there weren't as many people. Then we would do a combination—first, we'd do the questions and have that part of it, then we'd have the public meeting where I'd sort of tell what was going on and answer general questions from the audience. This was different from the person who couldn't get their cousin into the country and all that.

I came home every other weekend.

AK: That sounds exhausting.

JP: You're right. The first two years I flew the "red-eye." I decided that was not very smart because then you're all turned around and you're sleepy, and that isn't very smart. So I quit that after two years and would just fly back and forth and do it in the daytime, not all night. Oh, that night flight—

AK: You would never recover—

JP: Yes. So that was how that all worked.

AK: Sounds pretty intense. Speaking of letters and people's problems, you had a lot of letters written to you concerning inflation, how that was the biggest issue on people's minds at that time. This was coupled with the unemployment issue. If I understand it correctly, it was felt that the solutions to one would exacerbate the other, that the trick was keeping them in balance. For you, which seemed more critical, controlling inflation or providing jobs?

JP: I don't think you can make choices between one or the other. But the White House and federal government have less effect on the business cycles than they think, and that the public thinks. I never thought that we were able to jam it back and forth. What we did was, people took credit when it was up, and they ducked their heads when it was down. I'm not at all sure that the business cycles—I think the contrary is true—that the business cycles work and the politicians sort of ride them.

AK: But there are small things you can do—tweak it here and there?

JP: Yes, but in most cases they're not as effective. I left Congress and the federal government with a general feeling that the federal government was the last entity of government to solve social problems, and that most of its problem-solving things have been failures or disappointments.

Certainly, if you take all the things that were done by the Great Society, and you go back and look at them, they all fell short. They were disappointments, and some were just total utter failures. But they sounded good to people.

Now, I think there is a role for government. Best, if it is a local government dealing in cooperation with the private sector, working together in a community. You get a much better chance of actually making some progress. I'm not at all keen, nor do I think that the government, particularly the federal government, is able to solve these things. They come out with these programs and then you go back and look at them, and see what really happened, and how well they've worked, and the cost of them.

Because we didn't have to pay any of those costs, you just put it on the bill, nobody had to worry about it, and nobody ever got defeated because of the deficit. No one ever got beat because of it. Everybody talked about it, but then they'd go back and say that they want this one and they want that—the farmers wanted this, people wanted that, and so we've got ourselves in a bad situation. I kind of watched all that.

The frustrating part was when you're in the minority—and we were little more than one-third—your ability to do these things is pretty restricted. And it didn't change. I mean, when Reagan came in, they didn't cut off the social programs which Congress wanted, so we just kept right on going.

AK: Did you develop this view while in Congress, or did you go into it with this idea already?

JP: I think I learned it more while I was there, but I had been in the state Legislature.

AK: If not the federal government, what would have been the appropriate level of government to solve, or perhaps just alleviate, some of these entrenched social problems?

JP: I think more appropriate would be, say, Yakima County—to have Yakima County take on some of these things. Then the public has to decide whether it's really worth it, because they have to pay for it. Then, also, you involve the private sectors, so that you really get at the problem and you can see the results. When they're vague national results, why, oh gosh. It's varied, but people's attitudes in the local communities is if it's fed money, why then it's free money.

AK: I'll just play the devil's advocate here for a moment. What about in the South, where there are huge areas of deep poverty?

JP: That's always the answer that's given: Oh yes, you could do it in the state of Washington, but down in Mississippi they won't do it, so we'll have to do it for them.

AK: But how does that play out? What about the

big inequities?

JP: I don't think the states are that much different, and you've got to hold them and make them be responsible. And if it's too bad, eventually people will leave those states.

AK: How do you make them comply with federal standards if you don't have any money to hold over them?

JP: You get down to that business of the most successful states were the ones that got on and got after things. If the states don't measure up, why some of the people will leave those states and others, the politicians will get thrown out. And that is democracy. You hold the state responsible. We always got that argument: Oh yes, we can do it your state, but in Louisiana they won't, so we've got to do it for them. So you change the whole system because of some people down in Louisiana. Let Louisiana face up to some changes and if they want to continue to have some of their politicians, why they'll pay a price. And if they look up and see Wisconsin or New Hampshire or Colorado are doing well and progressing faster—well, there it is. That's kind of the hard way. And we'd get it all the time.

AK: I see, kind of a Darwinian approach.

The next topic I wanted to discuss with you seems clearly in the federal sphere—the oil industry issues and their regulation, entwined with the foreign policy issues with Israel and the Arab states. You came out as favoring a phase-out of the oil depletion allowance, the elimination of tax incentives for foreign oil production versus having an oil production roll back, or windfall profits tax. Clearly these are domestic issues, but they had foreign policy implications—

JP: I didn't believe in doing some of these foreign policy things based on domestics. I had a theory: Kennan, whom I think is one of the smartest people on foreign policy, said, "You have to be very careful not to allow groups in the United States to set foreign policy." We set the foreign policy for Cuba out of Florida, because there's a lot of votes in Florida, and you have a group of

people down in Florida whose main purpose in life is their policy towards Fidel Castro. That may be, but I think the foreign policy should be set by the whole country.

We have that from groups that come from these countries—they set up the foreign policy, and I think it's a mistake to do that. You don't let the Irish set the policy toward Ireland or England. You have good relations with these areas, but you don't allow any of these groups to set the foreign policy. That's very difficult because some of these groups, like the Israeli lobby, are very powerful, and they were not happy with me.

AK: What stand did you take?

JP: Just that we should take the stand that fits. Our obligation—we had special relations with Israel and we did not want them run over. We did a magnificent job in several of the wars there, getting material into Israel, particularly after the Six Day War. We produced, and we should. But we should not have them set our policy for the Middle East. That runs counter to a lot of people's views.

The interesting thing is if you go to Israel, you get all kinds of different policy people. You have a lot of people in Israel who are not very happy about the settlements. And the last election was very close.

But, in America, the Israeli lobby gets almost full support even though sometimes they're not that keen on it, but they feel they have to support it. And so you have politicians who just roll over. I did not like to roll over, so at times I was at odds with the Israeli lobby. I didn't think that I was being unfair to Israel, but I had to make my vote based on what I thought was in the best interest of all the parties.

AK: Did you try to keep a balance with the Arabs and the Israelis in your own mind?

JP: It wasn't a balance, but I think you try to do what is in the best interest in the long run. We want to have peace and progress, and we want to make these things work.

When I went out to the Middle East, I went to most of the different countries and listened to

them. I thought that was the important way to go. And when I went to Israel in 1970, I spent time in Israel and then I went and spent time in the Palestinian camps, and listened to what they were doing. And I was in Syria, a short time in Syria. I'd been in Jordan, but where I spent time was up in Lebanon—Beirut. I went in to the Palestinian camps where we were supplying the food.

I thought Israel made a major mistake with their invasion of that country, and particularly going so far north. I got that from talking to many people in Israel, and different groups of people thought different things. I thought it was a major thing.

I thought it was a disaster when they had that assassination there—that was terrible—Rabin. That was a very sad thing because they were making progress and I thought they were on the road for a chance of peace.

AK: Clearly, some in Israel don't want that.

JP: The Middle East is full of people who will go to any length. The fact that he was killed was a sad thing because I thought he had a pretty balanced view.

You know, Carter did a good job in the Camp David accords. If that had been promoted and followed strictly, we'd be—well, it's a very sad situation now. But, maybe they'll work it out. Then they had elections, and that's really what it hurt.

AK: The other political piece in the Middle East was, of course, oil. In the years of the Ford administration, during the energy crisis arising from the oil embargo, a lot of quick fixes were proposed, but hardly anybody seemed to be looking at the long-term, what was really sustainable. There was no overall policy or no clear direction as to what would really benefit the country, but there were many small regional solutions. Can you ever hope for anything more coherent? I mean, I was reading through the different accounts, and I wondered if it was just too political—that no one facing the prospect of re-election could afford to take the long view. By its nature, is that not something government can do well, no matter how much it might be needed?

JP: Do you mean come in with new answers? We had the oil coming off the North Slope, up in the Arctic. You know, I was very disappointed. It came out of our committee, and I thought it was totally wrong when we put a condition that that oil could only be shipped to the Lower Forty-eight. It made it sound good—we'd always have it for America. That was done by the Maritime Unions, because if it had to come down to the Lower Forty-eight, then, according to the Maritime Act, it had to come down in American ships, built in America—and with a union crew.

We'd have been much better off to have left that for the marketplace—we'd have shipped that to Japan and maybe bought oil from Venezuela. But, of course, that was a political thing, and I thought it was a great mistake.

I also thought that the environmentalists had their heads in the sand, making a big deal out of that slope where nobody can go; it's practically a desert up there. As far as the caribou being upset with the pipeline, you see them and they're scratching their backs on the pipeline, and there's caribou all over, and it hasn't had any effect on the caribou.

So, we had the unions, we had the environmentalists, we had everybody in there making decisions, and that was one time when we ought to have made it very tough. We ought to pump that oil up there at this point.

AK: Was it just too hot, politically?

JP: Well, they weren't going to take on the Maritime Union, and they weren't going to take on the ship builders. You see, if you have to build ships in America, which is at least twice as expensive, why, that's very good for some areas of the country.

And the environmentalists are impossible at times, and so I think it's wonderful to have a wilderness area right here, where a lot of people can get to the wilderness. But no one can get up there—the North Slope—I've been up there—wow!

AK: Sometimes you came down on the side of the environmentalists.

JP: Of course—lots of times. But the thing that gets me is, these different groups that would come along and say, “You’re one of ours.”

“Well, I was on that issue, but I’m not on this issue,” and I’m saying, “Hey, on this one, you’re nuts.”

AK: You don’t want to belong to anyone.

JP: That’s right.

AK: Different groups like to have their congressman in their pockets. Let’s go over how you negotiated some of the tensions between environmental concerns and the competing energy needs of the mid-seventies period.

JP: Yes, you have to make judgments and it’s tough. I was very involved in keeping the tankers out of Puget Sound. I got kind of into a fight with the governor of our state, Dixy Lee Ray. I thought there was no reason to bring heavy, big tankers into lower Puget Sound.

AK: Did you prefer a pipeline?

JP: You could do pipelines, or they could do the refinery up there before you get into lower Puget Sound. There isn’t any reason to have refineries down there—big, enormous tankers of oil are a big threat and would be very tough on Puget Sound if you had a major oil spill. I thought that made a lot of sense.

AK: The water has nowhere to go—it’s like the bottom of a trough.

JP: Yes, it’s trapped.

AK: In another part of the country you supported the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act, an act to force the mining companies to restore the land and not just leave whole areas devastated. But President Ford vetoed it, saying the energy crisis outweighed the environmental needs of those areas.

JP: And the energy was needed. These are the tradeoffs you have to make. At times it’s

something that’s terribly important, and you did it. People see things from different ways.

I can’t remember the reasons Ford had, but we were in a difficult time.

AK: And yet the *Congressional Digest* called this the most important environmental bill of that year, one that had been worked on for years, and yet it’s just vetoed. I felt frustrated just reading about it.

JP: I thought that we could do it, but, one, I may not have understood the issue very well, or, two, I maybe made a bad vote. All kinds of things go on. And you have to remember that the environmentalists are just as bad as the industry when it comes to lobbying or using political pressure. I don’t hold them out as any wonderful group of people.

I don’t hold any of these groups out. Once they get to D.C., why, their lobbyists want to ring up victories because that’s the way they’ll look good. That’s a little tough, but you have to go back and look and see how things came out. The energy issue was an enormous problem.

And then you get into short term and long term. Something you may want to do here, and somebody says, “Yes, I’ll do it two years from now, but I won’t do it now because of this need or that need.”

AK: But what about the frustration of being on a committee like that, and working and learning all about some issue, and going through all the maneuvers of getting it through the process and passed, and then it’s vetoed?

JP: That’s our system. We need to have that veto. If it’s such a great bill, you can override the veto.

AK: So you take it pretty philosophically?

JP: Of course. They could override a veto. They had almost sixty Democrats, had almost sixty percent right there. But they didn’t, did they?

AK: It didn’t pass that year, not until 1977.

JP: The other thing you look at, and the thing

when it passes, is that it doesn't have some of the things that they wanted. You see, that was the great fight for the line-item veto. Now the president can do it, but you see, before they'd say, "Yes, I want this, but look at what they've put in here." The Senate can add any amendment, it doesn't have to be germane. They can put an amendment on that deals with wheat in America on a business bill that's going through that has nothing to do with it. Not in the House—amendments have to be germane.

But in the Senate, fifty votes allows you to put an amendment on that deals with sugar cane from Haiti on a bill that has nothing to do with it. The way that works is, the senator has some pet thing he wants to get across, so he waits. Then somebody comes along and says, "Will you vote for this thing? You'd be the fiftieth vote."

"Oh really? Well, you stick my little amendment on and I'll give you the fiftieth vote."

"Oh sure, let's stick it on."

So they stick it on and say that we can kill it in the conference committee or something. Then it doesn't and it carries through.

Then the president looks at it and says, "These three things don't belong there. I'm going to veto it. You send me the bill without this junk."

AK: That's like the disaster relief bill that is going through right now.

JP: Yes, everybody is doing it, and the other side says, "Hey, this is right. This is the way to get it. We'll put it on this bill."

AK: It makes it all sound like a game.

JP: It isn't a game. It's serious business, but it's like a chess game. You're trying to get from here to there with all kinds of strategy. That goes on in the state Legislature and it goes on in a city council. It's human beings.

AK: Oh, I know.

Now, I understand that you were not a great fan of the Great Society, but you helped sponsor some poverty-program bills like HR 4222, having to do with the provision of school lunches—should these lunches be for all children or should

they be means-tested? The discussion involved the possible impact on the budget, as well as the more philosophical aspects. How did you feel about issues of this sort—what did you think about school lunches—should they be for everyone or just needy kids? How did you weigh the conflicting policies?

JP: It's not easy! How do you sort these things out? They don't come in black and white. As for who should get lunch, you can come at in two different ways. You can say, "If you're going to have it, then—" And then you get into some areas where a large percentage of them don't pay, and then you have the ones who do pay. The stigma on those who don't pay, how do you get around it, or is it better to do the whole thing? You've got areas where it doesn't make any sense.

AK: The *Digest* said that there was five weeks of debate on this topic.

JP: I don't remember this issue—I don't remember how I voted on it.

AK: How would you vote today?

JP: I don't know. There you'd have to look at the bill, you see, and say, "How does this really apply, and how are they wording it? Are they just saying that we ought to have school lunches for everybody?" That would be a way of helping all families that have kids in school. If you wanted to do something that was some kind of mild tax relief, you'd say, "All right, we'll just feed the kids at lunch." And then, if you have the money to do that, that's one way to do it. Particularly if you're running a lunch program where some people get it and some people don't. On the other hand, then you have to look and say, "What kind of impact—how much money are we talking about here?"

AK: Yes, so these things come across your desk. How do you judge, individually or do you have a process, a way of measuring?

JP: One of the things I did, I always had somebody on every committee that I looked to

for leadership. I didn't use my brain, I tried to use other people's brains. So I always had at least one on each committee that I used, because they were on the committee and they thought a little like I did. I respected them and knew they weren't owned by anybody, so you'd look for that. I would look to see how they were voting on say, an amendment that was coming on the floor that was popped on.

AK: I wondered if you took these issues individually as they came up, or if you had an approach that guided you? I mean, some people are more fiscally oriented, and other people are saying, "How does this impact people?"

JP: Yes, and then you have to come back and say that the fiscal does impact, because somewhere down the road somebody's going to pay for this. Or, if you're paying this, would it be better to give more money to schools this way rather than doing it that way? The issue is really one to which you are giving a very small, light subsidy to people who have children. In today's world, that's pretty good, because I think we've over-subsidized the seniors. And here we have families and children as a great problem, so this would be the way to do it.

And did I think that twenty-five years ago? Not as strongly as I think now.

AK: Maybe it was different then, because I remember that at that time senior poverty was a major issue. That was what the talk was all about.

JP: You can talk about it, but if you look today you'll find seniors in much better shape than people who have children.

AK: I wonder if that is the case because of all these different programs that were put in place.

JP: No, it wasn't so much that. It's that the cost factors are much less for seniors. Generally, they are living in their own homes that they've paid for over the years. And then we have so many breaks for them. Every time you ride a ferry, you do this, you do that, you go on a bus—everywhere I go, now I get a break. And why? It's because we

are such an important lobby.

AK: And seniors vote—

JP: They do vote, yes. How did I vote on school lunches?

AK: I believe you were for it. It was very complicated—it went back and forth, there was a veto—it was difficult to trace to a conclusion.

JP: I can't remember at this point, but you can see all the issues. Somebody might stand up and say that we're giving money to one-third of the kids. It would be better if we just said, "Okay, here's lunch."

AK: Your actions with regard to the WIC program were easier to follow. You sponsored HR 2152 to reverse the president's proposal that families should be required to pay thirty percent of their disposable income for food stamps. You thought that was just too high, that it put people almost at the point where they actually weren't getting any benefit. It was costing them so much to get food stamps that they weren't getting ahead. And, you said, why should people go through so much paper work to get basically nothing? You wanted to reverse that trend and lower the bar, so that it wasn't such a high proportion of their income.

JP: Yes—but I was not on the committee, so—

AK: I was curious also about you voting against President Ford on this. Did you often vote against him?

JP: Oh, that never bothered me. I voted against Ford, I voted against all the presidents at times. Now, when you're in the minority it's a little different than when you're in the majority. The majority has a program to put through, there are times when you have to—and those are balances that are very difficult. I was very independent.

AK: How did you come to be a sponsor of this bill? As you say, you weren't on any committee that deals with this kind of issue. Did someone

come to you, ask you to sponsor?

JP: It could have been somebody, one of the legislators—

AK: If they, say, needed a Republican?

JP: Yes, but, well, when you say sponsor, they could have had thirty sponsors.

AK: True, but still, you're a little more out ahead than if you are just voting for it. It's a kind of statement of values or priorities of some kind.

JP: That's true. It could have been that one of my friends who I respected worked on it, worked it out, and here it was. And you say, "Yes, that makes good sense. Okay."

There's such a variety. I belonged to the Wednesday Group, which was a big factor in my congressional life. I was chairman of it three years in a row. That was about twenty-five to thirty Republicans of the more moderate persuasion. We got together once a week, on Wednesdays. We also had retreats where we'd go off for a weekend and have speakers come in and talk. There were some very able people in that group.

AK: It sounds a bit like graduate school.

JP: You learned a lot. Also it was a chance for people to report what was going on in other committees and why. They were very able, and that was a great help to me. Being chairman of it three years in a row was very interesting.

AK: Would you get to pick the issues that would be highlighted, and the speakers?

JP: Yes, on the retreats. I was very active with the other members of Congress in doing it. I had a lot of friends, and I used them. I found out about people—who was smart, what were their motives, and all that, and their expertise—and you'd ask them about how does this work. There are a variety of reasons about how you come to a decision.

And I had a very good staff. I took care of the politics and I had very able staff people.

AK: That sounds very key.

JP: And we didn't have much turnover. We did things together. We had a baseball team, and we socialized a lot together so that everybody felt like they were really part of it.

AK: Like a family.

JP: Yes, and that's very important. That's why you need some management skills. It helps if you know how to manage getting good people and not hiring people because they worked in your campaign, any of that sort of business. If they did, and you got to know them and they were very good, that's one thing. And never hire anyone you can't fire. All those kinds of things, I had a lot of rules that I did.

AK: Did you learn that in business or did you just kind of pick it up from experience?

JP: Yes, somewhat in business and somewhat from my father. He was clearly ahead on a lot of issues.

AK: How did you organize your office? I understand you had an unusual arrangement where you took the smaller room more commonly assigned to staff and gave them the larger space. Could you describe how that worked?

JP: I got the idea of taking the smaller room when I talked to Charlie Mosher—who owned a small newspaper in northern Ohio—a very good congressman. I went over and saw him for some reason, and he was in what normally is the administrative assistant's office, which is about half the size. I saw that it made lots of sense because the people are so busy and you're pretty crowded in there. They're the ones doing most of the work in the office there, and so I used that idea.

The other thing I did was work off of a coffee table rather than a desk, because I noticed that the desk was a great collector of all kinds of things that you're really better off if you don't have. I tried to use the system whereby people did not leave stacks of things for me to read or get at. We

would discuss the issue, I'd look at this and that and I might take something to read. The person who'd come in to see me, I didn't let him leave things. I'd say, "All right, we'll go over it," and try to figure out when the next time was, and I tried, in essence, to put the monkey on the back of whoever went out the door with that—what I called my monkey system. They had the initiative to get back, or the timing or that, so I just wasn't surrounded by things that I hadn't gotten to, and have the feeling of—oh, gosh, I'm not getting this done or that done. I tried to manage.

Then you have first-rate people, and I tried not to bring in political people. I divided up the issues that way.

AK: So then your staff would end up with the information, the packages to read, and they would, what, write up brief reports for you?

JP: They'd sit down with me and we'd go over where we were.

AK: Are you one of those kinds of people who learn best by listening rather than, say, reading?

JP: Yes. I might be reading lots of things, but I'd want to talk to them and say, "What is this, what's that?"

AK: Is that when information, an issue, really gels for you?

JP: Yes. You also have people who work for you that you have a lot of respect for. I had, I think, very bright, able people. We had a good group in the office—good feelings.

Since being there, we get together every five years. Last year we had a bunch come from Washington, D.C., and we've become very good friends. We had outings, weekend outings, and we had a baseball team. It was great fun. And today they've gone on to be very successful in life.

AK: Was your way of working, of organizing your office, unusual? My vision of a congressman's office is of it being rather imposing, certainly not just a coffee table.

JP: A little different than most. But you have a lot of people working very hard, sometimes under a lot of stress as far as time, so you want them to have the best atmosphere and a good feeling. And you want to talk to all the people, be around, be with them.

I was appalled when I realized that there are some congressmen that never talked to their staff, unless it was on an issue. They never saw them, they never dealt with them. They never had anything to do with them. They didn't get the most from their staff—it's a great mistake.

It's a mistake in business not to deal with the people who work for you, doing a lot of the heavy work. You've got to be around them all the time. Yes, I had some people say they never saw the boss. You lose a lot of your interest in working if you don't feel you're really a partner.

So, those were things that were important. I had them write the letters, I had them sign the letters, all that mail to the constituents. They knew how I felt, but I didn't get into writing letters and doing all that. They took care of it.

AK: It worked, I understand, because they had so much contact with you, they could really speak or act on your behalf with confidence.

JP: Yes. I remember, I went back and watched a congressman spend hours on his correspondence. I just thought that that's not me, and I'm not going to get trapped into that.

AK: It sounds like there are several models on how to manage the job, and you had to know what would work for you.

JP: I'm not saying mine was the good way to do it.

AK: No, but it suited you, your personality and style.

JP: Well, you have to have it fit. I do think sometimes lawyers have had a hard time being managers because they're used to doing most everything themselves. I would delegate all kinds of things and then watch, have a time when I'd look and see the product.

AK: Is that more of a business way of doing things, do you think?

JP: Yes, I would delegate everything I could.

AK: And then you could keep yourself fresh, keep your energy for the things only you could do?

JP: That's right. That's the interaction with other congressmen—talking. You have people who are coming in to see you and talk to you. I would be on the floor many times when there weren't a lot of people on the floor. I liked to be over on the floor, and be around listening to the debate. And talking and getting an idea.

And I did find that if a person wanted to see you, and you just came off the floor, they were a little slower about taking up your time than otherwise. When you come off the floor, you talk to them, you spend some time with them, but if you're in your office and they get in your office with you—you're trapped. It can go on and on. Not that you don't want to hear, but many times you can get the essence about what the concerns are.

And many groups have receptions; I would go to the receptions. I might not stay there too long, but I would go and see everybody from my district or whatever it was for a little bit and then move on. You have your own style of how you do things.

AK: Maybe this would be a good place to describe what your typical day would be like. What hour did you get up, and how your day would shape up—

JP: Well, to start with, do you have a breakfast meeting? I like breakfast meetings.

AK: Would you call yourself a morning person?

JP: Yes. So, it would be 7:00 or 7:30. If I didn't have a meeting, I played tennis, often times, early in the morning. We had courts we could play on over at the park. Most of the time I lived by the Capitol, close by. I played with other congressmen, many times. That's one more way you're talking and doing things.

Your committee meets, they're going to have a hearing on something, whatever it was. In your area you have a staff person who's keeping up with all the little details of this and that, of where you're supposed to be. You have your three-by-five card in your pocket, and that has lists of where you're supposed to be. I had Mary Lou Bammert who was great at keeping me straight and all.

If a bill from your committee was going to be on the floor, this and that, lunch, all the business, and your day was pretty well filled up.

AK: I know you were pretty sensitive about not missing votes, because someone had once charged you with that, so that you really made an effort in that area.

JP: It almost cost me an election. I was here in the state Senate, and you know this was not my major job—I was managing the envelope company. They had the Envelope Association meeting in Florida that year, and it was going to hit after session so I could go. Well, we had an extra session and we got everything cleared, but they had to have one more day to run a whole bunch of bills back through. They had to run about two hundred bills through for some technical reason. Everything was done, and so I told Governor Evans I was leaving. I said, "Have you got everything?"

He said, "How can you leave?" I told him, and he said, "Oh yes, I can understand."

So off I went.

AK: Did your vote matter, or was it a formality?

JP: There wasn't any consequence on any of these, but they had to be run through.

AK: So nothing failed from the lack of your presence?

JP: No. And then, sometimes we'd be in a committee meeting, and if something was going through forty-nine to zero, then I'd say that we didn't have to bother going down there. I wasn't aware that I was going to run for Congress. So when Martin Durkan ran for governor in '72, somebody labeled him as having the second worst

voting record in the state Senate. Then somebody in there said, “Who had the worst?” And I had the worst because of these two hundred votes I’d missed.

AK: But that’s so misleading!

JP: Yes, but boy, did I get beat up by my opponent. He ran these ads with the empty chair, ugh! So, I felt rather sensitive about that. So I was pretty careful after that.

AK: Yes, that would hurt.

But you made it. It sounds like every day serving in Congress would be somewhat different from every other day. There would always be something coming up. But would you work at it from early morning until late at night, habitually?

JP: You could. Many times you’ve got somebody back from the district, and you’d end up having dinner with them. The business side and the social side are so interwoven.

And I found it was important to get to know the other congressmen, and you get to know their wives and you get a better understanding. You can understand a person a little better if you get to know their spouse a little bit. You know how that works, where they’re coming from and all. I’m a great believer that it’s very important to thoroughly understand the other members of Congress. You can’t know all four hundred and thirty-five, but you get to know quite a number of them. How to deal with them—what are the things that are terribly important to them?

All that works because one vote can’t accomplish anything in Congress. Your own vote, just by itself, it’s nothing. The whole business is, if you’re going to be effective, is how do you gather other votes? That’s what you work on. Some of them don’t understand that.

AK: Your approach seemed to be through building relationships. Would some people do it through sheer power?

JP: It’s kind of hard, particularly if you’re in the minority, to have sheer power. Some do it by seniority. There’s the committee chairman or the

subcommittee chairman. However, of all those things, you’re better off if you thoroughly understand all the members, if you have good relations with them and develop friendships, even with people you don’t agree with.

AK: Do you think congress people who fail to do that just don’t last very long?

JP: No, they may stay there because that has nothing to do with getting elected.

AK: But they may not be able to get anything done?

JP: How effective they are has practically no relationship on how well they run for office.

AK: I see, a different set of skills.

JP: Totally. When I talk about being effective, I’m talking about public policy. I’m not talking about bringing home the bacon. Some people work at that, and then a lot of people in the district think, “Boy! He really knows how to do things. Look he got this Humpty Dumpty thing, and there it is.” Real public policy is far more important than something you bring back to the district, but it’s pretty hard to understand that.

AK: How would you go about communicating that to your constituents, that that is not what you are all about?

JP: If you work hard in your district you can do that, too. In many cases, they don’t know it, but if you want to get something done, why—

AK: So your audience in that sense is yourself—what you think you ought to be doing?

JP: Yes.

AK: And, of course, a select group of people who really follow these things.

JP: Some people back there know it, and either they give you hell for opposing what they’re doing—well.

Being effective in public policy is helped by personal characteristics—by not making enemies out of your opponents, because a month later you may need them. Not carrying grudges. Doing your homework. Willingness to take half a loaf. There are quite a number of things that fit in.

AK: So, it helps not to be an ideologue.

JP: That's true. You can have strong feelings, and not be a one-issue person, because there are far too many. There are a variety of things that help your relations with other members.

AK: Did you think about this a great deal, or did you just kind of feel your way into it?

JP: I think you learn these things in life. My father was very good at a lot of these things, and I learned them from him. He had lots of friends, not acquaintances, he really had friends. He helped a lot of people and had a very good way. If he disagreed with a person, why he disagreed, but he was never disagreeable. That allows you to be effective in dealing with other people, and Congress is dealing with people all the time.

AK: Earlier, we were talking about how people can misunderstand that position. They want you to vote for their issue, and they see their issue in isolation. And when the votes are counted up, they don't understand how you voted or why you did this or that. How people don't understand the complexities.

JP: Sometimes, yes, it's hard, particularly if you're a single-issue person. When I was in the Legislature—in the Senate—I was the leader of putting through the abortion bill in our state. It was put through by Republicans with some Democrats. It was not an issue in my first campaign for Congress. It wasn't even brought up, but it became a big issue when I ran the second time and it's been a big issue ever since. One of my good friends when I was back in Congress was Henry Hyde.

AK: Is that when the Christian Coalition was coming to the fore?

JP: When they got involved in it and took it on. And it's always been a very strong issue with the members of the Catholic faith. And, as I say, Henry Hyde was one of their big leaders. We didn't agree on this issue, but we're very good friends and when we were dealing on other things, why, we put it aside.

AK: Lots of people are unable to do that.

JP: Yes, lots of people are unable to put their pet issue, or whatever it is, aside and it handicaps them in working on something else.

AK: Is that tendency getting more common?

JP: I don't know. It's really a matter of personalities.

AK: Perhaps they are just getting more press lately. The single-issue candidates seem to be more of a phenomenon these days.

JP: Oh no. You read history—these issues come along and they become the big thing at that particular time. Some stay on and on.

I think it's very important not to be a one-issue person. Then people get horsed around to where they start trading votes. I did not trade votes. I mean, I didn't go and say, "If you'll vote for this, I'll vote for that." I didn't do that.

AK: That was just a little too fast and loose?

JP: I don't think you want to do that—this vote trading. I didn't do it. But now, when someone has helped you a lot on some issue, you hope you can do it. You look at the amendment, you give them the benefit of the doubt. I think that's really where it is, and they give you the benefit of the doubt if you're friends with them. But, if they really don't like it, they're not going to vote for it. In that gray area, there's often times enough votes to win or lose.

AK: It's fascinating, all the elements that come into play. Let's look now at a different set of dynamics. An issue that seemed to absorb a good deal of your attention at this time was the two-

hundred-mile limit for fisheries and your attendance at the Laws of the Sea Conference. You didn't seem to think this was a very effective body or process. Could you describe what this was all about and your role there?

JP: No, it wasn't very effective, but it was a good effort. They were trying to set up some type of standard rules all over the world.

AK: Was this a U.N. initiative, or some other international group? Where would you hold these meetings?

JP: I don't think it was U.N. It was an effort by some of the major maritime countries to get some standardized rules so that you didn't have a three-mile limit here, a two-hundred-mile limit there, you know, this and that. A lot of things on dealing with tuna, dealing with different species that maybe were endangered. Doing something here that helps this, but hurts that. All the things that go into maritime issues. So, they had this work, and we were a part of it. A lot of work went into it. Goodness sakes, it was two or three years.

AK: Was all that a build-up to one conference or were there a series of conferences?

JP: This thing went on. They had the conference, then they had a permanent group set up and they worked on it, my impression is, for about two years. Finally they brought it back, and I was critical of the administration then. It was the Reagan administration, because the conference had been done and now each country was to take it back and have it ratified, and the Reagan administration didn't support it. There were these people who didn't like some parts of it here and there, as you can imagine. And, in that presidential election, they had thrown their weight behind the Reagan candidacy, and they expected to get help from the administration in changing it.

I was fairly vocal. I thought that it wasn't everything that we wanted, but it was a good step forward, and if we didn't support it, how can we expect other countries to do it? It was going to take some leadership to get all the countries of the world to agree to overall maritime rules.

AK: Was this during Reagan's campaign against Ford or later?

JP: This was when he became president. I was disappointed. We had some hearings on it, and their pitch was that they were just trying to get a few changes made. Maybe they were. It's tough anytime these international rules are put in. Everybody wants the rules, but they want their own little thing that's special.

I felt that we had to be leaders in the world on this one. There were some things that came along and helped, but it was kind of a downer. And we needed protection because we had fishermen coming from other countries—the Japanese, the Russians, and different ones—coming in and fishing off our coast and using methods that we didn't think were quite square. And so we put through a two-hundred-mile limit for these outside fishermen that were coming in. We were building the stocks by doing the fish farms and then having the hatcheries, and having them go out, and having these fishermen take our fish.

AK: Were these the big factory trawlers that just scoop up everything?

JP: Yes, and that seemed wrong, and so we made some changes.

AK: The two-hundred-mile limit—was that a unilateral measure that the United States took outside the Laws of the Sea Conference?

JP: We did it on our own. Then we could set some rules and regulations on people who came in and fished. In Congress, it had some meaning for those in some areas but it wasn't a very big issue. It wasn't anything like stopping the bombing in Cambodia, things like that.

AK: No, but it must have had a big impact on Washington State. And you cosponsored a couple of bills pertaining to fisheries, HR 13560, to allow the military to patrol the fishing grounds, for one.

JP: A resolution doesn't mean anything. I hate to tell you that, but resolutions mean nothing.

AK: Just that it's a good idea?

JP: It's a sense of Congress. It encourages. It says, "Hey, go up there and police this thing so we can back up what our law is." It's a way to kind of prod the administration.

AK: Secondly, you were involved in another resolution that would authorize a straight baseline method for measuring the boundaries of the fishing zones. Did that mean using just a straight line in the ocean, rather than trying to follow the jagged line of the coast, so that people would have less difficulty knowing where the two-hundred-mile limit was?

JP: Yes, you've got to have some rules about how you do it. Is it two hundred miles from here or there?

AK: And you spoke out against port privileges for Polish ships—

JP: I think that was more on the East coast. I don't think we had a lot of Polish ships. That was something that the fellows from the Atlantic side who were on the committee wanted. I hardly even remember what it was.

AK: Well, more locally then, this is when the Judge Boldt ruling was made. Did that have an impact on your fisheries work?

JP: That had enormous impact. I didn't agree with the ruling.

AK: Could you review for me what that meant, and how you felt about it?

JP: Judge Boldt said that since the treaty said that the white man and the Indian will fish in common, that meant that the Indian was guaranteed fifty percent of the fish coming out of the water. And I said, "No, that allowed both people to put their line in the water, but it doesn't guarantee that you get half the fish." It was obviously a great deal for the Indians because of the numbers and the whole thing.

My view was that they had the right to fish as

we have the right to fish, and then what you catch, you catch. But then Boldt said it guaranteed them fifty percent, and boy, it started all kinds of things. What it meant was a thirty percent cut of the fishing, or thirty-five, or something.

AK: I was trying to figure out what happened—how that played out in practice.

JP: It got people going out and getting Indians to be part owners and things. It put the Indians in the fishing business. And fishing businesses had lots of troubles and trials. One of the problems is the capacity to catch fish is so increased with modern methods, the nets, all these different things. One of the worst has been these enormous nets. The Japanese in particular, they just had these—

AK: Drift nets?

JP: Yes, drift nets—just enormous. They just go on and on and on, laying out there.

AK: And they waste so much.

JP: That's right. Yes, they catch some of this fish, but in catching some of this fish, they catch all kinds of sea life and kill it all.

AK: I think it's creating a desert out there.

JP: Yes. There were all these battles.

AK: Just an aside, but do you fish, yourself?

JP: No. My father was a great fisherman. He just loved fishing, and my brother loves to fish. I really liked to go up to the playfield and play sports. I went fishing with my father. My brother would encourage me to go fishing with my father, and I went with him, but that was when I was a boy. Oh, my father loved to fish. That was his big interest.

AK: Did you go down and go out on any fishing boats?

JP: No, for one thing, the time—

AK: I just wondered how involved you would be, getting right down there with the boats and people, and all.

JP: I met with lots of fishermen, and had lots of concerns with them. They were my constituents. You bet.

AK: Besides working with the international community on fisheries issues, the United States was going through a period of readjustment of its relationships after the debacle of the Vietnam War in the mid-seventies. Could you comment on that?

JP: That was fascinating—all the boat people, and getting out. I was very involved in that. I was in the camps in Vietnam—twelve different camps out there.

AK: Now, did you do that privately or in an official capacity this time?

JP: I went out as a congressman. I would arrange to go out there once I became the ranking Republican for the subcommittee. There were four subcommittees of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and ours was everything from Pakistan around to Korea.

AK: Asia and the Pacific Rim—

JP: The chairman was Steve Solarz. Steve and I got along very well. He was controversial with some, but I really enjoyed Steve. We worked well together.

I think one of the things that was quite good was that there was no political Republican/Democrat positioning out there. In most cases, it was just American interest.

I spent a good deal of time out there. I was in all of those countries—everything from New Zealand and Australia to the border of Afghanistan. I went everywhere. I had spent a lot of time in Vietnam and in the camps. I was very involved in the camps. And I went to Switzerland when they had the big meeting on the refugees with Mondale.

AK: And it was your position—for the record—

that it was the right thing to do, to bring the people over here?

JP: Absolutely. We had a real obligation there. In our state of Washington, Governor Evans was terrific. He stood up and said, “You bet, we’ll take ours.” My son was down in the relocation center where they were coming in. He worked for the state then, helping them. The Vietnamese are turning out to be pretty good citizens. It was a very difficult thing for them, and by and large, it’s worked pretty well.

Yes, I was very involved and thoroughly enjoyed the work. I’d say that eighty percent of my time was put in on the committee on foreign affairs. And I got to be the U.S. delegate to the United Nations [*please see article “A United Nations Experience,” in Appendix D*]. I went to all kinds of sessions and I read. I had a lot of interest before I ever got into it by my reading. Yes, I thoroughly enjoyed it and spent a lot of time and effort, and it was fascinating.

AK: The Vietnamese—was it pretty unanimous that the refugees should be brought over, and how this should be handled, or was there some contention?

JP: Oh no. Certain areas were all right as long as you didn’t bring them into “our town.” There were a number of states that really didn’t want to take them.

AK: Any particular area of the country?

JP: I don’t know. It kind of varied from place to place. People felt threatened. I remember one of those southern states because the Vietnamese who were fishermen, they were immediately out there fishing. But we, here, got quite a few, and I think we did a pretty good job in meeting with them and getting them started.

AK: It must have been complicated, setting up all the different services they would have needed to make the transition, both for getting them here and getting them settled.

JP: That’s right.

AK: Would that be an example of a successful partnership between public and private groups?

JP: When it first started, when they first came in, the individual churches took them. It was very successful. I think in some respects the welfare department got in there faster than they should have.

AK: Because with the churches they were sponsored in a more personal way?

JP: Yes, everybody worked on it. Everybody helped. But I think, by and large, in this state there was a good feeling, about our feeling of having responsibility to these people. We were deeply involved.

AK: Can you think of any particular things—something that stands out in your mind—that you did to facilitate this effort with the refugees? What role would a congressman play? I mean, you meet and do this and that, talk with people, but what exactly would your involvement be on this one?

JP: First of all, it was a matter of setting up policy for the pipeline. Once they got to the state, we didn't have anything to do with them. But before they got to the state, they were collected in these refugee camps. When they first went out as boat people, these refugee camps were awful, just god-awful—on the shores of Indonesia and these different countries. How were they to be handled? They just landed on these shores, and many of these countries didn't have a lot of money, and they had a lot of troubles in their own countries. And so, here these boats are landing with all these people, and nobody wants them there. It's a mess.

We were helpful. The Japanese were very helpful because that way they bought their way out of not having to take any. They didn't take any. They were xenophobic, and so they didn't take any refugees. But for that, they paid half of all the costs in the whole world on refugees as far as the pipeline was concerned. They built the camps and they were very good.

We went into the Philippines and Imelda Marcos, who had a construction company, was going to build a camp. It was really going to be a

naval base as soon as they got rid of the Vietnamese, and it was going to cost twice as much as it should. And we were looking at it, but we sent strong signals that this wasn't what they should be doing. And so they did—they stopped it.

AK: Was this using American money to do this?

JP: Well, it was the wrong place to have the camp—it was the wrong thing. They finally put a camp in at Bataan and it worked well. They did it. It was interesting to see that. And the Indonesians, with the help of the Americans and the Japanese, they cleaned up those beach camps, which were just so awful.

AK: Did you get to see that—did you go there?

JP: Oh yes. I went to all kinds of camps. I went with Congress, and then I did my own trip out there. Norm Dicks went with me. I had a person from the State Department and a couple of others. We went around and looked at a variety of camps. It was very interesting. We went to a big camp right on the Thai border. These people were coming out all over the place. There's nobody leaving Vietnam now. They're doing quite well.

AK: Yes, now it's a different story.

JP: Yes, I was very involved. It was very interesting and it fit right in with my committee, my interests, my area, and the fact that in our state the whole thing was of great importance.

AK: Did the state of Washington take a disproportionate number?

JP: Yes, we took more than others. They wanted everybody to take a certain amount, and we took ours. We got more, but being that close and being a port and all the rest of it—but, as I say, I think the Vietnamese have been good citizens and have done well, by and large.

AK: Back in Congress, there was a certain amount of jockeying for power taking place in this post-Watergate era between the administration and the

representatives. There's the 1972 Case Act that stipulated that the executive has to transmit all agreements—that would be international agreements, I would imagine—to Congress within sixty days, so that they are not doing things without informing Congress. And then there was the 1973 War Powers Act.

JP: That's been going on for two hundred years. But yes, that's a very big one—War Powers—and presidents still do not accept it, truthfully. They always say, "No, no, no." I think it's a good compromise. It allows the president to go ahead, and he can go into any area, but after he's been in there thirty days, I forget, they have to come back to Congress and get some approval.

This was a reaction to Vietnam, where we ran a full-scale war out there and we never declared war and we never paid the price, and never raised the taxes. So, it was a reaction, too.

AK: It was putting a limit on that, yes.

JP: And I think it was worthwhile. Certainly in the Gulf War—which I strongly supported us going in there—I thought it was absolutely the right way, and the fact that we didn't go on in, and I'm absolutely supportive of that, also.

AK: You mean of not going all the way into Iraq?

JP: No, no, because the whole group hanging together—the Arab countries were there only to do Kuwait. And the whole thing worked out. They finally went to Congress. Now, Congress didn't go to war. What they did was approved a resolution that the U.N. had passed. So it was a little different wrinkle, but for all intents and purposes, they approved the action.

But, if Congress won't approve the action, boy, you're on pretty thin ground for any major effort. Something that is a short strike or something that has to be done and they can't wait around for Congress to debate it for a few months—

AK: The element of surprise would be gone.

JP: Yes, and particularly if you're reacting to

something that's happened. But I think a full-scale war, and have Congress not declare it—it's wrong.

AK: President Ford wanted to go into Angola, and Congress said no. Is this one of those cases where, without that law, it would have been a different outcome?

JP: It probably would have worked out better, sure. The problem there is, how do you get out?

AK: In another situation, in 1974, Turkey invaded Cypress using American weapons that were supposed to be only for defense, not offense.

JP: The Greek lobby in the United States came out against it and a whole bunch of congressmen jumped up and attacked Turkey.

AK: Would this be a case, as you talked about earlier, of an ethnic community in the United States making foreign policy?

JP: That's right. This is a good example of a group—the Greeks in America. I took the other side. Turkey had been a great supporter. They had been on the NATO line. And they'd sent troops to Korea—and nobody else sent troops to Korea—they did. So I took the approach of, hey, let's not beat up the Turks here.

After all, it was the Greek colonels that started the whole thing. The Greeks went in and did it. And then the Turks came back after being thrown out. They kind of overdid it a little, but they didn't want to do anything halfway.

But the Greeks had an enormous campaign going on in this country. They met with me, and oh boy!

AK: How did you handle that?

JP: I listened to them.

Maury Hausheer: [*Also present in the room during the interview was Maury Hausheer, Lieutenant Governor Pritchard's staff director. He also worked in Pritchard's congressional office.*] Can I get in on this? I went to a meeting in Seattle where you had the representatives of the Greek

community, about ten of them—one a retired general, one a retired foreign service officer, a couple of professors at the University of Washington—prominent Greeks. They talked to Joel in a very reasonable manner about why this was a bad idea. They talked to him in a very rational way, which went on for about half an hour. Then when they found out that he really wasn't going to change his vote—

AK: Did they already know what position he was going to take?

MH: No, no. They knew what his position was, because it was in the best interest of U.S. foreign policy to stay with the Turks.

Then, all of a sudden, they lost it. Instead of going on with this sophistication, these very well educated people went right back to their childhood where the Turks were absolutely no good, they're barbarians, they're murderers, they had never contributed anything to civilization. One or two of them said that they were going to see that he was defeated in the next election.

In other words, they were okay for a half an hour, then how they really felt about the Turks came out. It was not intellectual at all. This was how they really felt.

AK: They took the mask off.

MH: They despised the Turks.

JP: Somebody in their family had been murdered by the Turks.

MH: I remember that well.

AK: So how did you respond to this very emotional display?

JP: I remained calm, didn't I?

AK: And then after awhile you ushered them out?

MH: They left. They left in anger.

JP: We stood up and they left. They were very disappointed. But, hey, that's just part of the game.

I was used to meeting with people who weren't happy. I didn't get upset. I don't think I did.

MH: No, no. But they were. This mask of civility left them.

JP: I remember meeting with Archbishop Makarios who was the leader of one of the groups there. I went into Cypress and met with them, and talked with both sides—had a briefing. And, oh boy, the emotion and all! But that's part of the game—I shouldn't use that word. You know what I mean.

MH: I saw the debate on the floor of Congress, and it shows the influence of immigrant groups on American foreign policy. It's there. It can be there and it's not in the long-term interest of the U.S.

JP: You do not have to vote for things that are approved by a majority. What you do is, you go around, and if you want to be popular, you vote for that special interest, this special interest. You vote with the gun nuts, or this bunch or that bunch, and each one thinks you're a hero. Ninety percent of the people think it's sort of dumb, but to the ten percent, that's how they really do it. So, it's like feeding the robins. You give a worm to each one. And there are some people that operate that way.

AK: That wasn't your way.

JP: No, you don't need to do that.

AK: We were talking about Congress flexing its muscle vis-à-vis the administration in the mid-seventies. They began to scrutinize Henry Kissinger's movements more closely than previously, and even issued a citation against him for contempt of Congress. This was said to be "unprecedented."

JP: Because they wouldn't cooperate with the committees.

AK: This had something to do with the CIA and FBI during Watergate.

JP: That's one. I think with Kissinger, he found out that the trouble was that if you told senators or congressmen, why, they couldn't keep their mouths shut. So everything got leaked and everything went out. And so the administration, which was doing the dealing with these other countries, and they'd want to talk to him about all these things that he was involved in.

AK: Still in process—

JP: Yes. Then they would leak or their staff would leak and the stuff would show up in the papers. So, he took the approach—in a very strong way—he wasn't going to tell them anything. That's just difficult in our system.

MH: He did wiretap one of the National Security Council members who was leaking.

JP: I was going to say, that's what he found out.

MH: But he did wiretap when it was not legal.

JP: We've got major, serious things we're dealing with. One of the reasons they leak is that's one of the ways they can be big shots with the press.

AK: It's also one way you can get things stopped that maybe shouldn't be happening. Who knows what was going on?

JP: That's true. Who knows? If you're the guy that's on one side and you're doing what you're absolutely sure is the right thing to do, and then these guys are leaking this stuff. After he goes up, he testifies, or meets with them, on the basis of, "We won't say anything." But he couldn't trust them. And so our ship leaked at the top.

AK: How much oversight should Congress have for foreign affairs? Where do you draw the line between what the president is doing and what Congress should know?

JP: I think Congress has to have oversight because they've got to fund these things. But that's where the rub comes on these things. It isn't easy, and there isn't some easy answer, and there's always

friction and there always will be. Particularly when you have one party running the executive and one party running Congress.

AK: Well, and perhaps it was exacerbated by having a president who could not be trusted—Nixon.

JP: Lyndon Johnson was much worse than Nixon.

AK: Maybe Congress was on the alert after Watergate, looking for things.

JP: Oh, this has been going on for two hundred years—the battling between Congress and the president over who has the power.

AK: So you see it as just part of this back and forth ebb between the two, part of the system? I mean, nothing unusual?

JP: Yes. It's very hard to write it down and put in it exactly who was going to do what and when. The system works reasonably well.

AK: Does it come down to personalities, then? If you have a strong president, it ebbs his way?

JP: Yes, and it depends also in what area you're in.

MH: Also, who the presidents have in their leadership positions for foreign policy—their secretary of state, chairman of National Security Council. I'd never feel sorry for Kissinger, because he could handle anything. He was so good. He was really good, and he was absolutely arrogant beyond belief, and self-centered, and everything else. But he was very competent, and he would do anything to get his way—he would cheat, he would lie—

JP: Now, you have to remember that Mr. Hausheer ran a United States senator's office.

MH: He was somewhat devious, but it was always in the best interest of the United States as he saw it. You have to remember, Kissinger came out of Europe and he had a very pessimistic view of the

future. The European view at the time, the intellectual view, was that Communism would eventually win because we didn't have the discipline to withstand it.

So, what Kissinger was doing in his mind was delaying the inevitable. He was going to fight off the Soviet Union. That's why he went to China, by the way, too. He was going to fight off the Soviet Union as long as possible. That was the major thing.

One time, Kissinger—his expert on eastern European affairs was Larry Eagleburger who was undersecretary of state for Eastern European affairs, and they were friends—but one time over an eighteen hour period, Kissinger fired Eagleburger three times because they got in such fights over what they should be doing in Eastern Europe.

But Kissinger was really good, but the problem was—because he could see the big picture, and he was always way ahead of everybody—that he always made himself look good.

JP: That's not unusual, they all do that.

AK: Perhaps he did it in a more naked way, leaving no doubt.

MH: He told the Russians they'd better go along with Détente because Nixon was unpredictable, and he might cause them harm.

JP: That would be wonderful!

MH: Yes, and so they decided they'd better agree.

JP: I was around him once in awhile, and he was talking to a bunch of us, the Republicans involved in foreign affairs, and he would say, "We have to prove to them that we're willing to stand up and really be tough and do something. You have to kick the hell out of somebody to impress the Russians." And we said, "Who do we kick around?" What is that little, tiny country with that nut in north Africa?

AK: Lybia?

JP: Lybia. And he said, "Let's see, Lybia. Maybe we should just kick hell out of them some day." And sure enough, we tried.

We need to show that you're willing to be very, very tough. Otherwise, they don't take you very seriously.

AK: That's a funny way to run foreign policy.

MH: His book on diplomacy is really worthwhile, but it's difficult to read. He really thinks of himself as a Metternich in the world. He really makes foreign policy—

JP: Didn't you think that was a great book? I thought it was terrific.

MH: It's a great book. It's sort of hard reading.

JP: Yes, you have to stay with it. But what were we talking about? Go ahead.

AK: That's all right. We were discussing Congress and foreign policy. Now, there were still issues with Vietnam. I know that you worked very hard for the refugees, but you came out against any more aid to South Vietnam—military aid.

JP: I went over there and I came to the conclusion that it wasn't winnable, and without putting another half a million men in there. There was no support. We never declared war, so the thing for us to do was get out. The problem was that it wasn't easy to get out and the North Vietnamese weren't making it easy. They were enjoying our predicament.

And the Chinese were not helping. They really weren't involved at all, but we were scared to death that if we got into it, it was going to be like Korea, and everybody was, like, "Don't bring them in!"

Yes, I wanted to stop the war in Vietnam. Everybody did. That's how Nixon got elected in '68—one of the biggest reasons. Everybody said that we've got to stop, but we can't stop and be humiliated, so we've got to come out on our terms. Well, we couldn't get out on our terms and it was a hell of a deal. We finally did get out of there, but it was a hell of a mess.

AK: In your thinking, what were the long-term impacts of the mess, as you call it, of not being able to come out on our terms?

JP: You mean getting out?

AK: Yes, the impact on foreign policy, and on internal issues—domestic issues?

JP: It was devastating on people's confidence—and it spawned this whole business of the sixties.

AK: Do you want to elaborate on that?

JP: Yes, this whole business of institutions—of not having any faith in your government—the young people. The whole thing was, I think, very detrimental to the structures and people's attitudes, particularly younger people's attitudes towards the institutions of our country.

AK: Ultimately it was a failure—

JP: Everybody realized that it was going to be awful, and they got out. I didn't hear anybody saying, "Gee whiz, we should have stayed in there and put another half a million people in there."

Now, there are attitudes of, "We could have won the war if we hadn't been held back for this reason or that reason." But, for whatever reason, everybody knew the whole thing had come to a god-awful end, and it did. We were kind of run out of there. We took some people with us, but we left a lot of people—Vietnamese who had dealt with Americans. Some of them were double dealing. We didn't know who our friends and our foes were, really.

AK: I think that was probably true from the beginning.

JP: And we hadn't drafted equally, and so it wasn't everybody that was drafted. It was the lower bottom of the barrel that got hauled over there. They didn't give a damn about the war. It was just, "How do I live three hundred and sixty-five days and get out of here?"

MH: Yes, that was something, wasn't it. I was in

the Korean War, which was even different. There were people who could get out of the Korean War by going to college, but it was like World War II. But by the time you got to Vietnam, if you went to college, or got married or something, you didn't have to go in the draft. So you had this whole underclass. It was really unfair.

AK: It was really not a representative group.

JP: Oh no. It was just so bad. And the attitude of the soldiers—they didn't give a damn about the war. Could they last a year and live? So there was no morale, there was nothing.

And boy, was that played back. Everybody at home was raising hell. I contend that those demonstrations held us back from getting out, because, if I heard it once, I heard it over and over and over, "I don't give a damn if those guys are sitting in my office, I'm not going to get run out of this thing. I'm not having those kids tell me what I'm doing."

MH: I think the demonstrations had an impact on North Vietnam.

JP: It really helped them.

MH: Henry Kissinger, to this day, does not think well of Jane Fonda. He feels that when he was negotiating in Paris, they'd tell him, "Hey, American people, we've got you!"

JP: I know all that business. It was just a disaster for every reason. It was just awful.

AK: So, afterward, how does the country come out of this?

JP: Very slowly. It didn't come out of it very well. It was a terrible thing. In some ways, that's why the Gulf War had such a good feeling to people, that hey, the army does work; hey, we can be together, and so on.

AK: Did you give speeches on it, or address it in other ways?

JP: Yes, I debated Al Swift on the Gulf War

on television.

AK: I'm sorry, no, I meant the Vietnam War.

JP: No, I didn't give speeches.

AK: No one wanted to hear?

JP: They wanted to know what I thought, oh sure, but I didn't run around bad-mouthing.

AK: I wondered if there was some process to come through that post-war anguish, and find a new direction for the country?

JP: I was disdainful of the people who were protesting—the wild stuff. I was for stopping the war, but I wasn't for tearing the hell out of the country. I didn't let the war become an excuse for me to go out and raise hell and do every undisciplined thing I wanted to do, and then blame it on the war.

MH: It had an impact in the Democratic Party—on people like Scoop Jackson because he supported the war all the way through.

AK: It isolated him.

MH: Yes, it isolated him, and they confused him on everything. Teachers in schools, public schools, would have it on their boards: "This is Scoop's war." He was blamed for everything—every death and everything else—because Jackson was an internationalist.

JP: That's right.

MH: And he really believed it. They treated him so shabbily, and of course, he never forgot them. He remembered everyone who criticized him.

JP: And that guy who ran against me in '74 had supported the guy from Spokane and the Democrat, Brian Maxie. Scoop wouldn't have his picture taken with the guy when he walked up. He said, "I'm not having my picture taken with this guy."

MH: It really hurt him, yes.

AK: You just went on, then? I was looking—hoping, I suppose—for ways that people on the national level could help this process along. I don't like to use the term "healing," but move the country along—

JP: What you do is—we got out of Vietnam finally, and you move along.

AK: You work with the refugees?

JP: Yes. And the fact that all those people who were raising hell over the Vietnam War, and the far-out fringe who were making sort of heroes out of the Viet Cong—the way Vietnam acted immediately after the war was pretty brutal and awful. So, Vietnam didn't end up as a hero in the thing.

AK: No.

MH: The interesting thing is, we were deceived in the United States by the anti-war movement. They argued that the Viet Cong were separate and different from the North Vietnamese. They were not.

JP: Oh God, no.

MH: Because they believed they were an indigenous group that was there just to overthrow the South Vietnamese, and they were separate. After the war, it was immediately discovered that they were the same thing.

JP: And they were sort of lionized by some—the Jane Fondas of the world.

But, first of all, it was a traumatic thing. Everybody was glad to be out of it. I was one who had opposed the war, but I didn't want to drag it up, and I didn't want to use it politically. There wasn't anything to gain by it. There wasn't anything there. Hey, move it on and let's have the country start worrying about the things that we've got to worry about.

AK: To some people, at the time and in commen-

taries later, it looked like America performing triage by amnesia, where the country just abruptly turned the corner and moved on, and didn't discuss or reconcile what had just happened. While I can understand the impulse—

JP: It's sort of like a disgraceful thing in a family. "We're not going to dwell on this. Let's turn the page and get on with the future."

AK: I'm afraid it just seemed like a quintessentially American way of handling a messy situation.

JP: Yes, that's a plus if you can turn the page and move on. But I think it's hard for many countries—they stay on these things and beat each other up.

MH: Well, remember, this came about because of a fear of communism.

AK: I know, I understand that.

MH: It was there, and Vietnam did hurt Russia. They put a lot into it. It cost them a lot. It probably hastened their collapse.

JP: Oh yes, because they took so much of their resources and dumped them in there.

MH: You can't say it didn't have an impact—

AK: Oh, tremendous.

MH: We just couldn't do it.

Another thing we did in that war that we probably won't do again right away—we didn't do it in the Gulf War—we didn't make political decisions in the Pentagon. You couldn't do any major bombing without approval from the Pentagon. You got in the Gulf War and the people who ran the Gulf War were determined this wasn't going to happen. "We're going to do it differently."

AK: Military decisions rather than political decisions?

JP: Absolutely. But of course, they had the best team in there we've ever had, I believe—Cheney and Scowcroft and Baker and Powell. And you had a president who really understood. So, they were in sync, they did it and they got through it.

By the time of Vietnam, you see, Johnson's reasons—all of this was Kennedy getting beat up by Khrushchev. Now, Stalin did not believe in screwing around in the Third World. When he led Russia, they weren't into this playing the game all over. But Khrushchev came along and he thought, "This is the way we'll do it. We'll hook up with the Third World, and they'll raise hell with the colonial powers, and this is a winning strategy."

It turned out to be hugely expensive. Yes, Cuba hurt us, but it was a bothersome thing for us. But they spent a lot of money in Cuba, and they spent a lot of money in this war—Vietnam—and Russia couldn't really afford it.

AK: And that was how it played out.

FURTHER THOUGHTS

STEVE EXCELL

LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE

Steve Excell: The State Departments of various countries had been meeting, trying to put together a treaty, and when they think they are getting to the point of a treaty, they hold one of these international conferences, on global warming or health or whatever it might be.

There was a Law of the Sea Conference scheduled in the early 1970s. It was very charged with politics. A lot of Third World countries immediately went to a two-hundred-mile zone, whether they had fishing or not, because they viewed it as economic leverage. There were countries that were landlocked and didn't even have seas, in Africa and elsewhere, that wanted revenue sharing—if you get anything out of the sea, pay us. So there was a kind of Third World versus developed industrial world kind of view.

The U.S. was about the only country that had the technology to mine nickel and manganese nodules off of the sea floor. U.S. law and international law, basically, didn't recognize anything beyond a three-mile state limit and something like a seventeen-mile federal limit. And then all of a sudden, we were talking two hundred-mile limits.

It was all bogged down in international laws and customs, all sorts of cross currents. Joel saw the need to do fisheries conservation in a greater arena than just rivers or to a three-mile limit. At the same time, he had the most respect for the

rule of law and courts, but he recognized some of the phony-baloney politics between developing countries and developed countries. He ended up being appointed by the Nixon administration and Congress to be one of the congressional advisors to the Law of the Sea Conference.

Anne Kilgannon: Did this come out of his committee assignment? How many people were appointed?

SE: Yes, because he was on the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. There were eight or twelve of them, a couple from each house of each political party, probably. It was a natural. And Magnuson was clearly working the two-hundred-mile limit economic zone on the Senate side, and Joel was somebody who was acceptable to both the Democrats and the Nixon administration.

AK: Did Joel support this idea of a two-hundred-mile limit?

SE: He was guardedly supportive. He wanted to see the conservation rules put in by international agreements, but was very wary of just unilaterally declaring it—the U.S. just saying that we're out to two hundred, so Great Britain, France and the rest of you who aren't doing it, we don't care about you. He was concerned that it be done correctly. He was also concerned about what this meant, because there were a lot of areas where the two hundred miles crossed. What do you do when a country says, no ships can pass here, and you can't get through straits, or the Bering Sea? There were all sorts of complicating factors.

It turns out there is no Law of the Sea treaty, yet. It died, collapsed under its own weight. The U.S. did adopt the Magnuson Conservation Act. We do regulate our own people out to two hundred miles. We have a tough time regulating others, but we try through treaties.

AK: Joel did sponsor a bill to have the military patrol fishing grounds.

SE: Right, because the Coast Guard wasn't set up for it. This issue was so heady back then,

countries like Peru and Ecuador that did declare a two-hundred-mile limit, the American Navy was sent by the president to purposely cruise through their zone to tell them they don't own it. It was that tough an issue.

Basically, what Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon all said was, you cannot take the ocean by yourself. The ocean is a common commodity. Since then, we actually have achieved treaties for Antarctica and the moon that set ground rules for all nations, so no one owns the resource and the management is set up. With the Law of the Sea, it wasn't about to be, because it was more an argument about money than it was about conservation. Developing countries wanted the industrialized countries to pay them for anything they took out of the sea, because if it's going to be common ownership, then we want our royalties. So, it got mired down. And Joel was a delegate.

AK: How did he operate in that sphere—did he go to listen, or as an advocate for a position?

SE: I think he thought he had a fiduciary responsibility to represent the U.S. position. I think he was listening to both the Nixon White House as well as to what Congress perceived to be some of the problems. There were State Department people assigned to him, he didn't go out there as a kind of lone bandit.

METRO BUSES

Steve Excell: I remember we figured out how to get an articulated bus from Germany to take congressional staff people around. He'd been one of the original Metro committee members back in the 1950s, so he was one of those who were kind of the granddaddy generation of Metro. He was very much in favor of the pollution clean-up and the bus system and rapid transit when he was in the Legislature. For a very brief time, when he worked at a law firm after he was out of the state Senate, he even lobbied for Metro for one session down in Olympia. He believed in it. He didn't make money out of it, but he believed in it.

So, he worked behind the scenes to convince

the Nixon administration, which had no reason to believe in Metro, or why Metro was important to Seattle. Great things happened. He worked in concert—he worked with Maggie and Jackson, and they didn't have any weight with the Nixon administration, but Joel did, so they tag-teamed. They'd let Maggie and Scoop work Mike Mansfield or Carl Albert, and Joel would go and work the Nixon administration, and then things happened. It was very bipartisan, very cooperative. It's something long seen from politics, unfortunately, whether it's the Legislature or Congress. But it worked.

Yet there won't be a single plaque in any Metro bus stop for all the work that Joel did to up the grants, to get the bus system off the ground.

RELATIONSHIP WITH LABOR

Steve Excell: Joel worked well with labor. They didn't expect him to be one hundred percent. There were a lot of issues he didn't get terribly excited about that the business community did, like *common situs* picketing and all sorts of labor versus management issues. Joel's basic attitude was that labor management law in this country was put together in the 1920s and 1930s—let it rest. He took a position of not allowing either labor or management to change the rules. He thought the rules were relatively fair the way they've been historically. Of course, the old way was for labor to try to get a Democratic president and a Democratic Congress to make it more favorable to labor. And business was waiting to get a Republican president to try to make it more favorable, because they didn't think they'd ever take over Congress. Joel's attitude was that neither side should be trying to hijack the other side. Let's just live with the labor laws the way they are.

And labor accepted that, and they worked well with him. They never really challenged him in any of his races. In those days, COPE, which was the Committee on Political Education for labor, had big bucks. In those days there were no spending limits and you could put big bucks in a race, and if they wanted to defeat Joel Pritchard, they could. Living proof that they were capable of doing this was when Jack Cunningham was

replaced by Mike Lowry as the congressman from the Seventh District; Jack was defeated after one term because he went to war with labor. Jack signed up for the entire business management agenda to gut the labor laws and Jack was a one-term congressman.

So Joel made his peace with both labor and management. Because Joel was from the business community, he could talk to the business community about labor relations, and because he was willing to listen, he could talk to labor. It was pretty rare. Probably John Spellman, Dan Evans, and Joel Pritchard are the few Republicans that come to mind that didn't sign up for the one hundred percent business management agenda. Joel viewed his job as being fair to both sides.

OIL DRILLING AND SUPERTANKERS

Steve Excell: Oil drilling on Puget Sound was a hot issue in the seventies. Offshore drilling had become popular in the Gulf States, and the federal government under Nixon, as part of budget savings, was aggressively trying to put out leases for oil exploration because the federal government got revenues by doing them on the continental shelf. And nobody knew whether there was going to be oil in Puget Sound, or oil off the Washington coast.

At the same time, the oil industry was moving from smaller tankers to supertankers, which in those days could be single hulled. And they didn't have pilot boats. There wasn't a lot of protection—no oil spill stuff in place, and oil spills had happened. And they had had blow-outs of oil platforms in the Gulf States.

So Evans as governor was concerned about it, because there weren't really any rules for this. It was like staking a claim—if you find it, it's yours. The feeling was that there had to be some rules. First, Puget Sound pretty well got taken off the list for oil drilling based on the state's actions of resisting the federal government, by threatening to go to court. The one that really hung out there was that the state didn't have any ability to regulate interstate and foreign commerce—shipping was strictly a federal issue. No matter how strongly Evans felt about it, there was no

way to stop it. He could stop the oil ports because they had to dock, so they had to deal with land, and they had pipelines. And if the state wasn't going to give any pipeline permits, and you're an oil company, you take the governor's threats seriously and quit. But with shipping you can say, "You don't have any control over that, governor, it's interstate and foreign commerce."

Joel thought there was an ability to do better, and Magnuson agreed. Joel happened to be on the right committee in the House, and Maggie happened to be on the right committee in the Senate, so the delegation kind of fell in behind the two. And there were some citizen groups organized; there were all sorts of anti-oil groups at the time. But they didn't carry the day as much as the fact that the technology existed to do better on oil transport. Basically the Magnuson Act did a couple of things: it limited tankers to 125,000 deadweight tons, which makes it of modest size versus a supertanker that can be three or four times that big. So, if you spill, you're spilling a smaller amount. And it required pilot boats inside the Strait of Juan de Fuca, so a local guide who knows the waters, the weather, and drift conditions, will come in and either guide the boat by taking the helm or help guide the boat with a tug. They also gave the industry time to do double-hulled tankers, for which the technology existed—there were some. Joel was involved in this battle.

Anne Kilgannon: Can you tell me more about his role in getting this legislation passed? What did Joel do, did he go around and meet with people?

SE: This one was more formal. There were hearings at the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. They looked at the experience of the Gulf States with tanker safety and oil port safety. There were a lot of hearings, a lot of assessments. The Coast Guard had views, the Nixon administration had views, the military had views, because they have tankers. This was one of the more formal things that happened, that went through the full-blown congressional process, where Joel didn't just go whisper in somebody's ear and get something done.

And the interesting part was, the Gulf coast

states were on the other side. Most of those states are poor, and these are big employers. When you have one-third of the state of Louisiana working in the oil industry, or Texas, or whatever, they have a whole different attitude about this stuff.

So, some special rules were cut for Puget Sound. What the Magnuson Act basically did was it dealt with Puget Sound as a management problem. It came vessel traffic control systems, so supertankers have lanes to follow, and special rules of the road, special rules for tankers entering just Puget Sound. And the Coast Guard got a computerized operation center. They recognized the practicalities, that what was needed on Puget Sound was not necessarily what was needed on the Gulf coast. They didn't try to do one size fits all—Maggie and Joel showed some flexibility.

AK: This sounds like Joel following his maxim of finding a local solution to a problem if possible. Wasn't this the issue that raised the ire of Dixy Lee Ray, the governor?

SE: I think Dixy fought harder against tanker

limitations—she was pretty pro-tanker, defending the old technology, unquestioning. She started picking a battle with Maggie in particular—not Joel as much as Maggie—because she thought Maggie was in her party and Maggie ought to listen to her. She's the governor. Joel, I think, also had a more charming bedside manner. Maggie, in those days, was part of the imperial Congress, and he knew he had clout. He didn't have to take this crap off a governor—he was the senior ranking state official.

Dixy actually fought harder than the oil companies did. They kind of hid behind her skirts and let her do the fight for them. It didn't work. This issue was driven by a number of years of hearings and solid information, where Congress moved slowly in a deliberative process. In the end analysis, Dixy wasn't a viable force, but nobody in the delegation, including Joel, wants to have a governor mad at them. I think Joel's response was to listen carefully and be polite, but to act on the facts. I think Maggie truly got ticked off, and it became a public feud where they started arguing in the papers, but that wasn't Joel's style to do that.

CHAPTER 13

ISSUES: SAVING WILDERNESS TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Anne Kilgannon: I'd like to talk now about something closer, more personal to you, the creation of the Gold Rush Park.

Joel Pritchard: That's a little thing. My grandparents were in the gold rush. The gold rush was a big thing in Seattle, a major impact on Seattle. It really made Seattle. A hundred thousand people went to the gold rush, thirty thousand of them finally got up there. About four thousand of them hit gold and a few thousand of them—

AK: Kept it?

JP: Yes. Maybe three or four hundred of them ended up with some gold. Only a handful really kept it. People took it away from them—all the different ways you can spend money. And it was

a wild time, there was a depression on in the country and this was a great adventure.

AK: Certainly something to commemorate. How did you get involved in this? Wasn't it your idea, originally?

JP: I went with my brother and his son, and my son, for the Bicentennial. That's where I got this idea. I said we ought to do something for the Bicentennial, and so we went up and hiked over the Chilkoot and down to Bennett.*

AK: That sounds like a pretty vigorous hike.

JP: It was an interesting thing to do. And in doing it, why, you read everything. And it fits into what you've been told, the picture you have, and all.

AK: So, first came the hike, and then the idea for the park?

JP: I don't know how it got hooked, but we did it. Then we pushed to have this park. It's the only park that's separated—there are two parts to it that are not connected, in Seattle and Alaska.

AK: I understand that Bruce Chapman, who was on the Seattle City Council, was somewhat involved with this project.

JP: Bruce and I were very close. It's a very nice thing.

***Frank Pritchard:** That was a great trip. It was his idea. Nineteen seventy-five was the year before the Bicentennial and he wanted to do something. We both had kids college age, and we had this close friend who was a salesman at Griffin and was a great mountain climber. His name was George Senner. In fact, he went on all our mountain climbs. He was always the leader. A great, close personal friend of both of us. So, the five of us flew up to Juneau and took a smaller plane up to Skagway, the place everybody starts for the Klondike. The actual starting place is a few miles around the bend, called Dyea. We started hiking from Dyea, the five of us.

The biggest packs were mine and my son's. Joel and his son didn't have such big packs. We got up to this town, and the hotel let us use their ballroom to organize our stuff. Of course, typical, my brother arrives and he doesn't have all the stuff he should have. We had to take food and whatnot for five days. Anyway, we got our stuff all laid out and started packing it into our packs, and he had to go down the street to the store and get stuff. We finally got going.

It was wonderful. George had asked Joel what he liked to eat on a hike. "Oh," Joel said, "I kind of like liverwurst." So, George brought five pounds of liverwurst. It was awful. I just remember

that, because we ate a lot of liverwurst. So, we made the hike and we just had a wonderful time.

Anne Kilgannon: It was summer, I'm assuming.

FP: Oh yes. Joel's son had brought along some gin, as I remember—the best gin. So, every night before dinner, we'd have a few drinks of gin. It warms you up to sleep well.

Every once in a while, we'd be camped near somebody else. One night we were camped near two girls from Calgary, and they were doing it on the cheap. It was obvious. They just had their trail food, and here we were over there—

AK: Drinking gin and eating liverwurst!

FP: That was so much fun. It was very interesting to Joel and me because our paternal grandparents had done this. As we did it, we kept talking about how bad our grandfather's judgment was to bring a young bride from England, who had grown up in a convent, on to this kind of a deal. And they did it when they didn't have good gear. Each of them had a ton of supplies.

We made the hike over, and we got to Bennett at the railroad station, and they wouldn't let us come in and sit down. It was raining. They had a big dining hall there, and the train comes and stops for an hour and a half, and the people eat.

AK: Were you too scruffy looking?

FP: We were dirty after five days of hiking, and we wandered into this dining hall. We said, "We just want to sit down." They wouldn't let us. We had to wait until the train came and all the other people got in, and then they let us in. We could buy our meal there, and then we got on the train and went back down the coast.

There's a sequel to this, maybe Joel told you.

AK: I'm not sure. He didn't tell me about the hotel problem.

FP: It really burned him that we got treated this way.

AK: In 1975 he's in Congress. Did he reveal that?

FP: No. But, the next year, the White Pass and Yukon Railroad—that was the company—is before a committee he's on, and they're asking for money. He puts on this guy, and the guy says, "Oh, Congressman, if we had known it was you."

Joel just cut his head off and said, "That's the trouble—why do you treat hikers so badly and why would you treat a congressman any differently?" He just loved that.

AK: What a moment—poetic justice!

FP: Yes. We just had a great time, and it was good to have our two sons with us.

I remember the mosquitoes were so big. We remembered our grandmother telling us that they used to escape the mosquitoes by going out—some of these rivers weren't very deep—where there would be an island or a gravel bar in the river, and if you went out there, the mosquitoes wouldn't come out there. And so we went out there, and it was true.

AK: Did you actually camp out on gravel bars?

FP: No, but we'd go out and spend time there to get away from the big mosquitoes.

There are certain things you look back on where you had a lot of fun, and this was one. People think it's a tough climb and hike and it sounds that way, but it was real easy and fun. In those days it wasn't heavily used. About the only people we saw until we got to the train, were these two girls from Calgary. He and I both enjoyed it.

He had a Bicentennial flag that he'd brought, so he stood on the summit of the pass and waved it, and had a picture taken. His son and my son just thought this was corny. They were embarrassed, so they walked away. They wouldn't be in the picture.

AK: That's quite an image. When he later worked on the creation of the Klondike Gold Rush Park, was he already thinking of it during this hike, or did the idea come up later?

FP: I think it came up later.

AK: It was a good fit. It tied in with your family history, and it tied in with your support for historic preservation.

JP: Yes, I'm a believer that we want to keep our history and know what we're doing, where we've been and why, and so, yes, it tied in with all that.

But, that's the kind of thing that people misinterpret as being effective in Congress.

AK: Because you "brought this home," got this to happen?

JP: You help make it happen, and that's what I call "bringing home the bacon." Yes, you do some of that in your district, but that's not terribly important compared to being in the battle on public policy. You do that, but someone on your staff does all the work on it.

AK: It still represents a kind of legacy for that area. It helped turn around Pioneer Square.

JP: Of course, I worked in Pioneer Square. That's where the printing company was when I worked there. And my dad worked there, and so I had a lot of interest in Pioneer Square.

AK: Another area that you worked on about this time was the creation of the Pacific Northwest Trail. There are some nice photographs of you out there hiking, with your backpack and all. How

did your involvement there come about?

JP: That got to be a little difficult—who was that guy we were doing it for?

AK: Ron Strickland.

JP: Yes, we worked on it, and then it didn't turn out. It didn't happen. The idea was to have a trail all the way across the Northwest.

AK: From Glacier National Park to the Olympic National Park. It sounded like a nice idea.

JP: It didn't work out, but now there's going to be a trail because of what Jim Ellis is doing on that Mountains to Sound Greenway. There's going to be a trail that ties into that, where you start almost at the Columbia River and walk it and go through the tunnel—the railroad tunnel—and that's a great thing. But anyway, it didn't happen then.

AK: Well, it looked like you got some nice hikes out of it. Another opportunity, perhaps, for more outdoor adventure, was your involvement in the Alpine Lakes issue. That seemed like a much more complicated issue.

JP: That was a much more substantive thing than the Trails issue. The whole delegation worked together on Alpine Lakes.

AK: With the exception, it sounded like, of Mike McCormack, who was against it in the end. The story of its creation was quite a lesson in how to get something through Congress.

JP: We got that through, but Lloyd Meeds took the lead on that. And the Alpine Lakes was in McCormack's district, and it wasn't totally perfect, but we did it.

But that wasn't the one I was so involved in—that was the Supreme Court Douglas Wilderness area over there. We were much more involved in that, and that's the one where John McKay and Degginger were there. We had two parts to it and we made the area bigger than Scoop had wanted.

What I did, I went and got Mike Lowry to cosponsor it with me. We got it in and we got it through our part. Then we had a meeting in Scoop's office, but I remember Mike couldn't be there, I was there, and we all agreed that we wanted to get this thing through. I said fine, and Scoop said, "You've got to not do anything more on that bigger one."

And I said, "Well, we can't just turn our back on it. That'll probably move it along, but we'll send it over to the Senate."

AK: Had you already made the boundaries bigger?

JP: Yes. I said, "We'll just send it over to the Senate, and you come up with the one that we think is right here, and then that will be it." I'd made it bigger, and he didn't want to have the environmentalists—

Maury Hausheer: He didn't want to be the one to shrink it.

JP: Yes, he didn't want to shrink it. They're not easy to work with, those people. John McKay and Degginger had come in and said, "Let's do this to it."

And I said, "All right, why not give it a try?" So we moved it along pretty well.

The whole thing got stuck there for a little bit and then we came back six or eight months later and we got the two parts in. We got the bigger wilderness area in. One is named after Douglas because he liked to hike up there, and the other part is just north of that. That we really did work on.

AK: Did someone come to you with the idea, and you said yes, or was it your own idea?

MH: This originated out of the office.

JP: You have to understand, there aren't any original ideas. People are giving ideas, and there's undoubtedly someone in this state that can stand up and say, "I took it to Pritchard." It's floating around. I don't know. We thought it was a good idea and they worked on it.

AK: Sometimes, as in the Alpine Lakes issue, a group is behind it, they propose it.

JP: The two parts idea—that was John McKay.

AK: Who was John McKay—a staff person?

MH: He is a lawyer in Seattle. He's now the head of Legal Services Corporation of the United States. And Grant Degginger is now a lawyer in Seattle. They worked it and when McKay left to go to law school, Degginger took it and ran with it. It wasn't all that easy.

AK: How did this come about? Were you identified as a sponsor because you were a hiker, likely to be sympathetic?

JP: Yes. I like wilderness areas. I'm not big on some things environmentalists are wow-wow about, but I think wilderness areas are good. Particularly where you have large numbers of people who can go in and enjoy it and see it.*

MH: Lowry's office had really nothing to do

***Anne Kilgannon:** Would you say your brother's support for wilderness areas was based on his own experience as a backpacker?

Frank Pritchard: I think so. I would say both of us became environmentalists—I know it’s a bad word now—as a result of mountain climbing and hiking. Prior to that, when we were kids, we spent our summers on Bainbridge Island, on a beach. I don’t think we really thought much about it. Nobody did. Every day I’d take the garbage and row out in the middle of Rich Passage and dump it. Nobody thought anything of it.

AK: There are interesting parallels between Joel’s personal life and his political interests. His support for wilderness bills, for historic preservation, seem to have their roots in his own activities and experiences.

FP: Yes, I think it came from his hiking and climbing.

with it.

JP: Yes, but we never said that.

AK: Who had jurisdiction over this land? You carved it out of what, the Forest Service?

JP: Yes, the Forest Service, and up there.

AK: Were they supportive? Who was opposed to this?

JP: I’m not going to get into it.

MH: There were people opposed to it.

JP: Oh Lord, yes.

AK: Generally the timber companies tend to be opposed, but the Forest Service, judging from the Alpine Lakes story, also balks at these designations.

MH: There were tradeoffs and a lot of negotiating with the timber companies and things like that. It didn’t just happen. Then when it was adopted everybody else in the delegation took credit for it.

JP: Oh yes, but we gave them all the credit.

MH: They even ran for higher office taking credit for it.

JP: Remember, there’s one rule: if you don’t care who gets the credit, there’s no limit to what you

can accomplish. And we tried to live by that creed. I won’t say it always worked, but we tried to.

When I came there I was the only Republican—not just the only Republican in the House, there were two Democratic senators, also. So I had a little bit of work to do so that they felt kindly toward me.

AK: Let’s go onto another issue. In 1976 you were cosponsor of House Resolution 11164, which dealt with the creation of a cabinet-level position for the Department of Education. You made a comment in your constituent newsletter that the United States was one of the very few countries that didn’t have such a position and that you thought it was very critical to do that.

JP: I’m not sure now that I’m very right on that.

AK: Do you mean that you’ve changed your mind since then?

JP: Well, I just think that it’s one thing to have ninety-three percent of the support of education come from the state and locals—we do a better job in education if we keep it at the state and local level, mainly. It’s all right to have a federal presence for the distribution of, say, handicapped funds and some of that, but we already had HEW—Health, Education, and Welfare, and all you did was just split it out. So, now there were three departments rather than one. I don’t think it turned out to be a very big, significant thing.

The thing I don’t like is that too often the politics at the national level gets into the education, and I think that’s not too helpful.

Whenever I talked to school people I said, “What is it that you need from Washington, D.C., that you don’t have now?” I never had anything but one answer and that was money. And it had to come from the state, sent to Washington, D.C., and be sent back, and part of it sticks there because you keep hiring more people for the bureaucracy.

I think there’s some role on the federal level; there are some things they can do.

AK: What about policy or research, that kind of thing?

JP: With the policy and all, we have found that as decision-making moved away from the school and moved away from the school districts, we didn’t get better schools. We got worse schools. So, it became a big political issue—but it really wasn’t. All they did was take three departments and split them into individual ones.

I think that the thing the promoters thought was that they were going to move education to where it got twenty-five percent of its support from the federal government. Well, the federal government is broke and the state governments are in the black, because they have to be. It didn’t make a lot of sense to do it. What they had were aspirations for something that wasn’t going to be there.

AK: So you started out with good intentions, but then it didn’t work out?

JP: Well, then I wasn’t a keeper. This was a big national thing, and the real push came from the teachers’ organizations and union, and after I saw that in the thing, I lost some of my interest in it. So I don’t look at that as a terribly important thing that I did—it wasn’t big.

AK: Perhaps this was a small thing, too, but you were a cosponsor of the authorization of funds for the National Endowment of the Arts and Humanities. You made a strong statement in support of the arts, and you with Senator Magnuson—in quite a nice photo opportunity—gave a big check to the Seattle Symphony Orchestra. So, perhaps a small thing for you, but a big thing for the symphony—about six-hundred

thousand dollars.

JP: Well, those were great things we could do then because we weren’t in the hole. But, you see, the press does that. You’re in a whole lot of things and they pick up something like that and make it, where you’re doing a lot of things far more important. But it’s show biz, politics.

Now it’s very tough, but I think there’s some role to play, but I don’t think it should be expanded. It’s just one more thing that I’ve gotten a little tougher on.

AK: What is it that changes your mind over the years—different priorities?

JP: It’s because of the deficit. If you’re putting that on your children, they’ve got to pay it, and well, then that’s different. Now, should your children—should we take their credit card, sign them up for a program, and fifteen or twenty years later, they’re paying for it.

The arts are important and ought to be supported, but is that the best way to do it, with your kids’ taxes?

AK: So, that’s the question that looms the largest, rather than the merits of any particular program?

JP: If you did it right away, and if you put your money on the line. It’s the way we paid for the thing that I object to—we didn’t pay for it, you see. We just put it on the credit card, and you and I won’t pay for it, your kids will. You’ll get a little of it, but they really will unless we do something.

AK: Something to think about, to be sure. In 1976, you were making efforts in another area, perhaps of more importance to you, as a cosponsor of what was called the “Sunshine Bill.” Common Cause called this bill “the most comprehensive anti-secrecy measure since the Freedom of Information Act.” It stipulated the opening of government meetings to the public.

Government operations were going through a number of changes at this time. There seemed to be a new level of scrutiny of lobbyists, with the Public Disclosure of Lobbyists Act. There were new regulations, a tightening of reporting

about contributions. And Tip O'Neil pushed through a stronger code of ethics for congressmen, which rather severely limited outside income and honorariums. Could you comment on these changes?

JP: I had a policy in which if I was given an honorarium, I'd put it into a fund which was given away to charity. It only applied to charitable organizations. But I didn't get a lot of honorariums, I didn't get a lot of money for speaking. But what little I ever did, I put it in that fund. I can't remember very many times, but sometimes there would be some kind of fee and we'd stick it in there.

AK: But I gather not every congressman had this policy. How did you come to have this policy, yourself?

JP: It wasn't any great thing. Scoop Jackson did that, and he really got honoraria, a lot of them. He put them in a foundation, in the name of his sister who had died, I believe, and he gave money out of that. I used that idea, so that's what I did if I got any.

But it was tightening up. It's gotten now so you can't really take a congressman to dinner. I think sometimes they go crazy on these things. The people that have restaurants are complaining about it.

AK: Was it a post-Watergate surge to clean up everything?

JP: When I was in the envelope business, I was on the board of the Envelope Makers of America, because we were manufacturers. And I went back to D.C. because I knew something about political life, so they had me go and check up on our lobbyists. The envelope association had somebody—he didn't just represent our organization, we were one of three or four he represented. In those days the post office was completely run by Congress, so letter sizes, letter costs, everything had a big impact on our business, so we thought we ought to have somebody back there finding out what was going on. It was very naive lobbying.

But then I found out that our lobbyist took

the chief staff person for the committee chairman that ran the postal and civil service commission to White Sulfur Springs for a week in the spring and a week in the fall—he and his wife. I said, “My, you must enjoy it down there.”

He said, “My wife hates it, but these people are important, so we take them down to White Sulfur Springs every spring and fall.”

Well, that's the kind of stuff that went on, and that would be considered pretty smart lobbying. Later on this guy got into a lot of trouble, but that sort of thing went on.

AK: But the new rules would not allow that?

JP: Oh, the rules over the years have changed, and changed, and changed, and tightened up. I think an awful lot of it is for the good. I think they've kind of gone overboard in some areas, but in most cases the tightening up of what lobbyists can do and the opening up of some meetings has been good. Now, there still has to be some time when you can sit down and talk to some other people just off the record and kind of see if you can work out some difference. You can't have some press sitting there while you're working out with someone. Nothing in human relations, not all things in human relations can be done with everyone sitting around.

AK: In the glare of the spotlight?

JP: You don't get anything done. But I think formal meetings when things are voted on, all of those kinds of things should be done with a clear record and opportunity for people to see what's going on. Again, in the Sunshine area, I think ninety-eight percent of it is good, and I think maybe two percent there's sometimes when you have to sit down with someone and have a private chat—kind of get everybody off posturing for the camera. But it's much better than when I first went there.

AK: Nineteen seventy-six was the Bicentennial year, of course. Did you participate in any of the celebrations, beyond your trip to the Klondike?

JP: That was our Bicentennial effort—my brother

and I took our twenty-year-old sons and we retraced our grandparents' route into the Klondike and went over the Chilkoot Pass. We thought we ought to do something that was kind of historical. There were a lot of ceremonies and things that we participated in, but that was my little personal thing I did.

AK: Just continuing along those lines, what do you think you have passed on to your own kids of your sense of what this country is all about—the message behind the celebration?

JP: Well, I think that this is fine when people talk about these things. We had so much conversation in my own family when I was growing up about our grandparents coming out West, from England, and coming from Scotland. I think it has a lot to do with your interest, and I was kind of always a history nut. I enjoyed it and I read lots of historical novels, even clear back in the seventh and eighth grade. That was the thing I liked best was history.

AK: But how do you pass this love, this sensibility, on?

JP: You could pass it on by a variety of ways—by conversation, you could do it by books. We used to have a lot of old movies—the history wasn't always accurate—but I'm talking about coming West and all that, if you're in the state of Washington. My family on both sides were pretty involved. They both came in 1889, the year we were a state. We had a lot of history around us. We were sort of immersed in history all the time. It was always my best subject in school.

AK: The summer and into the fall of 1976 was another election campaign.

JP: By that time I didn't have any problem.

AK: No, you won in what was called a smashing victory.

JP: Nobody ran. We didn't have anybody run against us that time.

AK: That year, though, there was a sharp struggle within the national Republican Party, with Ronald Reagan coming to the fore and challenging President Ford for the nomination.

JP: Yes, I was very involved. Jerry Ford was a friend of mine, and I was very involved with Ford's election. And I was at the convention.

AK: I understand that at the Washington convention in Spokane, that you had made up four life-size mannequins that you planned to bring on stage at some moment, to represent the congressmen who would not be elected if Reagan was the presidential candidate—the opposite of coattails, I guess. In the end you didn't use them, but the press reported that you gave a rather fiery speech for the nomination of Ford. Can you tell me what your thinking was at that time?

JP: I never felt we should press if we didn't need to. The pitch was that we couldn't increase our delegation if we moved very far off of what I thought was Ford's place.

AK: The center? Was that a big struggle within the party, between the moderates and the right?

JP: Well, there's always been a split in the Republican Party clear back to Teddy Roosevelt's time. We've always had it, and the person who got around it best was Nixon, because the skins thought he was a skin and the shirts thought he was a shirt. If you've ever played basketball, that's the way they divide up. That's the way he did it. There's always been that split.

I was very involved in the Eisenhower campaign, and I liked Jerry Ford very much. We were friends, and I thought that if he had been supported, he'd have made it. I thought they just beat him up in the South something awful—over the Panama Canal. I was in the subcommittee that dealt with it, and Ford had done the right thing and he stood by it. And, well, it was the pardoning of Nixon—which he had to do—and so we came to the end of the line there. So then Carter came in.

AK: Beyond your feelings about Jerry Ford, what

did you think of Reagan?

JP: Reagan was a very good politician. He had some very simple ways he did things. The smartest thing he did was stepping up and putting Bush on as vice president when all of his inner circle didn't want it. That really helped him. And then he took Jim Baker into his White House, and for the first four years the White House operated pretty well. Then when those guys got out, and Don Regan became the head, that's when the problems began and they got more and more into this Iran-Contra stuff. But he had a cinch deal against Carter, Reagan did, because Carter had that hostage situation for a year.

AK: All that was to come, but what about as a candidate in 1976 against Ford?

JP: I just didn't think that Reagan would be that good a president, and of course, I just didn't see any way we could win Congress with that.

AK: You were looking at the big picture. Back at the Washington State convention in Spokane, there was rather a messy situation where Reagan's people were taking over the state machinery and they didn't want to have anything to do with Dan Evans, the retiring governor.

JP: Well, you know Evans had been the governor for twelve years.

AK: Yes, the most prominent Republican in the state, and they didn't seem to want him at the convention.

JP: They worked that out. The Republicans from King County were the real ones that flocked against Evans. They had controlled the county all the way through Evans' time. Evans had controlled the state but never King County. King County was controlled by the forces that didn't like Evans—they'd come out of the Christensen campaign and they never got over it, and on and on.

AK: Where did John Spellman fit into that picture?

JP: Spellman was not part of that. No, he was more on Evans' side, and when he ran for County Council, he defeated one of the county Republicans' key people in there, to win that primary. And then he became King County executive, and then he went on to become governor. He lost the first time to Dixy, but then we got McDermott the second time, and were able to defeat him.

AK: This seems like a major transition period for the state, and for the Republican Party—Evans leaving after twelve years of the governorship, replaced by Dixy Lee Ray, a Democrat, and Carter taking over from Ford.

JP: Oh yes. But, well, Dixy was a disaster for the Democrats. She was a very smart lady that was ill-suited for her executive position, that's all. She just had a hard time working with people, and fought with Magnuson, and my Lord, fought with everybody. So, it was very loose.

And I was the only Republican, you see, back in Washington, D.C., and all the rest of them were Democrats, so in some ways you kind of had to watch how you managed yourself. On the other hand, you could pretty much do what you wanted.

AK: You were well supported in your district. You won the election, and you won big. You, I think, did something different this campaign though, you made it very clear that you would not accept any PAC money, any special interest money, for your campaign. Is that the first time you took that stand?

JP: Yes. I didn't take any PAC money. PAC money really came in as an issue in 1974. It was supposed to be a way that small people could contribute.

AK: Band together, make themselves visible?

JP: Yes, but of course, what happened was the organizations, the executive secretaries and that got into it, and it became, well, PAC money got switched around and became national money. So much more of the money came out of D.C. that I just felt better not taking PAC money.

I had a good group of friends in my district and we would have a breakfast and raise most of

it. I didn't spend a lot of money in campaigns. I spent \$39,000 the first time I ran against Pelly, and against Hemplemann I spent \$108,000, I think it was. And that's just peanuts today. I didn't have a lot of TV. Hemplemann really outspent me that last week or so, in '72, and Scoop and everybody got in, and really, we almost lost. But after we got in, we didn't have much trouble. An incumbent, if they do their chores, has such advantages.

AK: Well, you kept in close contact with your district.

JP: Yes, we worked the district. We had lots of community meetings. I had a district that leaned Democratic, but we did our chores.

In 1980, the Democrats did some polling that persuaded Janice Niemi to run. All the polls showed that if you didn't get into personalities, she'd be very hard to beat. But I'd been close on a number of issues that involved women as well as the abortion issue. So, she was not able to break that off and play that. I think we did beat her sixty-one to thirty-nine percent. I think I enjoyed beating her more than any other opponent.

AK: She at least was a real opponent.

JP: No, she was sort of a nasty, aging, flower girl. I have very little use for her, as you can tell. She's a judge now.

AK: We're jumping ahead. In 1976, we had a new president, Jimmy Carter. What were your impressions of him?

JP: I liked Carter. He'd been governor of Georgia for what, two years?

AK: Four years, I believe. They said he had the least government experience of any of the candidates.

JP: He came in with a crew that was not very knowledgeable, but they were a pretty good campaign crew. They hit on the idea that if you went into Iowa and you captured that early, you could tip the whole thing around. Everyone else is waiting for New Hampshire. So, Carter went

in there and Mo Udall didn't make it when he should have—but he was a House member and they didn't vote for House members then—and I forget the other guy. And here's Carter, out of nowhere. It was kind of a fluke, but he was in the right spot at the right time. Hamilton Jordan and that other guy came up with this idea that they could go to Iowa and tip it around, and they did. One thing led to another.

And then they got into the White House and they were really in over their heads. They had a big majority in the House and the Senate, but—

AK: They couldn't seem to get much done, though.

JP: And they didn't do too well. But then, of course, they got into the hostage situation and it didn't matter who was in there—hostages for a year, good Lord.

AK: Part of the ineffectiveness has been attributed to a change in Congress. Starting with your class, but really becoming a force in Congress, were what was called "Watergate Babies," a group of younger congressmen who were less beholden to a party, more individualistic in style, more willing to use the press, and less patient with process. They came in and they wanted action, now. They didn't want to sit and be quiet, and listen and learn for a few years. They wanted to jump right in.

JP: I was in '72, and then Watergate hit. But that was a big class—I think it was seventy-four or something. All the guys that came in and ran the leadership for quite awhile were those guys. If you go back and look, they were all in that class.

AK: They started up by challenging the leadership, the committee chairs.

JP: They had a majority in their caucus, and they had a majority in the House, so they could do that. They threw out some old chairmen. The Democrats had two parts to the party—they had the South and then they had the rest. The South allowed them to be in the majority, and the reason they're not in the majority now is because they don't have the South like they used to. But then,

every congressman, with very few exceptions, from the South was a Democrat. And so the tradeoff was, they got to be seniority, so it all worked out.

And then they fluffed it out. When that started coming apart, that's when the Republicans had a chance to get a majority after, really, sixty years. It was the South, because the South gave solid Democratic votes all the time. But when they threw those chairmen out and these guys came in, then the split started. They started losing votes in the South. That's when the thing started to kind of come apart.

AK: That's interesting—unintended consequences, for sure.

JP: That's right.

AK: These new congressmen were said to be very media savvy, media conscious in a way that more traditional congressmen were not. Is that a fair assessment?

JP: Oh, press, press, press. They were better campaigners, always running for office.

AK: Campaigning became a second industry. Being a congressman was one thing, but being a campaigner was the real thing, it was said.

JP: There were a lot of very aggressive guys.

AK: So this is the crew that Carter had to work with. Now, he came across quite differently. He brought in a whole new symbolism, a new look to the presidency—he wore his sweater, he carried his own bags. What did you make of that?

JP: I thought it was just show biz, symbolism, yes. I mean, you're in a campaign and you come off an airplane with your bag in your hand. It's like when he got sworn in, he walked from the Capitol down, instead of riding down.

AK: Right, no limousines. Was he playing “a man of the people?”

JP: Those guys came up with this new thing of,

we'll get away from the imperial presidency. And he did. He got away from being the imperial president, but people weren't crazy about that.

AK: Did it backfire?

JP: Reagan came along and looked more like a president.

AK: People seem to want that?

JP: A certain amount of it. They do, but they don't. That's old stuff.

AK: Another rising politician of the time was Tip O'Neill, as the new Speaker of the House. How did you see him?

JP: Tip is very partisan.

AK: He didn't make any bones about it.

JP: No, I remember somebody introduced me to him as a freshman, and when he found out I was a Republican, he just turned and walked away.

AK: How did he perform as Speaker? Did he run the House well?

JP: He ran it reasonably well, yes. In those days nobody took a popularity poll on how popular the Speaker was. Carl Albert had been so weak. Tip was there. Nobody knew whether Tip O'Neill was up or down, it didn't make any difference. His only poll was: did he control the Democrats? They had a big majority—they had two hundred and eighty. It was just enormous.

Tip was an old pol. He was the typical Irish Catholic politician from Boston. It was the old business, and he played that pretty well. He had to get along with this new freshman group, but that wasn't too hard for him. He came in, and they allowed some of the chairmen to be kids. That's how Foley got there—youngest chairman in the country. Foley didn't even vote for the switch. He voted for the old boy, made a speech for him, for Poage. Then when Poage was thrown out, they turned and said, “Who's the best guy you've got? You better nominate him.” Everybody said, “Well,

Foley's the best. He's a class act to do that."

In some of the groups—some of the pressure groups were like that—they didn't like some of the Southern chairmen who weren't liberal enough, or pushing enough. So this gang was going to go in there and push more.

AK: There were also various scandals involving some of these long-time congressmen, like Wilbur Mills.

JP: And with Wayne Hayes. So that played right into this business.

AK: Of cleaning out these older congressmen?

JP: Yes. Now, Wilbur Mills was an extremely able chairman. He knew more about the tax code and all that stuff; he was very good. It was too bad when he went off the deep end. He was far superior to the guy from Oregon who took his place, or from Rostenkowski. But he'd been in there a long time.

AK: You became the ranking Republican on the Oceanography subcommittee this year and you did have some issues important to Washington that came up.

JP: We did do the oil spill.

AK: Yes, the Argo Merchant spill.

JP: That's right and Dixy opposed it. But I did maneuver that one through because we had to get it through without an objection or time delay or something. Bowman objected to it, and I got Cunningham to go to Bowman and get him to back off on the basis that Cunningham needed it for his election. That's the only way we could get it, because Bowman had no use for me—he was a flaming conservative.

AK: Adele Ferguson wrote that Governor Ray was angry with you because she saw this as you taking over a state responsibility. Did you have to work with her on very many issues? How did you deal with her?

JP: No. I ignored her. We were doing our federal things and she was having enough trouble doing her stuff here.

AK: She claimed it as a state issue, but there doesn't seem to have been an issue, in your mind, about jurisdiction. I was wondering about the line between federal matters and state affairs, about the relationships of the people working on the different levels.

JP: Evans worked closely with Magnuson, but he didn't work that closely with Adams. Maggie and Evans got along very well. And I was close to Maggie. He was the senator I was close to. I got along with Jackson all right, but I was close to Maggie.

First of all, I let his people know that I would not run against him. I let everybody know that I was not running for the Senate. Immediately that takes you off of all this business of everybody trying to beat you up. I decided that my future was to do as good a job as I could for the twelve years, and if I was running around trying to be a candidate or promote myself in the Senate, I would cut back my effectiveness in the House because I was the only Republican. The delegation back there was eight to one, Democratic.

AK: Were there people who were looking to you to run for the Senate?

JP: No, I convinced them. Once you work for those other congressmen and senators, if they know you're not trying to promote yourself all the time, then you can start having a good relationship with people. That was just crucial for me. If I was going to be effective at all, I had to first get my delegation so they weren't putting roadblocks in my way.

AK: You seemed to work quite a lot with Brock Adams—your names are paired quite often as cosponsors of bills and in the press. What was that relationship for you?

JP: That's because we were the two congressmen from Seattle. An issue that comes up that deals with Seattle, or they report that maybe everybody

in the state voted a certain way but the two. So, we had Seattle. Brock and I got along fine. We didn't have any problems.

AK: He soon afterward went over to the Department of Transportation as secretary. And at the next election, Jack Cunningham was able to fill that spot. And then you were not the only Republican in the delegation.

JP: That's right, but he didn't last too long.

AK: He didn't seem to mesh that well with the rest of the delegation.

JP: Yes, he had a hard time dealing with the rest of the delegation, and in taking care of his own district. He could have done it better. That's how Lowry got in.

AK: So he was a one-term congressman?

JP: He wasn't even there one term because he came in late, five months after, or six months. And I gave him my number one committee—Government Operations. Tip would not give Jack a committee. He said the Republicans had to dig it out of our side. And Cunningham complained to me that it wasn't the committee he wanted, which didn't please me too much. But, like I told you, John Rhodes got me on Foreign Affairs because I'd done him that favor of finding a committee for Cunningham.

AK: Yes, that finally worked out for you.

JP: And very shortly after that the ranking Republican on that committee died, and I moved up even though I didn't have any seniority—kind of a fluke. And then I found what I had really come to Congress to do, which was work on foreign policy. So it all worked out.

AK: It's interesting how unrelated actions lead to such developments.

JP: Yes, that was really terribly important for me as far as my interest in Congress on the issues, because it was a key thing.

AK: You remained on the Oceanography subcommittee though, and the Coast Guard and Navigation subcommittee. There were big issues in 1976 and '77 having to do with oil spills and deep seabed mining issues, and still, the two-hundred-mile limit.

JP: That's right. I kept my interest in the Maritime, but it's a small committee. I was very involved in the two-hundred-mile limit.

AK: This question of mining the seabed, did that also come before the Law of the Sea Conference? Your remarks about that seem a little impatient, that you just wanted this country to be able to go ahead with it.

JP: We were waiting. I went to the Law of the Sea meeting in Geneva. I remember having dinner with Shirley Temple one night and her husband who is an expert on seas—a fellow named Black. And he was over there as one of our people to give us advice. That was a very interesting thing, to go to Switzerland and go to those meetings.

We had a lot of things we worked on, on the Law of the Seas. We made some progress, but it's very difficult because it's a voluntary thing. All the countries knew that they had to make some adjustments and changes, and try to have uniform laws everywhere, so that when you are off one shore, it's not one country saying it's nine miles and some other country saying it's fifty miles. There was progress made.

AK: What did the seabed mining question involve? Would that be mining outside your own territorial waters?

JP: I don't even remember it. It could be, seabed mining for minerals. I don't think they've been very successful in it, but for one moment it was kind of hoped that they could go out there and do it, but it wasn't as successful as they thought. It was sort of the talk of the day.

AK: The oil tanker issues came before you on the Coast Guard and Navigation subcommittee. As there was a rash of oil spills, that became a hot issue.

JP: It was a hot item. We were very anxious to keep oil tankers out of Puget Sound from below Port Townsend.

AK: You were successful, I believe.

JP: Yes we were, you bet.

AK: Instead of tankers, some people began promoting a pipeline. What was your position on that idea?

JP: I think it would have been a good thing. There are so many problems to it that it's never been done, but I still think it would have been a good thing.

AK: At the time it was promoted as a jobs program and a better solution for the environment. But there were all kinds of wrinkles—

JP: Yes. We could have brought the oil down from Alaska and piped it into the Middle West, instead of taking it all the way through the Panama Canal and all of that. But of course, we've got the Maritime Union, you see. They had enormous power back then.

AK: I know you were about to go off the Government Operations committee, but I wanted to ask you about an item that appeared in your newsletter. You talk about that committee as being the critical place to be. President Carter was trying to reduce the size of government and it seems that your committee played a role in that effort. I was surprised to see that that committee had oversight of the CIA, the Selective Service, Department of Defense, General Accounting Office, and the executive office of the President. I realized that I had no clear idea of that committee's responsibilities. Could you describe that work for me?

JP: I never saw any of that. That sounds like something my staff wrote up, how important my committee was.

We were in subcommittees. Jack Brooks had the committees. He was a big pal of Lyndon Johnson's. I don't think they were going to do too much damage. Just because they had

jurisdiction over it didn't mean they held any hearings over it. They don't have the expertise. You've got to have a committee, and you've got to have lawyers that really understand a particular segment of business before you get into it. But technically, Government Operations could look at anything.

AK: Anything the government was doing?

JP: Our committee just listed everything they could think of that was important, or my staff did, and said, "Look at the committee we're on." This is the committee I was trying to get off of.

AK: Didn't this committee deal with the post office?

JP: Yes. I tried to be careful and not get involved in that because of my connection with the envelope association and business. A few of my friends wanted me to get more involved, but I didn't want to because I thought there was a conflict there—a perceived conflict.

AK: I know your family was still involved in the business, but you yourself were out of it. You resigned from that when you went to Congress, isn't that so?

JP: My brother was in printing. There were three divisions. There was check printing and envelopes. Envelopes were the thing I worked in. I had a little bit of stock and they paid me off. I'm glad they did because it gave me a little money. The kids were in college at the time.

AK: Unlike when you were a state representative and senator, you really worked in Congress full time.

JP: It doesn't matter if you're a good, bad, or mediocre congressman, you are busy. You have a three-by-five inch card that you have in your shirt pocket—you get it every day, and it is just the whole day, every day. What time is it? Oh yes, I've got a committee, and where is that? And you look, there's a reception, and oh yes, I've got to go to that. It's just full tilt. Then you're out to

your district and it's full tilt. I came home every other weekend the first three or four sessions.

AK: One of the items in the new ethics code brought in by Tip O'Neill, is that you weren't supposed to have an outside income of more than fifteen percent of your congressional salary. It sounds like compliance was not an issue for you as you really had no other income.

JP: What if you were a wealthy person?

AK: It was earned income, not unearned income—kind of interesting.

JP: That allowed them to pay somebody money for fifteen percent. You could be an advisor, you could be on a board. I wasn't into anything like that.

AK: To make such a rule, some people must have had trouble with it.

JP: Of course, because they were on deals where they got money every month.

AK: Another construction of the issue came from John Anderson who said, "I've got five kids in college. I need to earn money." That's a lot of tuition.

JP: Yes, it's tough. If they were important, they could give speeches and things. But if they were on boards, they'd be an advisor, and then you had lawyers. That's the big thing.

AK: Lawyers seemed to be the ones hardest hit.

JP: Sure. They are in a firm, and they can put out a list saying now one of our partners is a state senator or whatever, and so now we are even more connected, and you can get us and we can find out what's going on better. Law firms love to have a senator or congressman that they keep on the payroll, The inference was that "we can get the inside stuff." So they cut it down to fifteen percent. I never had any problems with that kind of stuff.

AK: The Speaker also pushed through, at that

time, a fairly substantial raise for congressmen, to sweeten the pie, perhaps.

JP: Yes, I really believed in that. I always voted for a pay raise. I hated those guys who would just plead with people to vote and raise the pay, and then not vote for it for themselves and make a big thing at home of how they voted against the pay raise.

AK: Well, you need to be paid.

JP: Of course. The cheapest thing in the world is to pay your congressman yourself. Don't have somebody else pay the congressman, have the public pay the Congress. But those guys, they'd say, "I just can't. I've got a close election. I'll get all beat up, but I've got to have this."

I'd say, "Of course I'm voting for it. We need it."

It is expensive to live in Washington, D.C. and have a place at home. It's costly. And you've got to fly your family back and forth, and if you're going to have your kids there you're going to fly them back there, and college, back and forth. Oh boy.

AK: And I suppose you can't walk around in a ratty shirt. You have to look good.

JP: Nobody gets rich in Congress. They're being paid by the taxpayers. Very few people make money in public life, unless they're crooked or they've got some connections.

I think it's expensive. I did not like congressmen traveling except where we paid for it. These guys would get up and say, "But I didn't pay for it." Israel would take everybody to Israel, and I'd say, "That's wrong. If I'm going to Israel, we want the taxpayers to pay for it. We don't want Israel to pay for it."

AK: Then you're in their pocket?

JP: Sure. But people couldn't understand it.

AK: It just seems cleaner, more straightforward.

JP: Yes. I traveled all the time. I used to tell people

that I probably traveled more than anybody in Congress once I was on Foreign Relations.

AK: In 1977 you were also chosen to chair the Wednesday Group. We should talk about that experience. There were about thirty-five people in the group?

JP: Yes. That was very important. They were very able, some of them very outstanding key people, like Barber Conable, ranking member on Ways and Means. These were key people. We did some things like weekend retreats where we brought in people to speak. That made a difference in my being chair of the Wednesday Group.

AK: Can you explain how you became chair?

JP: I was active in the group, and I knew how to do things, and a lot of people didn't want to be chair. They're busy.

AK: Did you look for it?

JP: No, I didn't look for it, but when they said would I take it on, I said, "Sure," because that was something I knew how to do. And I had a good staff person, Pat Goldman, a terrific person. I did some things to improve it, and worked hard at it. As a result, people thought that I had some clout, or they'd say, "Can we get some help out of your gang?" Those things kind of all fit together.

AK: I have an article here by Shelby Scates that says, "Until Pritchard took over as chairman early this year," that would be of the Wednesday Group, "the group composed of about seventy-five mainstream Republicans spent its time discussing issues and informing each other of House action." And then he goes on to say that you changed all that, and he quotes you as saying, "The Republican caucus has got to start playing a role in the House. It has to be a positive role. It can't continue merely being against proposals."

It sounds like you were trying to be more proactive there.

JP: It wasn't seventy, it was thirty.

AK: I wondered about the discrepancy with the numbers—a lot of difference between thirty and seventy.

More quotes from you: You said, "The Republican Party is getting squeezed out of the middle by the Democratic Party. Instead of trying to take the fight to them on this big ideological turf, some Republicans are running to the right. It's not going to win us more seats in the next year's election."

You said that you wanted to look at regulatory reform, and that you had a big civil rights proposal here to move everything under one—fifty-two different separate civil rights laws written into one act. It sounds like you were working to take the Republican Party in a new direction.

JP: It sounds pretty good.

AK: It sounds useful, productive. If you're in this tiny minority, you might as well be proactive, rather than just sitting there.

JP: Sure. The Wednesday Group were very able people, very enjoyable. They became my social friends.

AK: It sounds like being in this group allowed you—gave you the setting or opportunity—to do things in more depth.

JP: Oh yes. You do it in two layers. You do it this way, and you do it that way. You've got to have depth, but you've also got to have your lines out so that you can make things happen. I played a lot of tennis with those guys. I traveled, and I worked at my relations.

AK: When I read pieces like this, I think you've really arrived, you're really there. It sounds like it's really gelling for you.

JP: Oh yes, I'm coming on—really enjoying it. And you've got to remember that all those guys like Shelby Scates were great pals of mine. He climbed Mount Rainier with me. So it isn't really fair. Shelby was a real pal of mine.

AK: You were doing good things, but it doesn't

hurt to have those relationships.

JP: We'd been friends from down in Olympia, and we were close friends. As I say, we climbed all the mountains together. He was in my mountain climbing group.

They always report good things. I had very good press. But we didn't try to bamboozle them. We didn't do any of that stuff.

AK: Well, you had something worthwhile to say.

I wanted to talk about another appointment you had that year, in August of 1977. You were one of two congressmen to be appointed to the National Commission on Neighborhoods. That sounds very interesting—another opportunity to make an impact.

JP: That was a very good thing. Maury Hausheer was the staff guy on it. The Neighborhood Commission was Carter's. It was brought on after they had riots and all the problems and the Kerner Commission report and all this stuff. Yes, Carter named this commission, it was two senators and two House members. The Republicans didn't have many inner city people, so Bob Michel came to me and said, would I do it? These are the kinds of things a lot of guys didn't want to be on because it didn't deal with their district.

AK: But it sounds like a fascinating experience.

JP: It was. So, I got put on that commission, and we really got into it. I went to it. It was like about every third weekend we went to a different place. We'd go to Watts, all these different places. It was fascinating. And Maury was the staff guy, so he really knew what he was doing.

I made good friends on it. There were some real wild ones, and there were some good ones. Blanchard, the guy who later became governor of Michigan, was on it.

We went to the meetings. The two senators never came, but that's not unusual. But I went to all of them, and it was very interesting. I learned. We came up with some proposals. It was pretty good stuff. I learned a lot out of it.

AK: Those were the years when you also start to

hear about "the rust belt." Are those the kind of cities you went to?

JP: We went to the cities that were having problems, Saint Louis, these different places. Gephardt was a young city councilman there.

AK: So you go down in the streets and talk to people?

JP: Oh yes, right in there. That's where I really got an appreciation for the Catholic schools, because they're in those tough areas.

AK: Tell me about what you learned.

JP: You learned about what it takes in cities. And it takes institutions. You have to get jobs in there, and you have to do training, and you have to give power to some of those community groups in there, and let them have some power in those groups and help them. Like the Catholic Church and these different institutions that were working in these tough areas.

And I came to the conclusion that we'd made an awful mistake on busing. I think we did. It really was a flight out of Seattle. What you need is good schools, and it doesn't matter where, or what, or how. And hauling kids from one end of town to the other end—then they don't go to school in their neighborhoods with their friends. But we've got to do that, and we've got to work with the parents.

Anyway, it was a learning process for me and it was very good.

AK: If you could have put in place a program, or whatever you wanted, did you have something in the end that you thought would be helpful?

JP: Yes, we had some programs we tried that we met with the president on. But you can't change those things with these programs. This idea that we'll do this and it'll come down—no, those people have to change. They have to be supportive. It's a mixed bag—some are doing things right, some are doing things wrong. You can't turn your back on them.

The only thing I agree with Jack Kemp on is

empowerment zones, where you give extra help to those zones if people are in there, in businesses. And you've got to have really good schools in those areas.

AK: Did you see solutions, or did the problems seem intractable?

JP: Some areas were making progress, and some weren't, no. That's the thing. But it's always people there who make the thing work. It's like this Americorps. They call it the local Peace Corps, but it's not at all.

The Commission was a good thing for me. It was an area that I wasn't particularly strong on even though I came from a city district. I'd been involved in some civil rights things, but this was different from civil rights—this was civil responsibility. There's a big difference.

AK: Could you elaborate on that? That sounds like an important distinction.

JP: Well, I'm going to give you the right to do something, but nothing happens until you pick it up and take some responsibility to make it happen. You can sit around and always find reasons why it isn't fair and blame other things, but that isn't going to solve the problem. That's really where we've been.

AK: Do you think we can turn that around?

JP: It's very tough, and very slow, and very hard, and it's just not easy to do.

AK: This victim culture—

JP: With this society we have, and with the number of one-parent families—not one parent, they're mother families—all these kind of things that are so endemic, it's a slow, slow process. But it isn't impossible, and it's working.

If you get into an area and you see, well, this thing is working here. Many times it's because of a person who lives there who makes that difference. He or she, or a combination, they've made a difference. It's very hard to impose this from somewhere and come into this neighborhood

and make it work.

AK: You did seem to be indicating in your remarks that in the end it was local, and that no national policy would really make a difference. They had to do it themselves.

JP: They've got to do it themselves.

AK: Is there any way of clearing away some regulations, or doing something that will at least get out of the way?

JP: You have to give more freedom, and you have to let them have more freedom. The problem is that the groups who have been tied up with getting these rules through, don't want to. The old civil rights leaders don't want to give up on busing, but the younger ones do. They say that this isn't doing us any good. But people have an investment in it, whether it's the different groups that cling—and change is threatening for everybody.

AK: Because they worked so hard to get it.

JP: It's very hard. Change is threatening to everybody.

AK: You used the Pike Place Market as a good example of what can happen, in your letters home when you were appointed to the commission.

JP: But this was not inner city, these were some of the brightest people in our town—Victor Steinbrueck—they were very able. They kept the market local and it's been an enormous success, although it still has some problems. It's a constant battle in there, but if you've been up to the Public Market, that's something. And it's right downtown.

AK: So if more towns could somehow hang on to what they already have?

JP: Yes. The other thing is that they are different everywhere, neighborhoods, so you can't come in with a cookie cutter and go along and make it all go.

AK: How long did you serve on this commission?

JP: It got disbanded. You may have read of a guy named Robert Kutner, who was very able, he was our staff director. But the guy that was chairman of the commission, Joseph Timilty, a state senator from Massachusetts, had signed up for Carter early on. So Carter made him chairman.

Now, Joe was pretty good, but Joe couldn't get along with Kutner. So somewhere down the road I said, "Hey, we aren't going to get rid of our chairman."

I met with Kutner and I said, "It isn't going to work."

Kutner said, "If you knock me out, I'll cut out all of the funding," because his close pal was the chief staff director for the Senate Finance Committee.

So our guy, Blanchard, went over to see the senator and the senator said, "Oh no, we wouldn't do that." It went ahead, and when it went through, the staff guy had cut it out and the senator didn't say boo. That was the end of the committee. Maybe it had served its time, anyway. That's when I saw the power of the staff. They just wrote it off.

AK: That was that?

JP: Yes. And this senator who had said to Blanchard, "No, no, no," he'd said to the Democratic House members, "Well, you know they're busy." And Kutner, he's a big guy back in D.C. He writes articles. I liked Bob Kutner and got along fine with him, but you can't have two people running it. Joe Timilty was the chairman and Kutner wanted to go after him. Well, that was their business. I kind of smiled over that kind of a deal.

AK: Did you issue a report or were you just cut off?

JP: We'd gone through a phase. We did our report, and that's when I realized that Carter, technically,

was smarter than the devil. He read that report and then met with us, and he quoted parts of it, and it was quite a little show of this regurgitation of articles, facts, things. He was very good at that. He loved details too much. But we met with him, and he was encouraging. And that was that.

AK: Well, fascinating.

JP: It was an interesting thing, and I got there because nobody else really cared to be on it, as far as I could tell.

AK: One thing I'm always impressed with is the variety of things that you get to work on.

JP: First of all, any congressman can do this. One, you've got pretty good connections with everybody on your side, or pretty good connections out there, so that if something pops up people say, do you want to do it?

It's like travel. All those guys who took trips, they'd ask me to go with them. The Democrats, they didn't want some difficult Republican, and they had to have a certain number of Republicans go on the plane—maybe six Democrats and three Republicans. So I was always being asked to go here and there. And because I was on Foreign Relations, it was okay.

Editor's note: This is the last interview that was recorded with Joel Pritchard. His health took a rapid turn for the worse and it became clear that we would not be able to finish the series as planned. Joel Pritchard suggested, and Maury Hausheer generously agreed, that the rest of his story should be told by Maury, who had worked so closely with him through most of the period not yet discussed. Maury also directed me to others who could cover some topics in more depth. Frank Pritchard, Joel's brother, guided the project, overseeing the editing and filling in more detail and his own perspective. All their care and assistance has been invaluable in bringing this project to completion.

FURTHER THOUGHTS

STEVE EXCELL

KLONDIKE GOLD RUSH PARK

Anne Kilgannon: How did Congressman Pritchard pick his issues? Did his staff help identify issues, or did he come up with things?

Steve Excell: He reminds me very much of Paul Schell, the new mayor of Seattle. He likes ideas, and once he gets one he stays with it. He's tenacious. And he tries to find people that can help him with these ideas.

His dream was always to climb the Chilkoot Pass, because his grandparents did. They weren't really gold miners as much as the folks that sold the pans to the gold miners. So they were smart. It was the beginning of the generations of Seattle-based business people in the Pritchard family. So, it was always his dream to go and climb Chilkoot and see Skagway and do all that, and he finally got to do that.

Then he had this idea that because the gold rush was so central to Alaska's history, and so central to Seattle's history, it's getting to the point where there ought to be some preservation of that history in both places. So, let's do a Klondike Gold Rush National Park and preserve the U.S. portion of the climb and some of the historic structures. Put a museum together to preserve the history part. And some of that ought to be in Pioneer Square, which is the living portion of Seattle that is visible today.

AK: Yes, that's how all those merchants whose buildings are still there got their start.

SE: The Interior Department in those days was just adamantly convinced that a park has got to be in one state, and we're not doing too many new parks. This was the beginning of looking at deficit reduction. There were budget impoundments—if the Democratic Congress didn't like what Nixon was doing, they would impound budget monies. So, there were budget games going on.

AK: I understand that President Nixon was also impounding funds and playing that game. Doesn't sound like the easiest of times for new proposals.

SE: Oh yes. Nixon was impounding social services stuff, and Congress was holding back on his requests for defense spending for Vietnam. There were all sorts of things going on. Congress finally put impounding restrictions on Nixon—kept him from putting the money in the top desk drawer—the Budget Impoundment Control Act.

Joel still thought this park was a good idea, so he started working the White House and working John Ehrlichman, who was head of domestic policy for the Nixon White House. And he started working with Scoop, who was on the Interior Committee, and they all warmed up to the idea. It made perfect sense. All these old policies of the Interior Department and the Parks Department went by the wayside, and the money secretly got put into the budget.

I think, when he started on this thing, Joel was in his second term in Congress, and nobody in their second term in Congress ever got a project through. But it mysteriously appeared by immaculate conception over the objections of the Interior Department, with the White House committed to sign it and not veto it if he could get it out of Congress. So the poor Interior Department got stuck with it.

But the interesting part about it was, once people were assigned to the project they loved it. I remember going down before the museum even opened and talking to folks that were working on finding the location, they were just excited about it. Once it happened, the people involved in the

Park Service just thought it was the greatest thing that ever was.

It's a new concept, that you can actually have museums that track history—like the Oregon Trail—and it doesn't all have to be in one place. You can find pockets to preserve. It really was vanguard thinking that's now commonplace in the U.S. Park Service.

This was one he came up with totally on his own. He came out with the Madison Library idea on his own—can't we do something to save it? He turned a little bit of the Madison Library over to us as staff people to do. But these are things that he walked around and thought about. But the Gold Rush Park he did himself. He did every bit of it himself, except for getting the Library of Congress to dig out some history of the gold rush, and some of that kind of stuff.

Joel was looking at historic photos—there were all sorts of photos here. He would call in and say, "Mary Lou, get me the State Historical Society," or "Give me the University of Washington library." He'd say, "Don't you guys have some old photos of the Seattle waterfront, or anything with Skagway in it?" Joel was into this. He ordered, on his own, a big antique map of downtown Seattle at the turn of the century that was basically Pioneer Square and part of the waterfront. He had it blown up and mounted on cheap Styrofoam board, and it hung in his office just to remind him that every once in a while he had to work on the Klondike Gold Rush National Park. He was very much into history, not just because of his family, but intellectually, he was just interested in history. This was an interesting local history project that had been kind of overlooked.

So, he wanted to do it. He did all the meetings with the delegation members and the committee members and the Nixon administration and the Parks folks. He did it all himself. He privately worked it. And mysteriously the appropriation appeared, and his name wasn't attached to it. It was just one of those little things that he worked his magic on. That's the way Joel operated. It was very effective, but it's the kind of effectiveness that you don't get the credit for.

AK: He was at the ribbon cutting though. He did give a speech. He did play a role at the opening.

ALPINE LAKES

Steve Excell: The Alpine Lakes issue pitted east against west of the Cascades. Seattle had a budding environmental movement, probably ahead of the rest of the country, and everybody had their Kelty pack—including Joel—and backpacked in those days. With the new environmental ethic, in came the idea of preserving the Alpine Lakes area. There were great battles: Joel was intrigued with the idea, and Brock Adams and Maggie and Jackson were intrigued, and Lloyd Meeds from Everett was intrigued. But the rest of the delegation hated it, Mike McCormack, from central Washington, hated it. It impacted the Wenatchee cutting circle more than us, and this, unfortunately, became very much an East versus West issue, as Pack River Timber Company was a big employer over there.

The problem up there in the Alpine Lakes was, in its infinite wisdom, when the railroads were given land concessions, the government thought it would help development to checkerboard the grants. So, therefore, someone will develop on this section and it will be a town or houses, and we'll own this valuable land next door. They didn't realize the land would go undeveloped for a century. The checkerboards extended, not only along the railroads, but for hundreds of miles away from the railroads—all the land grants were checkerboarded up there.

Anne Kilgannon: So, public and privately owned land was all mixed up?

SE: Yes. So, of course, then you hike on this checkerboard that happens to be public land and it's gorgeous, but you've got to sit and look at this clear-cut over there. So the thought was to try and do a set of land exchanges and buy out the checkerboards, to get contiguous public ownership at Alpine Lakes. A little bit like what was done with the North Cascades National Park, which did not have as much checkerboarding. That was more manageable because it was mostly federal timber land, so there you can just say that this is now park land.

Alpine Lakes was checkerboarded, then, and there were two things that were available. One

were the ice and peaks, which don't have as many trees, but there were lots of lakes. The other area was as you were going down, more into the river valleys, where there is more timber. The timber companies said that if you just take the ice and peaks, we don't care about that, as long as you leave us the river valleys. Well, the environmental community wanted the river valleys.

So, we'd have great hikes up Icicle Creek out of Leavenworth, and decide whether something was in or out.

AK: Do you mean that during this discussion, you'd take the time and fly back and hike around yourselves, and check it out?

SE: Yes, we checked out various things. I got to do a couple of them, and Joel did a couple of them.

The real sparkplug on the House side, among staff members, was Mark Houser, who worked for Lloyd Meeds. He was an absolute animal on getting Alpine Lakes done. He's still an avid outdoors person, an outdoor writer, and works on environmental causes out of his basement. Mark was one of those incredible guys—he was not a charismatic staff person, he had a speech impediment, and he was one of those guys who would never get his laundry out of the dry cleaners, so he could show up to work wearing anything—but he really believed in Alpine Lakes. Probably Mark, among the staff people, did more work than I and the others, including on the Senate side, but we were the crucibles. He'd try out these ideas—should this be in, should this be out? We'd say, “No, that has to be out, that has to be in.”

AK: And how did you make those judgment calls?

SE: By understanding the lay of the landscape, understanding and trying to reach some balance between the interests that were involved. Not to put the timber guys out of business, but also to have some quality recreation area.

AK: To strike a balance between, say, good science and economics?

SE: There wasn't even that much science. It was mostly trying to get an area where you'd get thirty

years of growth and have it fill in, and it would look nice and offer hiking opportunities. If an area was lean on timber but had a waterfall, or had some lakes, it was in. Other areas were out because they were closer to Wenatchee and easier to log. It was going section by section.

We had elaborate maps in our office. It was like a situation room—a war room at the Pentagon. Of course, the environmentalists asked for the moon. They'd like all the Cascades from Canada to Oregon, and the timber companies could have three little icy peaks. And the Forest Service had their preferred plan that everyone hated. There were lots of little rings around on this map.

Finally, the staff and the members started talking about this. Brock Adams, Joel, and Lloyd Meeds on the House side, and Maggie and Scoop—Scoop more than Maggie, because Scoop was more of a conservationist. Maggie said, “I'll get the money.” Mike Stewart, Maggie's legislative assistant, was interested, but Maggie wasn't, personally. But Scoop and Joel both had a little bit of the old Teddy Roosevelt conservationist thing. Lloyd Meeds was not as interested as Mark Houser, his staff.

AK: Was Congressman Meeds pushed along by his own staff, then?

SE: Yes, kind of pushed to do it. Mark was the sparkplug that kept everybody enthused. It went on for a number of years because it was so contentious. There wasn't an easy way out. You had to have a trade, and give something up, which was hard for the environmentalists to say, “A land swap means we have to give up something?” There was never enough money to buy it. It would never happen if it had to be bought outright. There had to be land swaps, which forced tradeoffs—which was good because it forced people to get serious. If anybody wanted anything out of this, they had to figure out what they wanted to give up to get—there wasn't an ability to do a winner-take-all.

Over time, then, it allowed everything to kind of equalize. It ultimately passed in 1976, just as I left. Most of the serious fighting and the field work were done while I was still there. It was actually

fun, because for us, we didn't have any timber companies in our district. We got to be on the side of the backpackers and the Sierra Club and the Mountaineers. I was a Mountaineer back then, and so was Joel.

AK: Did a lot of your information come from these groups, groups like the Alpine Lakes Protection Society?

SE: Yes, and the Forest Service, and from being on the ground looking at it. It got pretty technical in the sense that people didn't do it just by a map. There was a lot of on the ground, what are the values here? Is this better for timber than it is for recreation? You had to keep trying to build contiguous parcels, so you wanted an area that was going to be a wilderness area.

Some of the things we did were kind of dumb. What we intended to do was actually have a recreation area that people could backpack in, and what we actually did created a natural ecosystem wilderness area, so you couldn't even take helicopters up to test the lakes for acid rain. A lot of dumb things happened afterward, it was almost too restrictive. The EPA couldn't even go up there and sample the water to see if pollution from Seattle was impacting the lakes. They said, "If we have to go in by mule or by foot, we're not going to do it." There was a little rigidity built around it. But the concept of getting some contiguous recreation land and having some natural land set aside was basically pretty good.

We listened to everybody. Joel was a consummate fountain of wisdom, because you had to be fair. This wasn't going to be winner-take-all. Joel saw eye-to-eye with Brock Adams and Lloyd Meeds and Scoop and Maggie, to the extent that Maggie was involved. I don't think it would have happened had anyone of them been opposed.

Mike McCormack was opposed, but his hard-core opposition hurt him. Had he said, "I'm willing to preserve a recreation area, but I want to protect timber jobs," he probably would have had a veto power on something happening. But this idea that "I'm not going to talk about it at all, it's not negotiable," I think actually hurt Mike. I think it hurt him on some of his other agendas, because Joel and others were more team players

with the delegation than was Mike. Mike McCormack came the closest to being the odd person out on a number of issues, and this was one of them.

And in the end, it happened. I don't think the timber industry was terribly impacted, and, I think, given the value of the area, it's a great gain for the state. It's right up there with North Cascades National Park. It's a great area.

SCENIC TRAIL

Steve Excell: Ron Strickland was this fellow who looked like Abe Lincoln probably looked when he was twenty-three, very tall, very lean, with a scruffy beard and a kind of awkward speaking style. He was a committee of one, he was just himself—a majority of one or a minority of one. And he had this concept that there should be a continuous trail, connecting Canada and even to Mexico someday, but at least through the Cascades through Washington State and possibly Oregon, connecting the Cascade crest and a trail from Glacier National Park's continental divide to Cape Alava in the Olympic National Park.

Alpine Lakes and North Cascades Park actually made that a doable idea, but it takes money and time because trails have to be developed, and trail headings, and you have to park cars by roads. You actually have to develop trails. You have to get people across rivers and streams. Everyone thinks of a trail as being a natural thing that just happens, but actually they are developed, and you need maps and guidebooks.

The first couple of times Ron Strickland got together enough bucks to come back to Washington, D.C. and present his idea, we thought this guy was crazy. But Ron, a guy who was very persistent, didn't take no for an answer, had this dream. And he was actually out there on weekends working on this trail. He would actually get out there.

Anne Kilgannon: Not waiting for funding or permission or anything?

SE: Yes, he'd get out there and scout where the trail should go, and get people out there clearing

the trail, and was just doing it. After awhile, we realized that he was actually a sparkplug and he got us all excited. Joel was excited that this might actually happen—that you might actually go from, let’s say, I-90 to Highway 20 on a trail that connected the crest of the Cascades. This guy who we thought was a crazy clone of Abe Lincoln turned out to be this nature guru who was showing us how this trail could actually happen, and was actually out there playing Lewis and Clark, mapping the alternative routes.

When he started out he had none of the establishment behind him, not the Sierra Club, not the Mountaineers. He started out solely on his own, and he was eccentric enough that it’s amazing, but he developed a following. He was so eccentric that you would say that this guy would never get a following, but by the time it was all said and done, he did. He convinced everyone that it could be done, and here’s how to make it cheaper, and here’s an alternative route. He spent every waking moment and every penny—he wasn’t rich—he had working on this thing.

Eventually, because he stayed at it, he infected Joel, he infected Scoop, he infected Lloyd Meeds, he infected all of us at the staff level, and everyone started thinking about how this could be. Eventually, it happened. It happened on a shoestring. Just getting the commitment to have the national designated trail, and then that got the Forest Service, the Park Service, and other players working at how to make it happen. That also, then, unleashed the volunteers and the backpacking groups to work on it. It became a big collaborative effort.

Now you can hike a fair chunk of the Cascade Crest. The trail is there, it’s signed, it’s mapped, you can hike it. It’s part of the Pacific Crest National Scenic Trail. You can definitely do I-90 to Highway 20 fairly easily. There’s a few places where some of the old Forest Services bridges have washed out and there needs to be some repairs, but that’s a big chunk of the state. The Pacific Northwest Trail, that Ron Strickland worked on next, now goes east and west—a world class trail system!

But from one person with an idea, with no allies, no resources and not even being a particu-

larly charismatic leader, he stayed with it. I’ll tell you one thing Joel admired was persistence—keep your nose to the grindstone, don’t get discouraged. Strickland embodied a lot of that. He was very much like the story of Tom Beyers in saving the Public Health Hospital. If Joel saw someone who was dedicated and tenacious enough to stay the course, he was probably willing to join ranks with them. But not with the fellow who comes into the room and says, “This is a great idea, why don’t you do it?” and then doesn’t want to do the work. With Strickland, with Tom Beyers, I think Joel saw the stick-to-itiveness to actually make it happen. And he came to Joel first, I think because Joel was his congressman. But it worked, and Joel got enthused. Ron taught us all a little object lesson about what one person can do if you’re tenacious enough to stay the course. It was an interesting case study.

BILDERBURG CONFERENCE

Steve Excell: Joel was always interested in population growth, world poverty, peaceful dispute resolutions. These are issues that attracted the Rockefeller Foundation—David Rockefeller, who was head of Chase Manhattan Bank. So Joel, out of the blue, gets an invitation to go to the Bilderburg Conference, which in conservative Republican circles is considered a conspiracy of the United Nations or the Trilateral Commission because it involves the Rockefellers financing heads of state, selected parliamentarians, and CEOs to meet someplace in the world and talk about global economic issues.

There’s a few groups like this. There’s the Club of Rome. There’s the Trilateral Commission. And there’s the Bilderburg Conference, which was named for the block of flats where it first met in 1954. Almost all are funded by the Rockefeller Foundation in their entirety. This has caused all sorts of subterranean agendas from those that don’t like abortion or don’t like birth control.

But, out of the blue, Joel gets invited, and it’s being held in Turkey, in Istanbul. So, Joel goes to Turkey. This was a big conference.

Anne Kilgannon: How do you think he got chosen? Did he really stand out?

SE: He was known for these issues. He was one of the state co-chairs for the abortion referendum in this state, and sponsored it in the Legislature, and legalized abortion. And he was very active, in the early days, with Planned Parenthood, before they became more political. He was very much into family planning counseling and a number of things. But he didn't yet have a national reputation. Clearly, the Rockefeller Foundation did their own checking, and discovered him as a budding young congressman who came concerned about these kind of global issues. He'd been in some obscure newspapers talking about land reform in Vietnam, and he'd been in the Seattle papers talking about abortion and the need for population control.

AK: So, somehow he shows up on the radar screen.

SE: He got on the radar screen, and it flabbergasted him and us. But, he gets back from this trip and he says, "I brought you guys back some trinkets. We went out to this village." I still have the copper bowl that Joel brought back from this village somewhere. He turns to Mary Lou and says, "Mary Lou, send one hundred bucks to David Rockefeller. I had to bum a hundred bucks off Rockefeller. We went out to this village exploring together, and I didn't have any money." Here's Joel bumming a hundred bucks from, in those days, one of the richest men in the world. The whole staff, of course, is going, "Ah-ah-ah, we'll never live this down."

But it didn't bother Joel at all. So Mary Lou got a hundred dollars out of Joel's checking account and put it in an envelope and had Joel put a little thank you note—what a good time he had—in there and sent it. Joel was the only person in the whole world who would have enough guts to say, "Can I borrow some money?" Because Joel didn't care. He didn't plan on those things. He got stuck out in this village without any money to buy anything in local currency, so David Rockefeller gave him a hundred bucks—which Joel immediately repaid when he got back. With

Joel, money did not matter, and I don't think with Rockefeller it mattered either, but for different reasons!

So, Joel did go to the conference, and it was all hush hush. Nobody knew much about it, but it eventually got into the newspapers at some point that Joel had been to the Bilderburg Conference, and then some of the paranoia on the far right said, "Oh, my God, he's part of the Trilateral Commission and the Rockefeller crowd." It took on a life of its own after that, that he was a secret agent for the Rockefeller family. But Joel's the only one who can do things like bum a hundred dollars from David Rockefeller and remember to send it back. And get away with it, because Joel was just so well liked that it was not a problem at all.

GRANT DEGGINGER

COUGAR LAKES WILDERNESS AND W.O. DOUGLAS WILDERNESS AREA

Grant Degginger worked for Congressman Joel Pritchard as his press secretary and legislative assistant from 1979 until he left the office in 1983 to attend law school. He is now a partner at Lane, Powell law firm in Seattle.

Grant Degginger: In late 1978 or early 1979, the U.S. Forest Service issued its second Roadless Area Review and Evaluation report. It became known as RARE II. The report evaluated all the remaining roadless areas managed by the Forest Service all around the country. Each area was given a rating based upon specified criteria, and the Service made a recommendation as to whether each evaluated area should become part of the wilderness system. Few if any areas in Washington State were recommended by the Service based upon the RARE II study. Several local chapters of environmental organizations asked us to look into this. I believe the Sierra Club was particularly interested. Since RARE II was advertised as the last chance for inclusion in the wilderness system, we thought it would be important to follow up.

John McKay and I met with Forest Service staff

in D.C. and in Seattle. We were particularly interested in determining whether several study areas, which were fairly close to Seattle, should be designated as wilderness. One area was called Cougar Lakes and the other was called Norse Peak.

Cougar Lakes was approximately 200,000 acres, which ran between Highway 410 at its northern boundary to Highway 12 at its southern boundary. It included Bumping Lake. Access was available from Goose Prairie, the boyhood home of William O. Douglas. Norse Peak was north of Highway 410, near Crystal Mountain. It was accessible from the Greenwater River drainage.

I remember hiking the area at least once with Charlie Raines from the Cascade chapter of the Sierra Club. It was about a one-and-a-half-hour drive from Seattle. It had some beautiful lakes and waterfalls. It had both day hike and "heartier" hiking opportunities. Also, we were aware that the Greenwater community had suffered some devastating flooding, allegedly due to logging activities farther up the river.

In the Spring of 1979, John and I discussed the results of our investigation with Joel. We recommended that he focus additional attention on the Cougar Lakes and Norse Peak areas by filing a bill to include them in the wilderness system.

No delegation members had emerged as a leader on the wilderness issue, although several had expressed interest in individual areas. The issue needed some leadership in the delegation. The major political issue we discussed was that none of the area we were recommending for wilderness was in the First Congressional District. Most of Cougar Lakes and Norse Peak were in the Fourth District. Mike McCormack, a Democrat from Richland, represented the area. Mike's office was just across from Joel's in the Rayburn Building. Mike was not a big fan of wilderness.

Joel decided that he would introduce the bill; however he wanted to invite Mike Lowry to be an original cosponsor, and he said he would talk to McCormack before he introduced the bill. Lowry was delighted to be invited and signed on immediately. McCormack didn't like the bill at all, but appreciated Joel speaking to him in advance so that he could prepare a timely press release blasting it.

The bill was referred to the House Interior Committee's Subcommittee on Public Lands. The committee's chair was John Seiberling of Ohio, a very liberal Democrat from a wealthy tire manufacturing family. Staff was supportive of the bill; however they were doing the wilderness bills of those states whose delegations had reached consensus before they took on the tougher ones. We had to wait our turn.

We did not even get a hearing in the Ninety-seventh Congress. Joel and Mike Lowry reintroduced the bill in early 1981. By then the landscape had changed. Mike McCormack had been defeated by Sid Morrison. Slade Gorton had defeated Magnuson, and Reagan had defeated Carter. The changes in the state delegation actually were positive from the standpoint of our bill; however the Reagan administration was not particularly supportive of wilderness.

Sid Morrison approached the bill with a pretty open mind. He was concerned with his farmers in the Yakima Valley and had some interest in seeing if Bumping Lake could be expanded for storage capacity. In about the spring of 1981, the Public Lands subcommittee finally held a hearing on our bill. Richard Lyng, the assistant secretary of Agriculture in charge of the Forest Service, and John Crowell, his deputy, opposed the bill.

That summer, some of the staff of members of our delegation and several members of the committee went on a trip to see some of the potential wilderness areas in eastern Washington. We spent a day and a night near the Cougar Lakes area. Sid Morrison participated in part of that trip. I began to get the feeling that support for including a big piece of our areas was growing. I also recall Joel viewing some of the potential wilderness areas with John Seiberling and some of the committee members and staff.

Joel kept nudging the delegation towards working the wilderness issue harder. Progress was made in 1981-82; however it wasn't until the next congress that things really moved along. Sid received support for wilderness from many orchardists in the Valley as a way of preserving water and water quality. Slade's staff took a lead role in getting the bill moving in the Senate. Creigh Agnew did an outstanding job pulling the elements together for a statewide bill and getting

it passed. I left D.C. in late 1982, but still worked on it in 1983.

I believe the bill passed in 1984. I remember John McKay, Joel and I went to the dedication of the William O. Douglas Wilderness just outside Goose Prairie. I think this took place in the fall of 1984. Sid Morrison was master of ceremonies. Mike Lowry was there. Many from the environmental community attended. It was a most rewarding event.

The process took about five years. Joel never gave up. He worked the bill in his quiet, persistent and effective way, and the result was we ended up not only with Cougar Lakes, now the William O. Douglas Wilderness, and Norse Peak, but with an additional million acres of wilderness in the state.

MAURY HAUSHEER

THE CREATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND OTHER POLICY ISSUES

Anne Kilgannon: I understand that Joel changed his mind about supporting the creation of the Department of Education afterwards. He had thought that it would be a good thing, but it didn't actually work out the way he thought.

Maury Hausheer: Yes, but it wouldn't have happened without Joel.

AK: Maybe you ought to clarify that a bit. He was not very good at saying that sort of thing, taking the credit.

MH: The Carter administration wanted it and it was a very important issue to them, and it became the National Education Association's major policy initiative. You have to remember that is was in 1978 or '79, and the American Federation of Teachers was opposed to it. They did not want to separate education from Health and Human Services. The secretary of Health and Human Services, Joseph Califano, was also against it. He wanted to keep education in his agency.

But the NEA decided that that's what they wanted and they had a commitment from the

Carter administration. I want to give you that background. It's actually authentic.

Joel began to think it was probably a good idea and so he supported it. He got about fifteen other Republican House members to go along. It would not have been adopted in the House without those people.

AK: And then he regretted it?

MH: He did not deeply regret, it but it didn't seem to work as well as it should. Public education is primarily a function of the state. This created another layer of bureaucracy to take the money. The federal government provides about seven percent of the total public school education costs, and fifty to sixty percent of the paperwork.

AK: Did he get a reputation as somebody who could persuade people to do things?

MH: Yes.

AK: So people trying to do things might come to him and say, "What do you think of this?"

MH: Yes, on certain things. He was very selective because he did not like to try to push other people unless it was something he believed in.

AK: Did he have a predictable group of things he would be interested in, or could you always know what would interest him? Say as a staff member, to bring something forward?

MH: Yes. We often did. You get a sixth sense after a while about what he would like to do.

AK: What would you say would be the top things that he'd be behind or interested in finding out more about? The tobacco subsidy comes a little bit out of the blue, and so does this canal.

MH: Yes. He was, of course, interested in foreign policy. He was interested in education because it was an important concern in his district. He was a strong believer in free trade.

AK: And the preservation of wilderness areas?

MH: That's right. He was very strong on that. I remember when the wilderness issue first came up, and he at first had some hesitation because he didn't want to interfere in another member's district.

AK: But then he was committed, and he went ahead?

MH: Yes, he went ahead, but he tried to be non-threatening to other members. He wouldn't demagogue an issue.

AK: He did talk some about his foreign travel. He seemed interested in any and every area of the world. Maybe more Pacific rim areas because of Seattle, but he was in Afghanistan, he was in Pakistan, he was all over. Did he have particular issues within foreign affairs that he was keen about? He seemed willing to go anywhere.

MH: Yes. He was very interested in the process of foreign policy. Working things out with other countries. Foreign policy is very complex. It isn't like you take a position on this and make demands; you have to work out issues the best way you can.

AK: Did he have a philosophy of what America should be doing?

MH: Yes. He believed we should always do what was in our long-term national interest.

He had an excellent relationship with the career State Department officials. They really liked him and he appreciated them, too. Many of them became very good friends. These are people who became ambassadors, or had distinguished foreign policy careers. In fact, for several years we had an internship program in his office with the Department of State. Individuals would come from the State Department and work with us and these people really enjoyed it because Joel understood the foreign policy process.

It was a process of America and the world and how you work these things out. Of course things have changed now because the Soviet Union has disappeared.

AK: He didn't strike me exactly as a "cold

warrior." He didn't seem to me to be a particularly imperialist sort of person.

MH: No.

AK: Would his positions have more to do with promoting trade and promoting bilateral actions and getting to know people, rather than imposing some kind of American will?

MH: Yes.

AK: Those were the Reagan years. What did he think about some of the things that were happening? In Central America, for instance?

MH: He took Communism very seriously. He did not believe, like many revisionist historians did, that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were equally good and bad. We're not doing the same thing. He thought Marxism was a serious threat in parts of Latin America.

He was interested in the facts. In finding out what was really happening, not what some people said. That's why he liked the hands-on approach to find out what was really happening.

AK: I was quite struck by his early involvement with Roy Prosterman in the land reform movement. To me, that showed a very deep understanding of why people rebel or why they fight, or why there are these civil wars or these different struggles going on. People want fairness and they want land, and if you have countries where that is not so, then you're going to have a lot of insurgency. He seemed to be trying to understand the underlying causes for things, rather than having an ideological analysis, particularly. He never used any words that seemed to have any ideological bent.

MH: During his last trip to Vietnam with Roy Prosterman, he found that the Vietnamese were having economic problems they did not anticipate. Vietnam is still not a pleasant place. But he was interested in finding out the truth. Talking to average people as well as government officials off the record. Things like that.

He had a good understanding of the Middle

East because he would talk to both Arab and Israeli officials. He had an understanding of the conflict there. He understood that foreign policy is never finished. You just can't say, "Hey! We're all done with that now, everything's going to be fine." It's an ongoing process.

He also understood that sometimes you have to take tough stands, and you may be faking somewhat, but you've got to do it. He understood that foreign policy is about national interests, so you have to do what's in your long-term best interest no matter what it is. No matter what country it is that you're having a problem with, you've got to take care of your country first. If you don't, the other nations will take advantage of you. That is not what idealists believe, but that is the only realistic way to handle international diplomacy.

CHAPTER 14

TRANSITION FROM CONGRESS

Anne Kilgannon: How did you meet Joel Pritchard, and how did you happen to go to work for him?

Maury Hausheer: I met him in the capacities I had at the time, as a teacher at Bellevue High School. He asked me to come back there—to Washington, D.C.—and then he wanted me to work with him after that.

AK: And that was attractive to you? Were you interested in politics?

MH: Oh yes. I thought it was interesting and a little different.

AK: Did you see eye-to-eye on political matters?

MH: Most of the time, but it's a relationship where you do the work the person you work for wants you to do. It isn't necessarily whether you totally agree with it or not, but yes, I had a lot of respect for him, for his integrity. And for the fact that he really wanted to solve problems and do things, and for the fact that he wasn't interested in playing politics or getting credit. He didn't have an overdeveloped ego as do so many people who are elected to public office. It isn't necessarily a bad thing to have that overdeveloped ego, but it was comforting to know he didn't have that problem.

AK: I understand that was one of his most striking characteristics.

MH: That's right. He wasn't as self-absorbed as most elected office holders.

AK: What was it like to work for Joel Pritchard?

MH: He was very easy to work for, and was always giving you credit and praise for what you did for him.

AK: So, would he be the person who had the ideas, and you would come in and he would say, "Could you do this, or look into this," or whatever it was?

MH: Yes, sometimes that was the case, and sometimes I developed things. I came up with ideas and we would discuss it and check it out. If I felt it was very good, I would encourage him, and sometimes he would want to do it and sometimes he wouldn't. It was one of those things where it was his judgment and you did what he wanted to do. But he was very receptive to a creative and thoughtful staff. That's the kind of people he had around him, as far as I knew, all the time—smart and competent people who were concerned about the public welfare.

AK: That's certainly how he always described it to me. I know he liked to keep his staff small and very involved. He thought it was wrong for a congressman to have much of a separation between themselves and their staff.

MH: Yes, in fact, in Washington, D.C. the first two years when he was in the Cannon Office Building, he did not take the member's office. He had a smaller office because space was a priority. Often, members would have a huge office and then they'd have all these staff people around jammed into some little, tiny cubbyhole. He was the only one that I knew of that didn't do that.

AK: He was more concerned with doing the work than with making a big impression, I understand.

MH: Yes. I think, like all people, you want to look good, you want to be well thought of. I believe that it was very important to Joel to be well thought of by other people. I think most of

us feel that way.

AK: You worked with Joel pretty much until the end of his congressional career. He had always said he would leave after twelve years, in 1984, that he'd give himself that long. He had a strong belief in term limits, long before that was fashionable, shall we say. But when it came right down to it, was it hard for him to leave Congress?

MH: Yes, it was hard for him to leave. I knew he was going to leave and I had gone to work for a United States senator just before he left. I talked to people on the staff and, yes, he was going to leave, but there were so many people who wanted him to stay. The fact that he had said, "I'll leave after twelve years," and the paper printed it, even the newspaper reporters told him, "Well, we didn't believe you anyway, so you don't have to do that." Members of Congress are always promising that they are going to stay for a short period of time, but they stay longer. I think it did affect him. He liked being in Congress. He liked it a lot.

AK: Did Joel discuss his feelings about term limits very much?

MH: Not a lot, but he did feel that political officials had the tendency to stay too long in a job. They then began to develop a feeling that it's their permanent right to this position, and often they stay much longer than they should. Joel believed that for most elected officials it's better if they would leave after a shorter period of time and not become attached to the office they hold.

AK: Is it better, in that sense, to leave of your own volition than to get voted out of office?

MH: It's much better to leave of your own volition. After Joel left, he was offered all kinds of jobs in Washington, D.C. with lobbying firms, and one of the reasons was that he had left of his own volition. There were other members who had lost, and some members are so bitter at the people in their districts—even if these people had elected them and re-elected them—if they lose the election one time, then they're angry at these people. Even if forty-nine percent of the people

voted for them, they're angry and they don't go back. They stay in Washington, or they go somewhere else. You see that a lot.

AK: So they never get over it?

MH: They don't get over it. It's much better for your mental health if you go out on your own.

AK: I think he alluded to that once, seeing these has-beens hanging around, and that he didn't ever want to be one of them.

MH: And there are more and more of them every year.

AK: When he knew he was going to retire, did he have a plan for what he wanted to do? The news releases quote him as saying, "No, I'm just coming home." Did he really have no idea of what he would do next?

MH: I think he didn't. He didn't come home right away. He stayed in Washington, D.C. for awhile. He had remarried in 1983 and his wife had a very good job.

And when he did come home, he worked with KIRO TV as a commentator a little bit, and he enjoyed doing that. And he worked with Bogle and Gates in their federal legislative program.

AK: What kinds of things did Joel do with them?

MH: He lobbied and helped with certain issues. But he did not like that kind of work. He did not like to ask people he knew, former colleagues, to vote on something that they might be uncomfortable with. So, he really didn't care for it, but it was a good job and he had other offers of good jobs. Different organizations sought Joel's employment. He knew how to get things done in Congress, but he did not enjoy that type of work.

AK: When it came right down to it, it wasn't for him? I wondered what it would be like—changing roles like that.

MH: He didn't mind doing things in Congress or in the state Legislature for an issue that he cared

about, but he didn't like to be getting paid for it.

AK: To not be able to choose your own issues, but to do someone else's bidding would be really different.

MH: That's right. He liked the people at Bogle and Gates, he really liked them, the Washington, D.C. group and the ones in Seattle, but he didn't particularly like that type of work.

AK: Did he have some previous connection to that firm? Out of all his offers, how did he choose to work for them?

MH: I don't know. I think it was personal because they were a Seattle firm.

AK: How long did he stay with this work?

MH: Until about 1988.

AK: During this interim period, Joel held another position of significance. In 1987 he was appointed to the Panama Canal Consultative Commission. He served about a year in that capacity. Can you tell me something more about this position?

MH: I can't speak to that very well. I do know that this did not amount to very much. I think they only met a few times.

AK: He seemed to enjoy it. I know he went back to D.C. and met with the group and attended some hearings—the records show at least that amount of activity.

MH: Oh yes. Joel had an excellent grasp of foreign policy. He had an outstanding knowledge of foreign affairs, and he understood how complicated it was. He never demagogued the issue of foreign affairs, which is easy to do in American politics. He never played that game at all, never once did he do that. He did what he thought was in the long-term national interest. That was his position.

AK: Do you happen to know what position he took on the Panama Canal? The issue of returning

the control of the canal zone to Panama was hotly debated.

MH: He supported the transfer to the government of Panama, the treaty that was arranged under President Carter.

AK: By 1987 there seemed to be some problems with President Noriega of Panama because he was running the canal in ways that may have been against the provisions of the treaty.

MH: Yes, at that time, but Joel did support President Bush's actions in going after Noriega, feeling that this was probably the only alternative.

AK: Did the commission travel to Panama? Would that help develop a feel for the situation?

MH: Oh yes. He went to Panama on occasion, not necessarily as a member of this commission, but he went there several times.

AK: What would have been his particular contribution to this group? Was he a steady hand, an experienced foreign policy person?

MH: Oh sure, and I think most of the members of the commission were of the same thought. They wanted to make sure that things worked well, worked right, and that the changeover went well. All the political factors and all those things came into being.

AK: This was a presidential appointment. Were the terms short, and when your time of service is up, it's not that the work is necessarily finished, but just your time to step down?

MH: In this particular commission, yes. In fact, I remember when he was lieutenant governor, he did receive a phone call from the chairman of the commission telling him that this was being abolished.

AK: So it was a time-limited issue—the commission doesn't exist anymore?

MH: That's right.

AK: Maybe it achieved its purpose.

Besides holding these responsible positions, I think it should be mentioned that Joel was undergoing treatment for cancer after he left Congress, though I understand that his decision to retire had no relation to his illness. But he went through a round of treatment and was given a good prognosis. Did that experience, to your knowledge, change how he looked at his life?

MH: I don't think, in particular, that it did. Joel's view of life was that a lot of life is based on chances or odds. No one knew what the future held, so why not go ahead and live the way you wanted to live? I don't think he thought about it very much.

AK: I know for some people it heightens their awareness, their joy for life. It throws everything they do in a different perspective. Did he experience it that way?

MH: Joel really enjoyed life a lot before he had cancer. I don't feel it made any difference, but he knew it was there and he understood it was serious. He didn't worry about things that he felt he couldn't change.

AK: He was such an active person. Did he continue to play tennis and charge on through?

MH: Yes, he was in excellent physical condition. He was very fast and quick, and he ran everywhere.

FURTHER THOUGHTS

KIRBY TORRANCE

SENATE APPOINTMENT

Kirby Torrance: When Joel got married again, we decided to have a party for them. He was going to bring his wife out to Seattle and they stayed in our coach house for a while. So we thought it would be nice to have a party to introduce people in Seattle to Joel's new wife. In the meantime, Henry Jackson had died. Between the time when we planned the party and sent the invitations and when we had the party, he'd died, and the issue came up who was Spellman going to appoint? The governor appoints the interim senator, and I think there was a year or so, maybe two years left on Jackson's term. So there was a lot of speculation. It wasn't his idea, but Joel was a candidate and Dan Evans was a candidate.

Well, we had his party, and it turned out by coincidence that that very night the governor was to announce who his choice was. I imagine that there were two hundred people, the nicest party that I had ever been to, and there were reporters, political candidates, business people, Bill Gates Senior was there, Dan Evans was there, Joel was there, and everybody you can think of in our circle was there.

And Spellman appointed Evans, who later decided he didn't like being senator. I was upset about it. I thought Joel should have been appointed. I talked to Frank later, and it turned out that Joel wasn't really too excited about being appointed senator. He would have had to run for

election in about a year or two and Frank and Joel didn't know for sure if that would be a good idea or not, that is if he could get elected. I forget all the ramifications, but Joel really didn't go after the appointment. I'll put it this way, though, if Frank and Joel, or we and some other guys, had gone to Spellman and said, "By golly, you better appoint Pritchard," I think he would have done it. That didn't happen, and nobody tried to make it happen. So that's how it happened that Evans was appointed. But, of course, both Dan and Joel were excellent choices.

Anne Kilgannon: Must have added some sparkle to that party, that whole anticipation.

KT: It was a magic evening. It was like the whole evening was charged with electricity! It was a nice day like today and the next day it was on the front page of the Sunday paper—from Saturday night—and I've never seen a social event on the front page of a Sunday paper before or since then. People who were there remember it, and the place was crowded, but that's what happened there.

CHAPTER 15

LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR OF WASHINGTON STATE

Anne Kilgannon: About this time, 1986, 1987 or so, discussion begins in the press about the possible retirement of Lieutenant Governor John Cherberg, who has been in that office for the last thirty-two years, a real state institution. Did Cherberg, who was Joel's old Queen Anne football coach, approach Joel about taking his position, or was this something that Joel decided to do on his own?

Maury Hausheer: It's something Joel decided to do on his own, because he had been thinking he might want to do this for some time. I remember in 1979, Joel and I were on our way from Seattle to Olympia. He was going to visit with Governor Dixy Lee Ray, and we stopped at the Poodle Dog Restaurant and I asked him, "What are you going to do when you leave Congress?" He said, "I think I would like to be lieutenant governor someday." This is what he told me in 1979.

But he wouldn't run against John Cherberg. I suspect he would have run in 1984 if Cherberg had retired, but then Cherberg ran for another term, and so he waited until 1988.

AK: He wouldn't do to Cherberg what he had done to Pelly, challenge him at the end of his career?

MH: That's right. He did go and talk to Cherberg, and Cherberg encouraged him to run. So he did tell him that he wanted to do it, but there were other people who wanted to run for lieutenant

governor, too. A lot of people ran for lieutenant governor in 1987.

AK: Yes, the field was very crowded. What was the big attraction of this office?

MH: I'm not sure. I think part of it is that there's no specific paradigm for it. It's a nice job, you can make it what you want it to be. In most states, by the way, the office of lieutenant governor is a stepping stone for some other office—for governor or U.S. Senate seat, or something like that.

There were other people who wanted to run. Doug Sutherland, who at that time was mayor of Tacoma, was interested in running for lieutenant governor. He had a poll that showed Joel's ID and popularity were so overwhelming that he dropped out and gave the poll to Joel.

There was a congressman from the state of Washington who looked at running for another office, and he did a poll and found out that even though Joel had been out of office since 1984, his name identification was so much higher than his, the congressman who was still in office, that he decided not to run. Joel had a name identification not only from being in Congress for twelve years, but also from being a commentator on KIRO. That helped him very much.

AK: With all this, had Joel ever considered running for the U.S. Senate? I know he insisted that he would not while he was in Congress, but what about at this time?

MH: No, there wasn't any way he could run for the Senate. Joel did tell me two or three times, and maybe this is just speculation, that if he had been ten or fifteen years younger he would have run for the Senate when the time arrived. He loved serving in a legislative body, and would have liked to be a senator. But, never for a minute, did he seem to have any regrets that he didn't or couldn't.

He was considered by Governor Spellman, after Senator Jackson died, for that position, but Spellman appointed Dan Evans. Joel had no qualms about the appointment of Dan Evans. He felt that Governor Evans would be a very good senator. He thought that was great. I understand

that there were only two people considered, Dan Evans and Joel.

AK: I remember reading about that. But Dan Evans was about the same age as Joel, so age didn't seem to be a factor. Did Joel think that you had to be in the Senate a certain amount of time before you could really make a contribution?

MH: No, that's not true. To be a committee chairman and things like that, yes, but there are people who are fairly effective since it's a much smaller body. And the rules of the Senate are different, so it's different.

AK: But once Dan Evans was appointed, that changed things anyway, I suppose.

To return from what might have been, to what he did do, when he was thinking of running for lieutenant governor, did he form some kind of committee to explore the idea?

MH: I wasn't here at that time, but, yes, he had a group of people around him. But he pretty much knew what he wanted to do, and he and his brother to a great extent determined what they were going to do.

His style of campaigning was different. He didn't make a lot of promises. Often, when people run for office, they say all these big changes they're going to make. He did not do that. He talked about himself, and I think in some ways that's why the race was fairly close, because he didn't promise sweeping changes. He did talk about being able to work with both sides and his knowledge of foreign affairs.

By the way, when he was lieutenant governor a lot of foreign dignitaries came to visit him because he could discuss their issues with them very easily. He knew them and he'd been to most of their countries, sometimes several times, and understood them.

AK: George Fleming turned out to be the person he ultimately ran against after a rather crowded field in the primary. He was the Senate Democratic caucus chair and he ran on a platform emphasizing his fight against drugs, somewhat like the present lieutenant governor.

Joel's campaign focused on his strength as a person as you described. He wanted to bill himself as a mediator, and as he said in his literature, to end partisan bickering. Wasn't that vintage Joel, his hallmark?

MH: Yes, that's true. And I think that was probably outdated as far as effectiveness as a campaign strategy. I think we have learned in political life in the last ten or fifteen years, you've got to offer big changes, things that are going to be bigger, better, faster, and sometimes be very critical of your opponent.

AK: So, he was being old-fashioned in his style? Just being a "good person?"

MH: Yes, that's the old-fashioned way of doing things. What you're saying is, "I'm qualified. Look at my qualifications. Look what I can do." The public doesn't really care about that as much as they like to say, "What are you going to do for me?" That's what they're really interested in.

Joel's way, I say, was an old-fashioned way of looking at things. It's a different way, but it's attractive to many people. But to get the masses to vote for you, you need to promise a change, something that will make a difference in their lives.

AK: But he didn't want to criticize Cherberg, did he, so promising big changes wouldn't work.

MH: Oh, no. That's right. In fact, he was more a defender of Cherberg than Fleming was, is my feeling. He never criticized Cherberg.

AK: Despite their different party affiliations, that would have been very awkward, given their relationship.

MH: People do it all the time, though. They don't criticize them directly, but indirectly they say, "I'm going to do this." In other words, implying that the person who's there now didn't do it, or is not up to the job.

AK: Did he have a real clear idea of what the job would be like, what it entailed and what he wanted

to do with it?

MH: I don't think entirely, because there are certain things that are already there. You have to preside over the Senate, and you have some other duties by statute.

AK: Yes, but it seems to be an office that people use as a platform to do other things, champion various causes.

MH: You can do other things with it, whatever you want to do. The position of lieutenant governor of Washington State has unlimited possibilities, politically. Except, it's interesting, the last two lieutenant governors, John Cherberg and Joel, had no higher ambitions. Cherberg made an attempt one time—he ran for mayor of Seattle while he was lieutenant governor, but he lost, and that was that. He never tried anything else after that. And Joel was not going to run for anything else.

AK: He made a pledge to that effect that, no, this was not a stepping stone, this was what he wanted to do. Perhaps that wasn't so true for some of the other people.

MH: That's right. But for other people, for younger people who are on their way up, it's a wonderful place to be. You can use it to develop yourself.

AK: Joel did use the office as a platform to promote literacy and the volunteers who worked in that field. I found a colorful description of him as lieutenant governor "tirelessly criss-crossing the state to acknowledge the work of community-based literacy efforts, presenting citations to outstanding literacy students and supporting fellow volunteers." Did Joel have that kind of work in mind when he was campaigning, that way of using the office? I mean, did he begin with that vision of the possibilities of the office?

MH: He sort of fell into it because the Washington State literacy people came to him for some assistance, and we worked with them to see how we could develop a program of what they would

like. Their primary concern was how to honor their volunteers, they had so many of them.

AK: Having this high official participate in their ceremonies would certainly help them.

MH: Yes. I have a note on that: "During 1991, Lieutenant Governor Joel Pritchard, in cooperation with Washington Literacy, the umbrella organization for voluntary efforts in our state, in cooperation with the Washington State Library and the daily and weekly newspapers of Washington State, founded a statewide adult literacy volunteer recognition program called Washington Reads. Its purpose was to honor the ten thousand-plus adult literacy volunteers in Washington State, to gain publicity for literacy programs, to encourage cooperation and coordination among the various organizations involved in literacy, and increase the awareness of public officials about literacy issues. Lieutenant Governor Pritchard raised the private money necessary to carry out the objectives of Washington Reads."

AK: How did he go about the fundraising?

MH: We asked people for money to buy the recognition pins for the volunteers at the events.

AK: Asking is the easiest way, I understand. And did you attend these recognition events?

MH: Yes, we went to events and everything else. We had pins to recognize the volunteers. There was lots of volunteer recognition activity for two or three years there.

We didn't ask for a lot of money, Joel would never ask for a lot of money. He hated to ask for money, but we did ask for and receive some money to finance this program of volunteer recognition. Washington Literacy didn't have the money to do it, and so we worked in cooperation with them. I think the people liked it, those who participated in it.

In some ways that was the major thing. I don't want to get side-tracked here, but literacy is almost a political issue, too. You have to be very careful with it because it's good to be for literacy and against illiteracy, but getting the job done is very,

very difficult.

For the people who have trouble reading, for instance, they founded several different groups. One group works with people who are from a foreign country and don't know the language. They have the community college programs to work with. But then you have the hard-core people who can't read—adults who can't read, Americans born and raised in America, and these are the people who seem to be unable to adequately overcome their literacy problem.

AK: I understand that these people are disproportionately represented in our prison population.

MH: Yes. But often they are doing other things, too. They're on welfare, there's lots of programs. But there's no program to deal with people that is accountable, so we don't know how effective they are.

Also, the volunteers—that's a tough job. Teaching a person to read—I didn't realize this—is very difficult. It takes years for people to read.

AK: So years of one-on-one, sticking with it.

MH: Yes, sticking with it. It's easy to get discouraged. It's easy for the volunteer to feel that they're the problem. There are a lot of things that go into this. In other words, it's nice to go on television and say, "I'm for literacy," but that's tough to do, very difficult to do—much more difficult than we think it is.

AK: Were you a volunteer, yourself? You sound like you are speaking from a first-hand experience.

MH: Yes, I've done it. It's difficult, and the volunteers will tell you, too, because after three or four months the person you're helping quits, or they're not making enough progress, or whatever. There are lots of success stories, too, I realize, but it's a real problem and I suspect it will always be there.

And we'll always have politicians trying to make something out of it. There are always going to be programs that want money to teach people to read, but there's no program where you have one-on-one and are accountable and can measure

it. It's hard to measure how effective programs are.

It's not like a program in a community college where you have English as a second language, and you teach that. That you know, but these other people out there, there's no way of knowing, and you have all these volunteers trying to help. It's much more complicated than we think it is. But it's popular and it's nice.

The one thing that we did here was try to honor the volunteers, which is a different tactic. We praised them because that was what they needed, according to Washington Literacy at that time, in 1991 and 1992. That was what these people needed more than anything else, to be recognized and to keep going.

AK: This activity was a good fit for Joel, because he had been a tutor at one time, too.

MH: And he was still tutoring, up until about 1994, at Beacon Hill School in Seattle.

AK: This was where he would go up and work in the classroom?

MH: Yes, once or twice a week.

AK: That's quite often for somebody as busy as he was. How did he happen to start doing that?

MH: I can't remember exactly. I remember we went to a school in West Seattle and they had a program, and he thought he'd like to try that. So, he went to Beacon Hill, and I'd often go with him and help.

AK: What was he like with the kids, grandfatherly?

MH: When I was there I was busy. There were a lot of people there at that particular school, several older people, volunteers who were helping. Some were very good, really good people who were doing this, and you could see the progress they made. They were usually with first and second and third-graders.

AK: That's different. I mean, it's nice going

around doing the ceremonial part, but actually taking it upon yourself to go out and tutor—that’s not just talk, that’s action.

Now, the work on literacy was, of course, a sideline. The first duty of a lieutenant governor is to preside in the Senate. Lieutenant Governor Cherberg set the standard, having been there for so long, for style. He had relished, by all accounts, the ceremonial aspects of the office, and was known for his dignity and decorum and for his knowledge of the rules of procedure. When Joel assumed the office, did he model himself along those lines, or did he develop his own way of doing things?

MH: He had his own way of doing things.

AK: Joel did not strike me as a person overly concerned with decorum.

MH: No, one thing he did demand, though, was that men wear their suit jackets on the floor.

AK: Was that a problem?

MH: With some people, yes. He did want order, but he was much looser than Lieutenant Governor Cherberg.

AK: Can you give me some examples of what that would mean in practice?

MH: Well, he would sometimes make comments.

AK: Do you mean jokes?

MH: When somebody would say something or ask a question, sometimes Joel’s comments might be taken as a little bit flippant.

But he did want order. He never mastered all the rules of the Senate. He wasn’t that interested in them. He had other people there to tell him what to do.

AK: Would he, for instance, sometimes make a ruling and then somebody would have to say, “We can’t really do it that way.”

MH: No, no. He would ask first, but sometimes

he didn’t turn off the microphone when he was asking, or he would say things that other people could hear, and sometimes that was funny, too.

Another thing he did, though, on all these rulings, he made sure it was totally nonpartisan. He had the lawyer for the Democrats and the Republicans—the lawyers for each caucus were with him and helped him make the decisions on every rule of any importance. Any procedural rule about whether an amendment was germane, anything like that, they both had to agree.

AK: So, how does it work? Someone would propose an amendment and Joel would have to stop and consult?

MH: If a senator challenges the amendment that somebody has offered and says that it’s not germane, that you can’t do that, it violates the rules of the Senate because it doesn’t apply to this, or this and that. Then they would make their remarks, and maybe they would recess for fifteen or twenty minutes, go back in the office and they would have a discussion about what really was the rule of the Senate.

But he never favored one person over another. Often they would rule in favor of a person Joel would like to have ruled the other way on. But you didn’t—it was nonpartisan all the way.

AK: This nonpartisanship, was this new or unusual?

MH: I think that it was unusual. You don’t have to do it that way, by the way. The United States House and Senate don’t operate that way. You operate the way your caucus wants. So, with Joel, politics were kept out of rulings.

AK: Did John Cherberg try to pass on the baton, to teach Joel the procedures and rules?

MH: No, this was all Joel’s doing. He wanted it to be a nonpartisan office. I believe, and I don’t want to be unfair about this, but I think that all the thirty-two years that Lieutenant Governor Cherberg was here he had a Democratic majority. The Senate Democratic caucus did a lot for Cherberg, helped him with things and everything else.

Our office tried to be somewhat independent of the Senate. He wanted to be independent. Joel did not work for the Senate. He was elected by the people. That was his view.

AK: So you were drawing a line?

MH: We tried to draw a line that was not hard and fast. He did attend the Republican caucuses, and if there was a procedural vote on an amendment where he could vote, he'd usually vote with the Republicans.

AK: He could only vote to break a tie, right?

MH: Yes, a tie on a procedural vote, not on final passage. He wanted this to be a nonpartisan job, as much as possible. That was his view, that he didn't want to rely heavily on the Republican caucus for assistance. He very much tried to maintain a relationship on both sides.

One thing that began to bother him the last four years was the fact that often in the Senate dining room the people would eat lunch split up along partisan lines. He thought that was very bad.

AK: So, did he try to sit with different people, break up that pattern?

MH: Yes.

AK: By some accounts, there seems to be waves of that partisanship feeling, back and forth, with greater or lesser amounts.

MH: That's true.

AK: I'm trying to get a sense of his style. Was he a vigorous wielder of the gavel? The one he showed me was very bashed up, it look very well used.

MH: He did not want the Senate to be out of control.

AK: Did he have other ways of presiding that were characteristic?

MH: He tried to move things along very fast, like

he wanted to get it over with. If you follow strict rules of decorum and tradition, it takes longer. Joel liked things to move.

AK: I notice he customarily stood. Was that unusual?

MH: I don't know. But that's how he wanted to operate.

AK: He seemed very fully engaged in the process.

MH: While he was there he wanted to be engaged, and wanted to move it along. He tended to be impatient with things dragging out.

AK: Did he go so far as to cut people off?

MH: Yes, but there were usually rules about speech making. Seldom did the senators, over the seven years, give long speeches. It wasn't like Congress.

AK: Did he have any occasions when things fell apart for him—when, say, there was a very contentious issue and the senators did not handle themselves with decorum?

MH: Once in a while there would be people who would be upset with him. Sometimes they would be hurt if he would rule against them or he wouldn't let them vote from the wings, or something like that.

AK: He would make them come to their desks to vote?

MH: Not to their desks, but out to the floor. Their feelings would be hurt. Sometimes they would ask a parliamentary inquiry question and they'd get a quick answer and they wouldn't like it. I would hear criticism of Joel, but things never fell apart.

AK: He never let it get that far?

MH: Oh no. Criticism didn't bother him. He was very comfortable with himself and felt he was doing the right thing.

AK: On these occasions when somebody was upset, would he go and talk with them, or just let it settle?

MH: Sometimes. If he knew someone was upset with him, he would talk with them.

AK: So he would try to smooth things over?

MH: Yes. There was a senator who is no longer here, who, at one time, Joel said, had stated some very untrue things about his brother. Joel treated him with the utmost respect. He didn't talk to anybody about it, and he treated this senator very well. But privately, he did not care for him.

But no, he was not bothered by people getting their egos hurt. He felt they had a problem, and that's the way it was.

AK: Who were the big personalities in the Senate at this time? Who were the leaders?

MH: There was Jeannette Hayner when he first came there, and George Sellar. The Republicans controlled it from 1989 when he started, up until January of 1993 when they lost it.

AK: That was his only experience of being in a majority in all his years.

MH: Yes. You had Jeannette Hayner and George Sellar. And Irv Newhouse, very important. And Dan McDonald and others.

On the Democratic side, you had Larry Vognild, who was the Democratic leader. You had Marc Gaspard and Phil Talmadge, of course. Talmadge was a strong presence in the Senate. The interesting thing about Talmadge is that he offered lots of amendments when the Republicans controlled the Senate, all kinds of amendments, but I would say that ninety percent of his amendments failed, often because it was Talmadge. It's just the way things operated.

When Marc Gaspard took over as majority leader in 1993 for the Democrats, the Talmadge amendments usually were adopted.

AK: The Democrats took it back from the Republicans—

MH: For four years, yes. Then Sid Snyder was the caucus chairman, Gaspard was majority leader, Talmadge was there for awhile, and you had Nita Rinehart as chair of Ways and Means, a place of power in the Senate.

AK: These would be the people Joel would work closely with?

MH: Yes, because he was the chairman of the Rules Committee and he worked with them.

AK: I believe that was the first time he had been on Rules. Did he enjoy that committee?

MH: I don't think he particularly enjoyed it, but he wanted to do it because Cherberg had always been there. They were going to take it away from the lieutenant governor after the 1988 election.

AK: I understand that the lieutenant governor being a member of Rules was just a tradition, that it wasn't actually a statute or written down anywhere.

MH: That's right. He was the presiding officer, but just another Republican member of the committee. So, I don't think he enjoyed it.

Another thing that was quite different for him, that he complained about several times to me, was that when he had served as a senator, the Rules Committee would actually debate the bills. Now, there is almost no debate on the merits of a bill. What the majority wants, they get through the Rules and that's it. He wanted to do the job, but he realized that it was not like it was when he was a senator. Things had changed.

AK: He must have considered that a setback.

MH: Yes.

AK: Were there other ways that the Senate had changed from his time that he thought were either improvements or not so good?

MH: Most of them not so good.

AK: Was this the beginning of a more

acrimonious time?

MH: Yes, the acrimoniousness, the partisanship, the feeling that the quality of the senators is not the highest. There are few lawyers now, and lawyers usually know how to get along and work things out.

AK: To compromise?

MH: Yes, compromise. He felt that so many people came here out of being community activists on one issue. They became well known in their district and they used that, and then ran for the Senate. He regretted that.

There are about seven or eight times as many lobbyists as there used to be, because we have taught people how to lobby. We've told people, "You just go down to Olympia and really raise Cain or threaten people, and this is how you get things done."

So, they were all over the place. There has been a loss of civility. There were changes that he felt were not good.

AK: The Republican Party itself is changing during these years. There are more of the one-issue candidates. The religious right is coming into the picture in a way that would, I would think, make a Joel Pritchard-style Republican nervous. Was he becoming less at home in his own party?

MH: Maybe a little bit.

AK: The era of Dan Evans is over with?

MH: That's right. This is true, but he noticed the change in the Democratic Party, too, as it moved further to the left. You have people who are sometimes one- or two-issue people there, too.

AK: So, is the centering weakening?

MH: The center is weakening, and this is what he noticed. He understood that in a statewide election, a person who has been at least branded a far-right person can't win in the state of Washington.

AK: You can certainly win a local race.

MH: The center, the centrist Republicans have a better chance winning statewide, because it's primarily a Democratic state.

But Joel also changed his mind on other things. He was a strong supporter of women's choice, and was the author of the original legislation. But pro-choice people, the strong advocates, bothered him after a while, because of what he felt was their single-issue focus. They did not try to see the other side of it. In other words, to himself, he had mixed emotions about it. He wanted choice, but he hated to see it be so politicized.

AK: The issue of abortion rights has become extremely polarized, unfortunately. Each side demonizing the other.

MH: Polarized, yes. And he did not like that.

Another thing that he changed his mind on was campaign finance reform. He did Initiative 134, which was adopted in the election of 1992. Joel had quite a bit to do with that, though I know other people have claimed the credit.

AK: He claimed to have "led the charge." And that was so uncharacteristic for him to make such a statement, to take the credit like that. It rather stood out, in that regard.

MH: He did do a lot to raise money for this effort, to go to all the editorial boards in the state and try to do that. This was an effort to make it so that money didn't have such a dominant position in the campaigns.

Now, since then, there have been ways that they have been working their way around that. But that was a real effort. Joel began to believe within the last year or two that there probably isn't a whole lot you can do about this. That no matter what kind of campaign finance laws you pass, an incumbent still has a tremendous advantage. I think he began to believe that putting limits—limiting spending, public financing, all that stuff—as long as an incumbent can send out newsletters and mail, they have a tremendous advantage. Unless that is dealt with, these other

things are really peripheral. Any type of change in campaign finance law isn't going to work that well—in Congress or at the state level.

AK: And yet those newsletters are very important to bring citizens into the process.

MH: I don't think they are at all. I think they're primarily—this is my opinion from seeing it for fourteen years in Congress and almost eight years here—that of the people who use newsletters, it is almost the case that the use of newsletters is proportionate to your effectiveness. The more newsletters you use in Congress, usually means you aren't doing very much. The information that is there is very superficial and not very important. That's true at the state level. I used to read all the newsletters from the state senators, and I thought it was a terrible waste of taxpayers' money. But until that is dealt with, the incumbent has a tremendous advantage, because many people feel they are getting good information and they are usually not. These are just puff pieces.

AK: Yet Joel used newsletters, and they were actually quite good. At least, they were useful for my purposes of tracking his activities and interests.

MH: He did use these letters from Congress. And I think they're pretty good, yes.

AK: They weren't bombastic, or full of a lot of empty photos of shaking hands and whatnot.

MH: I know. Actually, Congress has rules, much more strict rules than the state Legislature here has, over how you can talk about yourself, and the pictures you can use.

AK: Did you both develop this negative attitude about newsletters as you saw how they were being used? Would this account for Joel downplaying those newsletters when I asked about them later? He seemed uncomfortable with me using them as a source, perhaps because of this view?

MH: We both had that view. Newsletters are printed for a political purpose. Look, it's a

wonderful thing. It's worth hundreds of thousands of dollars a year to a congressman to have newsletters available. It's a marvelous re-election tool.

You can say people like them. However, most people throw them away. But, even if they throw them away, all you have to do is have your name on there—they are great for name identification.

AK: On the theory that if you keep seeing the name, eventually it sinks in?

MH: Almost every member of Congress and every legislator will tell you that these are good things, that they want to stay in contact, but what that means is that it's a tremendous advantage for the incumbent.

AK: Okay, let's explore this a bit. If newsletters are not a good source of information, what would be a good source if people wanted to keep up with what Congress is doing, or what their Congress person is doing? How would you do that? The press does not exactly cover things in a reliable way.

MH: The press doesn't either because the press is lazy. But I think you do have things you can do now. You have the *Congressional Quarterly*, which does publish everything.

AK: Would that cover individual member's actions in Congress?

MH: Yes, they tell how they vote.

AK: But not the thinking behind the vote?

MH: That's right. You can't do it. But what I'm saying is, that the newsletter view is not the accurate one, either. It isn't even close.

In some ways this would be an argument—getting back to the argument—that probably there should be no restrictions on campaign money. That's how you get people to have a chance to replace someone. It's almost like that. In other words, what Joel was concerned about was, even though you put limits on things, the incumbent has such an overwhelming advantage. So if people

want to stay there forever, it is often possible, unless there's a wave against one party, then things are swept out. That makes a difference.

AK: For Initiative 134, what was his position? What was he advocating with that effort?

MH: Initiative 134 would allow a \$500 per election contribution limit to candidates for the legislature from political action committees, corporations, unions, and individuals.

AK: It lumped them all together under the same rule? An individual was the same as a PAC?

MH: Yes. Five hundred dollars from each. And it allows a \$1,000 contribution if you were running for statewide office. It prohibited the use of taxpayer funds for political campaigns, and restricts state-funded mailings by incumbent legislators.

AK: This last part was aimed at newsletters?

MH: A little bit. It's not too much, though. And it prohibits legislators from raising funds during legislative sessions. That was a good thing because there was so much of that going on when we got here. For instance, the opening day of the Legislature, people would come around with checks.

AK: That doesn't look good.

MH: No, it doesn't look good. That stopped. Anyway, it wasn't that bad, but I think Joel began to think that, hey, maybe nothing is really going to work. I mean, this is such a gray area. What I'm saying is that, I don't know, as long as you have an incumbent, I don't care what you do in Congress, they're not going to do things that—

AK: That harm their positions?

MH: No. They're going to send out newsletters. Until you take care of that, I don't think it makes much difference how much money you spend.

AK: How did Joel feel about the issue of “soft

money” that goes to the party?

MH: I don't think he really cared that much about it. I don't think that's a big deal, either. One of the things he liked about Initiative 134 is that it allowed money to go to political parties. What has happened through the last twenty years is that political parties have almost been destroyed. People pick on them and everything else. Actually, political parties should be developed. He felt Initiative 134 helped do that. The money could go to the parties and the parties could distribute the money.

AK: Would that give the parties a greater hand in choosing the candidates?

MH: Yes.

AK: Joel spent so much time trying to build up the Republican Party and get good candidates.

MH: Yes, at the legislative level.

AK: I imagine, as politicians become more individualistic and less party oriented, there is less accountability.

MH: Well, there isn't. And you can choose whatever party you want to run in, but then if you have the backing of a certain group, that's all you need. So the groups became more important than the political parties.

AK: What was the outcome of the Initiative 134 campaign?

MH: It passed—seventy-three percent of the vote. But what I'm getting at, it wasn't the final answer either.

AK: I guess nothing ever is. Who worked with him on this campaign?

MH: I did.

AK: Did you have a group that you organized for this effort?

MH: There was a group, but it was not a large group. For instance, Boeing wouldn't take a position on it. The pro group didn't have much money—what they had was a great ballot title.

AK: When Joel said he “led the charge,” was he the highest state official to step up to the plate on this issue?

MH: Yes.

AK: Did he go around and give speeches and use his name to legitimize the cause?

MH: That's right.

AK: After your victory, did you have a party?

MH: No, I don't think so. We just went on, and by the way, less money was spent in 1994 than was spent in 1992 or 1990. I believe in 1996 we're getting back up there again. I guess it isn't the money that is important, but it doesn't seem to make a lot of difference. And there are going to be other reforms—the governor and everybody, the League of Women Voters, they're talking about it. I suspect that no matter what happens, it's not going to work. The incumbents are going to win most of the time if they run.

AK: Well, it costs so much money to run a campaign, with the cost of media like television. And that won't change.

Were there other initiative campaigns that Joel got involved in while he was lieutenant governor?

MH: Yes, the gambling initiative in 1996. Joel was fundamentally opposed to all gambling.

AK: Yes, that's been a constant theme throughout his career. What was this particular effort—what was his role this time?

MH: He was co-chair with Norm Maleng of this group that tried to defeat slot machines and Indian casinos.

AK: And were they successful?

MH: Oh yes, overwhelmingly successful. But it seems like gambling is one of those things, too, that won't go away. I suspect since gambling interests have a lot of money and are getting into politics, we'll probably have more gambling in Washington State, much more gambling.

AK: That's the trend he was always against. Joel would say that gambling is one thing, but it's when gamblers get involved in trying to influence state politics, that's when it gets really bad.

MH: Yes, it does.

AK: So, again, would Joel give speeches, or what?

MH: Some, yes.

AK: One last initiative that he was involved with, this time with Jean Gardner as co-chair, was the gun safety initiative in 1997. That one was not successful. Did he talk with you about his feelings about that issue?

MH: He thought it was a good initiative, but he was not feeling well from his cancer at that time, but I think he went to most of the meetings. He passed away before the election, but he was for it. He realized he was there just as a name to be put on the initiative. He mentioned that, but he thought it was a worthy initiative, but it did not pass.

AK: What were his personal feelings about guns?

MH: The initiative had to do with trigger locks, I believe, and safety. He thought it was fine, and he believed in handgun control. He understood that the other side had an argument, too.

Let me give you an example. The most heavily armed people in the United States live in North Dakota. They have more guns per household there, and yet have a very, very low crime rate.

AK: Well, there are not very many people there. I believe the crime rate has something to do with the density of population.

MH: Well, we don't know. There are all kinds of

correlations with crime rate. Joel realized that there don't seem to be final answers on some of these things.

AK: He once said to me that he knew about guns having been in World War II, and having had to use guns, and the power of what that's like. That's the only thing he said, was something about how he understood about gun use from that experience, and that therefore he was supportive of this initiative.

MH: That's right. He didn't like them. He didn't own a gun or anything like that. He didn't like them. But there were friends of his that own guns, and his father liked to hunt.

AK: Yes, his father was a hunter, but Joel said that it wasn't quite his thing.

Besides working on initiatives, let's get back to our discussion of the duties of a lieutenant governor. I know he had a friendly relationship with the two governors that he worked with, Governor Gardner and Governor Lowry, but I believe he was disappointed that they didn't turn to him for more help, that they didn't really use him in ways that would have been helpful to them as he saw it. What had he envisioned doing for them?

MH: Working in cooperation with them in any way that they might feel he could be helpful. But they did not ask him his advice on things, they kept him at arm's length. Both of them did, but his relationship with them was very cordial. Joel felt that part of this was the staff doing this, because they feel they can control people or something like that. But that was all right with him if they didn't want to do it.

There would be people in the press who would talk off the record to Joel about this. They couldn't believe it. They didn't understand it. They would bring it up.

AK: Was this different, I mean, how had it been before with Lieutenant Governor Cherberg?

MH: I think it was to a certain extent. Under Cherberg, I think that Spellman worked with

Cherberg.

Another thing that Joel realized being lieutenant governor, was that governors needed a succession policy. In other words, what we've seen in other states is, when a governor dies in office or is removed, and the lieutenant governor takes over, it's often a disaster. There is no easy transition. Often, it's just terrible. People lose their jobs, everything. It's just awful.

What should happen, and you'd think the press would pick it up, is that governors need a succession policy if something happens to them. They need to work it out with whomever might succeed them, because you never know when it's going to happen. Most politicians feel they're immortal anyway, so they don't have to do that.

AK: Sounds like some adolescents: "Of course I'm not going to die."

MH: Of course not, it wouldn't be fair!

AK: "I'm not finished with my job, they need me too much."

MH: "They need me," yes. But we knew two or three lieutenant governors who became governor, and it was awful. Even if they were from the same party, because there hadn't been any work done about how to transition.

AK: Did he ever approach someone with this concern?

MH: Oh, no. I'm sure he felt they would be upset. Not only that, but he could have helped them with some of the problems they'd had, I suspect with Governor Lowry more than Governor Gardner. Gardner happened to hold office during a great economic time, so things didn't make a lot of difference. When Lowry became governor, there was a downturn.

No one asked, but Joel had a good relationship with them.

AK: I suppose it helped that he had no designs on their job?

MH: I think that was helpful, yes.

AK: With some earlier Washington State lieutenant governors, there were reputedly all kinds of political games—silly stuff, really. If the governor had to leave the state on business, the lieutenant governor would try to pull something off, for instance. But by Joel's time, we seem long past that kind of thing. He did pledge not to descend to tricks of that sort.

MH: When the governor was out of the state, whatever the governor's office wanted or asked him to do, he would do.

AK: Would these be mostly ceremonial type things? He was actually acting governor fairly often.

MH: He would fill in lots of times, for ribbon cutting, speeches.

AK: Would he go over with either Governor Gardner or Lowry what was to be said, or could he make up his own speech for the occasion?

MH: He would do it himself, or they would let him know early about what they wanted done. Sometimes it was a ceremony here, or some event, or some group that had come to Olympia to see the governor and he wasn't going to be here, and Joel would talk with them.

AK: And did he enjoy that part of his duties?

MH: Most of it, let's put it that way. Some groups were sometimes very difficult to deal with, not politically, but they sometimes demanded things that were unreasonable.

AK: Did Joel think that the governor and lieutenant governor should run together as a team—that the office should be more like the vice president's role?

MH: Yes, he came to that conclusion.

AK: Did that grow out of this experience of not working closely with the governors?

MH: Probably he felt they should change the

constitution so that they would run as a team. They would be much more effective, and the lieutenant governor would work for the governor and be more supportive. But he also knew there would be little chance of that happening.

AK: Did he ever try to do anything with this idea?

MH: No. He would tell senators, but there are always many senators who would like to be lieutenant governor, and so they would never do that.

AK: On the contrary side, did he see that there was some merit in not being a team?

MH: No. You go off on your own direction. If Joel had been ambitious, he would have been a real threat to these governors. I have no doubt that Joel could have been elected governor in 1992, when Lowry ran. If he had decided to run, he could have probably won the Republican primary and been elected governor.

AK: Did that ever cross his mind?

MH: No, but, also, he was a good friend of Sid Morrison's who was running for governor. If Joel had wanted to, he probably could have been elected governor. But he didn't want to be governor.

AK: Do you think Mike Lowry was aware of that?

MH: Oh yes. He had told Lowry that. And people knew that, because I remember when Governor Gardner announced that he was not going to run in 1992, the press called Joel and he said, "No, I'm not running for governor. Absolutely not."

AK: But it was in other people's minds?

MH: Yes. And there were people around, major business people, who wanted Joel to run.

AK: He would have made a good governor.

MH: Yes, I think he would have made a good governor, but he didn't want to be governor. He

wouldn't have minded running, but he wouldn't have wanted to serve. He liked to campaign, but he wouldn't want to be governor.

AK: What were his favorite parts about being lieutenant governor? What did he feel most in tune with and enjoy doing?

MH: I think he liked being around the Legislature, being part of things. He liked talking with them, sharing stories with them. He liked to be given problems to solve, like working behind the scenes to get something adopted or something killed. He liked to do things like that without anyone knowing it, about what happened. These are the kind of things he liked to do.

He liked being with other politicians. He actually enjoyed it. He was very much a people person. He very much liked being with other people. Joel did not like being alone.

AK: He was a very gregarious sort of person.

MH: Yes, very gregarious. He liked being around people. And it didn't make a whole lot of difference what party they were, but he liked being around political people. And he liked talking to members of the press and other people, certain people that he liked very much.

AK: What did he do for recreation during these years, to keep himself fresh?

MH: He played a lot of tennis. I think that was his main recreation.

AK: I know he played with Governor Gardner, but I don't know if Governor Lowry played tennis.

MH: No, he did not. Joel liked to play with people who were a little bit better than he was. He really liked to play tennis, and I suspect that if he had been a great tennis player, he certainly would have done that instead of going into politics.

AK: Those were the things he liked to do, then. What were the parts of the office that he enjoyed less, that he was less enthusiastic about?

MH: That's very hard for me to say because he had a great sense of duty—that you do what you're supposed to do and never complain about it. It's a very old-fashioned sense that there are certain things in the job description, what comes with it, you have to do it. Those are your chores, he would say. You don't complain about it.

AK: Well, not that he complained about then, but were there some aspects that were more chore-like than, say, creative?

MH: Yes. I think Joel believed there didn't need to be as many bills as were passed, as were adopted.

AK: So, quality over quantity?

MH: There was lots of quantity. He thought that the bills were not discussed that much. That they didn't understand the situation, that the more laws you create, the more laws you have to create to fix the laws you've created.

AK: Would that be his frustration about the tendency to micro-manage, as he called it?

MH: Yes, and I think, also, the rules of legislation. Sometimes he would have liked to move it along, not go through with the formalities and various things.

I will say that he did not like two or three of the traditions—one tradition being that you had various princesses, apple blossom or dairy, or whatever, who speak to the Legislature every year. It had nothing to do with anything, but that had been a tradition that had been established, so he did it.

AK: Again, comparing him with his predecessor, Lieutenant Governor Cherberg had actually become a kind of trade ambassador for the state, and had become quite well known in that role. Did Joel carry on that role? He certainly had the background to do that with all his international experience and connections. Did he make significant trips for the state?

MH: He did take a few. But he didn't think that

was the way you developed business—that junkets didn’t work. He never went overseas at state expense. He did go to China to assist the Port of Tacoma, but the state did not pay for it.

He did not believe that was the best way to develop international trade. International trade is based on a lot of things besides that. He felt it was based on the kind of schools you have, the education system, your location in the world, your tax structure, your resources. In the long run, that’s how you develop economically. It will sort of take care of itself, and you can’t go around offering special deals to this group and that group. He felt that was pandering to them, by offering tax breaks. He really didn’t agree with that. He felt that is not the way you do economic development. But if you have roads, schools, a quality of life—

AK: If you take care of your infrastructure—

MH: And some of it is by accident of history—where you’re located. If you’re closer to Asia, you’ll probably have more trade with Asia than if you’re a long way from Asia, those kinds of things.

AK: If he didn’t travel much then, was he still involved in trade issues?

MH: Yes, he would do things to help trade. If Boeing or Weyerhaeuser would bring somebody in to see him, a government official from somewhere, or somebody else, he would certainly talk to them.

But he didn’t believe in state-sponsored trips. Part of that came from his experience in Congress, in traveling on the Foreign Affairs Committee, where he met with government officials all over the world. He came to the conclusion that having the states running around all over the world was not very effective. In addition, there were studies that show that that’s probably true.

Anyway, it’s still fun to do.

AK: Were there other ways to promote the state or serve the state diplomatically that fell to him?

MH: He met with lots of other foreign dignitaries, officials. The governor’s office liked to have these people talk to Joel, because Joel usually knew a

lot about their nation. The governor’s office, which has an international affairs component, often wanted Joel to greet them. He usually had been to their nation, so they liked to talk with him and discuss things with him. He had lots of foreign contacts.

Did that do anything for the economic development of the state? I doubt if it had much influence, but at least people came through here and they would always come to see him. We had lots of foreign dignitaries from all over the world coming to our office.

AK: Did he enjoy keeping up with the international scene?

MH: He loved it. He actually liked talking to these people.

AK: Foreign affairs was his passion.

MH: He even liked even talking to school kids about foreign affairs, too. He would spend a lot of time going over intricate details. He was very good with them.

AK: Would groups come to his office on field trips?

MH: Yes. They would stand up or sit down, and then he would talk and they would ask questions. He would talk and he loved to answer their questions.

AK: That sounds very giving.

MH: He liked that, and it was something he knew and understood. He liked to explain state government and foreign affairs.

DON BRAZIER

Don Brazier was interviewed on January 14, 1999. Mr. Brazier, now retired, has been active in politics in the state of Washington for more than forty years. Trained as an attorney, he represented the Fourteenth District as a Republican representative in the 1967 session. He worked as the

chief aide to Attorney General Slade Gorton until he was appointed as chair of the Utilities and Transportation Commission in 1970. He also served as an Evans appointee on the State Power and Energy Facilities Siting Council in 1973. Later, Mr. Brazier served on the Public Disclosure Commission. He also has worked as a lobbyist for many years in Olympia. He is currently working on his second volume of a history of the Washington State Legislature.

Besides being an "Evans-Pritchard Republican," Mr. Brazier had a long-standing personal and family connection with Joel Pritchard.

"My uncle and Joel's father were associated in business for over fifty years. My first recollection of Joel is when I was about five or six years old, and my dad used to take me and my younger brother to watch Joel play soccer and softball for the West Queen Anne grade school teams in Seattle, where I was in school several years behind Joel. Later, when I was a teenager, Joel was a counselor when I was a camper at Camp Orkila, the Seattle YMCA camp. Prior to that my family had spent the better part of a couple of summers, living in one of the homes belonging to the Pritchards on Bainbridge Island."

Don Brazier: I thought Joel was wonderful. He was always one of my personal heroes. As far back as I can remember, Joey Pritchard was the big guy. I thought the sun rose and set on Joel Pritchard from the time I was five years old until today.

Anne Kilgannon: Did he pay attention to you as a little kid?

DB: He always paid attention. I never remember him not being friendly, even when I was a little guy and he was a big guy.

Don and Joel saw each other periodically, kept in touch through their families, and worked together during the Evans gubernatorial campaign of 1963, and then again while serving in the Legislature in 1967, when Don was in the House and Joel was in the Senate.

DB: In 1957, I had moved to Yakima and was

practicing law over there. I was asked to be the Yakima County chairman of the Dan Evans for Governor Committee in 1963. I took on that assignment, and therein renewed my friendship with Joel.

One time, in the summer of 1964, Joel arrived at my house in Yakima on a late afternoon with a carload of fellows, all of whom I think worked with him at the envelope company, to go doorbelling for us for Dan in Yakima. Of course, we had our workers there, but that gave us our first introduction to doorbelling in the Evans campaign.

AK: Did he train you in how to do it?

DB: I had done it before in my own campaign for the city council, but this was just sort of a help. Nobody else in our organization had done it, and this was to give us a push and get us going.

AK: I know he went around the state teaching people how to doorbell.

DB: Yes. He came to my house and we had a bunch of people there and he had some fellows to help us and gave us our instructions, and everybody went doorbelling.

In addition to being active in the Evans campaign, in my more conservative days I was a fairly strong supporter of Barry Goldwater. In 1964, when we went to the state convention, Dan and Joel kept pushing me out in front so that people would know they had somebody for Goldwater in their operation. Most of them were for Rockefeller. They felt Goldwater was too conservative, but I came from a very conservative community and I thought the world of Barry Goldwater, even though his politics are somewhat to the right of mine. Over the years, in the later times, I've basically considered myself an Evans-Pritchard Republican.

Don then recalled, "I'd see Joel from time to time. Having known him all my life, we were always friendly. In the late 1960s, I brought my family over twice from Yakima and we spent the summer vacation on Bainbridge Island. During that time, we went over to the Pritchard's on several

occasions. I recall playing Pickle-Ball and playing on the beach with the kids.”

“I’d see Joel periodically during the time he was in Congress. My greatest recollection is from the last year he was in Congress. My law partner and I did lobbying for about ninety percent of our practice—Tom in Washington D.C. and I stayed in Olympia. In 1984, Tom took a semi-sabbatical, and I got a call one day to go to D.C.”

DB: So, I spent two weeks in Washington, D.C. and I didn’t know what I was doing. I didn’t have the foggiest notion, except I was trying to get legislation for my client, Washington Mutual Savings Bank. Whatever I was supposed to do got done, and I attribute that fact not to anything I did, but to the help of Slade Gorton, who was in the Senate, and Joel and Mike Lowry and their staffs in the House. So, I came home a hero, and to this day I don’t know what it was I did, but it got done.

During that time, I saw Joel every day, and went out one, possibly two evenings to his house for dinner. During that period of time, I had several serious discussions with him, wanting him not to keep his commitment to only stay twelve years. But he’d made the commitment.

AK: Was it a case of: “I said I’d do it, therefore I’m doing it.”

DB: Yes. He actually stayed back there and semi-lobbied, but he didn’t like it.

AK: When he was leaving Congress, did he know what he wanted to do next?

DB: No, not at least as far as I know, he didn’t. He just decided he was leaving Congress.

He worked for Bogle and Gates, the Seattle law firm, and I don’t know much about that relationship, except that I think the relationship was fine. I think he got along fine with the firm, but he just didn’t care much for what he was doing.

He’d always joked about running for lieutenant governor, and when it became obvious that John Cherberg was not going to run— And, of course, Joel had known John since high school,

he’d been the coach in high school. I think, though they were of different parties, Johnny was really kind of proud of the fact that Joel was running. I don’t think it disappointed him in the least when Joel won.

I’d see him fairly regularly, and it seemed to me, as time went on, we spent more and more time together. I was lobbying until I retired in 1992, and I was working on my history of the legislature. I was really working on helping him with his ’92 campaign. We talked about how the legislators got to Olympia one hundred years ago, and so forth. Joel decided that he really wasn’t going to campaign, but that he was going to come across the state, down the Snake River to the Columbia, and down the Columbia to Astoria, and then up to Olympia.

He would start at Clarkston and then he was going to duplicate how the legislators from Pacific County got here in the early territorial days. Basically, they walked up the Long Beach peninsula, boated across to about where Tokeland now is, walked across the peninsula, took a boat across Grays Harbor to the mouth of the Chehalis River, and canoed up the Chehalis River to the Black River. And then up the Black River to Black Lake, down Black Lake, and walked down to the Deschutes, down here and then into town.

The first thing we did in laying the plans was a friend of Joel’s flew us over the course. We got in a plane at Boeing Field in Seattle, we flew down to Long Beach and then up the Columbia and the Snake, all the way to Lewiston. Then we turned around and flew back. I recollect that we then made the trip in the first week of August. At any rate, it was the same week as the Republican convention in 1992, and that was done with malice of forethought. Joel did not want to go to the convention.

AK: Why not?

DB: Remember, this state was pretty much under control of the far right. Joel was a lot kinder person than I am, but he did not have a lot of use for that.

Joel and his son, Frank, drove, and I drove to the Tri-Cities, and then caught a ride up to Lewiston and met them there. We stayed overnight, and he’d arranged this jet boat to take

us down the river.

AK: How big was the boat, like a big motor boat—a cabin cruiser, with a little kitchen and all?

DB: I'm going to say it was maybe twenty or twenty-four feet long. There was not a kitchen, just a cabin, and it went like heck.

AK: Did you have a little fanfare when you set off?

DB: No, we just went. We got up very, very early on Monday morning and went down to the boat. He was going to see the media every place he stopped. It was just something he wanted to do. But every place he stopped, he saw the media and that got him the attention.

There was Frank and Joel and me and the skipper. The skipper's wife and a friend of hers had this great, big, pickup truck and they were going to follow us along the course. The first plan was that we would meet at Boyer State Park up the Snake River for lunch. It was a beautiful day—it was one of the most memorable experiences of my life.

It was August, and it was very hot. We got up to Boyer State Park and the ladies were there. They had this gourmet lunch laid out for us. When we got done with lunch our next point was at Lyon's Ferry. Joel, through politics or somebody, had arranged for us to stay at a wheat ranch just outside of Washtucna, a place to stay overnight. We were going to meet the ladies there about four o'clock.

It was quite a trip down the river, but even driving this big pickup rig, they should have been there a good hour ahead of us. We got down to Lyon's Ferry about three-thirty or quarter of four in the afternoon, and no sign of the women. Time goes by, time goes by. Five o'clock, after five, and the skipper, whose name now escapes me, gets a phone call. It was his wife and her lady friend. When we had left them at lunch and gotten in the boat, he had put the keys to the pickup in the pocket of his trousers. They were back where we started.

AK: And how many hours' drive back was that?

DB: This was five o'clock in the afternoon by now. So, we've got to figure out just what in the world we're going to do. In the meantime, the farmer who we were going to stay with had shown up, and he's got his own private plane. We're trying to figure out what in the world we're going to do, and these guys are planning how they're going to fly over this place and drop the keys in a bag. So, they go back and forth and back and forth, and after about half an hour of this, or an hour of this, it's determined there's a landing field about two hundred yards from where these gals are.

So, the skipper and the owner take off and they're gone for hours. By this time, Frank and Joel and I sit around and have a beer and we wait. And we wait, and by this time it's getting dark, and on this little landing strip there are no lights. We're at the house by this time—a huge wheat farm. It's getting dusk and they still haven't come back. We've been up since four-thirty or five o'clock in the morning, we've had lunch at noon. By this time it's approaching nine o'clock at night, and we're hungrier than hell, and it's getting dark. Just about the time the light is fading, here comes the plane, and it lands. It's got the owner, the two women, and the food for dinner.

AK: What did they do with the truck?

DB: The skipper is driving the truck. By the time he gets there, it's about midnight. So that's the story of our first day on the boat.

The next day we went to Pasco and it was fairly uneventful. We went through all four of these big locks on the Snake River. One of the amazing things is when it's one hundred degrees out, which it was, and you boat into this lock and you drop eighty feet, in that eighty feet I'm sure the temperature dropped easily twenty degrees. It's hot as can be up there, but by the time you get down, it's pleasantly cool.

AK: Are you in the shade down there?

DB: It's shady, and in all this water, the heat's just gone away. Then you pull back out of the lock and all of a sudden it'd like a steam bath

again. But that was a very interesting experience. We got to the Tri-Cities uneventfully.

That evening we had a small fundraiser, and we went to the editorial board at the newspaper. Of course, this is one of the jokes between brother Frank and me in that campaign in '92. There were only two newspapers in the state that didn't endorse Joel. One was the *Vancouver Columbian*, and brother Frank had accompanied Joel to the interview at the *Columbian*. The other was the *Tri-City Herald*, and I accompanied Joel there.

Joel really wanted me to go on, but frankly, I had my car in the Tri-Cities, and also I'd had enough. Joel went all the way to Astoria.

AK: Did his son stay with him?

DB: Frank stayed with him, and drove—I think he had a car. He left him for awhile and met him at Astoria. I don't recall.

They stopped every place along the way. They went into Goldendale and Vancouver and Longview. Then they got to Astoria and went into Long Beach. I think he visited with Senator Snyder when he was in Long Beach, and then came across, and came as far up the Chehalis River as he could.

AK: Was he canoeing by now?

DB: No, it wasn't canoeing. He'd hired a guy to take him up because the river was way down at that time.

The final event was really early in the morning a day or so later. We put him in a canoe—not actually a canoe, but a kayak—and he came across Capitol Lake in this thing, paddling, and met us all down here at the park, and we had breakfast for the campaign. We got really good press out of it.

Then he went all the way up the I-5 corridor to Blaine, and that was his campaign. That was 1992.

AK: Was it pretty safe to take things easy? Was there much competition that campaign?

DB: In '92 his opponent was not too well known. It wasn't a real serious campaign.

Now, in the aftermath of '92, in '93, we canoed down the Black River. We started out at Littlerock and went down the Black River, which is hardly a river. We're going along in these two canoes, and all of a sudden, the doggone river ends. It just runs out of water. So, we had to get out, haul our canoes clear across some farmer's field, and tote them to the highway. About a mile down the road, we got back in the river. We went on that day to a place outside of Rochester.

The next year we went back, got in the canoes where we'd gotten out, and went down, I'm going to say, another fifteen miles. That was a really interesting trip that day. We had planned to eventually do the Chehalis all the way to Grays Harbor. But by the next year, Joel wasn't doing so well, and we could never get a date that fit. We got as far as Malone, where we got out of the river the second time. I intend to continue that trip some day and get out to the end.

The other thing Joel wanted to do, having done the Snake, he wanted to go to the Canadian border and do the Columbia, or do the Okanogan, but we were never able to get a time frame that we could do that in.

In 1992, Joel's marriage was breaking up, and so I said to him, "You don't want to commute every day to Seattle," so he moved in with me. For the next four years, when he was in Olympia, he stayed with me. So during the legislative sessions, we were together every single day of the week. We'd sit for hours and just BS about everything: politics, old times, our families having been in the same business.

Right up until the time he didn't run again. I think that was not an easy decision for him, not to run again. I think he was worried, as we all were, about what he was going to do.

SID SNYDER

Senator Sid Snyder was interviewed April 29, 1998 in his office adjacent to the Senate chambers. Long considered an Olympia institution, Senator Snyder began his career in 1949 as an elevator operator for the House of Representatives. He was later a bill clerk, promoted in 1951 to bill room supervisor, and then in 1957 became the assistant

chief clerk of the House. He held that position until 1969, when he then became secretary of the Senate. "I retired in 1988, never thought I would be back," he recalled, but the senator who represented his home district died in 1990, and Sid Snyder was appointed to the seat. He has been representing the Nineteenth District in the Senate ever since.

Senator Snyder recalled: I remember when Joel Pritchard was a member of the freshman class of 1959. He won the '58 election, along with several other bright and shining stars, you might say, including Slade Gorton, who later was attorney general and is now our U.S. senator.

I think Joel was a standout from the very word go. There was no question about him being a Republican, and he was partisan, but he worked to get things done and accomplish things. He worked both sides of the aisle.

After I became secretary of the Senate, he was a member for a short while before he went to Congress. He promised he would serve only six terms, twelve years, and that's what he did. I, certainly, am one person who wished he would have served longer, because I think he did a good job of representing the state, even though I'm from the opposite political party. I guess one reason I'd like to have seen Joel stay in Congress is because seniority means so much there. After twelve years you're just starting to gain some seniority, and then to lose that and start all over with somebody else, I think the state would have been the beneficiary with him continuing in Congress.

Also, I know Joel was considered for the appointment for the United States Senate when Henry Jackson died. In fact, I understand that Governor Spellman preferred to appoint Joel over Dan Evans, but the polls showed that Dan Evans was much more widely known in the state than Joel Pritchard. And so, he appointed Evans.

Sid Snyder: When we talk about his days as lieutenant governor, I was elected in 1990, so I was here during six years of his presiding. I always felt that Joel was extremely fair in making his rulings, like following in the footsteps of Lieutenant Governor Cherberg.

Anne Kilgannon: Can you compare them as to style for me?

SS: Their styles were a lot different. If I had one criticism of Joel, it is that as far as being a presiding officer and operating the place, there was quite a contrast. John Cherberg ran a very dignified place and kept decorum. Not that Joel didn't keep decorum in the place, but—and I say this with all due respect for Joel—that he was a lousy presiding officer. Now, I don't mean that his rulings were bad or anything like that, but he just didn't seem to really follow the script. He would kind of go off and do his own thing a lot of times. I know it was frustrating to the people who worked with him on the rostrum, too.

AK: Could you give me an example of what that would mean?

SS: I think that often times, when he went to refer to the calendar, he might say, "the calendar," or he might say, "the journal," or he might say, "the script." He might use several different words.

AK: So, this would cause people to be a little off balance? Not quite knowing what he was talking about?

SS: Yes. He knew, but I just don't think he really was that concerned about being that technically accurate. He did a good job of expediting things, and he was very fair in recognizing both sides of the aisle. One kind of an unwritten rule is when leadership stands up, even though there's other people trying to get the floor before that, you recognize the leadership on both sides of the aisle. He was very good in doing those things.

On a rare occasion, the lieutenant governor can vote—he can vote on anything except final passage, that means procedural motions or breaking a tie on amendments, and I remember one time I had an amendment in which there was a tie and he voted in my favor. The amendment was adopted and, so, I was indeed grateful to him.

AK: Then he wasn't a partisan player, necessarily?

SS: No, and here again, Joel was partisan; I'm partisan, but I think Joel came to try to accomplish things and to get things done.

Back in the early seventies when he was a member, one of the things he helped, in a bipartisan manner, was that he was a sponsor of the abortion legislation. I knew he drew some flack from some of the members of his party. He wasn't too enamored in later years, I know, with some of the right-wing elements of his party, and he spoke out that way.

AK: That was something that interested me. He had been in the Senate himself, from 1966 to 1970, and the Senate is said to have changed dramatically from his time then to when he came back as lieutenant governor in 1989. The whole tone of the place, at least according to the press on it, suggested that it was much more partisan, that there were more special interests, more one-issue voters. Could you address that perception?

SS: I think that's very true. Senator Prince and I, we want to try to do something to get back more civility to the process. I think Joel would have been—and was—an ally to try to accomplish that. We think we're elected to govern, not to rule. Now, it seems to be to rule. I'm not blaming Democrats or Republicans for that; it's been something that has transpired.

In 1963 there was a coalition in the House. A half dozen Democrats joined with forty-eight Republicans and took over control and elected a Democratic coalitionist as Speaker. The rules started to change after that, where the protection of the minority wasn't as great. Here again, I'm sure that's one thing that Joel didn't like.

It has become more partisan. It used to be that when Joel first came in '59, that both parties had a part in putting the budget together. And if there was a necessity for a tax increase, each party came up with a proportionate amount of votes to come up with the fifty in the House and twenty-five in the Senate.

Joel worked to accomplish things and get things done. I use the abortion issue—whether you're pro or against, he did things he believed in, and he worked for them, and he didn't do it in a bitter way. There seems to be a lot of bitterness,

these days, around the Legislature. It's the control and the power to do things.

In fact, the Dan Evans and Joel Pritchards may have a tough time getting Republican nominations in some of the districts in which they ran, because there is the extreme—and I hate to use the word right-wing, but more conservative members—and I don't know if Dan Evans could get the nomination for governor in the Republican Party today. With the open primary the way we have it, I don't know if Joel could for lieutenant governor.

AK: It is interesting to contrast the two periods. Were you aware of how Joel felt about the changes, and what he might have done to address some of the trends he deplored? Joel was, as you say, of the old school of politicians who practiced civility and compromise—give and take. He did comment that the Senate had lost some of those qualities, and that he tried to bring them back. What could a lieutenant governor do along those lines?

SS: Not really a lot. I think it goes back to the membership and trying to work together more. I think Joel is the type of person that regardless if they're Democrat or Republican, that's the person I'd like to have representing me in government and the Legislature.

There was no question about his fairness in his rulings. He didn't make political rulings from the rostrum.

AK: From behind the scenes, could Joel do things to influence legislation or other matters that he supported?

SS: I think he probably could work with some of the members.

AK: Would that be just within his own caucus, or broader?

SS: I think broader. He had the respect of most of the Democrats that served in the eight years that he was lieutenant governor. He did do a lot of things, and I think he's the type of person that would want to leave government in the place better than when he came in. I think that's the

type of person that I'd like to see here again.

And you know about his reading program—

AK: Yes, his work on literacy. Was that widely known, or did he keep it somewhat to the side?

SS: I think he did it on the side. Sure, if he was in a certain area there would be an article in the local newspaper—undoubtedly it wasn't a front page article—but the people who were involved would know, but I don't think he had a lot of widespread recognition that he probably deserved for that. But people who knew him, and knew his work, thought he was great.

AK: What other things would he be noted for?

SS: In 1991, he helped with the Education Reform Act, he helped promote that. And, here again, it's a controversy now. There are elements within the Republican Party that want to eliminate that reform and not go ahead with it. I'm sure that he would have objected to that.

AK: He was heavily involved with Initiative 134, which dealt with campaign reform. He wanted to severely limit the types of campaign contributions people could get from individuals and PACs, all the different groups. He thought it was wrong to get large amounts of money from special interests. Did you ever talk with him about that, or hear him present his views?

SS: He spoke to the issue. We had different conversations, and I think all of us agree that spending on these campaigns is out of hand. When you can spend three- or four-hundred thousand dollars for a legislative race, that is just beyond imagination. We never had any detailed conversations about that—we don't get enough time anymore, like we used to—but, I think that he thought that public-financed campaigns were maybe more of a good idea, that we need to do something about it.

AK: When he originally ran for lieutenant governor, the thing that he pushed the most was his experience—who he was, in essence, but also his noted reputation as a coalition builder, a person who could work both sides of the aisle. Was he

successful in that goal?

SS: The lieutenant governor has a hard time getting that deeply involved in trying to build a coalition. I think you have to be a member of the Legislature in order to really do that. He was a consensus builder. He was able to accomplish things because he was a consensus builder.

AK: When he made that his goal, I wonder what he pictured doing, what he understood as his capacity to work in that way? Could he, for instance, have meetings with the Democrats? How would he go about this?

SS: It's an awkward situation to be in. I know he would come to our caucus at the beginning of the session and explain how he was going to do things on the rostrum. Go through the process. But he was never around, really, on the issues, to get that deeply involved. Maybe he was with the Republicans. The lieutenant governor, naturally, has a standing invitation to attend all of their caucuses. But I don't know how many he attended. I think he was kind of disgusted with his own party in the way they were going on some of the issues.

AK: He was certainly becoming a minority within his own group. I wondered if he made it a practice to meet with the Democratic leadership on some issues, if, say, he would have coffee with you, or by some other means? Other than being fair on the rostrum, was there any way he could demonstrate this nonpartisanship?

SS: That was about the only way. He never really got involved as far as coming to us and saying, "We're in a dilemma on this one, can I help? Can I do this or that?" No, that didn't happen.

AK: He had made such a strong statement about the issue, I wanted to know how he would be able to carry it out. I know that he served with two Democratic governors, and although he had a cordial relationship with them, but that they kept him at arms' length.

SS: I don't think that's unusual at all.

AK: One idea that he wanted to pursue, is that he thought that the governor and lieutenant governor should run as a team from the same party, like the president and vice president do. But he said that the Senate would never take up the idea, because too many of them wanted to run for those offices. Did he talk about that issue?

SS: I don't think he ever pushed it very hard. It would be a little more stable for the state. There wouldn't be quite the housecleaning that there would be when you have the opposite party come in as far as directors and so forth.

AK: Could you create a portrait of the Senate for me when Lieutenant Governor Pritchard was the presiding officer? Who were the leaders and what were the big issues of the time?

SS: There was Jeannette Hayner and myself. Marc Gaspard was the Democratic leader, I was the caucus chair. Then George Sellar became the leader, and Dan McDonald. George was the caucus chair during those times.

I think the big issue was that we had to live under the limits of Initiative 601, which changed things quite a bit as far as state government was concerned. When Joel was first in office, we went through a huge surplus. I know the Democrats get tabbed with being big spenders, but when the Republicans put the budget together in '89 and again in '91, when they were in control, spending for one of those sessions went up twenty percent and it went up seventeen or eighteen percent the other session.

Then we had the Boeing downturn. That's when the Democrats came into control, and we were confronted with declining revenues and also with faulty forecasts on how many people were going to be enrolled in schools, and how many caseloads for DSHS. So, we had a shortfall on a carry-forward budget of about \$1.2 billion. We cut the carry-forward budget by about \$600,000 and increased taxes by about \$600 million, which have all been rolled back since that time—not all of them—the last goes into effect July 1.

That was probably the big issue. The big, drastic change in the revenues and in the spending. Then along came the 601 limits after that.

AK: Some other issues were growth management and the struggle for universal health care. Would he have had any influence on these issues, perhaps as a member of the Rules Committee?

SS: I won't say often, but occasionally he would vote with the Democrats in Rules, I know much to the chagrin of the Republicans. I imagine that he would be a growth management advocate.

AK: Perhaps you could outline for me what the role and duties of the office of the lieutenant governor are—it seems to be a misunderstood position.

SS: Yes, it is to a great extent. His biggest chore is presiding over the Senate. Ours is based a lot like the federal government where the lieutenant governor is like the vice president.

Other than that, he is, by statute, on some different committees. He's on the State Investment Board, with the governor and the treasurer. They are charged with investing and selling bonds, and so forth, for the state. The Board is a separate entity that invests the pension funds for the state.

And he's a member of the State Capitol Committee.

AK: Would that be the relevant committee where he was involved with the planning for the World War II monument?

SS: Yes. He raised the hackles of some of the veterans because he disagreed with the location and size and so forth, which was worked out over a period of time.

He is on the Rules Committee, and that's always a controversy as to whether the lieutenant governor should be on there or not.

AK: I understand that it is a tradition, but not a written-down statute.

SS: Tradition, yes. I suspect that someday that would probably be eliminated. Nobody's ever had the courage to step up and say—and the way it is now, Lieutenant Governor Owen is on the committee. But when the controlling party was the Republicans, they allocated members to the

committee and they said, “Okay, the Democrats are authorized nine members on the committee, and if you want to put the lieutenant governor on, then you can only have eight senators.” It’s been that way. It was the same thing when the Democrats had control.

AK: So the issue might be that his own party might not want him there as he would be taking the place of one of their own senators?

SS: That’s correct. He is taking the spot of a member.

AK: And especially if he is not voting consistently with his party, they might not like that.

SS: That’s right. Yes, you hit it right on the head.

AK: I believe you were on the Rules Committee at the same time. Can you remember any instances when Joel weighed in on an issue, what his manner would have been?

SS: I don’t know if he would really speak, but he would vote against the Republicans on occasion.

AK: I have a photograph taken of him and the Rules Committee. They are in his office working, sitting around on the big couches in there. Was that their usual meeting place?

SS: The Rules Committee meets mostly downstairs, but sometimes we have a quick Rules meeting—maybe they go in to just pull one bill out of Rules or something like that—so we go in there. Probably several times during the session we go in there for just one bill. The majority party has a list of bills that they want to pull on a certain subject. They’ll circulate it first among the Rules members and then go in there and officially have the meeting.

AK: It was conveniently located just off the Senate floor.

He once told me that in his time as a senator, that Rules would really debate each issue. A bill would come up and a senator would speak for it, and then it would be debated. Then he said that

later, when he was lieutenant governor and a member of Rules, it would be more a case of following the party line, with no debate. The Republicans would be for it or against it, and that would be that. That was upsetting to him. Was that also your perception?

SS: I think that ninety percent of the bills are not partisan, but the ones that are partisan, I think that’s true. You get very little debate in Rules Committee. Sometimes you get a little, but if there is, it’s usually a very brief statement for or against them. Sometimes you get into it, but I don’t think more than half a dozen times during the session.

Rules used to have closed door meetings. Then they had secret ballots. Often times I’ve seen bills get more votes against them in Rules than they got on the floor. That was eliminated shortly after I became secretary of the Senate. In ’70 we still had those—they had little ballots with “yes” and “no” on them vertically and horizontally, and somebody would say, “Pass the biscuits.” That meant the secretary of the Senate would pass the ballots and they would circle one. But in ’71 they eliminated them.

It’s probably a lot better that they’re open now. But I don’t think we get any better legislation today than we got in those years.

AK: Did Joel have any special friendships with the senators, a closer relationship with some? Or would he be a little isolated, off to one side?

SS: I think Joel had a lot of friendships. It’s really changed over the years. It used to be that every night you went out in small groups and had dinner together, both Democrats and Republicans. But now, I don’t know if it’s because everyone is so busy they don’t have the time, but there isn’t the camaraderie that there used to be. I don’t know if the legislative friendships are developed on both sides of the aisle like they used to be in earlier years.

AK: All these changes really add up after a while. But, yet, you do get together on some things. I’d like you to tell me the story about Joel’s last day as lieutenant governor when senators from both sides of the aisle conspired to stage a little

donnybrook on the floor—

SS: That was pretty well set up. Senator West, a moderate Republican, and Dwight Pelz, they kind of worked this out against him. Joel had been known as quite a liberal member, he represents the center area of his district. They kind of put this thing together—they had a resolution that was introduced by Pelz, and West jumped up and said, “Point of order, Mr. President, this pinko has gone too far.” And they were back and forth, and the two attorneys purposely walked off the rostrum, and Joel whipped out his gavel trying to bring things to order.

AK: Was he very upset at the loss of decorum?

SS: Yes. They went on and on for quite awhile. He couldn’t understand it. He said, “I looked around for my attorneys and they were gone. I don’t know where they are.” They were kind of screaming. The members were all in on it. Then it led into the fact that what they were really doing was honoring him on his last day. It was really a great performance.

AK: And did you all keep your faces straight while all this was going on?

SS: Yes, I think so. Senator Prince got involved.

AK: So the whole Senate knew, everyone but him?

SS: Yes. And right before that we had had a confirmation of a Fish and Wildlife commissioner, which was rather controversial, although there were enough votes. This kind of led up to it because it was a bit controversial, and things were tense on the floor.

AK: So the temper was already a little high?

SS: Yes, this led into it. It wasn’t planned that way, but it couldn’t have worked out better. He was really surprised.

AK: The senators, then, are all yelling at each

other and he’s up on the rostrum gaveling to no avail, and then what happened?

SS: Finally it dawned on him. And he said, “I think I’m being had,” or something to that effect. And then it got into people making the complimentary speeches.

AK: Is that when you were joined by Governor Lowry and other state officials?

SS: Yes, the governor came in and sat down up there. I think that’s one of the few times Joel was close to tears with all the nice remarks that were made about him. They were all highly complimentary, no question about that.

AK: When was the decision to name the state library for him made?

SS: That was after he wasn’t a member. It wasn’t while he was in office. In fact, that happened probably in July, just a few months before he died.

AK: Do you happen to know how that came about, the naming of the library?

SS: Because of his interest in the literacy program and all that he had done there. I don’t know who initiated the idea, but probably everybody said, “Why didn’t I think of that?”

AK: It was a fitting tribute. Do you have any more stories or remarks you’d like to make?

SS: I think Joel was the kind of person you’d like to see come into public service, regardless of their political party or political affiliation. He wasn’t that staunch a member that he had to vote for everything the Republicans proposed. If he was a Democrat, he wouldn’t have supported everything.

I have the greatest admiration for him, and I’ll think we’ll remember that he had a great sense of humor.

AK: Yes, he prized his independence. Thank you so much for your thoughts.

CHAPTER 16

CHAMPION FOR EDUCATION

Anne Kilgannon: Before we leave the lieutenant governor years, you were telling me that there was at least one striking instance when Joel was able to make something happen behind the scenes. The issue was education reform, and Joel, personally, was able to effect the outcome of an important piece of reform legislation.

Maury Hausheer: Yes, it's a complicated process, hard to understand, and since it happened several years ago, I don't have all the details.

This is essentially what happened. This was, I believe, in 1991 or 1992. We had an education bill that year, and the Legislature usually wants to meddle in education—they had a history of talking about local control, but adding more rules from the state government as applied to K-12.

AK: Was there a new wave of concern about education, such as when the report *A Nation at Risk* came out?

MH: *A Nation at Risk* came out in early 1983. Governor Gardner was quite concerned about education. He wanted to be the education governor. He spoke often about education being more important to him than anything else in his administration. And according to the state constitution, education is the foremost responsibility of the state government.

What happened was that the Senate had their education bill—the education legislation started in the Senate that year. The Republicans were in control of the state Senate—with a one-vote

margin, and the Democrats were in control of the House.

The state senator who was chairman of the Education Committee was Senator Cliff Bailey of Snohomish County, and he had a bill on education that put a lot of emphasis on counseling and block grants and things like that. This was adopted by the Senate and sent over to the House. The title of that bill was Substitute Senate Bill 5953.

The House then, under the leadership of Kim Peery, who at that time was a state representative from down near the Vancouver area, put on an amendment that was quite different and would have set the stage for really significant and dramatic education reform in this state: the standards, various requirements, and the means to carry it out. The House put a striking amendment on the Senate bill.

AK: Could you explain what that means?

MH: That means they struck the Senate bill and put on a new bill.

AK: So, they kept the number and tacked on a new bill?

MH: Yes. What this bill would do was repeal the master's degree requirement that had passed a few years before that and extended the new teacher probation period to two years. It required the State Board of Education, in cooperation with the Governor's Council on Educational Reform, to report to the Legislature on ways to improve the certification process by December of 1992. It required the school districts to enhance curriculum if fourth, eighth, and eleventh grade test scores were not satisfactory. It required school districts to notify parents of their child's performance at fourth, eighth and eleventh grade tests. It required twelfth grade students to demonstrate mastery of required learning in order to graduate.

AK: This was much tighter?

MH: Yes, much tighter. And it would allow local school districts who were not in conflict with state law to adopt, through the open meeting process,

policies, programs and services to improve student learning. Another thing it did, it allowed school districts to waive the self-study process, the teacher classroom contract hours requirement, and the program hours requirement, if it submits to the state Board of Education proposal which specifically targets learning objectives and outlines a plan to achieve these objectives.

AK: These rules and regulations that schools could waive, would they be perceived as holding teachers back from good teaching?

MH: Yes. What we talked about here was you had seat time and all the various requirements, but a school district could get a waiver. They had some steps they had to go through, but almost any school district that wanted to, if they had a plan for student learning—a definite plan to improve student learning with measurements of success on how this plan worked—they could get out of state requirements that would interfere with this objective.

They created a commission on student learning. That was adopted and put on by the House. Then they went to a conference committee and the Senate members of the committee agreed to accept most of the House bill.

AK: Was that an unusual maneuver?

MH: Yes, it is a little bit unusual, but Senator Bailey felt that was the only way to go. The Republican caucus wasn't even close to buying it. In Republican caucus meetings, Senator Bailey would get up and say that he'd really like to have this, but they said, "No, we don't believe in this. This is no good. We don't trust it."

AK: Why didn't they like it? You'd think Republicans would like the idea of more accountability.

MH: Because it was so dramatically different. You have to remember too, that many people in the House who were for it, weren't really for it. They were pretty sure it was a dead bill, anyway. This is sort of a dream—this is real reform. It normally would not have been adopted in the

House if people thought it was going to be passed in the Senate and signed by the governor.

Sunday morning, the Senate was going to meet at 1:00 p.m. and I was down here with Joel about 10:00 a.m. We had talked to Senator Bailey briefly, and he was upset that the education bill seemed to be dead. Joel decided that he was going to make an all-out effort to get Republican support for this bill and get it through the Senate.

AK: Why did he believe so strongly in it, when so few others did?

MH: The reason he believed strongly in this was because at this time he was a member of Washington 2000 which was to implement goals for education reform at the start of the century. He, along with Frank Shrontz, the head of the Boeing Company, were the two co-chairs of this. Big business in the state of Washington was quite concerned about the lack of skills of high school graduates that they were getting and they wanted changes. It was, primarily, the Washington Roundtable—the top thirty corporations in the state.

He felt there was no reason why we can't get this through. So, we go into caucus and Joel wants to speak. They were talking about it. They weren't even going to bring this up. This bill was dead. Then Joel gave an impassioned speech of some length about how this had to come about. One thing he pointed out to these people was, "Look, this is the only thing that's going to work, and some of the people who claim to be for it aren't really for it. Therefore, you're getting at them if you adopt this measure. This is something that will call their bluff." Then he explained why it was necessary. This did not mean more state control. He tried to go through everything with them. He gave an impassioned speech, and he told them, "You've got to do it." He kept telling them over and over again that they have to do this.

AK: Did they listen respectfully?

MH: Oh yes. They listened and he got unexpected support.

AK: Was this the first time this had really been

laid out to them in this way?

MH: Yes, this is the first time. What he was saying was that, politically, this was the way to go. He put it on a political basis that, not only would it work, but it was what business wanted—major businesses wanted. This was the last chance for public education to be successful in the state of Washington. We've got to do it. Just a lot of things. The interesting thing is that many said, "Okay, we'll do it for you, Joel."

They went out and the first item of business they brought up was the conference report for passage, and it caught a lot of people off guard on the other side who said they were for it. They ended up voting against it, because they said, "Aren't we moving awfully fast on this?"

AK: So, they were for it in theory, but not when it came right down to it?

MH: Yes. And I remember, I contacted the governor's office about this, and I said that this is going to happen. This bill is going to pass. I talked to the governor's education person and I said, "Isn't this what the governor wants?"

And he said, "Well, I think so, but I don't know exactly what's in the bill."

I said, "It doesn't make any difference. It's going to pass anyway. It's already been passed by the House."

AK: Do you remember the vote count? Was it close?

MH: It was not too close. I would say there was a seven or eight margin. But it caught people off guard. Some Republicans voted against it and some Democrats voted against it, too. Some Democrats who had supposedly been for it, and some Republicans that had supposedly been against it, voted for it.

AK: So, everybody's all over the place?

MH: Everybody is all confused. Then I called the person in the governor's office about this and said, "It passed." He said, "I'm trying to get a copy of it now." Later that night he met with the

superintendent of schools in Edmonds, and they went over it. They said, "Well, we think it's good." This is what they'd been officially advocating all along.

AK: He's got them backed into a corner. It would have looked foolish if they had not supported it, if it was vetoed.

MH: Then the governor didn't sign it until six days later.

AK: Well, he's got a certain amount of time, doesn't he?

MH: He has a certain amount of time, but he was studying it. They were going through it. One of the governor's staff people had grave doubts about it in the beginning. Even though they were officially for it, they didn't like it. One person in particular did not like it. But then, after about six days, the governor did sign it.

That's what set up, eventually, 1209, the Governor's Task Force in Education Reform which went all over the state holding hearings.

AK: Twelve-thousand and nine is the Education, Improvement, and Student Achievement Act of 1993.

MH: Yes. And the passage of 1209 set in process where there will be standards, goals, objectives, and certificates of mastery to develop these things now. And I think it is very important if it works. The major problem will be—and we didn't foresee this at the time—a lot of parents will find out that their children didn't get the certificate of mastery. They will be upset. We don't know what the public reaction will be when these things will go into effect.

Also, it's very difficult to come up with requirements. It's fairly easy to do mathematics, but when you get to things like English, or you get things like art, there seems to be no way they can do standards for art.

AK: Can they do standards for all the subjects?

MH: Not all, but various ones: science, math,

English, history—there are standards now. And language. There will be standards and teachers will have requirements. There will be standards and recognition of standards, so people will know where they are. There will be statewide standards.

AK: So, the trouble is that you don't know what to do with the people who can't meet the standards?

MH: That will be up to the school districts, but the feeling here is that you don't necessarily reward school districts for failure. That's a novel idea, because the thing before was that if there were low scores, that means these people need more money. What they're saying to the school districts is, "You'd better do it with the money you're getting, because you aren't going to get more. If you don't, you may be taken over by the state."

AK: The way some districts were back in New Jersey recently?

MH: Yes, bring them up to standards. A lot of this is because of the Washington Roundtable, the top thirty corporations in the state. Their feeling was they were going to give up on public education if this did not work, because they were quite concerned with the lack of skills of people applying for jobs in these corporations. They wanted to make sure that they would make it work.

We'll have testing and accountability, and we'll know where they are, and then you'll have certificates of mastery. And not everyone will get them.

But, anyway, Joel set this up. This bill was dead in 1991. But on that Sunday he went against all odds, and it's like he didn't do anything—he just went in and was himself, and raised his voice a lot!

AK: Do you mean he shouted at them?

MH: Oh yes. He was very forceful.

AK: Was he angry or frustrated, or just excited?

MH: Certain people would say things, and he

would tell them that wasn't true. He wanted to win his argument, and he was forceful in his presentation, and he got most of their votes. It was adopted.

A lot of people don't know, but this is why the educational reform process in the state has moved farther along in Washington than in most other states. We wouldn't have had it this early without Joel Pritchard.

AK: But, for the record, he was not in the habit of shouting at people, was he?

MH: No, this was somewhat of an emergency. And he wanted to do it, and he didn't see any reason why it should fail. It's very interesting, because everybody else said, "It's dead." It wasn't like this was a great obstacle to overcome. This was just like going in and getting the job done and then that's it. "So, don't worry about it, I'll take care of it." And he did.

AK: You mentioned that Joel was involved with Washington 2000, also at one time called America 2000. Can you tell me about that group and Joel's work with them?

MH: Yes. This came about because the governor met with Lamar Alexander, who was the secretary of Education in the Bush administration, to set up what was called Washington 2000, which would be part of America 2000. Now, in the Clinton administration, it's called Goals 2000. The idea was to improve education by the year 2000, to dramatically improve it at the state and local level.

AK: And how did Joel get involved in that effort?

MH: Governor Gardner asked him to serve on this as the co-chair with Frank Shrontz, the head of the Boeing Company. He agreed to do it, and it became Washington 2000. His area of involvement was in the direction they were going and what needed to be done.

AK: What does this group do? How did it address these issues?

MH: What that group led to was the Partnership for Learning. This was after Goals 2000 came under the direction of the state superintendent of Public Instruction in 1994. What the Partnership does is they try to keep 1209 on track, and not be changed, not be modified. They try to keep the objectives of 1209, education reform, on track, the process on track, meeting the guidelines that were developed.

AK: I'm still trying to get a sense of how they would do that.

MH: Primarily by dealing with public opinion. Joel wrote lots of articles. He and Shrontz made joint appearances to the editorial boards. They raised money and did extensive polling throughout the state about how people think about their schools and about education.

AK: Would they have staff people to help them with the background work?

MH: We had staff people, yes.

Let me give you an example, here. This is a survey done in July of 1994 by Moore Information Incorporated, out of Portland, Oregon, which was a political polling firm. They found, "In order to be successful, high school graduates today need a higher level of skill and knowledge than high school graduates needed a generation ago." Eighty-four percent agree, only twelve percent disagree.

"We need to establish high standards of learning for all children, so they will be prepared for the twenty-first century." Ninety-three percent agree.

"Students need to analyze and solve problems as well as master basic reading, writing, and math skills." Ninety-three percent agree.

AK: Sounds like a consensus. Those are high numbers.

MH: "Voters strongly support the major components and features of the Education Reform Act," which is 1209.

"It will establish higher academic standards which all schools and all students will be expected

to meet." Eighty-three percent favor that.

"Every student will have to demonstrate achievement in several subjects in order to graduate, instead of simply attending a certain number of classes." Ninety-two percent agree to this survey.

"It holds schools accountable for achieving results rather than following rules and regulations." Seventy-two percent agree with that.

When you ask them, "Are you familiar with the Education Reform Act passed by the Legislature in 1993," thirty-two percent claim they are familiar.

Those are the kinds of things they did. It was to keep progress focused—and it is on focus. There have been various groups that have wanted to get at it and change it or wreck it, and they have not yet been able to do that.

AK: Is this an ongoing effort?

MH: This is still carrying on, yes. The Partnership for Learning, yes. There are some new people, Kerry Killinger, and the Washington Roundtable is still there. A person by the name of Bill Elliott now is the staff person who runs it. They have two or three staff people, but it's still sort of a watch dog group to make sure that we're on track for education reform.

We'll see what happens, because if this is carried out, it will be significant reform. There'll be achievement standards, which are more important than seat time, hours, days in school, those kinds of things.

AK: This work was a big commitment. How well did this mesh with being lieutenant governor and the duties of that office?

MH: He was very, very busy with this.

AK: How much time would he spend on this effort?

MH: Whatever was required. People would want him to do things, go to meetings—lots of breakfast meetings where you would talk with community leaders. He gave many speeches throughout the state on this.

AK: Did he have a standard speech? Did he have a particular angle that he pushed, say, a different perspective than Frank Shrontz?

MH: Joel did much more speaking than Frank Shrontz did, because he was lieutenant governor, and he was probably a better speaker. I heard several of his speeches and they were usually interesting and humorous, and about how this was important. This was what had to be done. That you couldn't just major in gym or things like that, which he said he would like to have done in high school.

AK: This is all somewhat ironic, because he was not a good student himself, but he certainly recognized the value of education.

MH: Yes. This is what had to be done, and most business leaders and people like that you'd talk to in these communities are for this. This makes sense to them.

AK: For him, was the urgency coming from the idea that if the schools did not improve, people would not support public schools and would turn to private schools?

MH: The major corporations were, a little bit, and it's still there. We don't know if this is going to work. We hope it does. They feel something has to be done, and that you just can't keep doing the same thing and talking about it, and talking about it. You have to do some dramatic things. If this does not happen, they will advocate vouchers, or tuition tax credits, or charter schools, or they'll start schools themselves. They'll do all kinds of things to change things if it doesn't work.

AK: So, besides wanting better education, Joel wanted better public education. Was that his particular concern?

MH: Yes. And business people want that, too. They want the public education system to work. But if it doesn't, their view was, we're going to get out of this backing of levies and contributing money. If they aren't going to make the changes necessary so that people can write a sentence,

read, and add and subtract, then we're not going to do this anymore.

AK: Just to be clear, was part of his drive to do this coming from a real basic—I mean fundamental—support of public schools, as basic social institutions? I'm thinking of the idea that public schooling is, for some people, bound up with ideas and ideals about democracy, about the very nature of American society, because they are inclusive, because they supposedly “level the playing field,” a value that seemed core to his thinking. So, along those lines, would the loss of support for public schooling represent a falling apart of society, with the well-to-do turning to private schools?

MH: Yes. He wanted the public schools to work. You have to remember, private education is not very big in the state of Washington. It hasn't been developed like it is in the East where you have a large parochial school population. It just hasn't developed. You have to try to make public schools work. And who knows if you can do it?

A lot of it is based on Joel's pragmatism, he was very pragmatic. It's economics. It's not fair for kids not to be able to do these things. The economic welfare of a state is not well served by people not being able to learn.

It's also based on the assumption, which may or may not be true, that everybody can learn. I think Europeans would say, “Hey, wait a minute, it doesn't work that way.”

AK: That is a very American idea.

MH: It's a very American idea, and it may not be practical. It may not be real, but this is what we're trying to do right now.

AK: Well, it's a more hopeful assumption than the other.

MH: Yes, give it a chance.

AK: During this time, was Joel involved in other major issues, not necessarily education, but other things? Did he have other issues that he was as close to? Was this his main thrust?

MH: I think this was his main thing. He did his literacy effort, which ties into this, but this was a big deal and he was a strong believer in it. He believed in the people who were doing it.

The person who was doing the work on standards is Chuck Collins, who owns a company on Mercer Island and worked in several administrations. Joel had a high regard for him and what he was trying to do. Collins had personal experience because he wanted the people who worked for him to be able to do things, and they couldn't. Also, Collins was the first to point out that we're going to get into trouble down the road because parents aren't going to like it when their children don't measure up to the standards, and they're going to want them changed. We haven't seen that yet, but we're going to be seeing it. I think that's the challenge for the future—to stick with it. That's where there may be some changes. If many of these people feel that the requirements are too difficult, they are likely to get the Legislature to weaken the standards.

AK: In the end, it's all political?

MH: It's all politics, yes.

AK: Would Joel consider this achievement, salvaging this bill and pushing it through and all that followed, would this be his crowning moment?

MH: I don't think that he even thought of himself as the person who did it. I don't think he would have remembered that too well. That was not a big deal to him. It was just another meeting. I don't think he ever grasped the significance of it. I think if you went back and showed him this, he would have said, "Okay, I did that." He wouldn't himself remember it.

The big deal is this other stuff that's going on now. I would say that is the most important thing that he did as lieutenant governor. Being on this America 2000, Washington 2000, now the Partnership for Learning, that was the big thing for him. He was doing that when he died. He was still involved in that and was going to stay on for another year. That's the most important thing.

Let's put it this way, he gave it a head start it

would not have gotten, and maybe we wouldn't have had it at all. We have to remember we're way, way ahead of what most other states are doing. People don't realize it, but this path is well under way. When it goes into effect, it's real reform. We'll see what happens.

AK: So, if I could have asked him what were the top five or so things that he had a hand in—and I know he didn't like to take credit for things—this would have been one of those accomplishments?

MH: I think this is the most important thing he did as lieutenant governor, by far. The most significant, yes. At the same time, it's almost an unknown thing. No one knows about this. I've never spoken to the press about it, never talked to a single person in the press about how this happened. The press did not know. In fact, I think on that Sunday there was one person from the press in the Senate chamber when this was passed, because no one expected anything. The press person probably didn't understand the significance of it.

AK: Some small, inconsequential-seeming things become big things.

MH: That's right. You never know.

FRANK SHRONTZ

PARTNERSHIP FOR LEARNING

Frank Shrontz, Chairman Emeritus of the Boeing Company, served as the chair of the Partnership for Learning with Lieutenant Governor Joel Pritchard, who was the president of that organization. This interview was conducted on March 26, 1998.

Anne Kilgannon: In 1992, the Washington State Legislature established the Commission on Student Learning, with Terry Bergeson, who is now the state superintendent of Public Instruction, as the executive director of that organization. In various newspaper articles, you, along with John Ellis, the head of Puget Power, are often credited

with the promotion of this reform effort. Can you tell me about your interests in education, and why this particular reform caught fire with you?

Frank Shrontz: My first interest in education rose out of a concern that the Boeing Company, in the future, would not be getting the quality of worker that we needed to handle the ever increasingly sophisticated production systems. We were just not seeing from the product of the high schools the kind of basic knowledge in mathematics and reading, language and communication, that we needed to train for these new production processes that we were trying to put in place.

So, when Governor Gardner asked if I would serve on a council that he was creating to study the issue of K-12 education, I indicated that I would be willing to do that. During that period, I not only became increasingly concerned about the quality of education that they were getting in the K-12 system, from the standpoint of becoming good employees, but also about what that might do to the quality of their lives in the future. I guess my early interest was both a function of concern about the future work force and a concern about the life quality of the high school graduates.

AK: Did you feel that schools were declining or that the demands of the day were growing, or a bit of both?

FS: Perhaps a bit of both, although I don't know that children coming out of today's K-12 education system are necessarily getting a poorer education than they did twenty or thirty years ago, but certainly the standards and expectations are far higher. We are now competing today in a world environment, where a few years ago we could rely on just the U.S. competition. And in the world environment, our kids just were not measuring up in terms of academic capability.

AK: There has been a lot of attention paid in recent years to the education systems of Japan and Germany, and the "whiz kids" coming out of their schools. Was that the kind of thing you were reading about and that was adding to your concern?

FS: That was part of it, but I don't think I'd confine it to those two countries. I think our children, when compared with European kids broadly and Asian kids, in terms of educational accomplishment, it was just not adequate to maintain our leadership position. That was an increasing concern.

AK: So you were appointed to this council, which had about fifteen people on it. Was Joel Pritchard one of the members at that time?

FS: No, Joel was not on the council. My interface with Joel in the educational arena occurred later, when we created the Partnership for Learning to help sell education reform. I had had dealings with Joel in the political arena as a result of my involvement in senior management of Boeing, but I was not acquainted with Joel in his educational interests at that time.

AK: What kind of people sat on the council? Were they mostly business people, such as yourself, or was it a wide range?

FS: It was a very wide range. We did have two or three business people, but we also had professional educators. We had some legislators. It was intended to be a broad spectrum of backgrounds to come up with some recommendations.

AK: On this council, did you look at a variety of things schools should be doing, or was what is known as outcome-based education the preferred focus?

FS: I think what we wanted to do was to see if we couldn't refocus the educational system toward producing a better product, mainly a better-educated child. In the process of thinking that through, we became convinced that simply focusing on the inputs to the educational system, which our state had been doing, as have other states, for a long time—namely, how many kids attended school, what was the drop-out rate, what were teacher's salaries, how many minutes they sat in each class, and a whole raft of other measurements—we felt that was not getting the job done.

What we really needed to do was to say, “what are the standards of expectation that would be appropriate for children in the basic educational disciplines like math, science, reading,” and then figure out how well the children were doing against those standards.

Finally, to start putting some consequences into the school’s responsibility to achieve results. So we began to look, in that sense, at the product that came out of the system, not necessarily the inputs that went in the system. I think that formed the ground work of the recommendations of the Legislature, and ultimately the statute 1209.

AK: When you formulated your recommendations, was there a lot of excitement because it was quite a new approach? I mean, did your plan generate a lot of controversy because it challenged a lot of the ways things were done? How did you go about selling it?

FS: First of all, there was a fair amount of controversy within the council itself. But we did reach a consensus, and then the job was to try to sell it to the public. We went out, generally in small groups of council participants, to the public in open forums and we solicited inputs and reactions, and we tried to explain the direction we were going. So, there was an outreach to try and build some support in order to get it through the Legislature as law because there was controversy.

AK: Would you build coalitions with education groups like WEA and SPI?

FS: The head of the SPI at that time was on the council, as was the state head of the education union. So we did have representation from those constituent groups. But clearly it was necessary to do a selling job with the teachers, not only the need for reform, but why we thought it would make a difference.

AK: Did you also have to sell it to the Legislature?

FS: I thought the Legislature was a surprisingly easy sell compared to my expectations. The fact that we did have, as I recall, four legislators on

the council, I’m sure helped in that regard because they, in turn, provided the leadership. But there was controversy in the Legislature before the act passed.

AK: I know some people worried that it would cost more money, so there was some holding back on that account.

FS: I think the investment required was a consideration, but the fact that it was going to be a significant change was probably the biggest hurdle, because change is threatening to many people. And particularly those who are involved in the change. I think the fact that we had to sell both the need for change and the probability that the change would be productive, was our biggest task.

AK: Did you have some competition, I mean, were there other groups out there promoting their own solutions, like charter schools and the like?

FS: At the time that the legislation was being formulated, that was not a major issue. There were concerns by people like home schoolers and private schools as to how they would be affected by this legislation. But the big issue of vouchers and charter schools came later. And, incidentally, on that point, I don’t think many of us on the council would have a strong objection to charter schools as such, if they are properly formulated and expected to meet reasonable standards.

AK: It doesn’t have to be a contradiction, no.

When you were out selling this, as you say, is this when the need for what became the Partnership for Learning became apparent?

FS: Yes, I think there was a concern that once legislation had passed, that the forces out there that were opposing it would, in time, either erode or eliminate it completely. What we needed to do was to continue to build a strong consensus of support, and that had to start with education of the people as to the need and why this was an acceptable remedy.

A number of us got together and decided that we would try to fund a general education effort

to the public at large. Since that was going to require money, frankly, we asked the business community to help support that. That was what provided the momentum to build the Partnership. In that context, Joel was very helpful both in the initial fundraising and as the president of the Partnership in getting the message out.

AK: When does Joel come into the picture? Was the Partnership his idea?

FS: Joel was an early participant. Whether he was the formulator of the idea, I can't tell you. I had some early meetings with him and a small group of largely Seattle business people that formed the nucleus of getting this thing moving.

He was the president and I agreed to serve as the chair.

AK: What did each title mean in this case? What were your duties?

FS: I don't know that the title, in and of itself, means a lot, but I would have to say that Joel dedicated far more of his time in making this work than I did. He was really the driver of much of the activity that went on. That activity included everything from trying to get money for advertising, to community forums, to speaker groups, and so forth. Joel was very, very active.

AK: Would he meet with different business leaders and ask them for money?

FS: He would go to groups that would be formed in various communities throughout the state, because this is a statewide effort. His basic message was, why do we need this kind of change, and why is it important that we sustain it? He sought their personal involvement and also financial contributions.

AK: Did Joel have a particular take on this issue, a characteristic approach that he would present?

FS: Joel had a marvelous way of expressing these things in a very simple way and with a lot of humor. He would quite often tell stories about his experiences or experiences of friends, and why

education made a difference. So, he put a light touch on it, but the message was real and very strong.

AK: I understand that he liked to say he would have majored in gym, if that had been allowed then, but that now he was grateful that that was not the case. It's interesting, because he never built himself up as a great student, but freely acknowledged that he got his best education through reading and experience.

FS: That's right. Joel did not have a big ego, despite the success that he had in his life. He was very self-effacing, but also very humorous in the way he would present that. And there was usually a message in his humor, as well.

AK: So, Joel would travel around the state, talking and meeting with people. As lieutenant governor, did he have a very flexible schedule, or would this be considered part of his duties?

FS: I can only assume that the office accommodated that as part of his public duties. But he found the time one way or another to make it work, and he was always there when he was asked to go to a meeting, or go out and address some group.

I think this was driven not only by Joel's desire to do something worthwhile—and he believed in the cause—but he really loved kids. So, the combination of that made him a very forceful supporter of what we were trying to do.

AK: At the same time, he was also working with some people on adult literacy programs. I believe, at that time as well, that he was tutoring at an elementary school up in Seattle. So, he seemed to be immersing himself in education issues at every different level, both personally and politically.

FS: Absolutely. How Joel found the time to do all that, I don't know.

AK: He had a lot of energy.

FS: He dedicated his life to that, and it had to mean a lot of long hours.

AK: He just loved being with people, in the thick of things, I think.

FS: Yes, he did. Yes, he was very definitely a people person. That probably made it easier for him to justify it.

AK: Did he have an influence on your own way of thinking about these issues?

FS: I think he influenced me in terms of the enthusiasm that he put into it. It made it more difficult for me to say, “Gosh, I don’t think I have time to do that,” when you saw Joel doing so much more. He clearly influenced a lot of people to provide the kind of support needed, because Joel was highly regarded, and his judgment was widely respected.

AK: Do you think the Partnership would have been much less effective without him?

FS: Absolutely. I could not, at that time, have carried that load. I was still active as the CEO of Boeing and later as chairman, so I could not have devoted that time that he did. We would have needed somebody like Joel, but I don’t know of anybody else that could have done as effective a job.

AK: That organization is still extant, isn’t it?

FS: Yes, it is. I’ve agreed to stay on the board, but I’m no longer chairman and I don’t believe they have yet replaced Joel as the president.

AK: He was one of a kind, so in that sense, they can’t.

FS: That’s going to be tough to do. No, the job is far from being done. We’ve got a lot of work to do. This is really a long, slow process, and the longer it’s out there and people can’t see significant results, the more impatient they get, and the bigger danger that they will scuttle it. The Partnership is going to be very important in keeping that momentum going for the next two or three years, anyway.

AK: As I understand this, that’s the important point, that this is not a “quick fix.” That this was an attempt to move beyond the usual Band-Aid approach, of getting in with some fad or superficial change, and then moving on, leaving people frustrated and disillusioned. Perhaps part of your role is to train people to look at the big picture, to take the long haul, and not expect it to be tomorrow.

FS: Absolutely. I’m now involved in a task force that’s designed to come up with some ideas on how we can provide accountability. To a lot of people that means some kind of onerous intervention, but to most of us on the task force it really means, how can we provide adequate assistance and incentive for schools that are going to be struggling? Not everybody is going to change quickly, so we’ve got a lot of work left to do. Not only to set these standards, which are in the process of being completed, and the assessment with the testing in one form or another, but also to figure out how to help the schools who aren’t making significant improvements, the things we can do to make a difference. That is going to be a much slower process than a lot of people expect, and there’s going to be a lot of frustration along the way.

AK: There are so many different facets to this. There’s teacher training, and recruiting people to be teachers, there’s everything that happens in schools down to the books, the way schools are built. School boards—it’s a huge thing.

FS: That’s right. Everybody’s got a part to play, and the number of changes that have to occur to make this really work are pretty dramatic.

AK: And yet the language of reform is entering into the mainstream. You do hear people discussing the essential learning requirements and these certificates of mastery. People are becoming familiar with the vocabulary and concepts you are proposing.

Perhaps this would be the best time to discuss these core ideas of the reform. I think you described, for example, outcome-based education as an approach that asks, “what do you want to

see in an educated person,” and then working backward from there to achieve that outcome—doing what’s necessary to achieve that end. Would that be a fair characterization?

FS: I think that’s a fair comment. I guess what we really want, first of all, is to set some standards of expectation that will be measured against world-class kids. So, we are going to start with the end product, and that is, what do we want the children to know when they leave high school?

AK: And how would you decide this?

FS: I don’t. The professional educators who have a sense of what we need to know in math, and what we need in terms of communication and reading and science, need to develop the standards. And you can go now to a book and dig those out, and you can figure out what the standards are for, say, reading at the fourth grade, and the seventh, and the tenth grade.

Then we need to start assessing kids, and I avoid the word “testing,” because that implies multiple choice, but some kind of assessment as to whether the children are really achieving those objectives at those points in time. If they’re not, then the question is, what do we need to do to bring up the appropriate level of learning?

Assistance may be just simply more teacher training. But in some cases, you may, in fact, need to change out some of the instruction in a school.

AK: Do you mean getting different teachers?

FS: Get different teachers or change the curriculum in one form or another. This is a continuing cycle. I think you need to continue to measure whether those changes are making a difference. It’s an ongoing process.

On the task force, we came up with a recommendation which recently passed in the form of a new statute that says, for fourth grade reading at least, we would expect a school to make a twenty-five percent improvement over a three year time period from where they started.

AK: That’s pretty substantial.

FS: It’s substantial, but we don’t think you can inch this too small and really make a difference. Three years from now, somebody needs to look back and say, was that a realistic standard, and if not, what should it be for the next three years?

It’s an ongoing, very long-term problem until it gets a momentum on its own, which is certainly not so today. We are still going to need the Partnership, on which Joel had a big impact.

AK: Do you keep a picture in your mind of this student that you are aiming for, to help you keep your thinking on track and keep you inspired? Do you have some kind of model in your mind of this student just bursting with knowledge, coming out the door at graduation?

FS: That’s an approach I’m not sure I had thought about. In the sense that we want that tenth grader to achieve what we call the certificate of mastery, which is an acknowledgment that he or she has learned enough in the basic elements of education—mathematics, reading, writing, communication, science—that’s my objective. Have they learned enough to be able to compete effectively in the world and to be able to have a reasonable lifestyle?

And I think what we would say today is that less than half the kids that come out of high school can achieve that kind of educational excellence. I think what we’ve learned from studies that have been done is that almost all kids could learn at significantly higher levels than they are currently achieving. We need to have that expectation out there, because if we don’t have high expectations, and dumb the system down, then I think we cheat the kids, and we can’t do that.

AK: When you put it that way, I can’t imagine how anyone could be against this, and yet some people are opposed. Is it because they don’t understand the intent, or because they have different concerns?

FS: I think part of it is understanding. Again, that is the objective of the Partnership, to try to increase that level of awareness. Part of it, from some points of view, is that we are trying to teach kids values that may be inconsistent with their

own. The truth of the matter is, that it is not a value-based objective. Sure, we want the kids to be honest and truthful and all those good things, but we're really just trying to put into their heads some very basic knowledge and the ability to take that knowledge and apply it effectively to daily life.

There's nothing mysterious about this, but there are concerns that it's a conspiracy of big business to teach kids like the Japanese do, and have robots on the production line or whatever. Nothing could be further from the truth, but we haven't got that message to everybody.

AK: How do you answer those concerns? Do you have a way of reaching the people who have those concerns and helping them see it differently?

FS: We think so. The way we try to do it is what I've done for a year, and that is to try to lay out what is the objective, what are the steps to that objective, and try to convince people that it is not mysterious.

AK: You'll be missing Joel and his ability to reach out to all kinds of people as you carry on this work.

FS: Yes.

LIZ STROUP

WASHINGTON LITERACY

When Joel Pritchard was elected lieutenant governor of Washington in 1988, he became involved with Washington Literacy, a group that organized programs to teach adult literacy. Liz Stroup, formerly the Seattle city librarian, and now the executive director of Washington Literacy, was interviewed February 2, 1998 about the work of Lieutenant Governor Pritchard with this organization and other related matters.

Liz Stroup grew up in eastern Washington and attended library school at the University of Washington. Her first library job was at the North Central Regional Library in Wenatchee in the mid-1960s, with Jo Pardee. Jo subsequently

married Senator Web Hallauer. Liz Stroup left Wenatchee in 1969 to work at the Library of Congress, although she kept in touch with Jo Pardee Hallauer. She first met Joel Pritchard at a dinner in 1973 or 1974, when the Hallauers were visiting in Washington, D.C. and invited her to join them.

Liz Stroup: Web Hallauer and Jo Pardee Hallauer, my former boss, were back in Washington, D.C. when they asked me to have dinner with them and with Congressman Joel Pritchard. That was the first time I had actually met him.

He was an absolute delight. We had a wonderful evening talking about the peccadilloes and oddities of working on Capitol Hill. I had just been appointed chief of the Congressional Records Division of the Library of Congress.

Generally, thereafter, whenever Jo would come to D.C., we would have dinner with either Congressman Pritchard or Featherstone Reid who worked for Maggie [Senator Warren Magnuson]. They were all, at an earlier day, in the Washington State Legislature. While Web Hallauer and Joel were on different sides of the aisle, I think they were very close personal friends.

Anne Kilgannon: When you met him, did you also talk about libraries and literacy? Did you know at that time that he was interested in those issues?

LS: I didn't know that he was interested in literacy. He was very interested in the library and, as I recall, probably brought up something about public libraries which he had been a strong advocate for, for a long time.

A few years later, and I can't remember the exact year, but for ten years or so the Library of Congress had been building a third building, called the Madison Building, right on Independence Avenue, right next to the Cannon House Office Building. The library desperately needed the space and, sometime in the mid '70s or maybe '76 or '77, there was a move by Carl Albert, then the Speaker of the House, to appropriate the almost finished Madison Building for congressional offices. God knows, the members of Congress and their staffs were crammed, but it would have just

dealt a death blow to the Library of Congress with its eighty million items in its collections.

Joel Pritchard was one of two or three members of the House who stood up valiantly. I mean, he probably was a fairly junior member at the time—but he stood up to very powerful leadership in the House and managed to save the library. I think there was probably a little help from the American Library Association Washington office, who alerted the troops around the country, and I imagine that members of Congress probably heard from a lot of public library friends, and so on. But it was Congressman Pritchard who was the first lonely voice that said, “We cannot do this. Our national library is needed. It needs its space.” He became a hero of mine from that moment on.

To my delight, when I came back home to Seattle in 1988 to become city librarian of the Seattle Public Library, Joel was elected lieutenant governor. I had a passion for literacy and was on the board of Washington Literacy, which is a nonprofit organization which supports volunteer literacy programs around the state. Being on the board, I had heard from the then executive director, Chris Cassidy, that Lieutenant Governor Pritchard was very interested in having some kind of ceremonies around the state to honor the volunteer literacy tutors. It would not only provide great publicity, but it would give recognition and thanks to people who were largely unsung heroes and heroines.

I now head Washington Literacy. In about 1990, we started something called “Washington Reads.” And Joel, through the lieutenant governor’s office, every year would get certificates for “distinguished citizens of Washington,” I think they said. The calligraphy would be hand-done. All around the state, generally in September, which is International Literacy Month, Joel himself would travel. I know he went to Longview and to Walla Walla and Spokane, and certainly he always graced the Washington Reads ceremony in King County in Seattle. He would give the most moving speech of thanks to the volunteers and how it was through volunteers that you could change the world.

One of my last official acts as city librarian in September of 1996, before I left the library,

was on International Literacy Day. We had a special ceremony in the library auditorium. I think it was September 6 or 8 in 1996, whichever day was the Saturday, and the mayor was there and some others, and even Senator Murray was there. It was my great privilege to give Joel a special award as the literacy advocate and volunteer of the state, and to thank him for all he had done on behalf of the people who teach adults how to read.

AK: Did he, in his speeches, or to you in conversation, describe his own work as a literacy tutor?

LS: I believe that he had actually tutored children at the Beacon Hill School, that he had been a volunteer. And someone told me, but I’ve not been able to verify this, that he also in his later years did volunteer work at Saint James Literacy Program, which was for new immigrants. I’m going to try and check that out.

AK: That’s interesting. He was very involved with refugees from southeast Asia, Vietnam especially, as a congressman.

LS: I didn’t know that, but I’m not surprised. I’ll bet he also did do tutoring at St. James then.

AK: He went over there and visited the refugee camps and was very active in helping them come, and making sure that when they got here there were programs in place to help them.

LS: He was such a remarkable man and so modest that, if you were involved with him, for instance in literacy or libraries, he would never speak of some of the other great things that he had done in his life, which is why we miss him so much.

AK: Just to be clear then, when Joel came up with the idea for Washington Reads, had there been anything previously in place like that?

LS: No. There had never been anything to honor the volunteer literacy tutors around the state. In my files, in fact, there are copies of letters that Joel had sent to Boeing and PACCAR and to the Medina Foundation asking for a little bit of money

for these ceremonies for the plaques and maybe a little bit for refreshments. Each volunteer got a pin, too. We still have on hand at Washington Literacy over 1000 of the pins that I hope we'll be able to continue to give out in his memory.

AK: So, he just didn't come in as a figurehead and give the awards? He actually made things happen?

LS: He absolutely did. It was his personal presence at many of the awards. When I first started in this job in December, I talked to somebody at Longview who remembered the lieutenant governor and his passionate support for the work of volunteers. That had got this person going in a program that was just operating on a shoestring. So, it was not only his idea, and that he made it happen by raising a little bit of money that would enable us to cover the administrative cost, but he put his heart and his body and his presence into making it real.

AK: Do you remember what kind of things he said in those speeches?

LS: Because I didn't actually go to the speeches around the state, I can't say. I know that I was at a Washington Reads ceremony somewhere up in the Catholic Archdiocese cafeteria one year where the award was given, and I remember Joel talking about how the only way to really change the world was one volunteer at a time. I never forgot that.

In September of 1996, when I got to present him with the award of "Literacy Champion of the Century" or whatever we called it, he was so modest: "that he had really done nothing, he'd just been there to cheer people on," which was his usual diffidence: "I don't take credit for this."

AK: At these ceremonies—I'm trying to picture it—he gets up and he gives a speech. Does he also come down and greet people, and talk, and sit down with them and ask about how it was going?

LS: Yes, he did. That was the other hallmark of Joel. I don't think he ever met a stranger, and so that before the ceremony would start, generally

there was tea and cookies or punch, that kind of thing, he would be talking to the literacy tutors or the students. In the latter few years that he was involved, there were also awards given to the students who had persisted and struggled and learned to read as adults. He would just be there with their families. All of them were so proud that a lieutenant governor would actually express an interest and want to find out about each one of them.

Then there would be a ceremony, and at some point Joel would be invited to give the speech of the evening for fifteen or twenty minutes. He would talk about how the world is really changed by people who care enough to make a difference. I can't remember the details, but I just remember always having tears in my eyes and, as a librarian, my heart sort of leaping with the fact that a man who was in high public office cared so much about people learning to read, and was understanding of how courageous many of them were as adults to admit, and to go back and to struggle. It would be sort of like me going now to China and having to master Mandarin. People who failed to learn read as children, whether they were native-born or immigrants, go through a heroic kind of effort. And their volunteer tutor who is always in their corner, who can help them persist.

I remember—and I'm not sure if it was at the last September '96 service—but Joel and I were sitting in the audience talking. I think he asked me, among other things, if I had seen Web and Jo Hallauer, and we talked about them for a little bit. Then there was an older gentleman who was sitting just in front of us who turned around to Joel and introduced himself. And the gentleman, who was probably close to seventy—he was easily Joel's age—told Joel that he had for fifty years driven without having a driver's license because he could never pass a driver's test. He'd gone into the literacy action center in Seattle and a young lawyer from one of the big law firms, a young woman, had worked with him for two years using the driver's manual as the main thing. And he had, the spring before, passed his driver's test. Then he said with a chuckle—and I'll never forget Joel just dying laughing—he said, "And then two weeks later I got my first ticket." All these years he'd been so careful because he didn't have a

license. Joel's belly laugh was just the main thing. I will remember that sound.

AK: I only know the basics about literacy. Are there controversies in the literacy program? Would Joel have taken positions?

LS: There are certainly shifts and divides.

AK: I know there are in regular schools—the issue of “whole language” and the teaching of phonics.

LS: Sure there are. But not so much that, because most volunteer literacy tutors who are well trained use the Literacy Volunteers of America textbook. They're really very well trained. They use a variety of techniques depending upon where the person learning to read is coming from.

The real controversy that Joel may have weighed in on is that almost ninety percent of the federal and state money for adult basic literacy goes to community colleges who are generally only interested in people who read at the eighth grade level and above, so they can study for their GED. Whereas, it's the little, volunteer-based groups that one-on-one tutor people with fourth grade level and below—very low skills—who get about ten percent of this federal and state money. But they handle fifty percent of the people in literacy programs throughout the state.

Joel was always a champion of the volunteer programs being an equal partner in the whole process of literacy. I only regret, since I just started my job the first of December, that he's not around. With his help and advocacy, I think I could have managed to help gain more support for the volunteer one-on-one tutors, as opposed to the college classroom. All of which are needed, but that controversy is one.

Within literacy, there's sort of a whole language/phonics kind of thing. There are two national literacy volunteer organizations. One called Laubach Literacy, which is more structured. Maybe it's more phonics-based, that's probably an overstatement. Then the Literacy Volunteers of America, which are more whole language, or whatever works. They're both in Syracuse, New York, which is amazing. I think one broke away,

maybe.

I don't think Joel ever paid much attention to that kind of thing. But, in Seattle for example, the Literacy Council of Seattle is a Laubach-based group. Whereas, if you would go to Goodwill Literacy or one of the other ones, it's probably more likely to be a NLBA affiliate. But people work together pretty closely.

The big split is between structured classrooms, generally community college courses, and the individual one-on-one volunteer tutor.

All of the Washington Reads programs that I went to that he was at, probably half of the students who were there were new immigrants who were struggling so hard to learn to read, and with their whole families were there to be honored along with their tutors. I'm sure that Joel was concerned that everybody learn to read, whether they were new immigrants or whether they were native born.

The National Literacy Act, which created the National Institute for Literacy in 1991, actually mandates that there should be equal access to funds by community-based volunteer groups and formal educational programs. It would be interesting to me to know whether Joel, when he was in Congress, ever was working on a bill like that with Senator Simon in the Senate, who was also a passionate champion of literacy.

But I know that Joel, when he would give the awards out for Washington Reads and give big hugs to some of the students who got the awards along with their tutors, he was beaming as if they were his grandchildren, I think.

AK: When he was the lieutenant governor, did he find that a very helpful platform? Was that one of the reasons, perhaps, that he liked being lieutenant governor, that it gave him the scope for doing these projects?

LS: I think it may have. He was a wonderfully successful lieutenant governor, obviously. Much admired and beloved by people on both sides of the aisle. Strictly speaking, creating something like Washington Reads doesn't really fall under the purview of a lieutenant governor. But, because Joel cared passionately, particularly about volunteers in the community making a difference

for the social problems of the day, he made it happen. I don't think he did this because it gave him a platform to get elected.

AK: No, I meant it in the other way, as in that he enjoyed being lieutenant governor because it gave him a way of doing these other things. Not that he would use his office to promote himself.

LS: I don't think that was ever the issue, but probably it was that when Joel became aware of a problem, he felt like he should do something. In this case, because he believed so strongly in what volunteers in the community could do, it was a natural.

AK: I was thinking that it was sort of an elastic type of office that could go in a lot of different directions, and different lieutenant governors have used it to promote their chosen causes. It's kind of like the secretary of state; there are certain things you know that they do. But they also can do these other things, and I think that was something that he saw as one of the great possibilities for that office.

LS: That's right. I only would wish that there would be some way to permanently honor what Joel was and did, especially in the field of volunteerism, literacy. I'm hoping that we can get a Joel Pritchard award for the volunteer of the whole state every year who has done the most to advance the cause of literacy. That would just be one small thing.

AK: I think it would mean a great deal to him.

LS: I have a feeling he's looking over our shoulders every now and then.

AK: Then he must be smiling broadly at this conversation.

Were you present when the state library was dedicated to him?

LS: I'm sorry that I was not, and that's a wonderful thing, too. When was that actually done?

AK: It was last summer.

LS: I was probably traveling around the country in my camper van at the time or I would have tried to do it.

AK: That seemed a very appropriate memorial to him.

LS: Yes. For somebody who loved libraries and reading and books and literacy, it's very appropriate.

AK: Is there anything else you'd like to talk about?

LS: No. I think it's just hard for anybody who knew Joel to convey the sort of richness of his wide-ranging interest in people and in ideas, and just what a genuinely good man he was. He'll live on in the hearts of anybody whoever knew him very well, I think.

AK: Yes. He had that presence.

LS: He did, indeed.

FRANCES JACOBS

TUTORING AT BEACON HILL SCHOOL

Frances Jacobs has managed the tutoring program at Beacon Hill Elementary School in Seattle for several years. She recalled Lieutenant Governor Joel Pritchard's work as a volunteer reading tutor at the school.

Frances Jacobs: In 1989, our school's Title I program was using the HOSTS (Help One Student to Succeed) model. It featured community volunteers and cross-age student tutors working with students with reading difficulties. I read an article in the *P-I* suggesting the HOSTS program should be tried in Seattle schools since we had so many problems. The reporter did not know we had four Seattle schools using the model already. After contacting Bill Gibbons, president of the HOSTS Corporation, I was encouraged to write Joel Pritchard, a person who was very enthusiastic about HOSTS, to come tutor at our school. He

accepted and began coming in the fall of 1989, once a week for an hour. In this hour he tutored two children. Some of his staff tutored as well. When he could not come, many times they would substitute for him. I believe he tutored with us until 1992 or 1993.

What was so amazing about Joel was that in all this time, he came as a volunteer who believed in what he was doing for children, not as the lieutenant governor. He never had press pictures taken of him at our school. He had coffee with our tutors, some twenty or twenty-five at a time, and attended our tutor luncheons. He was “at home” with us, always unassuming and gracious. On at least two occasions, he took students he tutored to visit Olympia. He impressed us with his total commitment to literacy.

In February 1990, at the National HOSTS Conference in Portland, Oregon, I presented him with a new award created by HOSTS for Joel. It was called HOSTS Ambassador Award. It was given to him because of his commitment to the program by tutoring and influencing others to become volunteers. In typical Joel fashion, he returned the award to me and asked me if it could hang in the hallway of Beacon Hill School. It hangs here today.

When Joel could no longer tutor, he asked a friend, Pat Dederer, to take his place. She says she took her tutoring role as a special “passing of the torch.” She still comes once a week and tutors our children.

We feel we were very privileged to have known and worked with Joel Pritchard. He was a man for all seasons.

CHAPTER 17

OTHER COMMITMENTS

DON BONKER

THE CONCORD COALITION

Don Bonker represented southwest Washington in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1975 to 1988. Prior to that, he served as Clark County auditor from 1967 to 1974.

Don Bonker: Joel Pritchard did not easily make commitments to organizations and causes. He felt that some were merely parasite organizations and others existed for themselves rather than the causes they served. Once Joel was convinced of the organization's worthiness and that his personal involvement would make a difference, he would typically give completely of himself.

The Concord Coalition was no different. Joel was approached by former senator and co-founder of the Concord Coalition, Warren Rudman, to serve as co-chairman of the Washington State chapter. Likewise, I was asked by the late Paul Tsongas to serve as the other co-chairman, so that Joel and I, one a Republican and the other a Democrat, and both former congressmen, could provide experience and bipartisanship to the Concord Coalition's program in Washington State.

It was not simply by Senator Rudman's invitation that Joel Pritchard decided to take on the responsibility. Joel preferred not to overload his schedule, and serving as lieutenant governor kept him busy enough. There were two other factors that went into Joel's decision. One was his close association with Martha Phillips, executive director

of the Concord Coalition, and her effective coaxing of Joel to take on the responsibility. The second was vintage Pritchard. The Concord Coalition's mission of maintaining integrity and accountability on dealing with the national budget was very appealing to Joel. Having served in Congress for twelve years, Joel had his fill of special interests, pork-barrel spending, partisan wrangling, and finger pointing when it came to the federal government's budget. Clearly, the Concord Coalition had both the mission and reputation to warrant Joel Pritchard's commitment.

Working with Joel, as co-chairmen of the Concord Coalition, was both a familiar and enjoyable experience. Since we had served together ten years in the U.S. Congress, we were former colleagues accustomed to working together. Joel was quite comfortable working in a bipartisan fashion (what he did not appreciate were political extremists in either party). In the early 1970s, he was the lone Republican in Washington State's high-powered congressional delegation. Indeed, Joel defeated Senator Henry Jackson's personal choice for the First District, but in a matter of months Scoop found working closely with the Republican Pritchard was easy and advantageous. Joel proved a highly regarded team player during the delegation's prime years in Congress.

Washington State has one of the better Concord Coalition organizations, with an active program and membership. We were fortunate to have several executive directors who ably managed the office and various activities, allowing Joel and me to meet regularly with the staff to go over the programs and occasionally preside over special events. This suited Joel perfectly. He was not into micro-managing or taking charge of activities. He was very much into setting agendas, insuring that whatever the function, it was to be done properly and holding people accountable. In all his years in public office, there was never a hint of scandal or impropriety and that is what he demanded of others.

There were, of course, public events where Joel and I would give speeches and promote the Concord Coalition program. On these occasions, Joel performed more like an instructor, preferring to educate his audience by drawing on his years in Congress rather than attack those whose actions or votes worsened the budget deficit. In speaking,

Joel possessed a wonderfully informal, if not relaxed, manner that revealed his appealing personal traits and relational skills. While he never attempted to load his speeches with statistics and details, Joel was well informed and welcomed the challenge of taking questions and engaging in dialogue.

In the Washington State congressional delegation, Joel was easily the most likable and trusted. In a room with the likes of Maggie (Senator Warren Magnuson) and Tom Foley, Joel delighted in political folklore and the collegiality of partisans finding humor and jest in their early experiences. In the political tradition of the state, Joel Pritchard was a pedigree and something of a legendary figure in his own right. This is extraordinary given that in his early days, Joel Pritchard was in league with the two Republican giants of the last half of this century, Dan Evans and Slade Gorton, and in Congress he had to compete with the Democratic icons, Warren Magnuson, Scoop Jackson, and Tom Foley. Yet Joel Pritchard held his own by being true to himself, as a person and a political figure.

While Joel Pritchard could not be stereotyped in this day of labeling, he was undeniably a genuine person. As a politician, he lacked the usual attributes (ambitious, egocentric, driven, self-centered, etc.) one associates with the profession. Yet as a person, Joel had wonderful characteristics that made him immensely popular in both Washingtons—unpretentious, engaging, personable, caring, etc. Probably as much as anyone I have known, Joel Pritchard best fits the Jeffersonian concept of the exemplary public servant, and his example should be etched and long remembered in the annals of Washington's political life.

DENNY HECK

TVW

Denny Heck, the president of TVW, was interviewed on November 12, 1997, and related the circumstances of the creation of the statewide public affairs television channel. Mr. Heck recalled the significant contribution played by Lieu-

tenant Governor Joel Pritchard in this milestone legislation.

Denny Heck: TVW is a nonprofit corporation with federal tax-exempt status. We are a television network, the mission of which is to provide citizens with increased access to unbiased information about state government deliberations through unedited television coverage of state government and public policy events, and to accomplish that purpose also through other relevant technologies, such as over the Internet. A lot of people think of us as a state version of C-SPAN, and that's largely, although not altogether, accurate.

Anne Kilgannon: What would be the difference?

DH: Well, we're a lot more comprehensive in our programming. C-SPAN focuses exclusively on either congressional deliberations or public policy, and we do something they've never been able to do, which is we cover all the oral arguments before our state Supreme Court. We also provide television coverage of the executive branch boards and commissions. The philosophy at TVW is that people have an inherent right to watch their government at work and often times that translates down to the executive branch, board and commission deliberations, every bit as much as the Legislature's deliberations. Nine out of ten bills end in language that agency X, Y, or Z shall promulgate rules to implement this legislation and—

AK: That's where we get right down to it.

DH: The devil's in the details, so we're more comprehensive than C-SPAN. We do all of state government; it's kind of a full-meal deal.

AK: A valuable program. Can you tell me about the genesis of TVW, just a thumbnail sketch of when you first got this idea, and then introduce Joel Pritchard's role in the birthing, as you called it, of TVW?

DH: The idea first came from a friend of mine named Stan Marshburn in October of 1992, in a

discussion in then Governor Booth Gardner's office. Stan burst into the office one day and I can remember him standing there—I can remember his exact words: “I know what you ought to do when we get out of here. You ought to start a state-level C-SPAN.” Well, in fact it's something we ended up doing together.

In the 1993 session of the Legislature, he and I both pretty much took the winter off after leaving the Gardner administration. But then toward the end of that session, we decided to take a run at the Legislature in the form of a proposal to grant a tax credit that would fund TVW, which wasn't known as TVW then. And we actually got pretty close. That was the year in which the Legislature was significantly increasing taxes, and as a result of that there was quite a bit of activity in the revenue process. There was quite a bit of favorable sentiment, but in the final analysis, it died.

After the session was over, we decided that our near-miss warranted re-examination. As a consequence of that discussion, we decided to kind of undertake this, frankly, in a much more professional way. We went out and procured the funds from Boeing and Weyerhaeuser and Microsoft and the Henry M. Jackson Foundation, to fund the planning report, because we'd really gone into the Legislature in the '93 session kind of hat-in-hand-here's-a-good-idea, but not a lot else.

AK: It's amazing you got as far as you did then.

DH: Yes, well, you know, it's kind of like horseshoes and hand grenades, you know, close didn't count. So we wrote the planning report in calendar year 1993, and it was the object of very considerable favorable statewide editorial support. We took that momentum into the 1994 session of the Legislature. In the House of Representatives, the support was overwhelmingly favorable.

AK: Both sides of the aisle?

DH: Yes. The tax credit proposal passed the House of Representatives on a vote of ninety to six. And when you consider what a fundamental change in the dispensing of information about

legislative deliberations this represented, that was a big deal.

AK: What happened in the Senate?

DH: Not quite so favorably received in the Senate.

AK: Can you account for that?

DH: A lot of it was an institution that's just more conservative, and by conservative here, I mean slower to change, especially as it relates to institutional considerations. There was also resistance philosophically to the funding methodology. Key senators did not want to grant a tax credit. Tax credit methodology basically circumvents the spending limitation as contained in Initiative 601. 601 says you can't spend more than “X”, but if you grant a business a tax credit for a donation to an organization like TVW, you are in effect spending revenue above the 601 limit. So there was some resistance based on that. Their reaction was that this ought to come in the form of an appropriation, not a tax credit. A bill not containing the appropriation, but containing the conceptual language necessary to implement, was before a committee and came out on a very narrow vote and went to the Senate Rules Committee.

Enter, Lieutenant Governor Joel Pritchard.

AK: As chair of the Rules Committee.

DH: As chair. The lieutenant governor, then and now, was allowed by the Senate to preside and cast votes, even though he actually isn't a member of the Senate per se. It's a matter of tradition and custom. We had already had conversations with Joel about the TVW proposal. The TVW board chair, Jeannette Hayner, former majority leader, but then retired and a good friend of Joel's, had contacted him and pitched this idea as a good open-government reform. And I went in and talked to him, and initially he was very resistant. He was resistant not because of the public funds involved, not because of any of those other kinds of reasons, but because of his perception of how the C-SPAN experience had worked in Washington, D.C. His perspective wasn't very charitable.

AK: Well, I know he hated grandstanding of any kind, and any kind of ostentatious display of verbosity, shall we say, so I imagine—did he allude to that?

DH: Exactly. He thought that the Special Orders of Business that C-SPAN covers where members of Congress can stand up and give one or two minute harangues—and that’s basically what they’ve degenerated into—were ostentatious displays of verbosity. He didn’t like it and he thought C-SPAN had heightened it. I kind of tried to respectfully suggest to him that it wasn’t C-SPAN who had proposed Special Orders of Business—it was Congress who did it, and if he didn’t like it or Congress didn’t like it, they should have done away with it. But, you know, the point was that C-SPAN threw a spotlight on this kind of activity, which he didn’t like.

AK: They were the mechanism.

DH: They were the vessel. So he was resistant. Well, we had gone to see him—I don’t know how many times and how many phone calls. And at some point in the course of that ’94 session, he got his hands on an article about the prospect of television coverage of appellate court arguments and he zoomed in on it very fast and with a great deal of strength. These are now my words, not his—but clearly the sentiment he was conveying—he would suggest what an incredible historical treasure it would be today to be able to sit down and watch the U.S. Supreme Court oral argument debate over such cases as *Brown v. Topeka Board of Education*. I got the feeling that what got connected in his mind was the value in history of having some of these events videotaped. He was especially focusing on the court, which was a bit of an irony because at the time, while we proposed we might someday televise the court, we had no agreement in hand.

AK: So it was your secondary thing over on the side that actually—

DH: That he focused in on, I think. It was an article, and I don’t know what that article was. And then he’d had a conversation, and I don’t

know with whom he had a conversation. The irony here was, in this regard, Joel was ahead of us. Back to that 1993 planning report—when we wrote that, we said we want to do the Legislature and, you know, unlike those guys at C-SPAN, we think the executive branch ought to be covered. Unlike those guys at C-SPAN, someday we’d like to cover the court. We never even bothered to call them. And we didn’t bother to call them because we assumed that they would take the same position all courts have taken, which was “no cameras.” United States Supreme Court Justice David Souter said before Congress last year or the year before there would be television in the Supreme Court *quote*, “over my dead body,” *unquote*, in testimony to the Congress. So the U.S. Supreme Court is adamantly opposed to this. And we just assumed that the State Supreme Court Justices in Washington State would be as well. Ironically, late in that session, we received a call from a staff person from the Office of the Administrator for the Courts, which administers the business of the courts, and said, “Hey, why’d you leave us off?”

AK: You never know how things are going to come out.

DH: You never know—serendipity—the biggest player in history. So, Joel had kind of connected to this concept and he went from being actively resistant to being a staunch advocate. On two occasions our legislation, now winding its way through the Senate, came up to a vote in the Rules Committee. One time it failed on a tie vote, and he voted “yes.” The next time it passed by one vote—his. And as I said in a recent newsletter tribute to Joel, there are more people than I can count who deserve the credit of having played a critical role in the creation of TVW, but there really are very few who can say that they cast the single vote that made a difference.

AK: Did he also work on other people to get them to change their mind?

DH: Yes, he spoke favorably.

AK: Do you think he was persuasive? Did you

have a certain amount of opposition, which you think he helped to counter?

DH: I think so, but I don't have any empirical evidence.

AK: Did he have that power, though, to get people to see his point of view? Did he have that role in the Senate?

DH: I think so. I think he could legitimize an issue. I think he could create, I guess, what the social scientists call an authorizing environment. He could create an aura of "Oh, come on, this is okay."

AK: So, because of who he is, he has that type of ability?

DH: Because of who he was, he had not just the stature, but the kind of, I don't want to say leavening influence, because I don't mean he lightened it—I mean—

AK: He lifted things up?

DH: Yes, hey, I like that.

AK: To a different level, say, a different way of seeing things?

DH: Yes, put it in a different light. So the legislation came out of committee by one vote and then it passed the Senate. I don't recall the exact numbers, but by a pretty good margin. Actually, ultimately that bill didn't pass, and TVW was created merely by the insertion of the appropriation in the budget bill without the implementing legislation. But I can say with absolute certainty that if we didn't have a positive vote in the House for the tax credit and a positive vote in the Senate for the implementing legislation for the appropriation, then we would not have got our appropriation. Because, basically what we had now was an established position by both chambers by good-sized votes that they were in favor, in concept, of the creation of gavel-to-gavel coverage of legislative deliberations. And it made all the difference. Joel cast the deciding vote. Joel started from being actively resistant to being an advocate.

In the spring of 1996, as he was preparing to leave office, the chair of the nominating committee for TVW Board of Directors, Pati Otley, and I met with Joel in Seattle and asked him to please consider joining the TVW Board of Directors. We wanted to ask him before the endless number of requests would come in to a person of this stature who had recently left office. His reaction was that they'd already started and—

AK: He already had so many different involvements, too—ongoing commitments.

DH: Yes, that he cared a lot about. He quickly said yes, but if and only if we didn't tell anybody. Because he didn't want to signal the people that he was beginning to accept things for post-office.

AK: Open the floodgates?

DH: Exactly, he did not want to open the floodgates.

AK: Wasn't he also in chemotherapy at the time?

DH: He was in chemotherapy at the time. So we promised not to do anything until the fall. In the fall I called him back and said, "Joel, it's the fall." And he said, "Well, you know, Denny, I don't think I'm in the same position to do this that I was." That was code for "I don't think I'm going to live."

AK: "I don't feel well."

DH: In fact, I think he used words very similar to "I don't know how long I would be able to do it." My first reaction was to beg him. My second reaction was this is such an important and personal thing that I need to be careful here. So my recollection is I called Jeannette Hayner, my board chair, and I think I called Pati, and said, "This is the response I'm getting."

I think the consensus was, "Well, on whatever terms we can have Joel. For however long we have him, we want him."

So, I called him back up and said, "Joel, we don't care how long. We very much want you. We think this is important."

And he said, “I would love to do it.”

At that point he said some very nice things about TVW, because he’d come to believe that what he had had a role in helping to create was something that he could be proud of. And I left out the best part.

AK: Well, tell me now.

DH: The best part is that when we went active, which was on April 10, 1995, we had a signal activation ceremony. This was a big deal for us. It was the moment in time we began.

AK: Did it take place here in this office?

DH: It took place right here in the TVW headquarters. There was literally a button pushed that sent our signal statewide into the homes of about one million people at that moment in time. We deliberated at length on how that evening and ceremony would evolve. We, of course, wanted to maintain the kind of almost rigid adherence to either nonpartisanship or bipartisanship that we had managed to build for ourselves. So when it came time to decide who would actually push the button, one of my first thoughts was: board member, my former employer, and good friend, Booth Gardner. But he was a Democrat, and we had to have people from both sides of the aisle because this is a bipartisan undertaking. And it took us about three nanoseconds to get to Lieutenant Governor Joel Pritchard’s name because he had cast the vote that had made all the difference.

AK: And he was second in command—it’s a nice symbol.

DH: The governor, lieutenant governor; Democrat, Republican.

And, you know, in a tiny way, I can’t help but make the observation that TVW is among scores of legacies that Joel Pritchard will leave behind. We’ve lost Joel now in terms of being with us, but it’s very possible that what we know as the state of Washington will go on for centuries. It’s hopefully equally possible that there will be something, maybe even TVW itself, that exists

to continue to provide citizens of that entity with access to those deliberations, and therefore, Joel Pritchard may very well, in a very concrete way, be with us for centuries as well.

AK: That’s what is so wonderful about doing this, that he will not remain an unsung hero. It will be obvious what he did and why he did it, his level of understanding of why it mattered, and that his willingness to listen was one of his chief characteristics and to think about what he was doing, not just to have a partisan response.

DH: Joel was never partisan. I’ve known Joel for—don’t remember when I first met Joel. Obviously I came after Joel in terms of my service in the Legislature, but I knew him while he was in Congress. I was on the statewide ballot the same year that Joel was first elected lieutenant governor. I ran for superintendent of Public Instruction. Joel and I were at a lot of candidate nights together.

AK: What was he like, what was his style as a candidate?

DH: In terms of the public, Joel was Joel. There wasn’t truly any difference between the public Joel and the private Joel. He was one of those rare people in that regard, but I’d just have to say from a personal interaction standpoint, he was very, very kind. I remember vividly one night toward the end of the campaign in Seattle, up in the—not the Fremont area—what do you call it, Phinney Ridge? I can remember the church that the candidate meeting was in. I can remember where I parked. I can remember walking in. I can remember standing at the back of the room, and I can remember at that late date the fear that began to creep into my heart that this passionate undertaking that I was in the midst of appeared to be headed for failure, which it was.

AK: You didn’t know you were going on to better things.

DH: I didn’t know I was. At that point I was worried I wasn’t going on, period. But I remember Joel walking in. I can see this in my mind’s eye. This is ten years ago. I can remember him walk-

ing up to me, and he saw it in my eye and he was always very—civility—he’s kind of become Mr. Civility in Washington State politics. He truly was one who practiced a kinder, gentler approach. But I can remember him saying warm and supportive words to me. At that point, remember, he had come from a long background as a Republican politician, and I had come from a long background as a Democratic politician. I was much more partisan in my youth than Joel ever was, even though at the time I was running for a nonpartisan office. It would have been much more predictable, or what you would expect, for him not to have gone out of his way to put a hand on my shoulder.

I think this is probably all I can do.

AK: It was wonderful. Thank you.

CONGRESSIONAL HISTORY PROJECT

Near the end of his life, Joel Pritchard began work on a project that had fascinated him since his own days in Congress. Steve Excell explained that, “Joel had the idea of beginning to track the historical characters that had occupied every House and Senate office. He found out from old-timers: Oh, you have the office that Sam Rayburn used to be in before he was Speaker. Or, you have the office that so-and-so started out in, in Congress—John Kennedy—and there was a story! The thought that you might have been in the same office as John Kennedy! But nobody kept records good enough that you could put a plaque in front of an office—and you get a lot of constituents visiting, and they want gallery passes, and literature and stuff, so they come and visit. And that would be a piece of history.”

So, Joel began this research and compiling of stories, but the project quickly assumed enormous proportions. He was able to enlist the aid of friends, notably Joyce Chandler and Suzie Dicks, who were active members of the U.S. Capitol Historical Society. Joyce Chandler recalled, “This project was very important to Joel. He had a picture of what the end product would be, but he did not know how to get there. The Historical Society had provided him with office

space. It was small and needed cleaning up, but he was very pleased. It was a start.

“When I arrived one morning to help him, he was extremely excited. He had learned how to use the copy machine! He proceeded to show me all of the things that most of us know that a copy machine can do. To Joel this was all new and a wonderful discovery. From then on, whatever we did that involved the use of the copy machine, Joel was officially in charge of making copies. We went to the Library of Congress to copy the pictorial dictionaries of all the Congresses from 1932 on. This way we would have room assignments of all of the members. Our plan was to take them back to our office and sort them out according to buildings and rooms.

“At this time, Joel was getting weaker and our days were short. We would work at the copying for two or three hours and then go out for lunch. Joel would tell me that I ought to get going home in order to miss traffic. In reality he was tired and needed to go home and rest. The copying of the pictorial directories was as far as we got on the project. But we got it started. This project gave Joel an objective to focus on during those last few months. I felt very privileged to be part of the beginning of his project. It was a difficult time of saying goodbye, but it was also a tender time of two friends sharing a vision—a dream.”

Joel inspired others at the Historical Society to continue the work. Suzie Dicks reports that Society volunteers are building a database to be made available over the Internet of the “most comprehensive record of U.S. congressional history.” She noted, “By the end of 1999, the Society’s volunteers are expected to have entered the data for core biographical elements for the first six Congresses—those that occurred before the Congress moved to Washington. Over the following months, the more obvious sources, such as old Congressional directories and previous guides to Congress will be entered. Later, the more difficult information will be gathered piece by piece, and entered as it is found. It is expected to take many years—but to be fun for the volunteer researchers.

“When the mapping capability is ready, the volunteers will scan in every district map, with

the dates it was effective, so that a researcher can determine which congressmen represented a particular town or neighborhood throughout its history. And, of course, to complete the task begun by Joel Pritchard, the office directories will be entered and old blueprints scanned so each member and staff can know who used their office before them.”

The project has grown to include much more information about members of Congress than Joel ever envisioned, but his idea remains at the core of this work

BRUCE CHAPMAN

THE DISCOVERY INSTITUTE

Bruce Chapman was interviewed in his office at the Discovery Institute in Seattle on March 2, 1999. A long-time friend of Joel Pritchard, he has been involved in civic affairs and politics in Washington State in many capacities since the 1960s. Mr. Chapman began his career as an editorial writer for the Herald Tribune and publisher of Advance Magazine from the period of 1960 to 1966. He then served as a Seattle city councilman from 1971 to 1975, and was elected as secretary of state, serving from 1975 to 1981. Mr. Chapman was then appointed director of the U.S. Census Bureau from 1981 to 1983, and moved from that position to become deputy assistant to the president in the White House from 1983 to 1985. He was appointed U.S. ambassador to the United Nations organizations in Vienna from 1985 to 1988. Mr. Chapman became a Hudson Institute fellow from 1988 to 1990. In 1990, he founded the Discovery Institute, which he continues to direct today. We discussed Joel Pritchard's involvement with the Institute, and his long association with Mr. Chapman.

Anne Kilgannon: Can you tell me how you first met Joel Pritchard?

Bruce Chapman: First of all, I was a young Harvard undergraduate with a strong interest in politics and journalism, and some other friends and I had started a magazine of Republican

thought called *Advance*. In the process of doing that, we moved it from Harvard as an undergraduate publication distributed nationally to a national publication headquartered in Washington, D.C.

I had spent a couple of summers in Seattle thanks to my one-time roommate, Tom Alberg, who lived out here. I had joined the Young Republicans and gone to some things and had heard people like young state Representative Slade Gorton. As a writer/editor of this new magazine, and thinking also that some day I'd like to move to Washington State, I thought a perfect article in 1962-63 would be on the state of Washington, on the interesting group of young legislators who were out there. So I wrote an article called "The New Breed in Washington State." In that context I interviewed all of them, including Dan Evans and Slade Gorton and, of course, Joel. In many ways Joel was the easiest person to meet and know, and in some ways the most fun because he had the kind of open and engaging personality that made you feel at home at once.

Later on—and I can't remember exactly how this happened, but he and Slade Gorton came back East to talk to the people in the office of newly elected Governor Bill Scranton of Pennsylvania. They first came to Washington, D.C. and then went to Harrisburg. The reason they were doing this was that they were scoping out a governor's race for Dan Evans. They wanted advice from other Republicans who'd recently won elections. This would have been 1963, I think.

Joel loved to tell the story of how they came back East. I picked them up in my little Rambler automobile. I called it the "Advance-mobile," and it had a stuck door on one side and we always had to get out and open the door for whoever was sitting in the back. We went up to Harrisburg and we saw the people at the governor's office. My job was simply to drive them around and to be their local advance man as it were—no pun intended. On the way back we stopped at Gettysburg. Joel and Slade and I got out and, and according to Joel—because I don't remember much about it—there was an argument between Slade and me as to whether Pickett charged in this direction or that direction and who did what and when. It started to rain and Joel said, "Both

these people thought they were the experts on the Civil War.” He said “Finally, it was raining so hard I just sat in the car and waited for these fools to finish their conversation and get back in the car.” He told it as a great rollicking story.

I helped from a distance to raise a little money for Dan Evans, and in 1966 when the *Herald Tribune* folded—I had gone from *Advance Magazine* to the *New York Herald Tribune* as an editorial writer—I called Joel. We had forged a friendship by this time, and I said, “I’m interested in moving to Washington State. I’ve wanted to do this ever since I came out the first time. Do you have any ideas?” He really didn’t have any ideas, but I did move out in ’66 and almost immediately wound up seeing him as somebody who was active, still recruiting candidates for the state House and Senate. By then Dan Evans was in the governor’s office, as of ’64, and Joel was eyeing the Congress. It made sense for him to think about it.

AK: Really? At that date, in 1966?

BC: Maybe later. Maybe ’67, ’68.

AK: He maintains he wasn’t.

BC: Whether or not he was thinking about it, other people were certainly seeing him as somebody who ought to be doing something in the future. I think people were beginning to mutter about it.

I got involved in city politics almost as soon as I got out here, with Choose an Effective City Council, the group “CHECC.” He helped on that on the margins. That was an amalgam of young Republicans and young Democrats trying to change the city council. He was helpful to the group of us who were working on that.

I got elected to the city council in ’71, but in the meantime he had run for Congress. It was typical of his campaigns that people had a lot of fun in them. They had early morning meetings, and I can’t remember where they were held. I’m not a morning person and I hated going to morning breakfast meetings, and they always teased me about that. In Joel’s case I think you would say that there was a lot of careful preparation, there was a lot of thought given to the relationship with Tom Pelly, who was the incumbent, and whom

Joel had supported in the past. There was a great deal of frustration. I talked to somebody who was working for Pelly who was really resentful of what she called the “Pritchard boys.” Of course Tom Pelly felt that he was being pushed, and in a way he was. He had the safest Republican district in the state. It’s the one district that had survived the Goldwater defeat. Everybody else had lost.

That campaign had a huge base of people in it. I remember Don Kraft—of what was then Kraft, Smith and Lowe Advertising Agency—put together a hilarious invitation, sort of taking off on Hollywood extravaganzas to advertise this fund raiser. It was very typical of Joel that the thing was full of names of people. Joel was in it, but this seemingly was not about Joel, except that all these people were doing things for him.

In fact, if you went back into his past you would see that in his early days he helped organize campaigns for other people, including an unsuccessful campaign that Governor Langlie ran against Warren Magnuson back in the ’50s. That one was quite controversial. He and his brother Frank were involved in at least two mayor’s races. They had really learned a lot from these campaigns, including the importance of large numbers of names of people to support you. So they would put out a list of “a thousand people” who were supporting so-and-so and then another “thousand people” and it looked like a real bandwagon. Of course it was a real bandwagon, but just getting the names, whether they gave any money or not, was the object.

AK: To create a ground swell?

BC: Right. His campaign was so broad-based that it was scary to people who didn’t have that base. He had a large citizen’s organization. In those days Seattle still had a sizable Republican population, and his district, Queen Anne/Magnolia, was fairly solidly Republican.

He lost in the primary in 1970, but there was simply no doubt in anybody’s mind that he would do it again and that all these people were prepared to do it again. At that point, Tom Pelly—I don’t know how old he was, he may have been in his late sixties, he may have been sixty-eight—decided to retire, and then Joel had an open seat.

The funny part about it was that he particularly thought that this would not be a difficult race in 1972 against the Democrat John Hempelmann. It was considered to be a Republican district and he had done so well in the primary before, and now did not have the incumbent as an opponent. And he had this large organization, which was still there and holding meetings. I remember we helped organize a party in the Underground in downtown Pioneer Square. It was so crowded you couldn't move. It was just an incredibly successful party—unless you had claustrophobia.

He really down-played any differences with John Hempelmann. John had been in CHECC, this group that I'd talked about in the city. He was an able, articulate fellow and so he nearly won. He attacked, and Joel did not defend himself.

It's really odd when you think about it, that back in the '40s, Joel had been involved in this campaign against Magnuson, which was quite tough and it was uncharacteristic of anything else that ever happened to Joel. And Joel, I think, maybe decided that he wouldn't campaign like that ever again, and he didn't. He never did. I think he had a political career which in some ways couldn't be duplicated today, because at the end he had his reputation and he had almost no residual campaign organization. He was just somebody that nobody wanted to run against and he just did not have to mount much of a campaign.

He couldn't have started that way. And also, today you need a lot more money. You couldn't do it with just people. You would have to do it with money and he just didn't have much of a way to get money. He hated asking people for money. There would be big business people in Seattle who would give twenty-five or one hundred dollars to his campaign. That would be a big thing for them to do, to accomplish. And one of his fund raisers would go around and collect these twenty-five dollar checks. In retrospect, that was just a strange way to campaign. But it was a wonderful way, because it built a broad base. It was true citizen politics in those days.

Joel always had this theme, which was sort of a 1960s theme, that the solution to our problems was for more people to get involved. I don't think that's necessarily proven to be correct, because at certain times we did get more involved and it

didn't necessarily help our problems. And we now have fewer people involved, numerically. Anyhow, Joel did have people not only voting, but active and working for him.

He won that election in 1972, as we know, in the famous cliffhanger. He was behind on election night and he had to get fifty-eight percent of the absentees to win, and he got them. Of course, again, Republicans tended to predominate in the absentees in those days before motor-voter registration and that sort of thing. So he won it, and it was quite a shock to John Hempelmann, who was expecting to take office. In fact, they listed him as the victor in the election book back in D.C.

AK: I understand his name was painted on the door.

BC: I think Joel was absolutely shocked that it was such a close election. What he decided, of course, was to just redouble his effort and pay a lot of attention to the district and how he served the district.

I think that he was very fortunate in Congress in that he had a lot of very good people working for him who were just dedicated to him. They believed in him. He was so nice to people, and that helped forge the loyalty. But people also had a protective attitude toward Joel. They thought, "Oh, he's too nice for his own good." He was nice, truly, but he was also wily. There was a williness behind this niceness. What could be better? What could be more Machiavellian than to be really nice and make people want to help you and save you from your own naiveté and idealism?

AK: It's disarming, literally.

BC: It is disarming. And I think, because he was a moderate Republican in a basically conservative party and the only Republican in a Democratic delegation for a long time, he really had to get along with people if he was to survive. I mentioned in one of my articles that Senator Magnuson and Senator Jackson really tried hard to beat him in that '72 election because they thought, "Here's a chance to make a clean sweep."

Of course, Senator Jackson wanted to run for president at some point, and what better thing to do than go to the Democratic Party and say, "I've got the whole state. I've got the whole delegation. We've done this, even in the First District, which is Republican." After Joel won, they realized that he wouldn't make that mistake again of underestimating his opponent. They said to him, "We won't do this to you again," and they didn't. From then on he had pretty much of a cakewalk.

He also made the pledge, I think, in that election of '72, that he would only serve twelve years. I remember arguing against that. I said, "This is going to get you a headline for only one day, and yet in years to come you're going to be sorry, because you're going to have to live up to it."

AK: He stuck to it.

BC: He did stick to it. In fact it never occurred to me that you didn't have to stick to it. I don't think it ever occurred to him, but in fact—

AK: It occurred to a lot of other people.

BC: A lot of other people said, "Well, you don't have to stick to this. No one will be shocked or surprised." Like I said, I thought it was a mistake, but he did it.

AK: He really believed in it. He believed you shouldn't stay anywhere too long.

BC: That's absolutely true, yes. Since I really agree with him, I think I couldn't object too much. I could see why I wouldn't want to do it too long if I were in that job. I guess I just don't see it as some universal principle. Joel certainly never rubbed anybody's noses in it. He never said that other people had to do it.

AK: No. It seemed just a personal thing.

BC: In Congress he was well known for being a good service member. He took care of people in his constituency. He was probably too generous. People would come to town and he'd take them to dinner, and he really couldn't afford it. He had

some money from his business career, but he got divorced along the way there. It wasn't too long after he got elected, I think in '72, that he got divorced. That, of course, was expensive and hard on him. He still had a bunch of children.

AK: They were all in college.

BC: That was expensive. People on his staff would try to discourage this generosity on his part, and they did to some extent. But he would never embarrass anybody by letting them pick up the check. They might push to do it and he'd let them do it, but if there was any question, he would be there.

For a while he had so little money that he shared an apartment with Tim Petri who was a new member from Wisconsin. I think I may have introduced them. Tim was a college roommate of mine and he's still in Congress. He's one who didn't believe in term limits, and he's a very good congressman I might add.

Here was Joel, a new bachelor, and Tim, who at that point was still a bachelor, and so they had this pad. I remember going there and there was never anything to eat. I had no desire to ever stay with them because you'd open the refrigerator and about half the refrigerator was filled with Wisconsin string cheese that someone had dumped on Tim Petri. Then there'd be a couple of open cans of things that looked a lot like college dorm food. We'd always say after Joel opened the refrigerator, "Looks like we're going out again tonight."

But there were other people who hung out at that place. Joel really lived his life as a congressman. That's what his life was all about.

There were a lot of issues that Joel took up that were things that he believed in, not because of the politics, but because they were important to the country and important to the district, such as foreign affairs. He was much more interested in foreign affairs than he probably campaigned on. He traveled extensively. He learned a lot. He was somebody who learned by talking to people. He was much enchanted with Roy Prosterman at the University of Washington and his land reform ideas.

There were things he cared about because

they were important to the country and the district. And there were things he cared about because he just enjoyed them. I think the Klondike Gold Rush Park fell into that category. His grandparents had a direct connection. I think his grandfather had gone over the Chilkoot Pass.

AK: Yes. They both had.

BC: I, as a city councilman, was interested in Dawson City as a sister city. For a while it was, but it was a pretty unequal relationship. It was a tiny little town. But Joel was interested in that, and I think he was fascinated with what we were doing in Pioneer Square. He could see that even though it wasn't part of his district, that history meant something to him, and that it was now beginning to mean something to the whole community.

In connection with that, we talked about what it would take to put together a park with the Canadians. It would be an international park and we needed some anchor here. Obviously, we wanted part of this to represent the Klondike gold rush. Everybody should remember that the Klondike gold rush made Seattle a great city. We went from thirty-thousand to three-hundred thousand in about ten or fifteen years, in terms of population.

So he put the bill in and shepherded it through. It was not a very expensive bill and it essentially set up the Klondike Gold Rush Museum, which is still in Pioneer Square. Then other things were done up in Skagway, and with the Canadians, of course, in Dawson City.

AK: It was really unprecedented at that time, to have a park that was in two or three different places.

BC: Right. We now have a park. And there's another one that I know about, which is the Campobello International Park in Lubeck, Maine, and Campobello Island, Nova Scotia.

AK: But this was the first?

BC: This was the first and it was not then a terribly popular idea. I think he was popular with a small

band of historic preservationists and Allied Arts types as a result, but that had nothing to do with his interest in it. He just thought it was a great thing to do.

AK: I understand that his staff didn't do the legwork on this project, that he did it. That this was something personal.

BC: That's why I say there were things that he just enjoyed. It's not something the staff would have taken on necessarily, but it's something he enjoyed. And it was a lot of fun for me because we had this personal friendship. There wasn't all that much stuff we could do together, but this was one that was fun to do.

I have a mental picture of us up on that platform in Occidental Park and it was a sunny day and we were just savoring that announcement.

I want to make a statement about Joel. I think Joel was in politics and government service because of what he could accomplish there. It was an end in itself. But he also was in it because it was a wonderful way to get to know people and to establish and maintain friendships. He had so many people that he knew, and I think one of the reasons he really never got out of it was that so many of his personal friends were people he knew through public life.

AK: I think that is very insightful.

I understand that he had something to do with helping you to become secretary of state.

BC: He did. He encouraged me to consider becoming secretary of state. I was a city councilman but I actually had thought about doing various other things. At some point I was thinking about running for mayor, and I was thinking about running for lieutenant governor, or something of that sort. I had done some work for the secretary of state's office on a couple of reports on various topics and he knew about that.

There was another person who was interested in the job when it became vacant when Lud Kramer resigned. I was pledged to support that person, so Joel said to me, "What if that person was not going to get it?"

I said, "That would be another matter, but I

don't know about any such thing."

He didn't say anything more and then the next thing I knew he was back on the telephone. He said, "I called up Dan and asked to come and see him."

Dan said, "What about?"

Joel said, "Oh, I just want to come and see you."

Dan was suspicious and said, "Now come on, what is it that you want to talk to me about, Congressman?"

And Joel said, "It doesn't matter, but why don't you do this. I'll come and see you. When are you free?"

Dan said, "I have a speech in Seattle and I'll be driving down to Olympia and if you like you can spend the night at the mansion and we can talk about whatever you want."

So they got in the car and Joel said, "Say, what do you think about this secretary of state race?"

Dan said, "I don't know what I'm going to do about that."

Joel said, "What about Bruce Chapman?" Joel is telling this second hand.

Dan said, "Would he take it?"

Joel said, "I think he might take it if you offered it to him."

So Dan said, "Maybe I'll talk to him about it." They got down to Olympia and wound up at the house and he said, "Here's the guest room. Make yourself comfortable. What was it that you wanted to talk to me about?"

And Joel said, "Oh, nothing. I was just looking forward to having some time with you."

I don't know how he got back up to Seattle the next morning, but he did. That was the whole visit and he felt that he was very clever in how he handled that.

AK: He never told me that story. I had read something about that, but didn't know quite how it happened.

BC: It's a funny story and he told it very well.

I'd like to talk next about the refugees. I think the main thing to be said about the refugees issue is that in 1975 when Saigon was about to fall, I called him because I knew he'd been over there,

to Vietnam. I had been to Vietnam in the sixties and I knew people over there. I had also read some history. I said, "This is going to collapse, but people will get out. When the Nazis took over Austria people still got out. They got out of all these countries—some people got out. What are we doing to facilitate that?"

Joel called Senator Jackson's office and I don't know why he thought they would know more about it than he did, but he did. They were of the opinion that nobody would get out. Maybe ten thousand total would get out, just by flukes. But he said, "Keep working on it."

So then I called the secretary of state's office, because I knew somebody in Kissinger's shop. They said that they were astonished that anybody was interested in people getting out because all they were getting was criticism, that the people were afraid that the United States would be deluged with refugees.

I called Dan Evans and I said—I'll never forget—I said, "This is an issue where Governor Jerry Brown has made it quite clear that he doesn't want any refugees coming into California. He wants assurances that they won't land in California."

"Well, don't talk to me about Jerry Brown. You know what I think of Jerry Brown. Jerry Brown is no example for anything."

I said, "That's the whole point. I agree with you, but the point is that he doesn't want refugees. Imagine what will happen if you say we will take refugees."

"Oh," he said and after giving it some attention, he said, "Okay," and his staff got to work on it.

Then we got back and Joel and I talked to the secretary of state's office. They just couldn't believe that anybody was actually interested in having refugees. Then Dan made it public and we were the first state to call for refugees and Tom Pryor, who was doing something with emergency services in state government, wound up organizing the refugee program.

AK: Were people already coming out?

BC: Yes. This all took place over a couple of weeks, and of course this was in the days that the

North Vietnamese were marching down towards Saigon and Saigon was closed. The famous picture of helicopters is a whole other story.

The Navy didn't know what to do with people because when they picked them up, where were they going to go? They were taking them to Guam and they were taking them to Manila, to Subic Bay. So when states, this state in particular, were actually willing to receive people, that made a big difference. Of course it's hard for anybody to recognize now what the public mood was and what the political mood was. But the fact that Jerry Brown was emphatic that he did not want refugees was indicative of the times.

AK: What role did Joel play in all this?

BC: Joel facilitated the discussion. I think that's a fair thing to say.

AK: He was certainly a booster of this idea?

BC: And he was a big booster of it. And he was a booster of Tom Pryor. He knew all these people, of course.

Tom later got criticized. It was one of the most bizarre things. I don't remember who it was, but there was some report that said that they didn't keep accurate records on these people coming in and the expenditures on the foodstuffs and so forth. I said it would be a little bit like somebody with a notebook going up and down on D-Day checking whether the buttons were polished on people's uniforms and that their shoes were properly shined. Here were these people coming in, we didn't have names, we didn't know who they were. All we knew was that they were arriving. It was literally a life-and-death situation. The fact that this state could throw itself into this with no preparation was remarkable. By the way, Ralph Munro was involved in this. He was working on Dan's staff at that time. I had stepped out of it at that time. I had nothing more to do with it other than to think that it was a great thing.

Later, Joel surprised me by being interested in running for lieutenant governor. But when he left Congress he really was somewhat at sea. He didn't talk about it much, but he really detested the possibility of lobbying. While he was intrigued

by the idea of doing television—

AK: Didn't he work for KIRO at that point as a commentator?

BC: Yes, he did. He was intrigued by that but it really wasn't him. It really wasn't his style to put everything into ninety seconds.

AK: Yes. And didn't they want him to be more of an attack journalist than he really had the personality to be?

BC: Absolutely. It just wasn't his style. Joel was able to persuade people, not by arguing, but by getting them to stand outside the situation and to understand what was going on in it. He and they would stand outside the situation and he would describe, usually in a jocular fashion, what was going on. Then people would get an impression of what the real choices were, and then they would feel happier with where he wanted them to be. It's very hard to do that in a television commentary. But if you ever saw him in front of a group, that's how he did things. He had the whole group in a good mood about it, but also it was as if it was happening somewhere else and not to them, so their egos weren't engaged. The point of television journalism, however, is to engage your ego.

Joel said, "I've started out in this state, I'd like to finish in this state." So that's how he became lieutenant governor.

Frankly, I never even visited him down there. I kept thinking, "I'm going to do it, I've got to go down and have lunch with Joel," and I just didn't do it, ever.

We met up here from time to time, and when he said, "I'm really finally going to get out now," I said, "What are you going to do?"

He said, "I don't know what I'm going to do."

And I said, "Why don't you come with us?" He had been skeptical initially about Discovery Institute, about setting up a think tank. It just seemed like such a big thing to do.

AK: Perhaps you should say a few sentences about what it is you do?

BC: Discovery Institute is a public policy think

tank involved in national and international issues, primarily, and some local and regional issues that have larger implications. We established it as a branch of the Hudson Institute at first and then we broke off almost immediately and became an independent institute in 1990.

I think it's fair to say that although Joel was initially skeptical, he was frequently on board to help us do things, introduce speakers, take part in seminars, that kind of thing. I think as time went on he liked what he was seeing more and more and so when he finally did leave office, I said, "Why don't you come down and office with us? We'll put an office together for you." He did. He and Maury Hausheer came in and they started a project on politics.

I had a book that I am still writing on politicians and Joel is in it. He had his own take on politics. I'd interviewed him and I said, "Why don't you put some of your ideas down?" You know how these things go, it takes a long time to get around to it. He was quite sick by the time he did get around to it, but he wanted to do it and he wrote a very nice paper: *Common Characteristics of an Effective Legislator*. That's the distillation of what he believed.

AK: So, he wrote that as a paper for you. What was its purpose?

BC: To express part of our public policy program.

AK: Does your group have a journal?

BC: Actually we don't. We put things in other publications. This article appeared in the newspaper. I think if he'd lived longer it would have been more extensive, but it wound up as a paper that was perfect for a Sunday section of the newspaper. I can't remember which paper, it's in the *Times* or *P-I*. It's kind of a swan song and credo and a statement of his most strongly felt political convictions.

AK: So he would come in here and—

BC: We weren't here, we were in the Perkins Offices. In the Perkins Coie law firm over in the Washington Mutual Tower. He had an office and

we told him that if he wanted anything done, we would type it and take care of it. He had a phone and he didn't use a computer. He had access to the FAX and what-have-you.

AK: How often would he come in?

BC: He started coming in on a regular basis, but he almost immediately got sick again. Then he said, "I'm going to fight this for a while," and he'd be gone for a long period and then he'd come back. He was not in a lot of time, but we did a couple of things. During that time we had a party. A lot of people organized a big party to honor him, which was one of the first events held down at the International Conference Center. After that I was just astonished. He decided he wanted to do a trip to the Far East, and he did. The last year of his life, and he just did it.

AK: Was that the Pickle-Ball trip? There was one where he went promoting Pickle-Ball.

BC: I don't remember. He was very interested in that. The Pickle-Ball story is a great story. I think he always kicked himself. It could have been "the Pritchard-Ball" and he probably could have made some money on it.

AK: I don't think he cared. Then he was doing the congressional office project and running back and forth doing that.

BC: Yes. And he had to abandon that.

AK: Just to be clear, is there a difference between someone who works at the Discovery Institute and someone who's a fellow? What exactly does that mean?

BC: There are fellows of various kinds. There are full-time paid fellows, there are volunteer fellows, and there are people who are part-time paid fellows. He would have been considered a part-time unpaid fellow. We did not pay him. We weren't able to. I think if he had come a little earlier and hadn't been ill, we would have tried to build some staff around him and create a project.

Particularly on this issue of politics—think about right now—politicians have never stood in lower repute with the public. One of the things that Joel and I shared along with another man, Mort Frayn, who used to be in politics here, and with a few other people, was a sense of the dignity of political life and the inherent dignity of this very difficult process, and the need to encourage good people to take part in it. I think that's where he was headed and that's why this last piece he did was such a good statement for him.

I remember once it was done taking it up to him and saying, "Is this the way you want it?" This was after essentially editing it for him. "Are you satisfied?" He was at his apartment and he looked pretty weak and he said, "This is just going to be fine. Thank you." That was it. That was not long before he died. I was worried that it was going to come out after he died, but it came out about a month before he died. He was pleased.

**COMMON CHARACTERISTICS
OF EFFECTIVE LEGISLATORS
BY JOEL PRITCHARD**

In the age of term limit considerations and serious concern about the length of service of elected officials in our governments, many thoughtful commentators have expressed opinions decrying what will happen to legislative bodies when they become heavily populated with members who lack experience and institutional memory. It is my opinion that the quality of legislative bodies, including the U.S. House and Senate, as well as state legislatures, need not suffer if the right type of individuals seek and are elected to legislative office.

After serving thirty-two years as an elected public official, with twenty-four of those in legislative bodies, it is my observation that effective legislators possess characteristics, which regardless of their years of experience, are primarily responsible for their success. In addition to possessing an abundance of ambition, intelligence and a strong commitment to hard work, they have most of the following characteristics:

1. Their ego is under control. Those with a large ego control it. They do not give those who come

into contact with them the impression that they are a "legend in their own mind." They do not abuse staff members and those who assist them, nor behave in a condescending manner toward other people, including fellow legislators. Usually they are consistent in treating all people in a friendly and collegial way.

2. They are able to manage and lead their staff or those who are chosen to assist them, and they seek advice and counsel from those who are highly competent, thoughtful and trustworthy.

The ultimate effectiveness of a legislator can be partially judged by whom they employ, by their willingness to seek information from diverse sources and by whom they rely on for information and advice. Legislators who limit themselves to a narrow circle of ideologues from any side of the political spectrum, usually limit their effectiveness.

3. They do their legislative homework, seek to be well prepared, and develop expertise on at least one issue. Even though some issues are not of great importance to most members of a legislative body or to the general public, a legislator will obtain respect from fellow lawmakers by providing them with an improved understanding of certain types of legislation. Because legislators deal with many issues, each has an opportunity to become an expert. The choices are wide and deep. A good legislator develops expertise during each day of service.

4. They are not obsessed with obtaining credit from the media and the public for successful legislative accomplishments. They understand that proper modesty as well as giving deserved praise to fellow legislators builds trust and respect. It is an important aspect of bridge building that leads to future effectiveness in achieving goals. Most legislators do not care for fellow members who continually seek credit and approval by exploiting the media. Often we find that legislators who are obsessed with obtaining publicity and credit are in reality among the most ineffective members of their legislative body. Unfortunately this is a fact that all too often escapes the attention of the media.

5. They realize that getting half of what they want is preferable to obtaining nothing at all. This means that, if necessary, they are able to come to an agreement and compromise on an issue.

Political and social principles are extremely important, but of little benefit if results are not ultimately produced by their advocates. Obtaining desired legislation by increments is usually more realistic and achievable in U.S. legislative bodies than are dramatic changes in established law. Legislators who insist on having everything their way usually carry little influence among their colleagues and are relatively ineffective.

6. They have the capacity to work with colleagues in a bipartisan fashion and respect the sincerity of those who oppose their point of view. They are able to argue and discuss issues without rancor and realize that they may not possess the final truth in all matters of public policy. Respecting the opinions of others is important to the functioning of a legislative body and enhances the civility of our democratic processes. This means that legislators treat their fellow members with respect. In addition, it usually means that they understand that most complicated legislation, upon its enactment and becoming law, will turn out to lack perfection and over time will be modified and changed.

7. On issues where dramatic differences of opinion exist, they are intellectually capable of understanding their opponents' positions and arguments. This ability, which requires a special effort, gives a legislator a fuller understanding of his/her position. Being able to articulate an opponent's position allows one to improve the advocacy of their own argument and signals to their colleagues that they are a person of substance and ability and worthy of respect.

8. They refuse to take themselves too seriously. Even though they have been elected by fellow citizens and obtained a respected title, they accept the fact that the world does not revolve around them and their service as legislators. For many elected officials, periodic re-election and growing seniority bring to pass personality changes that give them an unrealistic sense of their importance.

Arrogance and acute self-centeredness are major symptoms and often become problems, which harm their effectiveness.

9. They understand that you become more effective by listening, questioning and learning than by talking. Members of legislative bodies usually have less respect for fellow members who constantly express opinions without evidence of thoughtful study, sincere intellectual curiosity and hard work. Grandstanding and demagoguery are poor substitutes for real achievement. Sometimes they assure re-election, but seldom lead to respect and effectiveness.

10. They are able to demonstrate their limitations and integrity by admitting imperfections. The ability to admit imperfections such as being wrong on an issue, and changing one's mind, are signs of personal security and strength, not of weakness. Such admission, when necessary, demonstrates genuineness of character and ensures bonds of trust and respect among peers and constituents.

As any observer will tell you, a majority of our legislators do not have all of these characteristics and I would be the first to confess that as a twenty-four year veteran of legislative service not all of them are part of my effectiveness arsenal. An effective legislator need not possess all of these characteristics, but will have a majority of them etched in their personality prior to their election. It is my observation that you can usually predict after a reasonably short period of time which new members of a legislative body will soon become effective as well as those who will have a more difficult time. People seldom change!

There are other factors that will help a relatively new legislator become effective, such as real life experiences, an innate capacity for good judgment and the character to stand up and be counted when the consequences may be difficult and one's political career is on the line. Many of our most effective legislators have great difficulty in being elected to higher office. Why is this so? I believe the major reason is that very good legislators are "work horses" instead of "show horses." Getting the job done for the benefit

of fellow citizens and fulfilling what they believe to be their obligations are more important to them than the cultivation of an impressive public image. Also, effective legislators often make decisions and take positions and votes that guarantee them long term opposition from various interest groups.

Unfortunately we have many legislators at the state and federal levels in this country who are easily re-elected, are well liked by the media and their constituents, but are inept and ineffective. They can and often will stay in a legislative body as long as possible, where they acquire seniority and power which they sometimes misuse. We will always have these individuals, because of the overwhelming ability of incumbents to be re-elected. I believe this will be so for the foreseeable future. Campaign finance "reforms" have so far done little to threaten the power of incumbency.

However, we must remember that most incumbents are serious, purposeful legislators and that even though overwhelming majorities are easily re-elected, they need not be classified as unworthy of support.

For too long legislators have been judged by pundits, political scientists, and the media by their voting record, the number and content of the bills they sponsor and cosponsor and the programs they propose. Even though these yardsticks are not without merit, they do not come close to telling the whole story of effectiveness. That is why I believe that if you want to pass judgment on present and future members of Congress and state legislators you need to seriously consider the characteristics mentioned. Doing so will improve the accuracy of our judgment and in the end, the effectiveness of legislative bodies in our democracy.



Joel Pritchard among a group of Vietnamese children on a trip he made to their country with Roy Prosterman of the Rural Development Institute. Pritchard's interest and expertise in foreign affairs led to many trips all over the globe, both professionally and personally.

Appendix A

TRIBUTES

The Rural Development Institute has operated since 1981 as a nonprofit corporation. It was founded by Professor Roy Prosterman of the University of Washington School of Law to “institutionalize the work done by him and his associates on the issues of land reform, rural development, and foreign aid in developing countries.” The mission of the Institute is “to alleviate poverty and to promote global stability through democratic land reform and rural development measures that confirm human potential and individual freedoms in less developed and transitional economies.” RDI seeks “to broaden access to farmland and secure land rights for farmers.”

RURAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE

The RDI Annual Report of 1997 included the following memorial tribute to Joel Pritchard, which explains his longtime association with the Institute:

JOEL PRITCHARD 1925-1997

It was with great regret that the Board members and Staff of the Rural Development Institute learned of the passing of Joel Pritchard, who was one of the original members of RDI’s Board of Directors and a supporter of our work for over a quarter of a century.

While still a member of the Washington State Legislature, then as a U.S. congressman, then as Washington’s lieutenant governor, and finally as a private citizen after a life of public service, Joel Pritchard spoke and acted for the world’s poor and landless. As a candidate for Congress he traveled to South Vietnam to learn about the land-reform issue first hand in the early 1970s. Then, just elected, he traveled with Roy Prosterman and *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* editor Jack Doughty to the Philippines in late 1972, visiting villages and interviewing tenant farmers. Joel’s commitment to land reform was strong and continuous, and in 1993 he returned to Vietnam for a four-week trip with RDI President Roy Prosterman and Executive Director Tim Hanstad, looking at the decollectivization of that country’s agriculture and assessing remaining needs. Cheerfully and energetically, he joined in interviewing farmers, took field notes, and proved himself an able photographer of the rural scene.

Again and again, Joel spoke up in a variety of contexts, in and out of Congress, for the needs of the rural poor. As an RDI board member, he brought his wise counsel to our young organization, as always quiet and unassuming in making his vital contributions to our work.

Joel Pritchard will be sorely missed, by the Rural Development Institute, as by so many others in our community.

Joel and I met when he was a Washington State senator and I was a news correspondent for KOMO TV in Seattle. I covered sessions of the Legislature from 1970 until 1973. In that time, Joel and I became close personal friends, a friendship that lasted until he died.

He would often see me during a break in a session and holler, "Hey, Chandler! Need a story?" I often used interviews with Joel, in part because I liked him so much and because he was always interesting. He was involved in everything from abortion rights to economic development. He worked hard and did his homework. Many of the stands he took were controversial, none more than advocating abortion rights for women. Yet, Joel was constantly in high spirits, never angry at an adversary and enjoyed the respect and affection of foe and ally alike.

During my first year in Congress, Joel was enormously helpful as I learned my way around the House of Representatives. We spent a lot of time together, discussing the major issues, rules of the House, the personalities of members and how to be effective. Two bits of advice are uppermost in my mind.

First, Joel believed that too many in Congress tried to accomplish their objectives overnight. "Remember, this is a marathon, not a sprint." He followed that adage, working toward an objective but never allowing setbacks to deter him. He also told me it was more important to get things done than to build a record. "There's no limit to what you can do if you don't care who gets the credit," he told me many times.

Joel Pritchard loved Congress and he was well liked by those with whom he served. He would often comment about another member, "Rod, he is so smart," or "She is really good." He rarely criticized others and went out of his way to give compliments and encouragement. His staff was totally devoted to him because he was devoted to them. Even during his illness, Joel was as concerned about friends and family as he was about himself.

Joel was known as a character and part of that came from his desire to organize, to get things arranged. On a trip to Japan with Congressman Bonker, Lowry, Morrison, and me, there were numerous opportunities for photographs with Japanese officials. Joel always took it upon himself to arrange everyone in the photo, usually with disastrous results because the Japanese had no idea what he was trying to do. He also bought a camera on this trip, having lost another one. (He was always looking for something he had misplaced.) He purchased a complex single-lens-reflex camera and wanted me to teach him how to use it. Finally, I just carried two cameras—Joel's and mine. He went home from that trip with the best photographs "he" had ever taken.

Joel is also responsible for the "chicken picture." Upon my election to Congress in 1982, I was presented with a painting of a chick emerging from an egg. It was captioned, as I recall, "What now?" Joel had purchased the painting at a yard sale, thinking it a wonderful work of art. His staff refused to allow it in the office and suggested "the chicken" become a roving picture, going to each newly elected member of Congress from Washington. Sid Morrison got it first, in 1981, with instructions to sign his name on the back of the painting and date it. "The chicken" hung in my office for two years until I presented it to newly elected Congressman John Miller in 1985. John passed it on to Jim McDermott. The last time I checked, "the chicken" is still making its way around the Washington delegation, one new member at a time, each signing the back before passing it on.

RECOLLECTIONS OF JOEL PRITCHARD

BY ROD CHANDLER

Joel left Congress before he wanted. He served from 1973 through 1984. Many, myself included, urged him to run again and to continue his service to the First District. Even President Reagan spoke with Joel and asked him to continue in Congress. Joel, however, had given his word in the 1972 election that he would, if elected, serve no more than twelve years. "All we have in this business is our reputations," he told me. "If I break my word on this, no one will be able to believe me on anything else." True to his vow, though regretting ever having made it, Joel Pritchard left Congress at the end of 1984. His word and reputation were intact. One more reason that I, and so many others, held such great affection and respect for Joel Pritchard.



Congressman Pritchard with President Gerald Ford.

Kirby Torrance: I think the thing that made him so successful, positively and entirely, was his integrity. All the time that I knew him, he was never out of bounds on anything. He did what he said he was going to do and he always tried to do what was right.

Anne Kilgannon: That would be his pledge not to stay in Congress beyond twelve years?

KT: We had helped Pelly get elected. We handed out those Pelly potholders. I think that Pelly saw the handwriting on the wall, and I think that is why he didn't run again. Joel ran on the issue of seniority. It was a matter of discussion in those days; it rears its head every so often. Pelly had been in office too long and there were other people in Congress who probably shouldn't have been there.

AK: Well, there were a whole lot of committee chairs who had been there a long time, and had a kind of lock on the place.

KT: Joel felt—and I thought so, too, at the time—and so he said, “This seniority thing has got to come to a stop. I'm pledging that if I'm elected, at the end of twelve years, I'm out of there; that's long enough.” When the time came—and I knew this would happen—I mean Joel made such a good job as congressman that people would say, “Hey, come on, times have changed. That was twelve years ago.” But no, no. He said, “I'm not going to run. I'm not going to do it.”

AK: He had a little twinge though? He liked Congress.

KT: I think he probably could have run for reelection, and gotten away with it, and he would have done a good job. But he made the commitment, and that is just another indication of the guy's character. It's too bad, in a way it's almost impossible to be as good of a character that he was, and yet that's what the American public is now demanding. He never smoked dope, never chased women, never did all of these things—he just didn't have bad habits, and you know, there are not that many around! It's hard to be a politi-

THE INTEGRITY OF JOEL PRITCHARD

INTERVIEW WITH KIRBY TORRANCE

cian nowadays and not have any bad habits. What kind of person do we want for an office holder?

AK: Someone entirely different from ourselves, I guess.

KT: Could be! But Joel was the epitome of what I think that today's voter would like to have for the president of the United States, or a congressman—the absolute epitome. He was conservative in a lot of ways, but he was always interested in what the new things were and so he was a rare politician, very rare—nothing like him. He was a guy who was above reproach in every respect. Here's a guy whose integrity was absolutely impeccable, who was a dedicated public servant, always tried to do the right thing; he was never influenced by anybody to do the wrong thing—never.

AK: In your book he was extraordinary, then?

KT: Yes. I don't think that he was necessarily an innovator of new ideas to an extreme degree, but you know, you can't do everything. But I think he brought people together. He was able to, in all kinds of endeavors, to support and understand what the other person's feelings were, what they think, or what their position was. He understood where they were coming from, and in order to get along—Joel was very good at that—he could react in a way that would tend to solve problems and move forward. You know how politicians get backed into a corner, “What do you think of so and so?” Or, “How do you stand on women's rights?” or “How do you stand on abortions?” or

what about this and that issue? He was very good at answering those questions without alienating somebody and yet maintaining his own integrity. He was very skilled at that, and in politics you had to be pretty skilled at that, and every time you make a statement as long as you are in office, the more statements you make, the more enemies you make. He knew that. He was careful. He knew that it's all right to disagree with somebody, but that doesn't mean that you have to have a war with them—he was very good about that.

Politics has temptations, which Joel would dodge completely and say, “Hey, don't try to buy my votes. I mean forget it; I'm not going to do it.”

AK: Where did you think he got that inner gyroscope?

KT: Their father had very, very high ethics, and very high principles, and—I call it the psychological gyroscope—he put Frank and Joel on a psychological gyroscope, and you couldn't move that gyroscope if you tried. See what I mean? Don't you think that is a good way to explain it?

AK: Yes!

KT: You couldn't move it if you wanted to.

AK: They always seemed to know who they were and what they should do.

KT: What you see is what you get. I always admired their father. There is a lot to associating with the right people, and Frank's father was very tough on that, and both the boys, if they found somebody anywhere that was off base, forget it. A good example of that was a guy who was very prominent in politics here in Washington State and spoke at the Republican National Convention and everybody applauded, but he got off base someplace. It was either a financial matter or some social matter, but it was completely off base, and as soon the Pritchards found out about, that was it—no more help. Didn't let him down, didn't bad-mouth him, just—that's it, and they got that from their father. Once you associate with somebody that's bad news, you can't afford it.

Their father was kind of a role model for me, too. Role models are very important to young people, and I believe when young people are getting started, they need help; they need a boost from somebody like Mr. Pritchard. It's important. Senior Pritchard was quite a guy.



Congressman Joel Pritchard with his parents, Frank Sr. and Jean Pritchard.

What we all loved about Joel Pritchard was his sweet spirit, his kindness toward others, and his energy and enthusiasm for organizing people and projects with one final purpose—to do the right thing. Joel’s aims were always honest and this served him well both in his public and private life. This is not say that Joel was without guile. He was a talented operator, and he knew how to get things done. He understood the art of the possible, and possessed the imagination to package his ideas so that others shared in the credit for his successes.

REMEMBERING JOEL PRITCHARD

BY BILL BELL

And Joel understood how important humor is in politics if it is used tastefully and intelligently to make a point. Who can forget his one-man telephone monologues, self-deprecating in the extreme but always on point in communicating a specific message to a specific audience. One I remember especially well took place after dinner at the Wednesday Club, a group of moderate House Republicans. Joel perched on a stool, telephone in hand, as he pretended to dial the White House with care and self-importance. Pridefully, he identified himself as “Congressman Pritchard,” and asked for Ed Meese. Then, after a tiny pause, his expression changed and he began to spell and re-spell “Pritchard” slowly for a string of operators who clearly had no idea who he was, and were treating him as yet another crank caller. And finally, when the line had obviously been disconnected, a protesting Joel shouted into the receiver, “Hello! Hello? Is anyone there?” while the laughing, appreciative audience stood and applauded. As longtime members of the minority party, they understood only too well the plaintive frustration Joel had voiced so perfectly. Later, Pete McCloskey, a fellow member of the Wednesday Club, told me that Joel’s monologue had energized the members to continue “fighting the good fight” far more than any speech by the leadership. In an essay written in 1997, Pete named House members whom he relied on for advice on pending legislation. Joel was among a half dozen or so along with George Bush, Jim Johnson, and Barber Conable. It was later, after Joel’s death, that Pete wrote, “Day to day, Joel was the best of all of us.”

Joel was best in many areas. He had been a good athlete at Queen Anne High School, playing football, tennis, and badminton. After the war, he played football at Marietta College where he married Joanne, the coach’s daughter, and the mother of Peggy, Frank, Annie, and Jeanie.

He was a master of games. His first love was probably tennis, but the game he will be most remembered for was “Pickle-Ball.” It was invented and first played on the Pritchard badminton court on Bainbridge Island during the summer of 1963. Our kids, Joel’s and mine, had complained one day that there was nothing to do, they were bored. Joel was quick to tell the kids that when we were young we invented things to do. He explained that we would all, then and there, invent a new game. So we experimented with different rackets and balls on the Pritchard badminton court. When Joel spotted one of the kids bouncing a Wiffle Ball, he borrowed it and we came up with a modified version of paddleball. After awhile the kids lost interest and wandered off, but Joel and I kept hitting the ball over the net. Joel felt that our goal was to come up with a game that kids and adults could all play to the level of their individual abilities.

It was the two-bounce rule, once on each side of net before a player could volley the ball in mid-air that was his answer. Very soon after that rule was in place, Barney McCallum, a close friend and neighbor on Pleasant Beach wandered down from his family’s place and joined us on the court. Barney came up with a second rule that made Pickle-Ball uniquely suitable for all ages. He suggested that no one could

go to the net, or enter the “penalty zone” unless the ball bounced in the area in front of the net. This rule nullified any height advantage a player might have at the net. Soon we, old and young, short and tall, were spending our time hard at Pickle-Ball on the Pritchard’s musty old badminton court. Then Bob O’Brien, the president of PACCAR and chairman of the Seattle University Board of Regents built a Pickle-Ball court on his property next door to the Pritchard house and the rest is history.

Pickle-Ball courts began springing up all over the Northwest. In Indonesia, where I introduced the game, I had the pleasure of watching the Australian Davis Cup team as they were roundly trounced by the Indonesians on a Pickle-Ball court that we had installed next to our Jakarta home. The American ambassador in Indonesia liked the game so much he had the embassy courts relined to Pickle-Ball specifications, making a lot of tennis players unhappy. The new Oil Club in Jakarta put in six courts, and soon after that Pickle-Ball arrived in Singapore. A company to promote and sell our game was formed by Barney, Joel, and myself, with Barney at the helm. It has prospered ever since. Please let the record show that the enthusiasm, energy, and imagination in the invention and development of Pickle-Ball was all Joel Pritchard. Those are the elements he brought to every project he undertook, together with the twin abilities great game players have: in victory or defeat, Joel was a class act, as graceful a winner as he was a loser.

A month or so before Joel Pritchard died, his namesake and godson, my son Joel Bell, wrote him this letter:

Dear Uncle Joel,

I want to thank you for showing up and staying most of the day at the annual family reunion on Bainbridge last month. I understood then, and more fully now from Dad, that it required much of you to stick around longer than was comfortable. One of the many photos that Julia took at the gathering is the usual group picture of you and me in the middle laughing at each other, and there is another of Dad, Bill Jacobs and you, which is a beauty—especially given the inherent limitations of Dad and Bill. She will print them soon and I will send them both to you.

Now that I am an uncle the greatest resource I have in handling all the responsibilities due that title, is my memory of you and your creation of “Uncle Day” so many years ago on Bainbridge, when our families vacationed together at your folks’ home. I can barely recall what we did each year—Seattle Center one year, Seafair another, and later as I grew older, the Olympics for a weekend hike or a drive some place of historic interest you wished to share with me. What I do remember above all, was my great anticipation and joy that the two of us would be doing something together, me and my Godfather.

I find that there are many things to thank you for, including the summer intern job in your office when I was in college, and the advice you shared with me on so many subjects, including to choke up on the racket, and not to try to hit the ball so hard. “It’s like life,” you told me. “Improve the odds when you can and work smart always. Life is like tennis: if you’re smart and do the right thing, generally things turn out all right in the end, and you are playing the game of life on your own terms and you are square with yourself and others.” Another time I remember asking you what “political capital” really meant. “Telling the truth when it’s hard,” you replied.

Since the reunion last month, Dad has told me of the conversation the two of you had just

before you left for the day, and your decision regarding future medical treatments. I now realize how challenging a time this is for you, and I want you to know that I am thinking of you, that I love you, and that you have contributed to my life in so many positive and immeasurable ways over the past thirty years or so, for which I will be forever grateful. I am a lucky man to be your namesake.

Love, Joel

After Joel's death, a memorial service was held in the Veterans Affairs Committee Room located in the Cannon Building of the House of Representatives. It was standing room only audience of current and former members of Congress and friends. Speakers included Norm Dicks, Joel's longtime friend and tennis partner, Slade Gorton, another longtime friend and colleague, Steve Solarz, Jennifer Dunn, Rod Chandler, Bill Frenzel, Lloyd Meeds, Thad Cochran, Jim Leach, Herb Stone, Joel's great friend and former chief of staff, myself and many others.

The situs of the Cannon Building for the service was most fitting. Joel was a World War II veteran who served in the Pacific Theater with distinction, and the Cannon Building housed his first office after being elected to Congress in 1972. This first office, located on the top floor of Cannon, couldn't be reached by the elevators and required a flight of steps leading to "the Attic," as several newly elected and disgruntled members bitterly described their new offices. Not Joel. He wondered who else had started their careers in "the Attic?" I was living in Australia at the time and Joel wrote me that with his historical bent and some research, he had discovered that both John Kennedy and Richard Nixon had been former occupants in "the Attic," and that someday he planned to research all the offices in Cannon and identify their occupants since 1910, when it opened for business.

This he did during the last two years of his life. With help from Joyce Chandler and Suzie Dicks of the U.S. Capitol Historical Society, they began researching the room-by-room occupants of the Cannon Building. The project required Joel to be in Washington, D.C. frequently during these years, and while here he would stay with me. Nightly, he would report on the Hill gossip, whatever he was reading at the time—usually history and biographies—and the status of his project. Near the end, when he didn't drive, he moved in with Herb and Ann Stone who lived on the Hill near the Society offices where he was doing his research. After he died, at the memorial service, former Congressman Clarence Brown, president of the U.S. Capitol Historical Society, announced that the Society would fund and complete an expanded version of Joel's last project, which continues on today. Alive or dead, he did understand how to organize a successful project and his last one is a continuing reminder of our good friend Joel Pritchard.

The Seattle Times, October 9, 1997

Former Lt. Gov. Pritchard dead at 72

*'Rare politician' focused
on teamwork, humor*

BY ROSS ANDERSON
Seattle Times staff reporter

Joel Pritchard, the former Seattle congressman and lieutenant governor who exemplified civility and bipartisanship, died yesterday after a 10-year battle with cancer. He was 72.

The genial Republican from a pioneer family retired in January after eight years as lieutenant governor. Earlier, he had spent 12 years in the Legislature and 12 years in Congress, quietly forging centrist coalitions for causes ranging from literacy and campaign reform to abortion rights and nuclear disarmament.

He died quietly last night in his Seattle apartment, having decided not to undergo another series of chemotherapy treatments.

"Joel was the last of a breed in politics, that rare politician who could work across partisan lines to solve problems," said Steve Excell, a Seattle consultant who worked for Mr. Pritchard in Congress. "Now politics is more like mud-wrestling, and Joel didn't like it."

Mr. Pritchard fit few contemporary political stereotypes. He was neither tall nor handsome, ambitious nor eloquent. He never learned to speak in TV sound bites. He considered himself a regular guy who happened to have been selected by his fellow citizens to represent them in Olympia or Washington, D.C.

"He subscribed to that quaint notion that he was elected to listen and help people," Excell recalled.

In Congress, Mr. Pritchard rubbed elbows with world leaders, dined at the White House and represented Congress during a session of the United Nations. But he was happiest on the tennis court with friends or working the legislative hallways.

"Joel believed deeply in the

value of political compromise and cooperation, the qualities that make democracy work," said former Seattle Times political reporter Dick Larsen, who covered most of Mr. Pritchard's career. "Of course, those qualities are now considered to be political liabilities."

In a recent article written for The Times, Mr. Pritchard listed some of the qualities of effective lawmakers — the ability to control

Continued on next page



BENJAMIN BENSCHNEIDER / SEATTLE TIMES, 1988
Joel Pritchard created pickleball, a combination of tennis, badminton and pingpong, for his four children.

their egos, to select good staffers, to share credit for accomplishments, to work with the other party and understand its views and to laugh at themselves.

"Politics is a serious business," he wrote, "but a sense of humor is essential to keeping a realistic sense of proportion."

But Mr. Pritchard's colleagues say his fundamental lesson was that "there is no limit to what you can accomplish if you don't care who gets the credit."

As a result, Mr. Pritchard never became a household word in Washington politics. At home, he is perhaps best known for "pickleball," a combination of tennis, badminton and pingpong, invented at the request of his children for a game that could be played in the family driveway.

Today, Washington is home to thousands of pickleball courts — a fitting legacy to the inventor.

Mr. Pritchard's grandparents arrived in Seattle in 1895 and settled in Southeast Seattle, where the family name is preserved by the Pritchard Beach Bathhouse on Lake Washington.

Mr. Pritchard grew up on Queen Anne Hill, attended Queen Anne High School and followed his father into the printing business, eventually rising from salesman to president of Griffin Envelope.

At the same time, he dived into local issues such as the creation of Metro and cleanup of Lake Washington. In 1958, he was elected to the Legislature, where he became a close friend of Dan Evans, who later rose to the governorship.

When Seattle reformers urged him to run for mayor in 1969, Mr. Pritchard dismissed the idea. "I'd love to run," he told them. "Trouble is, I don't want the job!"

Congress, however, felt like a better match. In 1970, he challenged longtime Rep. Tom Pelly, a Republican from Seattle's 36th District, and lost narrowly. Pelly retired two years later, clearing the way for Mr. Pritchard's election in 1972.

Long before congressional term limits became popular, Mr. Pritchard vowed to limit himself to 12 years. He insisted on a smaller office and smaller staff than most of his colleagues. When he made his first visit to the White House, he wore a rented tuxedo and showed up in an aging Volkswagen.

During his six terms, Mr. Pritchard was respected for his diplomacy on such issues as abortion rights and for his resistance to huge pork-barrel projects such as the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway. His major success may have been to squelch a plan to tear down the Madison Library and replace it with a new House office building.

"It was a conflict between the nation's culture and creature comforts for Congress," Excell recalls. "Joel went to bat for culture, and won."

Even as Seattle became a Democratic bastion, Mr. Pritchard was re-elected five times until he retired from Congress, as promised, in 1984.

In the mid-1980s, he worked in government relations for a Seattle law firm, Bogle and Gates, while fighting his first bout with lymphoma, a form of cancer. In 1988, he ran for lieutenant governor and won, presiding over eight legislative sessions that spanned the state's dramatic swing from Democratic to Republican control.

He almost certainly would have won a third term last year, but declined to run. One quality of a successful politician, he said, is knowing when to step down.

Earlier this year, the state library adjacent to the state Capitol was renamed in honor of Mr. Pritchard's recent efforts to expand literacy. The ceremony drew little attention, Excell said. "Joel didn't want the attention."

Married and divorced twice, Mr. Pritchard had four children, Frank, Anne Pritchard, Peggy Olson and Jeanie Fullerton.

Funeral plans are pending.

The Seattle Post-Intelligencer, October 11, 1997

Joel Pritchard was political role model

They don't seem to make many politicians like Joel Pritchard any more. And that only adds to the loss felt at his death by the Washington residents he served so ably over a quarter of a century.

He brought honor to the profession.

Most recently serving the state as lieutenant governor, the self-effacing, genial Pritchard was elected to the Legislature in 1972 and served 12 years in the U.S. House of Representatives. He died Wednesday after a long and vigorous battle with lymphoma.

Pritchard, a key figure in revitalizing this state's Republican Party in the 1970s, had the misfortune to serve in the minority in the House during his entire congressional career.

However, he surmounted that apparent handicap with quiet determination, good humor and the considerable coalition-building skills that earned him respect and trust on both sides of the aisle.

He was a man of his word, and everyone knew it. As a result, he served as a key bridge between Republicans and Democrats, and, as former House Speaker Tom Foley put it about

the state's then exceptionally cohesive and effective delegation, "the cement that bonded us together."

Pritchard made it his business to create a climate of bipartisan cooperation because he feared — correctly, as it has turned out — that otherwise the House would become hamstrung by corrosive, partisan rancor.

He was selected to serve a term representing the House at the United Nations, a body he regarded with the same blend of enthusiasm and irreverent, good-natured skepticism with which he viewed the U.S. House of Representatives.

A telling measure of the special esteem in which he was held by his congressional colleagues was apparent on the day he retired, making good on his promise to serve only 12 years. The tributes to him in the House chamber went on for hours, and those from Democrats were every bit as laudatory as those offered by fellow Republicans.

That was because it was understood even by those who disagreed with his politics that here was a man who wanted to make government work. As a result, Joel Pritchard made Congress a better institution.

May his tribe increase.



*Lieutenant Governor Pritchard flanked by his grandchildren,
Matt and Christie Irwin.*

Appendix B

JOEL PRITCHARD BUILDING DEDICATIONS

The following resolution, adopted by the Washington State Senate on April 26, 1997, renamed the Washington State Library Building on the Capitol campus as the Joel Pritchard State Library.

S-3332.1

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 8417

State of Washington 55th Legislature 1997 Regular Session

By Senators McDonald, Loveland, Anderson, Bauer, Benton, Brown, Deccio, Fairley, Finkbeiner, Franklin, Fraser, Goings, Hale, Hargrove, Haugen, Heavey, Hochstatter, Horn, Jacobsen, Johnson, Kline, Kohl, Long, McAuliffe, McCaslin, Morton, Newhouse, Oke, Patterson, Prentice, Prince, Rasmussen, Roach, Rossi, Schow, Sellar, Sheldon, Snyder, Spanel, Stevens, Strannigan, Swanson, Swecker, Thibaudeau, West, Winsley, Wojahn, Wood and Zarelli

Read first time 04/26/97.

1 WHEREAS, The Honorable Joel Pritchard was elected Washington's
2 fourteenth lieutenant governor in 1988; and

3 WHEREAS, Lieutenant Governor Pritchard was only the second
4 Lieutenant Governor in Washington history to be born in the state; and

5 WHEREAS, Lieutenant Governor Pritchard gave Washington citizens
6 thirty-two years of public service; and

7 WHEREAS, His service included four terms in the state House of
8 Representatives, one term in the state Senate, and six terms in the
9 United States House of Representatives; and

10 WHEREAS, Joel Pritchard was described in The Seattle Times at the
11 end of his long public career as someone who built a reputation as a
12 man "who achieves by putting public service above partisan or personal
13 advantage"; and

14 WHEREAS, Joel Pritchard recognized the importance of reading and
15 the joy of teaching others to read and made the cause of literacy the
16 hallmark of his term as Lieutenant Governor; and

17 WHEREAS, As part of his commitment to teach adults to read,
18 Lieutenant Governor Pritchard tirelessly crisscrossed the state to
19 acknowledge the work of community-based literacy efforts, present
20 citations to outstanding literacy students, and support fellow
21 volunteers; and

1 WHEREAS, Lieutenant Governor Pritchard personally volunteered as a
2 reading tutor at Seattle's Beacon Hill Elementary School and was an
3 energetic leader in the Washington Reads Program created to promote
4 literacy; and

5 WHEREAS, As a member of Congress, Joel Pritchard led the fight to
6 preserve the James Madison Memorial Building as the site of an addition
7 to the Library of Congress to preserve our nation's collection of rare
8 and valuable books, manuscripts, and presidential papers; and

9 WHEREAS, The Washington State Legislature wishes to thank
10 Lieutenant Governor Pritchard for his contributions to further the
11 cause of literacy, to promote libraries, and to encourage all
12 Washington citizens to read;

13 NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, By the Senate of the state of
14 Washington, the House of Representatives concurring, That the Director
15 of the Department of General Administration is hereby directed to
16 rename the Washington State Library Building as the "Joel Pritchard
17 State Library"; and

18 BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That all appropriate stationery and
19 references to the state library reflect the name change as soon as it
20 is economically possible; and

21 BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That a copy of this resolution be forwarded
22 to Lieutenant Governor Pritchard; the Honorable Gary Locke, Governor of
23 the State of Washington; State Librarian Nancy Zussy; and Marsha Long,
24 Director of the Department of General Administration.

--- END ---

*Remarks made by Joel Pritchard following the reading of Senate Concurrent
Resolution 8417 as recorded in the Journal of the Senate.*

Joel Pritchard: "Thank you very much. Thank you. To be honored by your peers and friends is something wonderful for a person and as you get a little older in life, you appreciate it even more. I think I will say this to you people that are in the legislative process. These are the times in the session when you start taking the heat from everybody and everybody is a critic of our process these days and beating up everybody that is in public life. It is a pretty easy thing to do.

"But, it is not an easy process that we have. Other countries have this parliamentary system where whoever gets the majority, they've got the prime minister, they have everything from top to bottom. We, in our country, we have this ability to have split responsibility and it is not easy and it puts an additional burden on the process. I think that we make a mistake—sorta—I won't say demonizing, but it is so often downgrading those who stand up and serve. It is not an easy process; it is not an easy thing to do in the community. I know what you go through and I know that at this time of the session what you are going through. I for one, say, 'Yes, it is not perfect, but it is the best system in the world.' Over the years we do pretty well. People like yourselves have to stand in here and take the heat and I appreciate the heat you are taking—and thanks again for this wonderful honor."

Secretary of State Ralph Munro announced May 1, 1996, that the new Puget Sound regional archives building would be named the Pritchard-Fleming Building in honor of two veteran public officials from the Seattle area. Lieutenant Governor Joel Pritchard and former state Senator George Fleming. The designation is a symbol of recognition and appreciation for longtime service to the people of the state of Washington. The building, located on the campus of Bellevue Community College, houses the Puget Sound branch of the Washington State Archives and the Northwest Center for Emerging Technologies, an innovative technology training program for community college students. The building was completed in 1998.

THE PRITCHARD-FLEMING BUILDING

DEDICATED MAY 1, 1996

People entering the Pritchard-Fleming Building learn this about Joel Pritchard from the building's dedication plaque:

“From 1959 to 1997, Joel Pritchard served the citizens of Washington with great distinction as a state legislator, member of Congress and lieutenant governor. He also contributed his time and energy to a number of local and state organizations, including the Metro Planning Council, the Washington State Constitutional Advisory Committee, and the Washington State Women's Rights Council. In the international arena, Pritchard served as United States delegate to the United Nations General Assembly. He sponsored legislation which established the Klondike Gold Rush National Historical Park and was a leader in efforts to create the Alpine Lakes, Norse Peak, and William O. Douglas Wilderness Areas. Known for his ability to bring people with different viewpoints and political affiliations together to get things done, Joel Pritchard was actively involved in issues such as the environment, merchant marine, protection of wildlife, literacy, human rights, nuclear arms control, international trade, and fisheries.”



Lieutenant Governor Joel Pritchard tutoring a student at Beacon Hill Elementary School.



Congressman Pritchard participated in many athletic events during his years of service.

Appendix C

PICKLE-BALL

Joel Pritchard: It was in 1963, just before Evans ran for governor. Bill Bell, his brother-in-law, was over and rented a place next door to me at the beach on Bainbridge Island. We went over and played golf one morning, and when we came back the kids were all on the porch. I said, “Why aren’t you down at the beach? That’s what you come to the beach for.”

They said, well, there’s nothing to do.

I said, “Why don’t you make up a game?”

My son says, “Oh yeah, Dad, big deal.” He was being a twelve-year-old kid, or something.

I said, “Well, I can make up a game.”

“Oh really?”

And I said, “Sure, I can make up one.” I had one.

When I was in the Legislature, we’d go down to the Y, Slade and Dan and I, and upstairs there, on the third floor, they had a paddleball court—it wasn’t like now, it was just three-sided, just the front and two sides. You’d go down there and play paddleball. We used to, when we were in Olympia, we’d go down to the Y and work out for an hour or so, and then come back for an evening session.

So I had two of those paddles in my trunk. I said, “Come on, Bill.” We went out—we had a badminton court at Bainbridge that was blacktopped. We played badminton on it back in the woods. I said we could use this if we could just get a ball and lower or raise the net. So we started fussing around.

Anne Kilgannon: Were your kids intrigued?

JP: No. But we were fussing around, and finally Dickie Green’s kid came down the beach with one of those plastic balls and I said, “Hey, let me see the ball. Can we try for a day or so?” because we didn’t have the right kind of ball. I called his mother and said, “I’m not stealing your kid’s ball.” But we worked at it and so we got it all put together, and finally Barney McCallum came down to the beach, and he revised a few little things, and the three of us started.

We had some things we kind of knew we had to have to make the game work. You’ve got to be able to hit it hard. Nobody plays golf to putt. So, that was all, and we made up this game and the kids played it. After awhile, the kids could never

THE GENESIS OF PICKLE-BALL

INTERVIEW WITH JOEL PRITCHARD

get on the court, because the parents from up and down the place were coming down and playing all the time. Then a couple of other people put in a court, and then a guy in my neighborhood in Magnolia, who was retired, he started making paddles, because people wanted paddles.

AK: Were these modified from paddleball paddles? They’re bigger, aren’t they?

JP: A little bigger than a Ping-Pong paddle. So, we got it started and we fussed around.

AK: There are several accounts about how you named the game. Is it true you named it for your dog?

JP: We needed a nutty name like Pickle-Ball, but, no, the dog was named after the game. A reporter came through and was doing a national story on the game, and somebody told him that story. Everybody said, “Shut your mouth. It’s a good story. It works better, leave it alone.” It’s like a lot of stories. So, we had that and it just took off. Now it’s played all over.

AK: Don’t you travel around and promote it? You went to Thailand with it just recently.

JP: We don’t have any money, but they asked me to come over there, not to promote it, but because they were playing it. We went over there and played with them.

AK: Do you still like to play?

JP: I can and I do, if it’s at the beach or something, but I like to play tennis. Next week, I’m starting a

new game called Crazy Ball. I'll tell you about it if it works.

AK: Is this another game of your own invention?

JP: Yes, my own idea. I have ideas for games.

AK: Well. It's a whole new side for you—a lot of fun.

It was a cold and dreary weekend morning when the Fathers of Pickle-Ball, Joel Pritchard and Bill Bell, arrived at our home to christen our new Pickle-Ball court—the first outdoor Pickle-Ball court in the District of Columbia! The idea to build the court was mine for two important reasons: it solved the lawn maintenance problem and it readily served as a basketball court, complete with three-point line. We sent to Seattle for the Pickle-Ball package early so that we could make sure we met the Pritchard-Bell specs and had the right equipment. We took one liberty with our court in that we never drew the proscribed sidelines. This increased the width of the court by about two feet. Of course, we were quite concerned about how the “Fathers” would react to this.

THE DICKS' PICKLE-BALL COURT

BY SUZIE DICKS

Now, Pickle-Ball was not new to any of us. Our original introduction was when we first came to Washington, D.C. and Norm was working for Senator Magnuson. Joel had an indoor Pickle-Ball party (which he never stopped talking about) and anyone who had anything to do with Washington State was in attendance. It was a terrific evening, and the Pickle-Ball was first class. Our other Pickle-Ball experiences were at Hood Canal, Washington, where we played regularly, often with Joel, at Ferdie Schmidt's court. Pickle-Ball courts are now everywhere on the canal.

After working for weeks to schedule the Pickle-Ball Christening with everybody's schedule, the date was set. On Thursday of that week, Norm found himself flying to the state. The two principals came anyway. Upon arriving, they inspected the court from our warm living room. Sons David, Ryan and I actually thought that they might never step outside again. But, braced with mugs of coffee, they ventured forth. They immediately noticed the court was wider, and thus determined the Dicks court not be deemed an official Pickle-Ball court. After playing till hands were frozen (not long) they found the extra width added an increased degree of challenge, and thus they officially proclaimed the Dicks court as the first “Pickle-Ball II” court anywhere! We had passed the test, given them “Pickle-Ball II” and all were elated. Can't honestly remember whether age or youth triumphed that day, but it will always be remembered as a sweet memory for Bill Bell and David and Ryan and Suzie Dicks!



Congressman Pritchard always got laughs with his "telephone gag," a phony, one-way telephone conversation which often poked good-natured fun at someone in the room.

Appendix D

PHOTOGRAPHS AND CLIPPINGS



Joel Pritchard's enthusiasm for sports started at a young age.



A portrait of Joel Pritchard as a young adult.



Joel Pritchard the young infantryman during World War II.



Before running for political office, Joel Pritchard actively campaigned for local, state, and national Republican candidates.



On the Chilkoot Trail in Alaska are (L-R) Joel Pritchard's son Frank, Joel Pritchard, Pritchard's nephew Jeff Pritchard, and Frank Pritchard.



Congressman Pritchard with U.S. Senators Dan Evans and Slade Gorton.



Congressman Pritchard listening to tapes made by President Richard Nixon and released as part of the Watergate investigation.



Congressman Joel Pritchard at a 1980 press conference about the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway, a man-made canal connecting the Tennessee and Tombigbee Rivers in Alabama and Mississippi.



Members of the Wednesday Group (L-R), Representatives Peter McCloskey of California, Caldwell Butler of Virginia, Joel Pritchard, Bill Frenzel of Minnesota, and Wednesday Group Executive Director Pat Goldman.



Lieutenant Governor Pritchard on the Washington State Senate rostrum.

The Weekly, October 27, 1982

beyond the freeze

Pritchard signs on for a new proposal on arms-reductions

by George Weigel

HENRY KISSINGER WAS SAID TO HAVE remarked that the worst mistake he made during his time in power was not interdicting the development of MIRVed missiles during SALT I. At that point, the United States was on the verge of deploying these independently targetable warheads that increase a single missile's destructive power many times over. The Soviet Union, which was behind the U.S. in MIRV capability, would surely follow suit. In retrospect, Kissinger understood what some arms-control specialists were arguing during the SALT I negotiations: that U.S. restraint in our MIRVing project could have been the carrot to get a reciprocal Soviet agreement on keeping the arms race limited to single-warhead missiles, both land-based and submarine-launched.

The MIRV genie has been out of its bottle for over ten years now, and the results are creating serious problems, not only for arms-control and arms-reduction schemes, but for maintaining stable deterrence as well. Given the increased accuracy of each MIRVed warhead, we are rapidly approaching the point, says Congressman Albert Gore, Jr. of Tennessee, where both the U.S. and the Soviet Union will be in a state of "mutual vulnerability." Leaders of both nations could find themselves "under a compulsion to launch a nuclear war, for reasons that have to do with the mechanical characteristics of the weapons themselves" (emphasis added).

Gore's analysis is not based on survivalist hysteria. The Tennessee representative knows that complete nuclear disarmament is far down the road, and that the compendium between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. is not a matter of "misunderstanding" but has roots in profoundly different political values and interests. Gore expects neither a revival of the heydays of detente nor a magical quick-fix to our strategic dilemma. In this long, twilight period of groping toward meaningful arms reduction, therefore, "it is crucial that at any level of armament, United States and Soviet nuclear forces be designed in a way that avoids a bias toward first use. . . . We need to make sure, if possible, that weapons in being—in their qualities and in their relationship to each other—do not add to the uncertainties and fears that threaten to drive events out of control in periods of great tension."

Over the past 18 months, Gore has been working to develop an approach to nuclear-arms reduction that eliminates, over time and with carefully built-in verification procedures, this threat of a first-strike by accurate, land-based, MIRVed ICBMs. That plan is embodied in a House resolution calling on the President to make the elimination of first-strike-capable systems the priority in START, and was introduced at a Washington, D.C., press conference on October 1 held by Gore and the resolution's three co-sponsors: Democratic Congressmen Les Aspin and Thomas Downey, and Seattle Republican Joel Pritchard. This intriguing alternative deserves more attention than it has so far received.

The specifics that would achieve the resolution's aims were spelled out by Gore in a House speech of August 10:

"The core of this proposal is the common ceiling of 5,000 ballistic missile warheads, which is, of course, the major component of the President's [START] negotiating offer. What I suggest is that this number of warheads should be re-allocated in ways which are inherently stable. Specifically, we and the Soviets should phase out . . . all our land-based MIRVed ICBM's, and retain only that portion of our present ICBM force which is un-MIRVed: our Minuteman II missiles, and their SS-11's. It so happens, moreover, that these missiles exist in nearly equal numbers, 450 to 518, which provides the basis for parity. However, because each country regards these missiles as old, I suggest that they be replaced by a new, lightweight ICBM specifically designed to carry just one warhead. The balance of the 5,000 warheads allotted each side would be deployed at sea, thereby continuing a trend in the evolution of both sides' nuclear forces which is salutary, because nuclear weapons at sea are likely to remain relatively invulnerable for the foreseeable future."

If Gore's proposals were adopted, and a 12-year phase-out of MIRVed ICBMs achieved by 1995 (as the detailed tables accompanying Gore's speech suggest), what would be the net results?

First, neither side would have a first-strike capability. While both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would have weapons with silo-busting (counterforce) capabilities, neither side

Continued on next page

would have anywhere near the numbers of these weapons necessary to conduct a first strike.

Second, these changes in American and Soviet force structures would maintain "essential equivalence" between the superpowers. Gore's tables show that, by 1995, both sides would end up with the same number of ICBM launchers, ICBM warheads, submarine-launched warheads, and equal aggregate numbers of ballistic missile warheads—at the 5,000 level proposed by President Reagan. Gore also suggests that both sides would end up with essentially equivalent missile throw-weight, the index of strategic capability that most worries U.S. planners faced with giant Soviet missiles like the SS-18.

Third, since cruise missiles would be limited on both sides to non-first-strike capabilities, a window would be open to get agreement on reducing or eliminating so-called "grey area" systems like the Pershing II and the Soviet SS-20, because neither side would be able to see these weapons as part of an overall first-strike strategy.

Gore's proposals also include a hedge against Soviet cheating, in that development of the MX and the Trident II missiles would continue, but neither would be procured or deployed.

The Gore-Pritchard proposals hold out the equally attractive prospect of agreement within the United States, as well as between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The detailed reduction tables that support the Gore-Pritchard resolution have been talked over with key Administration strategic planners and, off the record, they have expressed serious interest, according to a Capitol Hill source. Moreover, as Gore notes, his approach "is also consistent with the basic objectives of the freeze movement, in that it requires a stand-down in the deployment of new counterforce weapons, followed by a phasing-out of those which already exist. As Congressman Pritchard noted in his October 1 press-conference statement, this unique conjunction of forces

would "help raise the level of discourse in the Congress on the most important public policy issue we face." Pritchard sees the Gore approach as one essential step in creating a "third voice" in the Congressional debate, one that "meets the legitimate concerns of those at both the 'security and liberty' and 'peace and disarmament' poles of the spectrum," by "providing grounds on which those presently disagreed can work together toward common ends."

The future of the Gore-Pritchard resolution and Gore's specific negotiating proposals is complex and cloudy. The instant-freeze movement may see Gore-Pritchard—mistakenly—as half a loaf when the whole loaf is in sight. The Administration, committed to a START framework that fully satisfies no one, may be afraid—mistakenly—to risk the fragile equilibrium of its own strategic house by giving even tacit support to the Gore approach.

Yet there are several reasons for giving the Gore-Pritchard middle-course approach a fighting chance. For example, the President will almost certainly recommend the Dense-Pack basing mode for the MX missile next month, and the new Congress will almost just as surely reject the plan. We will then be stuck with a MIRVed ICBM that has no home: a circumstance in which a return to single-warhead ICBMs looks attractive indeed—especially since the result of going down that road would be real arms reductions, and not just more ineffective arms "control."

I should declare my own interest in this matter: for the past six weeks I have been consulting with Congressman Pritchard on the merits of the Gore approach. I believe that, examined on its own terms and set against the goal of reversing the arms race on which which all of us can agree, the Gore proposals are, potentially, the most important new concept in strategic policy in the past decade. They deserve the toughest possible technical examination, as well as the widest public debate. ■

Puget Soundings, April, 1984

An Interview with Joel Pritchard:

A United Nations Experience

by Bill Gaum

Q. Recently, certain groups have been advocating for U.S. withdrawal from the United Nations. In light of your recent tenure there do you feel this would be a wise course of action?

A. In short, no. Leaving the U.N. would accomplish little except to temporarily vent our frustration with the present politicization of the General Assembly. Upon leaving we would have no voice at all.

Traditionally the U.S. has seen itself as having a unique position in the world with a special responsibility to promote world peace. I think we have to remember the magnitude of that responsibility and consciously work toward bringing about a gradual return of a more central U.S. role in the General Assembly.

There are essentially two U.N.'s - the General Assembly and the specialized service agencies such as the World Health Organization (WHO) that have played such a valuable role in addressing serious world problems. It's the General Assembly with its current politicization, bloc voting, and double standards which is the source of our present frustrations with the U.N. The specialized agencies like WHO, the U.N. Development Fund, the U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees, and the U.N. Fund for Population Activities have rendered valuable and worthwhile services by establishing important development and health programs, resolving serious refugee problems and helping Third World countries start the process of bringing their spiraling population problems under control. It's important to remember that each time we take a step toward resolving these problems we further increase the stability of the international community and bring us one step closer to the long-term goals of international cooperation and world peace.

When one hears the complaints that we shouldn't be funding an international organization that so often attacks and vilifies the U.S. in its resolutions, one has to remember that while we're currently providing 25 percent of the U.N.'s funds, that over half of this goes to the specialized agencies which really are doing a great deal of good. To those who are concerned that the U.N. is a drain on the U.S. economy, it's important to note that much of the U.N. general funds end up going directly back into the U.S.

economy via the U.N. and various agency spending in New York City.

This is not to say that I am pleased with the current state of affairs in the U.N. On the contrary, I am disappointed. It's disheartening to hear the anti-American rhetoric particularly when we're working so hard to help so many of these countries.

In the long run though, as the Third World countries become more secure and mature in their outlooks, I think the U.N. can begin to more closely resemble the instrument of peace, freedom, and international cooperation initially envisioned by its founders. With the proper attitude and hard work it should be possible to evolve a more effective U.S. voice in the General Assembly.

Q. In the fifties and even into the early sixties the General Assembly was considered a viable forum for discussing and reaching agreements on various issues. What has happened to cause it to become so politicized?

A. It has always been politicized to some degree, but it has become far worse. There are three basic reasons for this condition. First is the great increase in the number of member countries. When the U.N. was first formed in 1945 there were only fifty-one members, most of whom were more or less already developed and whose main goal was to prevent World War III. Since that time, many new Third World countries have come into being, especially from formerly colonized areas of Asia and Africa. This has brought the current U.N. total to 158 member countries. As a result of their large numbers, these poor and often insecure new countries now have the ability, providing they vote together, to control the votes on virtually any resolution. Most of these countries are small, politically immature, have enormous domestic problems, lack

continued

Congressman Joel Pritchard is a Republican from the First District in the state of Washington. He is a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and is the ranking minority member of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Bill Gaum is a graduate student in the Graduate School of Public Affairs at the University of Washington. He is specializing in the area of foreign policy.

Continued on next page

. . . *What we're doing now is no longer
turning the other cheek . . .*

democratic governments, and are unable to view problems in any time frame other than the present day. As a result, the original longer term goals of world peace have taken a back seat to regional squabbling and various counter-productive attacks between countries. What makes this even worse is that these countries have divided themselves into various regional or ideological blocs which are often dominated by their most radical members.

A good example of this problem of bloc voting is the continual condemnation of South Africa by the fifty members of the African bloc. It's amazing how many worthwhile resolutions get a clause worked into them containing a purely political and one-sided condemnation of South Africa, even when the main text of the resolution may not relate to South Africa at all. In these cases the U.S. is forced to vote against the resolution in order not to show agreement with the part containing the unfair criticism. This puts us in a difficult position, because not only do we appear to be voting against something that for the most part appears constructive, but in addition, we usually end up getting criticized and condemned for supporting South Africa. It's important to note that the current U.S. delegation to the U.N. has voted numerous times in agreement with resolutions condemning South Africa's policy of apartheid. The reason the delegation hasn't voted for the more strongly-worded resolutions is that this administration feels that greater progress towards civil rights in South Africa can be made by applying pressure privately rather than through one-sided condemnations.

Unfortunately, while private pressure is the administration's present policy for encouraging reform within South Africa, thus far it hasn't proven very successful. This policy represents a major change from the Carter administration when Andrew Young was working hard to woo the African nations.

Another bloc effort with similar results is the Arab bloc's condemnation of Israel. Between the African bloc's continual condemnation of South Africa and the Arab bloc's condemnation of Israel, a tremendous amount of time gets wasted in the General Assembly.

The second and most important reason for the politicization of the U.N. is the Soviet Union's role as the "Great Spoiler." They are continually attempting to create dissension between the Third World countries and the West and between our NATO allies and the U.S. They've taken the cultivation of the Third World countries very seriously, and by gaining an amazingly in-depth knowledge of the procedures and mechanisms of the U.N. are able to shape the agenda in accordance with their own political and ideological ends.

As a consequence of this Soviet influence, a rather frustrating "double standard" currently exists in the U.N. Regardless of how massive or brutal violations of international law or human rights may be, if they are committed by a socialist country they are virtually ignored in the General Assembly, while minor or alleged misdeeds by the

U.S. are denounced in the harshest and most bitter terms. Since the Soviet and Third World blocs are highly organized and often vote together, they are able to prevent investigations or critical resolutions of any of their own member countries. The net result is that they are able to dominate the U.N.'s machinery for conflict resolutions as well as the machinery for the protection of human rights.

The third factor that leads to the politicization of the U.N. is the fact that none of the resolutions passed by the General Assembly have the force of law. Since by statute all resolutions are nonbinding on member states, countries can rationalize voting for extremist resolutions by saying that they're only making a political statement and the resolution has no force of law. In addition, since the resolutions are nonbinding, a state or group of states can use resolutions for political purposes knowing they can't be held to their own proposals.

Q. Given the current politicization of the U.N., what can the U.S. do to minimize the negative aspects of bloc voting?

A. The most promising course of action is one that we're already taking: the cultivation of individual countries by the U.S. In this process we identify moderate states that have the potential to become spokespersons for their blocs, then work with them so they know that their best interests lie in maintaining close and cooperative ties with the U.S. Our biggest plus in this is that most countries already realize they can't depend on the Soviet Union for anything other than military aid with heavy strings attached. We then encourage these states to make their own independent stands within their blocs and try to give them the appropriate and necessary support to help back them up. It's these kinds of actions that I feel will do the most good over the long run and which we should be emphasizing.

Q. Given the bloc voting and the frequent anti-U.S. stance in the General Assembly do you think the U.S. should use its foreign aid to countries as leverage to influence their voting?

A. I think a country's voting record in the U.N. should be one factor of many determining foreign aid, but certainly not the only factor.

In general, threatening to withhold foreign aid from countries in an attempt to punish them for their voting records does more harm than good. In the first place, the amount of aid the U.S. gives to those countries who frequently vote against us is not large enough to significantly influence their voting, and those who are the most flagrant verbal abusers of the U.S. receive virtually no U.S. aid at all.

Second, U.S. foreign aid is usually tied to important strategic considerations and is given for the purpose of

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*What is needed . . . is the political
maturation of the Third World countries.*

aiding and stabilizing those governments that in one way or another help U.S. interests. One of the variations of the U.N. double standard that emerges here is that many of these countries will cooperate with U.S. efforts privately, but because of pressures from within their own blocs, will often go along with resolutions unfairly condemning U.S. policy, especially if it is associated with Israel or South Africa. A good example of this is a vote taken December 16, 1982 in the General Assembly which, in addition to containing the usual condemnation of Israel for the occupation of the Golan Heights and the West Bank, also took the further step of declaring Israel a "non-peace-loving" nation. The tricky thing about this is that according to the U.N. Charter, all member states must be peace-loving nations. Thus, declaring Israel a non-peace-loving country is the first step by the Soviet, Arab, and African blocs toward ousting Israel from the United Nations. In this particular resolution, the African bloc countries of Somalia and Kenya went along with this vote which also called for severance of all diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties with Israel.

Even though these two countries receive relatively large amounts of U.S. foreign aid, they went along with this resolution because political considerations involving their own African bloc took a higher precedent than defending a country they do not particularly like from an unfair and manipulative resolution. Now it's important to note that both Kenya and Somalia are providing a significant bulwark against Soviet expansion in the Horn of Africa including helping to stabilize their region from the Soviet-backed civil war occurring next door in Ethiopia. They are also cooperating with the defense of U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf by allowing the pre-positioning of supplies for the Rapid Deployment Force. Thus it would clearly be counterproductive to withhold foreign aid from either of these countries simply because we disagree with portions of their voting record in the U.N.

Q. Do you feel that the recent "tougher" U.S. stand in the U.N. has been productive?

A. Yes, I do. It may be possible and more advantageous for us to have a more flexible approach in succeeding U.N. sessions, but in the last two years it has been necessary to draw the line both on rhetoric and also on the budget. The anti-U.S. rhetoric in the General Assembly had become so extreme we had to do something to defend ourselves. In effect what we're doing now is no longer turning the other cheek when a country unfairly criticizes us. We're letting them know that we don't appreciate the inflammatory remarks and that we're no longer going to let these statements go unchallenged.

The most successful way we've found to do this is to make it absolutely clear what our position is on each issue and why we're taking it. As I mentioned earlier, we sometimes have to vote against an otherwise worthwhile resolution because an extremist statement of one kind or another has been worked into it. This way we make it clear why we're doing what we're doing and thus can counter unfair or distorted criticisms of our voting record. In short, it keeps the record straight.

I feel that the new tougher stance has been an important first step toward evolving a more successful U.S. role in the U.N. It certainly has been successful in our effort to hold the mushrooming U.N. budget in check. We were able to hold the budget growth this year to less than 1 percent and this was accomplished before the passage of the Kassebaum/Lugar Amendment which put the congressional cap on U.S. contributions to the U.N. Interestingly enough, this was one area in which the Soviets worked together with us.

The second step in the evolution of this role, as I mentioned earlier, is the cultivation of individual countries by the U.S. who can become spokespersons for their regions. In general I'm hopeful about the long-term role of the U.N. as a forum for promoting world peace and cooperation. What is needed more than anything else right now is the political maturation of the Third World countries. I believe that within the next ten years or so we'll begin to see some of these more positive elements entering into the debates and discussions within the General Assembly.

The Seattle Times, July 14, 1997



GREG GILBERT/SEATTLE TIMES
Lt. Gov. Joel Pritchard

Pritchard proves no man's an island

*Lt. governor depends
on family, friends*

BY JERRY LARGE
Seattle Times staff reporter

Pritchard Island stopped being an island back in 1917, when they lowered Lake Washington by 9 feet.

On a sunny June morning, Joel Pritchard, former legislator, former congressman and, in a few months, former lieutenant governor, stands with his back to the lake speaking to the neighborhood people gathered to open the new Pritchard Beach bathhouse.

In 1917, he'd have been standing in water just off his grandfather's island. A breeze tosses Pritchard's short, white hair and thumps against the microphone. Today, Pritchard says, if someone tried to lower the lake, there would be lawsuits and countersuits. The litigation would go on for 100 years and nothing would get done. He smiles into the applause.

Joel Pritchard, now 71, likes to get things done, and in nearly four decades in office he has built a reputation as a man who achieves by putting public service above partisan or personal advantage.

Bob Davidson was Pritchard's administrative assistant in the other Washington, where Prit-

chard served in the House of Representatives from 1973 to 1985.

"He was the only Republican representing the state in Washington, D.C., during the Nixon-Watergate era. . . . There was no question about his personal integrity ever.

"Things that were so important to other politicians didn't matter a wit to him; where they stood when a picture was taken, who was introduced first, the only thing that would make him mad was if someone on the staff tried to get him in the spotlight."

Congressional suites usually have a big office for the congressman while staffers are tucked into smaller spaces. Davidson says Pritchard used to get a kick out of the puzzlement of congressmen who dropped in and found Pritchard holed up in a small room while his staff took up the best spaces.

There was no desk in his office, Davidson says, since, "if he had desk it would give people the impression they should give him papers. He wanted papers on the desks of staff. He focused on dealing with people and other members."

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Remembering whom he represented helped Pritchard keep a perspective on things. He was always surrounded by people who'd remind him what was what.

"I never had a press secretary," he says, no one to stand between him and the media or the public.

Instead of large paid staffs with political training, "We had wonderful people who helped us. Many women who didn't have jobs, and whose children were grown. We never had all these paid people. But I had good advisers, starting with my brother.

"Your friends are the best ones to keep your feet on the ground."

Family traditions

Friends, and Pritchard himself, credit his strongly traditional family for starting him out well-rooted.

His paternal grandparents came here in 1895. It was his grandfather Alfred who bought the small island in Southeast Seattle and gave it the family name. Alfred Pritchard worked on the railroad and did some contracting.

His son Frank became a printer. He was a printer for 55 years, and his sons Frank Jr. and Joel followed his lead.

"I grew up on Queen Anne Hill, went to John Hay and to Queen Anne High School. My mother went to Queen Anne and my kids went to Queen Anne."

Pritchard says he didn't have any grand ambitions. "My father worked 55 years as a printer. I worked for them for 25 years: Griffin Envelope . . . worked up to where I was running it."

His life has never been a narrow one, however. It has always been full of ideas. "My mother went to the library every Tuesday night and brought home a book for every member of the family. All my life I've been a reader. I read lots of history. It's why I'm so interested in the literacy program."

A copy of Henry Kissinger's latest book lies on the coffee table of the small First Hill condo Pritchard's renting. He's enamored of foreign affairs, deeply fascinated by the

workings of the world. "I just read a history of Spain from 1480-1712." He'd rather talk about that than about his life, but he can be nudged to bring out some more memories.

"I was very lucky to grow up at a time when I did. My father had a good job. I was raised in a very traditional family. You attempt to pass those things on. My parents were very strong and also lots of fun. It was a much easier time for growing up. You knew everybody in the neighborhood. I lived on Magnolia after I married, and I represented Queen Anne and Magnolia.

"You have lots of friends and people you know. It is a great help to anybody in public life to have people they have confidence in, in the community, in all facets of life."

The Pritchard boys

The fact is, Joel Pritchard has always been more than Joel Pritchard. He's part of a team, the not-so-public part of which is his older brother, Frank Jr.

"We worked together in the printing company. He always let me tag along," Frank, who is almost five years older, had an interest in politics. "We used to have great family discussions, and our father would help candidates he liked with free printing."

When Frank started getting involved, so did Joel. "We did a lot of campaigns together. We worked for 10 years helping other people before I ran."

Davidson says, "Frank had the organizational framework aspect of things, which would enable Joel to focus on the people side of things and the conduct of his official duties."

Bill Jacobson, head of the Washington Forest Protection Association, says: "We used to call them the Pritchard boys. They would see something that they thought needed doing or correcting and they'd go to work and make it happen. I don't remember hearing anything negative about them."

"It's critical that people respect you if you are going to be in public life," says Pritchard. "Doesn't mean

they always like you, but they have to respect you."

About the only place Pritchard hasn't been able to hold a coalition together is in marriage. "I'm a two-time loser," he says.

He married his first wife while he was in college, and he dropped out to work. They had a son and three daughters, all spaced two years apart. Three of them were still teenagers when he made his first run at Congress in 1970.

Pritchard met his second wife while he was in D.C. They married 10 years ago, but the marriage didn't last.

This is not a topic he's much interested in exploring. He's a private person in everything but politics.

Pritchard ran for the state House of Representatives in 1958 and defeated the incumbent for the 36th District seat with the help of the networks he'd built while organizing volunteers for other politicians, among them Seattle Mayor Gordon Clinton, U.S. Rep. Thomas Pelly and Gov. Dan Evans.

He won a state Senate seat in 1966, still representing Queen Anne and Magnolia. Then, in 1970 he took on his friend Pelly, who'd served in Congress 18 years with little opposition.

Congress needs new blood, Pritchard said at the time. Pelly reportedly planned to step down after making it an even 20 years and was miffed that his former campaign worker and friend wouldn't wait to run until then. Pelly won, but Pritchard came closer than most people expected.

In 1972, he won an open race for the seat, which serves the heavily Republican 1st Congressional District.

Pritchard made a promise then that he would leave Congress after 12 years. Many people were taken aback in 1985 when he made good on that promise and declined to run for another term.

And some Republicans thought when he ran for lieutenant governor in 1988 that he should have run for

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governor instead.

Pritchard, who was working as a lobbyist for a Seattle law firm, was attracted by the second-chair position, which includes presiding over the Senate. It seemed to fit him, calling as it does for someone who can straddle party lines and encourage consensus.

And now, even though he could have run for a third term — he was already in office when term limits took effect — he'll go out with this term.


Pritchard, who has won a couple

of battles with cancer, still plays a merciless game of tennis, and after he leaves office he plans to fill his time with various kinds of political and community work.

He's stumping for candidates he likes, making speeches, staying involved.

"Being involved in your community makes life so much richer."

At Pritchard Beach, he throws his arms around Frank Jr. and they walk over to cut the ribbon. The Pritchard boys.



Joel Pritchard with his brother, Frank Pritchard Jr.

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During his twelve years in Congress, Joel was always in the minority party, but was so well liked and trusted by members of both parties that he could play an effective role. He organized social events for House members and games like softball and Pickle-Ball. People got used to each other and the Washington delegation began to work on common interests. Joel was the glue that held the delegation together. When he retired after five re-elections, as he had promised before his first election, he came up to talk with me about possible new avenues. He really did not have much support in his family for running for lieutenant governor and we had a long talk over lunch. I told him he would be a natural in that role and could turn the job into a very useful public service. He did run, was elected, and became a very popular lieutenant governor by using his unique talent for bringing people together.

— From the foreword by Jim Ellis